

THE CITY HORSE

London's militia cavalry during the English Civil War, 1642–1660

PAUL SUTTON

Century of the Soldier
1618-1721
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The City Horse

London's militia cavalry during the English Civil War, 1642-1660

Paul Sutton

'This is the Century of the Soldier', Fulvio Testi, Poet, 1641

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Abbreviations

BL	The British Library
CAM	Calendar of Papers relating to the Committee for the Advancement of Money
CSPD	Calendar of State Papers: Domestic
HMC	Historical Manuscripts Commission
JJC	Journal of the Common Council
JHC	Journal of the House of Commons
JHL	Journal of the House of Lords
LMA	The London Metropolitan Archives
NMA	*Reconstructing the New Model Army Vol.1*& *Vol.2*: Wanklyn
ODNB	Oxford Dictionary of National Biography
OPH	The Parliamentary or Constitutional history of England, from the Earliest Times to the Restoration of King Charles II
TT	Thomason Tract Collection, in the King's Library, in the British Library

Conventions and Seventeenth Century Currency

During the seventeenth century, the English used the Old Style [OS] Julian calendar, which was 11 days behind the New Style [NS] Gregorian calendar used in Europe. Throughout this work Old Style dating has been used. In addition, the first day of each year for the English commenced on Lady Day, 25 March and not 1 January, and so the year number of the date of New Year changed on this day also, hence 25 March 1656 was preceded by 24 March 1655. To avoid confusion, all years have been rendered as starting on 1 January.

The spelling used in the contemporary sources have been used throughout, even when these appear incorrect by modern usage and only to avoid significant confusion have individual words been corrected or extended using square brackets [ ]. English sources of the period frequently used the long 's' (an f in appearance) instead of a regular short 's', as well as 'v' instead of 'u' and 'i' instead of 'j'. This spelling has been modernised throughout.

The contemporary symbol for pound sterling was 'l' instead of the modern '£'. The contemporary symbol has been used throughout as has 'd' for penny and 's' for shilling. Twelve pennies made up one shilling, and 20 shillings equalled a pound. A pound thus consisted of 240 pennies.

Preface

The idea for this book took shape in the mid–1980s when, as a young Civil War re-enactor, I was fascinated by all aspects of the war. The Sealed Knot unit that I was first a member of was the much-maligned 'Kent Trayned Bands' and, while I had little understanding of the society's politics that related to that unit, I became interested in the role of the county militias of the seventeenth century as a result. Once I became aware that a body of militia cavalry had been raised in London my curiosity was piqued and I was determined to establish the facts as to who they were and where they served. I was soon frustrated in these efforts, as it seemed nobody had written a book on them. How disappointing. Letting my youthful enthusiasm get the better of me I decided I would write one on the subject, despite not having written before, having no idea how to go about it or even what sources even existed, while also at the same time studying for my A Levels (which I then proceeded to flunk – but I'm not sure the two were connected!)

I approached Dave Ryan at Partizan Press with my idea, and he was his usual enthusiastic and encouraging self, but suggested I speak to Keith Roberts, who at the time was researching London's infantry militia, the Trained Bands. Together Keith and I planned to write this history and we got as far as agreeing which of us would write what sections. (Keith, after all these years I still have our letters on this!) Unfortunately, this grand design came to nothing as we both moved onto other things, which in my case was writing an extremely poor first attempt on the Cromwellian invasion of the West Indies, which Dave thought good enough to publish in 1990. My life then took a different turn as I moved and worked abroad for the next 20 years until moving to Australia in 2009. In Australia I was able to reconnect with my earlier passion of researching and writing, mainly about Australia's involvement in the Great War. As a result of a piece I had published on the Battle of Messines (1917) Charles Singleton from Helion Books approached me to enquire if I was interested in writing a book for them in 2017.

After some discussion it was agreed that I would rewrite (properly this time) my book on the West Indies, which became the two volume study that was published in 2021. At the time I remarked to Charles that after 30 years still nobody had written the history of the City Horse… And so, coming full circle it seems, I have now completed this work and I hope the reader will find it was worth the wait.

As always in authoring a book I received assistance and encouragement along the way. I would like to express my thanks to the staff of the National

Archives and The British Library. Also thank you to whoever digitised the numerous books and manuscripts that I have used extensively online from the comfort of my home in Australia. Certainly, this book would never have materialised without the Internet. My thanks again to Charles Singleton for his support and encouragement and to Stephen Ede-Borrett and Keith Roberts for the various discussions, advice, and suggestions. I would like to thank Stephen Ede-Borrett for his generous donation of the colour plates of the City Horse cornets produced by the late Dr Les Prince and to Anderson Subtil for producing the others. Thank you also to Seán Ó Brógáin for his excellent illustrations. Last, and by no means least, to my family for their forbearance – Stuart and Jamie my sons and Kanya, my wife, who still is, and always has been, my rock.

Queensland,
26 January 2023.

Cry God for Harry, England, and St George!

Introduction

For the first two years of the English Civil War that had erupted in the summer of 1642, the military forces of Parliament had generally struggled to contain the dominance of the Royalist forces of King Charles I. London had been transformed into the nexus of the Parliamentary war effort providing money, recruits and munitions that kept Parliament's military hopes alive. By 1644 the military situation was slowly turning in its favour as the resources that the capital and its population could provide began to tell. That year London was able to deploy two separate regiments of auxiliary cavalry, as well as some independent troops, in defence of the capital and Parliament. These units were militia, part-time soldiers, who were mobilised as military necessity dictated. That year the London militia cavalry were in constant service, a reminder of how dire the Parliamentary cause still was, and these civilians endured a great deal of hardship, with many losing their lives, as they served in the main field armies across southern England. In fact, they had been serving since the autumn of 1642, from the beginning of the conflict, and were to remain in service, in differing forms, until the political upheaval known to history as the English Revolution concluded in May 1660 with the restoration of monarchy. The aim of this book is to document and illustrate the formation, organisation, deployment, equipping, and financing of these various London militia cavalry units, commonly referred to as the City Horse, during this period. A particular emphasis has been placed throughout the book on the relationship between the City Horse and the political/military events of the day, illustrating how these events influenced both the raising and deployment of these various units of cavalry. The City Horse, for the purposes of this book, are defined as units of cavalry recruited at the behest and control of the government of the City of London and not the units of regular cavalry raised by Parliament within the confines of London and surrounding areas. The difference is subtle but important. The City Horse were never intended to be full-time units (though some became so) for they were envisaged to consist of citizen volunteers, deployed for a specific purpose for a limited duration. These units included the individual troops raised within the City of London at the end of 1642, which were regimented shortly afterwards and that served, with the permission of the City's Militia Committee, in the field armies of Parliament throughout the First Civil War. They also include the supernumerary, volunteer and *reformado* cavalry raised in the City during the heady summer of 1647, as well as those forces constituted by the various

Commonwealth and Protectorate governments in their attempts to settle the national militia prior to the Restoration of Charles II in 1660.

Today London is the sprawling megalopolis of suburbs, boroughs and local government authorities that has spread for tens of miles either side of the River Thames, but during the seventeenth century it was more geographically compact and politically more clearly defined. Throughout this work the City of London (or simply the City) is defined as the 26 wards, both inside and outside of the defensive walls, which were then governed by the Courts of Aldermen, Common Council and Common Hall. When the term London is used it means the modern geographic area of the City, Westminster, and Southwark. The *City and Liberty of Westminster* was then a separate authority governed by the Westminster Court of Burgesses, which comprised the suburbs between the western wall of the City and the land around Westminster Abbey, land that had previously been administered by the Church prior to the dissolution of the monasteries in 1585, and which in fact was an autonomous part of the county of Middlesex. Southwark, on the River Thames to the south of the City, which due to both its proximity to the City and the fact that London Bridge spanned the river here, had grown into an urban overflow of the City. Though technically part of the county of Surrey the City had purchased some Crown land there in the sixteenth century that had created the Ward of Bridge Without. However, this Ward was administered separately from the other 26 and elected no representatives to the City government. Furthermore, as it is never referred to in any of the records that mention the City Horse it will be referred to simply as Southwark in this work. The rest of the Southwark area, notorious for its lawlessness, was governed through the local manor courts of the Hundred of Brixton in the county of Surrey.

A Liberty, according to medieval English law, was a territory where the normal regalian right of the country did not apply and where governance was in the hands of a mesne lord, which could be an individual or a borough. Perhaps the two most significant examples of such in the country were the County Palatine of Durham and the Duchy of Lancaster, in which large swathes of the country were governed not by the King but proxies. These Liberties were normally granted based on land tenure rather than contiguous geographical territory and were formed because of an agreement with the Crown to devolve authority locally. For various historical reasons there were numerous small Liberties in and around London. Both Inner and Middle Temple, while geographically within the City of London, were Liberties and were self-governed and formed no part of the City government. The Liberty of the Tower of London consisted of the Royal fortress commonly referred to as the Tower, as well as land owned by it within and outside of the City walls. The Constable of the Tower effectively ran its local government. The Duchy of Lancaster lands within Westminster were an assortment of parishes and manors clustered to the south of the present Strand and which were frequently collectively known as the Liberty of the Savoy. Even the area now known as Westminster was a Liberty in the seventeenth century. Each of these Liberties had varying degrees of autonomy, based on the extent of the devolution granted by the monarch at their creation and subsequently


N
New Artillery Ground
Spitalfields
County of Middlesex
County of Middlesex
Smithfield
Cripplegate
Moorgate
Aldersgate
Newgate
Bishopsgate
The Guildhall
Cheapside Cross
Ludgate
Temple Bar
St. Paul's Cathederal
The Exchange
Aldgate
Postern Gate
The Tower Hamlets
Tower of London
River Thames
Charing Cross
Southwark
Palace of Whitehall
County of Surrey
Palace of Westminster
Westminster Abbey
City Wall
Gates
Boundary of the City of London (approximate)
0
¼
½
¾
1 mile

Map 1: London c.1642

thereafter and so it would be inaccurate to describe the area that is today known a London as a homogeneous region under a single governmental authority.

The Bills of Mortality were a non-governmental area that consisted of parishes within the City, Westminster, and Southwark as well as some that were farther afield but surrounding London on both sides of the Thames and which collectively reported the numbers of burials within each parish over a given period (normally weekly). The number of burials, as well as cause of death, was reported to the Worshipful Company of Parish Clerks who subsequently had the results published and are thus an invaluable source on mortality in and around London. In 1643 Parliament ordered the construction of a defensive perimeter that encircled the City, Westminster, Southwark and which also included within it parts of Surrey and Middlesex. These defences were subsequently referred to as the Lines of Communication. Both were artificially created areas that crossed boundaries of traditional government over much of which the City had no legal authority, but as will be seen later, would play a role in the politics that was to dominate the region and impact the role played by the City Horse. Map One shows the extent of the City and its environs at the outbreak of the Civil War.

The City of London, because of the wealth created by its position as the paramount trading and commercial centre of the Kingdom, had been granted various rights and privileges from Kings well before the Norman Conquest. These rights were affirmed by William the Conqueror in 1066 and by subsequent Kings who added to them over time, normally because of complex negotiations that invariably included the City providing the Crown with loans, taxes, or outright pecuniary gifts. Over time the City had developed almost total independence from the Crown with an inclusive government based on wealth and personal status and it jealously guarded these rights and privileges. Each of the City wards appointed an Alderman who was the chief representative of the ward within the City government, who were normally appointed for life and who presided over the ward-mote, the local court that dispensed justice within the ward. The Aldermen formed the Court of Aldermen which, prior to 1642, was the primary decision making body in the City and which elected one of their fellows to be Lord Mayor of the City of London, for a term of 12 months. An Alderman for a certain ward was always to be nominated by another Alderman and then elected by the Court, which for the most part consisted of the most influential and affluent of the City's citizens and was thus very much a closed shop, into which outsiders, or the newly wealthy, found it hard to gain admittance. Each of the wards was subdivided into precincts, whose freemen elected other freemen to serve on the Court of Common Council of the City and which gave an opportunity for these precluded from the Court of Aldermen to play some role in City governance. The size of the Court of Common Council varied over time but in the mid–seventeenth century it numbered at least 230 persons who were responsible to disburse City funds, manage City owned land as well as a host of minor responsibilities relating the running of the City. Crucially, it also had the right to amend the traditional constitution of the City. The Court of Common Hall was an occasional gathering of all the freemen of the City at which the office holders of the City were elected, and which traditionally also elected the Members of Parliament that the City sent to Westminster. In all three instances, they were the exclusive reserve for Freemen of the City of London, that is individuals who were wealthy and connected sufficiently to be granted this status by their peers, without which status nobody was allowed to trade or undertake any commerce in the City. Notably apprentices, women and the bulk of the City's population found themselves excluded from being granted the status of freeman and so had little influence in the government in the City in which they lived.[1]

This book has been divided into four unequal sections. The first section, this Introduction, outlines the aim of the book and then provides a brief overview of London in the seventeenth century along with some definitions of the more unique and complex terms of institutions that constituted the City government. It will seek to place the City Horse within the current military and political historiography and by doing so will expose the gap that this present work seeks to fill. It will then critically assess the primary sources that have survived the ravages of time that relate the London's militia cavalry that, while numerous, are also frustratingly limiting.

The second section commences with Chapter One, and provides the political context for the events of 1641/1642 in London that led directly to Civil War. More importantly, it explains how the political revolution within the City created the militant Militia Committee by whom the initial troops of horse were raised in the autumn of 1642, and which are then described in Chapter Two. Chapters Three and Four describe the formation of Colonel Edmund Harvey's regiment and how it was deployed in the campaigns of 1643 and 1644. The radical political climate during the summer of 1643 is explored in Chapter Five along with the various attempts of London radicals to establish their own army, which in turn led to the formation of Colonel Richard Turner's regiment late that year, and whose activities up to 1646 are described fully in Chapter Six. In Chapter Seven, Richard Browne's small force of City Horse that formed part of the Abingdon garrison in 1644–1646 are introduced, while Chapter Eight charts the establishment and deployment of a new London brigade of cavalry and dragoons between 1645 and 1646. Chapter Nine once again turns to the evolving political situation, this time in 1647, as Parliament and City headed on a collision course with the now victorious New Model Army. It describes the attempts of London to establish its own army to counter the New Model and in which the City Horse were once again destined to play a role, but which was to end in political disaster when the army occupied the capital. Chapter Ten then describes the events surrounding the outbreak of the Second Civil War and the dual role that the elements of auxiliary cavalry in London played in attempting both to subdue Royalist activities within the City but also subvert the army's continued occupation of the capital. In 1650 a third civil war erupted and once again formations of City Horse were raised and played their role in the fighting to come, culminating in their involvement at the Battle of Worcester (1651), which is described in Chapter Eleven. Chapter Twelve begins with the role of the City Horse during the Interregnum and their attempts to quell yet more Royalist uprisings and ends with the City Horse under the command of Richard Browne providing a guard of honour during the emotional entry of Charles II into London in May 1660.

---

[1] For a more detailed description of contemporary London and the evolution of its rights and privileges see John Stow, *A Survay of London Contayning the originall, antiquity, increase, moderne estate, and description of that citie, written in the year 1598*, (London,1599); Reginald R Sharpe (ed.), *London and the Kingdom: A History Derived Mainly from the Archives at Guildhall in the Custody of the Corporation of the City of London*, Vol.1, (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1894); Reginald R Sharpe (ed.), *London and the Kingdom: A History Derived Mainly from the Archives at Guildhall in the Custody of the Corporation of the City of London*, Vol. 2, (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1894); G. V. Chivers, The City Of London and the State, 1658–1664, University of Manchester, 1961) pp.4–14; Valerie Pearl, *London and the outbreak of the* Puritan revolution: City government and national politics, 1625–43, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) pp.9–68.

In Part Two, Chapter Thirteen explains the various attempts that were made to provide the City Horse units with mounts and weaponry between 1642 and 1646, as well as the problems of resupply and wastage. In Chapter Fourteen the complex arrangement for financing the cavalry is examined in some detail while Chapter Fifteen examines the command and control structure that evolved to lead the City Horse in battle. The officers are identified, and their effectiveness analysed. A Conclusion then follows which recaps the role of the City Horse and provides a statement as to their overall value and effectiveness during this critical period of English history and what legacy they left behind them. The Biographies at the back of the book describe the lives of 16 of the leading officers and their backgrounds but with an emphasis on both their religious and political activities. This present work concludes with four appendices. The first two analyse the record books of the commissioners responsible for raising cavalry militia units in both 1642 and 1645. These detailed books list the names and addresses of Londoners who volunteered in 1642 to provide funds to raise the first troops and those who were forced into doing the same in 1645. This analysis provides a fascinating insight to the willing, and unwilling, support Londoners provided to support their City Horse. The third appendix illustrates an intriguing link between the City Horse and a surviving seventeenth century cavalry cornet displayed in a church in the village of Bromsberrow in Gloucestershire. The fourth appendix lists and describes all the known instances of drawings or descriptions of City Horse cornets that still exist. I hope the reader will enjoy this culmination of many years work.

Much has been written about the period known variously as the English Civil War or English Revolution in the three and a half centuries since its bloody events tore the nation apart in the middle of the seventeenth century. Stalwarts such as C.V. Wedgwood's *The King's Peace 1637–1641* and *The King's War 1641–1647* or Peter Young and Richard Holmes' *The English Civil War: A Military History of the Three Civil Wars, 1642–1651*[2] have stood the test of time, and remain invaluable sources of background detail of the events that occurred. Since Brigadier Peter Young did much to bring the military history of the wars to a wider audience during the 1970s, in both his books and battlefield re-enactments, historians (amateur and professional alike) have produced a vast array of literature on such topics as regimental histories, battles, armies, tactics, organisation, financing and much more besides. The booklets produced by Partizan Press in the 1980s and '90s were a cornucopia of detail of all things military and still remain very much of interest, as do their later works and those now published by Helion Books and Pen and Sword Publications. Similarly much has been published about the armies of the day, starting with C. H. Firth's *Cromwell's Army*[3], Young and Emberton's *The Cavalier Army*[4] and including Firth and Godfrey Davis' monumental *The Regimental History of Cromwell's Army*.[5] The latter has now been supplemented by Keith Robert's *Cromwell's War Machine: the New Model Army, 1645–1660*[6] and Malcolm Wanklyn's two volume *Reconstructing the New Model Army*.[7] Clive Holmes's groundbreaking study of the Eastern Association and its army[8] has yet to be replicated for the other Parliamentary armies, though unit histories and officer lists abound. However, despite this plethora of publications strangely extraordinarily little in depth research on the militia of the seventeenth century has appeared in print.

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[2] C.V. Wedgwood, *The King's War 1641–1647*, (Collins Fontana:1973); C.V. Wedgwood, *The King's Peace 1647–1641*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956); Peter and Holmes Young, Richard, *The English Civil War: A Military History of the Three Civil Wars, 1642–1651*, (London: Eyre Methuen, 1974).

Unfortunately, nobody has expanded upon Lindsay Bonyton's *Elizabethan Militia 1558–1638*[9] to study the role of the national militia during the civil wars, a study which is long overdue.[10] The notable exception to this is Lawson Nagel's formative work on the London militia, which unfortunately ends in 1649.[11] Less notable, however, was Emberton's *Skippon's Brave Boys*,[12] which while a readable narrative of the role of the London Trained Bands lacked Nagel's analysis and was poorly referenced. A fuller scholarly work on the role of the national militia throughout the Civil War period waits to be written. Not surprisingly then that the City Horse fail to appear within the historiography in any meaningful way. Baring Keith Roberts's brief article on the Maiden Troops[13] and John Tincey's analytical article entitled 'Armed Complete'[14] the corpus of civil war publications is devoid of anything specifically related the City Horse. It is true that they make cameo appearances in both Nagel's work and in also in Gavin Robinson's informative research on the provision of horses to the Parliamentary armies[15] but both works' focus remained elsewhere. With this in mind it is hoped this present volume will fill the void within the historiography.

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[3] Charles Harding Firth, *Cromwell's army: a history of the English soldier during the Civil Wars, the Commonwealth and the Protectorate*, (London: Methuen & Co, 1902).

[4] Peter Young and Wilfred Emberton, *The Cavalier Army*, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1974).

[5] Charles Harding Firth and Godfrey Davis, *The Regimental History of Cromwell's Army*, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1940).

[6] Keith Roberts, *Cromwell's War Machine: the New Model Army, 1645–1660*, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2005).

[7] Malcolm Wanklyn, *Reconstructing the New Model Army*, 2 volumes, (Solihull: Helion & Company Limited, 2015).

[8] Clive Holmes, *The Eastern Association in the English Civil War*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

[9] Linsday Boynton, *The Elizabethan Militia 1558–1638*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967).

[10] At time of writing have been unable to read the recent volume by Peter Leadbetter, *The Perfect Militia: The Stuart Trained Bands of England and Wales 1603–1642*, (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2021), which promises partially to fill this gap in the historiography.

[11] Lawson Chase Nagel, 'The Militia of London, 1641–1649'. (Phd, King's College London, 1982).

[12] Wilfred Emberton, *Skippon's Brave Boys: The Origin, Development and Civil War Service of London's Trained Bands*, (Buckingham: Barracuda Books, 1984).

As has already been noted this work, although the subject is primarily military history, is inextricably linked to the politics of the period. These political machinations were both complex and confusing. To fully comprehend them a broad array of secondary works have be consulted. For an overview of London on the eve of the civil war and to explain the constitutional revolution that engulfed the City in late 1641 and early 1642 Valerie Pearl's *London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution*[16] has been widely utilised. To understand further the early political situation Keith Lindley's *Popular Politics and Religion in Civil War London*[17] and David Como's *Radical Parliamentarians and the English Civil War*[18] were both useful. J. H. Hexter's *The reign of King Pym*[19] was used extensively in writing the sections relating to 1643, Mark Kishlansky's *The Rise of the New Model Army*[20] for the events of 1647 (as indeed was Pearl's essay *London's Counter Revolution*[21]) and David Underdown's *Pride's Purge: Politics in the Puritan Revolution*[22] for the army *putsch* of 1648. Also invaluable was Robert Brenner's excellent *Merchants and Revolution*[23] that shed much light not just upon radical politics but also the connections between the City Horse and the merchant community of London. Other works, both primary and secondary sources, consulted or cited are listed in the extensive bibliography at the rear of the book.

Compared to other military formations that served during the civil war there is an abundance of primary source material still extant that relate to the City Horse, but even so this material is limited in nature and frustratingly fragmentary in coverage. The majority of this material covers the units that served during the First Civil War and from which a considerable amount can be gleaned of Edmund Harvey's regiment and, to a lesser extent, Richard Turner's. Snippets exist that relate to Richard Browne's Abingdon force while a more extensive collection of material remains regarding the regiments raised in 1645. However, after this almost nothing but brief mentions in official letters or newsprint exist for the entire period from 1647 until 1660, the exception being the first half of 1660 when once again the extant sources are able to revive our knowledge of the City Horse.

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[13] Keith Roberts, 'Maiden Troops', *English Civil War Notes and Queries*, No. 12, Leigh-on-Sea, undated.

[14] John Tincey, 'Armed Complete: How the Well Dressed Parliamentarian Cavalryman Protected Himself in 1642', *English Civil War Times*, No. 55, 1998.

[15] G Robinson, 'Horse Supply in the English Civil War', (Phd, University of Reading, 2001); G. Robinson, *Horses, People and Parliament in the English Civil War: Extracting Resources and Constructing Allegiance*, (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2012).

[16] Pearl, *London*.

[17] Keith Lindley, *Popular Politics and Religion in Civil War London*, (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1997).

[18] D. R. Como, *Radical Parliamentarians and the English Civil War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

[19] J. H. Hexter, *The Reign of King Pym*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961).

[20] M.A. Kishlansky, *The Rise of the New Model Army*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

[21] Valerie Pearl, 'London's Counter Revolution', in G. E. Aylmer (ed.),*The Interregnum: the Quest for Settlement, 1646–1660*, (London: Macmillan, 1972).

[22] David Underdown, *Pride's Purge : Politics in the Puritan Revolution*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).

[23] Robert Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550–1653*, (Princéton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

The vast majority of surviving source material in manuscript form relating to the City Horse is to be found at the National Archives in the Commonwealth Exchequer Papers (SP28).[24] On first sight these various documents seem to be muster rolls, lists of payments for equipment or soldier's pay. However, this is deceptive. The vast majority of those used in this present work were produced, often sometime after the transactions they describe, when the unit's officers were required to justify to the government Accounts Committee how they had spent the money provided to them and to ensure that money, horses and equipment had not been embezzled. The 'accounts' were submitted by individual officers for the money and equipment provided to them personally and for which they were responsible for disbursement or recording loss. While they shed fascinating insight into such matters as horse wastage, equipment issuance and loss, and often include lengthy lists of trooper's names and pay dates, they cannot be treated as a comprehensive list of everything received or spent by a particular unit, nor even necessarily an accurate list of such expenditure. Not every troop commander who must have received money or horses have surviving accounts in the Exchequer Papers collection and those that do are not necessarily complete, as few span the full duration of the troop's deployment. Most relate to money received from the main army treasurers but there are few attempts to justify money received from other sources, such as that which came from the Militia Committee directly. Some accounts, like those for Harvey's own troop, were submitted more than once, but why is unclear. The accounts for the money that Turner disbursed when raising his regiment are particularly detailed and informative, but they only cover the period of his command, barely four months. Thereafter, little survives for the regiment even though it existed for a further three years in varying forms. Much use has been used of these manuscripts to reconstruct various aspects of the units concerned but the purpose of their creation and their limitations ought to be recognised. It is indeed unfortunate that very few records that were produced when the City Horse was actually in the field, and which do not carry the tint of some bias have survived.[25] The exceptions to this are the revealing accounts of the army's horse commissioners, which are examined in detail in Appendices One and Two.

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[24] Those used in this work are detailed throughout the text and in the bibliography at the end of the book.

[25] For a more detailed critique of these sources see Robinson, 'Horse Supply in the English Civil War', pp.243–254.

Particularly frustrating for the historian is the lack of surviving material that must have been produced by the powerful Militia Committee. Numerous letters to the Committee survive in the printed State Paper collections and scattered letters and orders from the Committee appear in assorted locations, but no comprehensive corpus of committee material exists. The exception to this is the detailed minutes of the Committee for 1660. These records include officer lists, movement orders, pay records and much more besides. That similar records prior to this year no longer exist is curious. Surely similar meticulous records were produced from 1642 onwards and they must have provided similar insight into both the workings of this little understood committee but also on its relationship with the City Horse. In fact, the complete absence of these records today suggests that nefarious motives were at play to conspire for their destruction, possibly on the eve of the army's occupation of the capital in 1647 or prior to the Restoration in 1660 (or perhaps both!). The 1660 minutes illustrate the extent to which members of the Committee, all of whom were influential members of the City elite, were involved in the defence of London and, by extension, their opposition to first the army and secondly the newly restored monarch. The contents might have been politically embarrassing to individuals whose positions of wealth and status required them to remain on amicable terms with whoever dominated the national politics. While there is no evidence to support the contention that these compromising documents were systematically destroyed it is certainly within the bounds of possibility. Whatever the reason their absence has greatly circumscribed what can be learnt about the City Horse.

Despite the previous neglect by historians of the role played by the City Horse and the numerous limitations of the sources, London's militia cavalry played a significant role throughout the two decades that comprised the English Revolution. It might be true that in none of their engagements did they cover themselves with martial glory, indeed few units of the period can be said to have done that, but they did serve, fight and in numerous cases died, for a cause that the individual soldiers might, or might not, have believed in. For this reason alone their service needs to be remembered and recognised. This then is the story of the City Horse.



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London Politics and the Road to War

On 4 January 1642 the House of Commons granted the government of the City of London the authority to control their own militia, a prerogative traditionally held by the English Crown.[1] This abolition of the sovereign's right to control the military forces of London had eventuated from the argument between the House of Commons and King Charles over who had the authority to command the armed forces of the nation, which itself was part of a greater power struggle between the Crown and Parliament, a dispute which ultimately led to the outbreak of the English Civil War during the summer of 1642. It was no coincidence that Parliament decreed this transfer of power on the same day that Charles, in a spectacular political miscalculation, had attempted (and failed) to arrest five Members of Parliament for what he perceived to be treason. The revolutionary nature of this was magnified as it was to Common Council that this authority was granted rather than the traditional primary organ of City government, the Court of Aldermen or to the Lord Mayor. This was an entirely revolutionary and unprecedented act, all the more surprising for that until recently it seemed that the City government was dominated and controlled by individuals who supported the King in this power struggle, rather than Parliament. Furthermore it was this revolutionary event to which the origins of the City Horse, London's militia cavalry, can be traced.

How King Charles I managed to lose the support of the City of London in his struggle with Parliament has been debated frequently by historians and it is beyond the scope of this work to provide anything more than a cursory explanation. But it is important to put this into the context of the political events of the time to explain why the City Horse was established. Charles had been in a constant state of friction with his various Parliaments since his ascension to the throne in 1625, as he had sought to rule the country without the fetters that Parliament was determined to impose upon him. Charles made constant errors of judgement in his dealings with Parliament throughout his reign as he tried to finance his grandiose lifestyle and doomed military forays abroad. Parliament attempted to use the flow of funds that it controlled as leverage against the King to uphold the traditional privileges of Parliament and to force greater political concessions from the unwilling monarch. Charles had attempted to rule England without a Parliament for 11 years after 1629 but this just exacerbated his financial problems and alienated much of the Country towards him. In religious matters he allowed the unpopular Archbishop Laud to undo many of the previous reforms in the Church of England, making many across the nation fearful that he was prepared to force Catholicism upon the country, a fear only reinforced by his marriage to the French Catholic, Henrietta Maria, and his use of numerous outwardly Catholic advisers. War broke out with Scotland in 1639, and again in 1640, when Charles tried to force the Book of Common Prayer upon the mainly Presbyterian population but without a Parliament to provide the funds for the war it ended in defeat and humiliation. Charles called a Parliament in 1640 to secure more funding but those elected officials demanded the settlement of their political grievances before they would consider money for the cash-strapped monarch. This 'Short Parliament' was soon dissolved but the King's parlous finances forced him to call another Parliament in late 1640.

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[1] LMA, Vol. 40, *Journals of the Common Council*, Vol. 40, f.11.

This Parliament was also in no mood to grant the King the revenues he desired until an extensive list of grievances had been met, including the right of Parliament to appoint the King's advisers, have a greater role in the government of the nation as well as financial and religious reforms. The proud and arrogant Charles was unable to accept that Parliament could infringe upon his prerogative to rule and so the scene was set for a showdown between the monarch and his supporters and a Parliamentary opposition, which included men such as John Pym, John Hampden, Denzil Holles in the House of Commons and nobles such as the Earls of Essex and of Warwick and Viscount Saye and Sele, in the House of Lords. As the politics fractured the population began taking sides and the rift between the two widened as neither party was prepared to compromise or back down. London, the largest and wealthiest city in the land, was as divided in this argument as the rest of the country, as sides were drawn. The City had long benefited from a cosy relationship with the Crown, which granted it privilege, rights and concessions that allowed the merchants and traders to amass tremendous wealth, which in turn was used to provide loans and gifts to the sovereign. Despite this lucrative relationship there were many in London that resented the King's heavy-handed approach to governance and his lack of tolerance to anything but the established Church of England. A small but wealthy and influential body of merchants, traders and radical Puritan preachers found common ground with the Parliamentary opposition and were prepared to both support it and make their own demands upon the Crown. By 1641 London was bitterly divided as a militant opposition coalesced and took to the streets demanding reform, greater religious toleration and manifesting their support for their brethren in Parliament. Despite this the King had good reason to suppose that he could rely upon the City of London, controlled by a conservative elite, to support him in his wrangling with Parliament.

Traditionally, City governance rested upon a triumvirate of three executive bodies: the Court of Aldermen (also referred to as the Aldermanic Bench), the Court of Common Council and the Court of Common Hall. Of these, the most important was the Court of Aldermen, an exclusive body that contained the most affluent and therefore most influential of London's citizens. The Aldermen considered and decided all matters of concern regarding the well-being of the City, they were the City Judges, Justices of the Peace and filled the most important committees, such as those that raised revenue and administered the land owned by the City. New Aldermen, who for the most part were members of Livery Companies in the City, were chosen for life in each ward by those citizens that paid 'scot and lot' through a process of patronage, relationship and recommendation. Being entirely closed to outsiders it was a bastion of conservatism, self-interest and a natural ally of a monarchy that provided the monopoly of trade from which its members greatly benefited.

The Aldermen saw themselves as the protectors of the City's privilege, tradition, commerce and wealth. Crucially, it was the Court of Aldermen that also appointed the Lord Mayor on an annual basis, who ordinarily was an Alderman, and it was through him that the day-to-day government of the City was conducted. The Lord Mayor thus was the pinnacle of governance and the role carried with it enormous influence and prestige, but the Lord Mayor was also the mouthpiece through which the City was able to communicate directly with both Parliament and the Sovereign, on matters of interest to the City. Not surprisingly wealth was the main determining factor that promoted a merchant to the exclusive Aldermanic Bench. As most City commerce was dominated by either the Livery Companies or overseas trading enterprises, such as the East India and the Levant Companies that traded with the Near East, or the Merchant Adventures who monopolised the export of English wool to Europe, most of the Aldermen had their origins in these fields. As the wealth and status of these institutions relied significantly upon Royal patronage it is of no surprise that these influential individuals were inherently conservative by nature and they were predisposed, for the most part, to naturally support the King in his struggle with Parliament.[2]

The Court of Common Council acted as the City's legislature, which considered and instigated the myriad of rules and ordinances required to run the largest city in the Kingdom. Its members were selected from the citizens of the individual wards, through a not entirely democratic process overseen by the Aldermen and was a system that was susceptible to abuse, bribery, and fraud. The contested elections of December 1641 for Common Council illustrated clearly how the process could be manipulated by the Aldermen to stifle the growing opposition to their self-interest. Common Council, consisting of in excess of 230 members, only met at the Lord Mayor's convenience and any propositions put forward could be vetoed by the Court of Aldermen, giving it little real power other than what the Aldermen allowed it. With a broader and less exclusive membership base, Common Council provided a platform for individuals of less stature, influence and wealth to participate in the City government, but it also provided an opportunity for those members of the City that felt marginalised or excluded to meet and informally discuss their grievances, and so could, and did, become a place where dissent could germinate and grow.[3]

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[2] Pearl, *London*, pp.59–62.

The Court of Common Hall consisted of all free citizens of London (over 4,000 in 1642) who met annually, upon instruction of the Lord Mayor, to appoint civic officers for the coming year. Additionally, it provided two nominations for the post of Lord Mayor from which the Aldermen selected their preferred candidate, and they also appointed the Members of Parliament that the City provided to Westminster. Perhaps the most democratic of the City institutions it was certainly less easy to manipulate due to the large numbers of members but as its role in government was minimal, it seemed to pose no real threat to the dominance of the Aldermen in City governance in 1640, but it was through Common Hall that dissent within the City was initially channelled.[4]

London, with such a large and disparate population, had historically always been a melting pot of ideas as well as a reservoir of discontent for those excluded from the politics of the nation. It was also an incubator of new religious ideas and practices that frequently challenged the accepted religious boundaries set by the State. It was therefore no surprise then that elements of the City's population supported the challenges to the authority of the King throughout the 1620s and 1630s, and for the most part this support came from the disenfranchised and disenchanted elements excluded from City governance. Most of the population of London had no influence in the government of either the City or the nation and so had no say in the discussion and settlement of matters that directly impacted their lives, such as taxation, war, governance or religion. There were many, however, that were wealthy and politically ambitious and who resented their exclusion from these corridors of power. Throughout the seventeenth century an emerging class of educated, wealthy and ambitious men had formed, predominantly comprising individuals involved or connected to the growing colonial commerce with England's newly established colonies in the New World, many of whom also challenged the monopolies exercised by the overseas trading companies through continued interloping trading activities with Europe and beyond.

This colonial trade was not monopolised and controlled by Royal Charter and so was less dependent on royal patronage, while for the most part it was ignored by the wealthiest of London's citizens who preferred to focus on the simpler, but more profitable, monopolistic trade with Europe and the Near East. These 'New Merchants' that had found their niche in colonial commerce were for the most part excluded from positions of authority within the City. The commercial success of the 'New Merchants' was based on their ingenuity, initiative, flexibility, and creativity as they carved out lucrative businesses from scratch without the assistance and patronage that was available to the more traditional merchants in London. The 'New Merchants' with their connections to America and Europe, were also amenable to innovative ideas and original thought on how the government of nations could be achieved and were pioneers in developing new models of governance in the colonies with which they were so intimately connected. Wealthy and ambitious but excluded from traditional participation in government they were a natural political opposition to the governance of the nation and the City as they desired and schemed to gain admittance to government. Their non-traditional lives led them to nonconformist ways in religion as well, which in turn led them to revile against the established Church of England, which many feared was little better than Roman Catholicism, a view only reinforced by the support King Charles gave to Archbishop Laud in his attempts to strip away many of the reformed practices of the English Church and to restrict non-established worship in London.[5]

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[3] *Ibid.*, pp.53–58.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp.50–53.

These 'New Merchants', along with the lesser traders and shopkeepers of the City who also felt excluded and marginalised from the political and religious debates of the day, found natural allies with the Parliamentary opposition to the policies of King Charles throughout his reign. For the past few decades, many members of the political opposition were also colonial entrepreneurs who had collaborated with the 'New Merchants' in colonial ventures in the Americas and the West Indies. These grandee colonial entrepreneurs like the Earl of Warwick, Lord Saye and Sele and lesser gentry such as John Pym, John Hampden, Oliver St John and their associates, had developed deep-rooted relationships of trust and mutual self-interest with the 'New Merchants', many of whom shared their own political and religious views. These pre-Civil War relationships were to blossom into political alliance once conflict broke out and provided a crucial link between the Parliamentary opposition and the City of London. This political, commercial, and religious alignment was to form the basis for the City of London's support to the Parliamentary cause during the revolution that was to engulf the capital and nation over the next two decades. It also led to the establishment of a new form of City government, shorn of conservative values and vested interest, which would allow the City to play a leading military role in the Civil War on the side of the Parliament, especially before 1646, and one that would impact the use of City forces and also the City Horse.

The 'New Merchants' and their associates held little love for the *status quo* in the City and were seen by many as radicals, in both political and religious outlook. This was not a homogeneous political movement however, nor did they all share the same religious affiliations and beliefs, but they were united in their opposition to the government and in their desire to bring about both religious and political change to further their own self-interest. The desires of the 'New Merchants' and their allies found common ground with other sections of London society. While the developing conflict was in no way a class struggle those at the bottom of the society pile were perennially unhappy with their lot in life: many hoped for some social, religious, and political reform to ease the burdens of their lives and so were also natural allies of the radicals that were forming around the 'New Merchants'. The apprentices, labourers, and artisans of London were a fertile breeding ground of dissent and were attracted to ideals of revolution or radical change and were easily manipulated into demonstrating on the streets. Many of these were also nonconformist in their religious views and were easily influenced by the more extreme religious preachers who served as a link between them and the 'New Merchants' led opposition in the capital. Preachers in some parishes across London openly questioned and challenged the State view on organised religion and demanded greater toleration for those who held dissenting views.[6]

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[5] Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, pp.3–195.

Historically the governments of Kings James and Charles had refrained from wholesale reform of the established Church of the Elizabethan Settlement, which had retained the pre-Reformation Episcopal structure of bishops, priests and parishes. In this State supported structure there was no room for toleration or challenge to the established order and the persecution of deviants was often pursued. The vast majority of the national population were probably quite happy with this arrangement and were more concerned with their every day's lives rather than challenging the established religious order. However, many of these aspects of the established Church of England ran counter to what many of the Puritans, of whatever hue, believed. Presbyterians welcomed a national church structure with a controlled clergy but wanted lay elders to be involved in both parochial and disciplinary matters and they despised the bishops and their worldly interference. The Presbyterians were generally politically moderate by nature and while many hoped for political reform of the government there were few extreme radicals amongst their ranks. In addition to these a broader spectrum of more radical believers including Congregationalists, Independents, separatists, and sectaries all abhorred the notion of a regulated and State controlled Church, but in 1642 they were certainly a minority in the country. For them, the individual ought to be allowed to choose how they found God and they encouraged non-ordained preachers to spread the Word. They rejected the traditional church structure and welcomed the gathering of the Godly whenever, and wherever, they chose. At a political level, the Presbyterians in the nation and in London broadly supported the political opposition of Pym and his associates and were able to lend both their influence and wealth to the tussle with the King. Those who preferred the gathered church concept in 1642 were a small minority and while supportive of Parliament's political agenda were far from a dominant force within the opposition movement, being more concerned with spiritual rather than temporal matters.

The Congregationalists saw little hope that reform of the church would occur while King Charles and Archbishop Laud were controlling the Church of England. In order to practice as they wished many had fled abroad, to the Netherlands or the American colonies, where they faced no religious oppression while those that remained in England attempted to develop their practices as best they could. While they were still a minority of the population, the 1630s saw a spread of gathered churches across London that were independent of each other, and which developed as their members sought fit based on their interpretations of the Bible. As congregationalism spread, the gathered churches forged links with other congregations across London and other parts of the country, creating a network of support for likeminded groups with whom they could share ideas. Many of these individuals sympathised with the political opposition and it was only natural that these networks helped to spread ideas of political significance as well, encouraged by radical preachers such as Peter Goodwin, Hugh Peter and William Walwyn. These networks were also able to distribute printed tracts of radical ideas and arguments that came from illegal printing presses, many of them owned by non-conformists. As political and religious opposition merged after 1640 these radicals in London used printed petitions circulated through these informal networks to garner support for the reform programmes.[7]

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[6] *Ibid.*, pp.199–389.

By late 1641, London was in a political turmoil. The political opposition to the King in Parliament was supported by an informal alliance of City Presbyterians hoping for religious reform, merchants looking for financial advantage and retention of their commercial privilege, and 'New Merchants' hoping for opportunities to encroach upon the more established trade of the Livery Companies and overseas trading monopolies. Individuals of an entirely more radical nature, egged on by firebrand preachers and illicit publications, were becoming increasingly more assertive and demonstrative, and they found support in the excluded classes of society in the form of the City apprentices and ordinary inhabitants, who were gaining little from the *status quo*. Each group was looking for advantage but few desired revolution. Ranged against these progressive elements were the traditional and established conservative forces of City government in the form of Lord Mayor, Sheriff and the Alderman along with the wealthiest merchants and citizens who benefited significantly from the current order of society, and the outright Royalists. Between them they had the City of London firmly under control and the King had every right to think he could count on the loyal support of his capital, despite a significant minority who opposed him.

It is impossible define a single point in time when London started to drift towards the Parliamentary political cause and abandon the monarch, but the selection of the City members for the second Parliament of 1640 is significant. In late September 1640 Common Hall, which, due to its size was less influenced, or intimidated, by the omnipotent Aldermen, selected four individuals with known radical sympathies as their Members of Parliament: Isaac Pennington, Samuel Vassall, Mathew Cradock and Sir Thomas Soames. Cradock died the following year and was replaced by the even more militant John Venn. Pennington, Vassall and Venn were all vocal critics of King Charles' policies and they quickly established links with other liked minded Parliamentarians and soon became a crucial conduit through which the

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[7] See Como, *Radical Parliamentarians* for a detailed consideration of the beginnings of the radical movement in London.

City, both its government and the ordinary protesters, were able to present their grievances directly to Parliament, circumventing the traditional role of the Lord Mayor in that regard. As radical as these three were, they were not representative of the general political outlook of the City government, nor the majority of Londoners at the time, but their positions in Parliament allowed them to exert a greater influence than their numbers would suggest. The three became the self-appointed spokesmen on the national stage and a vital link with the minority of radicals within the City.[8]

Throughout 1641 the more radical citizens of London, bypassing the City government and supported by the City MPs, frequently submitted petitions directly to Parliament detailing their grievances on a variety of matters and demanded redress. These actions were widely publicised in the burgeoning press at the time, magnifying their importance and influencing popular opinion. These petitions for the most part were welcomed by the main opposition to the King in Parliament led by John Pym for they supported his claims of the abuses suffered by the people by the King's unwelcome policies, while at the same time they cemented the informal alliance between the radical Londoners that helped organise them and his Parliamentary opposition. During this period there were increasingly more street demonstrations in the capital as the inhabitants clamoured to be heard on a range of subjects, making it increasingly difficult for the Lord Mayor and Sheriffs to maintain law and order. Two City Sheriffs were appointed annually, one by the Lord Mayor and one by Common Hall, whose responsibility between the three of them it was to maintain law and order. The radicals and the protesters began to lack the confidence that these individuals, strictly connected to the conservative forces in the City as they were, could be trusted to remain impartial during these constant demonstrations and protests. In a sign that the radicals felt confident to challenge established authority, in June 1641 Common Hall advanced the claim that it alone had the right to appoint both Sheriffs. The Lord Mayor petitioned the House of Lords to decide but they merely suggested a committee of Aldermen and Common Councillors be convened to settle the dispute, which provided greater encouragement to those looking for change. In the end compromise was found which accepted the principal that Common Hall had a traditional right to select both Sheriffs but in this instance they ought to agree to appoint the Lord Mayor's candidate.[9] However, the Lord Mayor and Aldermen were unhappy with the outcome and rightly saw it as a challenge to their authority and a presage of things to come, which it most certainly was.

Despite this, the majority of City government was still broadly supportive of the King in his continuing tussle with Parliament, a point that was only reinforced by the election of the pro-Royalist Sir Richard Gurney as Lord Mayor during the summer of 1641, an election that further enhanced the split between the City radicals and the conservative forces in the government. The new mayor and his fellow Aldermen then arranged a sumptuous banquet in the City for the King, which only intensified the already deep-rooted hostility between the two factions. This conviviality with the monarch by the City establishment disguised the growing antipathy towards the King that was held by the general population. Charles, understanding full well the importance of London and the wealth that it contained, believed he had the firm support of the City, but he badly underestimated the level of opposition to him amongst the ordinary citizens and this led him to miscalculate his next moves.[10]

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[8] Pearl, *London*, pp.112–113,187.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp.120–123.

During the winter of 1641–1642, Londoners continued their mass demonstrations on the streets and around Westminster in their support for Parliament, while at the same time demanding the removal of the Bishops from the House of Lords, who were seen as the main obstructers of religious reform. These demonstrators could not easily be appeased and by now they had a deep-rooted mistrust of Royal authority and were ever suspicious of the King's motives. In December, the King appointed Sir Thomas Lunsford as Constable of the Tower of London, making him the sovereign's commander of military forces in the Royal garrison, a vital tool to control the City if force was required. This was a deeply unpopular move in London as Lunsford was seen as a brutish thug who would not refrain from violence, if needed, to maintain peace on the streets of London, which he was soon rumoured to be doing.

So incensed was the general population at this appointment that a petition for his removal was quickly circulated and even the Lord Mayor had to admit to the King that he doubted law and order could be preserved in the City unless he be replaced. The King was forced to make a humiliating about turn on this, which further reduced the credibility of Royal authority in the capital.[11] This episode was immediately followed by disputed elections for Common Council where blatant vote rigging and abuse were identified in some wards, ensuring pro-Royalist councillors being returned. Despite this electoral fraud there was a surge of anti-government supporters appointed to Common Council in the election dramatically changing the composition of the court, making it now more broadly pro-Parliamentary, though not necessarily radical, in outlook. One overtly hostile commentator disparagingly called these New Men 'Godly men … devoted to the *Puritan faction*.' In a prompt show of defiance these new members chose to participate in the meetings of Common Council immediately and not wait the traditional two weeks after the election before they took their places.[12] However, despite this shift in political outlook, the effects of it in Common Council would always be limited, as long as the Aldermanic veto and authority of the Lord Mayor remained in place.

On the national stage the political clash between the King and Parliament now came to a head. On 3 January arrest warrants were issued for five members of the House of Commons (John Hampden, Arthur Haselrig, Denzil Holles, John Pym and William Strode, as well as the peer Lord Mandeville – the later Earl of Manchester) for High Treason and the Commons were notified immediately but they advised the King of their refusal to handover the six.[13] At the same time Parliament ordered the City of London to establish a Committee of Safety to protect itself from the seemingly out of control monarch and to immediately increase the guard throughout the capital. One of the central disputes between the King and Parliament was which of them had the right to control the nation's militia and so this was a pre-emptive strike by the House of Commons to secure the City forces before Charles could. That same night, in a counter-move, the King sent an instruction to the Lord Mayor forbidding the use of the Trained Bands without his consent.[14] The following day, 4 January 1642, Charles made the rash decision to arrest his main antagonists in Parliament by force but was left red-faced when he entered Westminster only to find they had been pre-warned and that his birds had flown. They had not flown far however, for they were in hiding at the residence of Isaac Pennington in Coleman Street, close by the Guildhall. Parliament was outraged by this breach of its sovereignty and saw the King's entry into the Parliamentary chamber with armed soldiers as tantamount to a declaration of war. That same day Common Council, now dominated by Parliamentary supporters, appointed a committee consisting of 18 of some of the most radical members of the civic government to look to its own defence as they had been authorised to do the previous day by Parliament. Rumours quickly began to sweep the capital that hostile forces were descending on London and other nefarious plots.[15] On 5 January Charles entered the City of London and appeared before Common Council to ask for the five fugitive Parliamentarians to be handed over to him. To this Common Council replied that the King ought to abide by the advice of his Parliament, a clear declaration of its support for Parliament in the matter. The King left the City empty handed but such was the low standing of his authority now in the City that even the Lord Mayor was jostled and dragged from his horse and his chain of office pulled from about his neck. As a sign of how quickly things had changed it was the Committee of Safety and not Common Council that then drafted a petition to the King demonstrating further the City's support for Parliament and its own entry into the national political arena.[16]

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[10] *Ibid.*, pp.123–128.

[11] Nehemiah Wallington (R Webb, ed.), *Historical Notices of Events Occurring Chiefly in the Reign of Charles I*, Vol.1, (London: Richard Bentley, 1869), p.277; Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, pp.363–364.

[12] Samuel Butler, *A Letter from Mercurius Civicus to Mercurius Rusticus*, 1643, E.65 [32], pp.15, 16. See also Melvin C. Wren, 'The Disputed Elections in London in 1641', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 64, No. 250, 1949.

That Common Council was not the main organ of City government did not dissuade the House of Commons from considering these revolutionary measures. Common Council had usurped the Lord Mayor's prerogative to speak for the City and by establishing the Committee of Safety it had now bypassed the sovereign's right to command military forces in the Kingdom. The court then refused the King's demand to hand over the five Members to his face leaving it open to potential charges of treason, so this defiance was not something that was done lightly. With the militia now under orders of the Committee of Safety and the Lord Mayor marginalised it was clear that the sovereign had lost his authority in the City. In a sign of defeat the King fled Westminster on 10 January, knowing now full well that he had lost the support of London and that if an accommodation could not be found with his Parliamentary foes, war was inevitable.

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[13] *Journals of the House of Commons: 1640–1643*, Vol. 2, (London:1803) p.367.

[14] JCC, Vol. 40, f.11; William Douglas Hamilton(ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, Charles I, 1641–43*, (London: HMSO, 1887), p.238; Nagel, 'Militia', pp.35–36.

[15] JCC Vol. 40, f.11.

[16] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1641–43*, pp.240–241; JCC Vol. 40, f.12; Webb (ed.), *Wallington Notices*, Vol. 1, pp.285, 289; *A letter from Mercurius Civicus to Mercurius Rusticus*, p.18.

Despite all of this the by now isolated Court of Aldermen had not changed their allegiance to the King and so the City radicals, now with a significant presence in Common Council, a majority on the Committee of Safety and undisputed control over the streets were sufficiently emboldened to look for an opportunity to marginalise the Aldermen further. The Aldermen clearly saw the looming threat to their authority and needed to react to defend themselves but waited until February before they were ready to counter-attack. The Lord Mayor had been excluded from the Committee of Safety and so had no authority now over the City militia despite his traditional rights in this regard and nor was he or the Aldermen in a position to exercise their veto over Common Council proceedings. In mid-February, the Court of Aldermen, led by the Lord Mayor, petitioned the House of Lords for their rights to be reinstated, thinking that assembly would be more understanding at their loss of privilege than the Commons had been. The petition was signed by most of the Aldermen, many of the moderate Common Councillors and by many of the most influential individuals in the City, but not of course by any of the 'New Merchants' or their radical supporters on the Committee of Safety. In response the Commons, who received a copy of the petition, saw it as an affront to its authority, for it was they that had granted Common Council the authority to establish the Committee of Safety in the first place and who had allowed the traditional forms of government to be bypassed. The instigators of the petition were promptly arrested, and the petition ignored in Westminster. A similar move to have the petition read in Common Council was blocked and for the first time the Aldermanic veto was formally ignored, establishing yet another precedent and undermining further yet the traditional process of government in the City.[17]

With the Lord Mayor's ability to petition Parliament now curtained, the Aldermen sidelined, and their powers of veto defunct, the only authority the Lord Mayor retained was his right to call (or not call) a session of Common Council. On 13 March, the Committee of Safety asked the Lord Mayor to call Common Council to meet, but he refused on the grounds that he was ill. Sensing an opportunity the Committee immediately reported this to the House of Commons who promptly set up a committee to investigate their complaint. Over the next few months all sides in the dispute claimed and counter-claimed but in the end the Commons asked the Lords to concur with them that the Lord Mayor be obligated to call Common Council whenever the Committee of Safety declared it necessary.[18] This was a clear victory for Common Council but still the Lord Mayor refused to accept the loss of authority. His personal position was further undermined when on 10 June he proclaimed the Royal Commission of Array, effectively ordering the City militia be mustered in support of the King in the now likely event of armed confrontation between King and Parliament. This was the last straw for the radical Committee of Safety (known now as the Militia Committee) who demanded Parliament act to remove the Lord Mayor from office. Gurney was then formally impeached, tried and convicted of failing to fulfil his duties. On 12 August he was deposed and shortly afterwards Isaac Pennington, Member of Parliament and formerly Sheriff of the City of London, but also one of the most active and vociferous of the City radicals, was elected Lord Mayor in his stead.[19] With his election the constitutional revolution within the City was complete. Pennington had the support of Parliament, Common Council, the mass of the population, his nonconformist co-religionists and, crucially, the City radicals. In less than a year the City of London had shifted from a bastion of Royal support to the seemingly loyal follower of Parliament.

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[17] Pearl, *London*, pp.148–154.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp.152–154.

Not surprisingly the 'New Merchants' and their associates were to prove willing accomplices to the revolutionary regimes over the next two decades, though with differing levels of influence. It is also no surprise that when Common Council was granted the authority to take control of its own safety in January 1642 most of the Committee that was formed to do this consisted of individuals from Common Council of similar backgrounds and beliefs, who relished the opportunity to finally taste the power that only government can bring. The Militia Committee, born out of the political turmoil that was wracking the nation, was to command the City's forces throughout the Civil War and it was the individuals on this Committee that oversaw the raising and deployment of the City Horse. Allied to these individuals in government were their supporters outside, many of whom were to prove even more radical and who attempted on multiple occasions to establish military forces within London beyond the control of the formal City government. These allies were also to play a significant role in the establishment of the cavalry forces of the capital. These individuals were not all extreme radicals though and their beliefs, political and religious, varied considerably from the moderates who were simply happy to participate in any form of government to out and out republicans, so it would be a mistake to assume this was some ultra-radical coup. Indeed, as the fierier spirits amongst them were soon to learn, some of their more extreme ideas would not be tolerated by the more moderate majority.

Parliament might well have instructed Common Council to take control of the militia on 3 January and they in turn elected the Committee of Safety the following day to implement this, but it was no simple matter to effect this, not the least because the Lord Mayor still intended that he would control the militia. Both Parliament and the King claimed the authority to control the militia although tradition sided with the monarch but not withstanding this within days it was clear that it was Parliament that had won this fight. On the night of 6 January rumours spread throughout London of a Royalist plot to seize the capital. A call went out to raise the Trained Bands to defend the City, but the Lord Mayor refused on the grounds that he had no order from the King to do so. Infuriated, certain unidentified individuals took it upon themselves to call out the militia by a 'great bouncing at every man's door to be up in their arms presently, and to stand on his guard.'[20] Despite this later proving to be just another false alarm the militia were assembled and without the legal authority of the King, and as such a revolutionary precedent had been set. The King's Privy Council were furious and wrote to the Lord Mayor demanding an explanation as to how this had happened, but the reason was clear: both King and the Lord Mayor had lost control of the military forces in London and their authority was now being openly flouted.

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[19] *Ibid.*, pp.155–159; Lindley, *Popular Politics*, pp.211–215.

After the King had attempted to arrest the Five Members of 4 January, and fearing for their safety, the rest of the House of Commons had removed themselves from Westminster and sat in committee at the Guildhall for the next week. On 8 January, this Parliamentary committee declared that there was a real need to provide for the safety of both Houses of Parliament and that sufficient guards from the Trained Bands be allotted for this purpose, while they also declared that the Sheriffs of both London and Middlesex had the authority to arrange this and that any previous commissions for such were to be declared void. This was a direct response to the King's refusal a few days earlier to call out the militia to guard Westminster and effectively meant that the previous royal appointees' commissions were now invalid. They also ambiguously decreed that a majority of the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Common Council now had the authority to appoint officers of the militia, to order their muster, arming, training, and deployment of the militia and by doing so they further negated the age old authority of the King to control the militia, but they made no mention of how this majority would work in practice. Finally, they agreed to allow Philip Skippon to be commander-in-chief of the London militia, further eroding the monarch's traditional authority.[21] In just one day the Commons had on paper eradicated the monarch's traditional role of authority of the City of London militia, which meant from that point forward it was Parliament, and not the King, that was now the dominant military authority in the capital but it was to be some months yet before their control over the militia was absolute.

The Aldermen's petition in February attempted to annul these decisions but the Commons was in no mood to compromise, and the petition was ignored. Then on 29 March the Commons issued an ordinance settling control of the militia in London upon a new committee, superseding the earlier Committee of Safety, which had the power

> to assemble, and call together, all and singular His Majesty's Subjects of the said City of London, and the Liberties thereof, that are meet and fit for the Wars; and them to train, exercise, and put in Readiness; and them, after their Abilities and Faculties, well and sufficiently, from Time to Time, to cause to be arrayed and weaponed [sic], and to take the Musters of them in Places most fit for that

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[20] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1641–43*, p.249; Webb (ed.), *Wallington Notices*, Vol. 1, p.289.

[21] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1641–43*, pp.247–249; JCC Vol. 40, ff.13–15.

> Purpose: And the said Lords and Commons have likewise Ordained, That you shall have Power to make Colonels and Captains, and other Officers, and to remove them out of their Places, and to make others, from Time to Time, as you shall think fit for that Purpose; and that you shall have Power to lead, conduct, and employ the Persons aforesaid, arrayed and weaponed [sic], for the Suppression of all Rebellions, Insurrections, and Invasions that may happen, within the said City and Liberties thereof: and likewise shall have further Power and Authority to lead, conduct, and employ the Persons aforesaid, arrayed and weaponed [sic], as well within the said City, as within any other Part of this Realm of England, or Dominion of Wales, for the Suppression of all Insurrections, Rebellions, and Invasions that may happen, according as you from Time to Time shall receive Directions from the said Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament.[22]

This authority, born out of the political necessity to wrestle control from the King, was to form the basis of controlling the London militia until 1647 and it was the members of the Militia Committee, also appointed in the ordinance, which oversaw the raising, financing and deployment of the City Horse throughout the Civil War. Even if Common Council as a whole cannot be described as containing a majority of outright radicals, the new Militia Committee certainly did, and this was to remain their bastion of power until August 1643 but even after that they retained an influential majority within it. With the power to select officers the Militia Committee were able to ensure that the officer corps of the militia contained politically dependable individuals, trusted to support both the Parliamentary cause but also to espouse the radical ideas that the Committee itself held and who could be trusted to protect the interests of the City of London.[23]

While the original Committee of Safety included three members who later felt they could no longer support the Parliamentary cause, the rest of its members were most definitely vehement opponents of the Crown and could be considered political radicals by the standards of the time. The majority remained active on the Militia Committee until 1647. Many of them were sufficiently trusted to assume positions of authority within the tax collection apparatus that Parliament subsequently established to finance the war effort, while three became important suppliers of clothing and provisions for their armies. Some were Aldermen though most were not and very few of them had held any sort of position within government prior to the war. Nearly all were merchants or traders but almost none held any sort of position within the traditional mercantile enterprises of the City, for the most part they were all 'New Merchants' or their associates. The majority would later be classed as political Independents. In 1647, when Parliament established a new Militia Committee that was more politically aligned to its own political Presbyterian views, only 4 of the original 19 members of the 1642 committee were retained, which gives a clear indication of their political orientation.

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[22] Charles Harding Firth and Robert Sangster Rait (eds), *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642–1660*, Vol.1, (London: HMSO 1911), pp.5–6.

[23] Lindley, *Popular Politics*, pp.199–211.

Two other individuals who joined the Militia Committee in March 1642 were sufficiently radical to play a part in the regicide of 1649.[24]

The Militia Committee changed little in its political affinity between 1641 and 1647, even as members came and went. Powerful as the Committee was it was just a part of the City government mechanism, but it was one that many holding radical-leaning ideas were attracted to, which in itself perhaps illustrates that other parts of the government were not so disposed. Throughout the war the Aldermanic Bench and Common Council still played their traditional roles in government, though without the same power as it once had in the former case. While in the latter body sympathetic Parliamentarians might have been the majority, there was a significant body of moderates and crypto-Royalists, enough to temper some of the fierier radicals on occasion. The Lord Mayor still played a significant leadership role and could use that position to push a political agenda and it is no coincidence that the influence of the radicals on government waned once Isaac Pennington was replaced in late 1643 after which successive new mayors of a more moderate disposition took his place.

During the summer of 1642 England drew inexorably towards civil war. On 27 May, Parliament declared its belief that the King was intent on war, while Charles countered by stating that any person obeying Parliament's March Militia Ordinance would be guilty of treason. In early June Parliament sent the King a list of proposals for him to consider in an attempt to find a settlement to their grievances but he rejected these out of hand, while at the same time he wrote to the City government letting it know that any individual that chose to support Parliament in a war against the Crown would also be considered traitors, alienating the capital even further. On 5 July Parliament established its own Committee of Safety and a week later agreed to raise an army 'for the safety of the King's person, the defence of both Houses of Parliament, and of those who have obeyed their orders and commands; and for the preservation of the true religion, the laws, liberties and peace of the Kingdom,' to be commanded by the Earl of Essex.[25] Throughout August uncoordinated fighting occurred between the opposing sides in different parts of the Kingdom and then on 22 August 1642 King Charles raised his Royal Standard at Nottingham Castle, effectively declaring war on Parliament, the news of which reached London within days and was common knowledge within the City when it was published in newsletters around 27 August.[26] Naturally, this news produced an even more heightened sense of alarm and consternation within the City and it was not long before the City government reacted and it was this initial reaction that was to be the catalyst for the formation of the first troops of the City Horse.

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[24] Pearl, *London*, pp.240–246; Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, p.511 n.24.

[25] *JHC 1640–1643*, Vol. 2, p.668.

[26] Samuel Pecke, *Certaine Speciall and Remarkable Passages…, 22nd–26th August 1642*, E.114 [23].

2

Raising the City Horse, 1642

On 26 August, possibly the day the news had arrived in London that Charles had raised his standard, the Commons proposed that a loan be raised in the City, the proceeds of which were 'to be employed in quenching this unnatural War, now kindled in the Heart of this Kingdom.' Included in this proposal was the request that the City also raise two regiments of infantry and four troops of horse for the defence of City and Parliament.[1] The previous day Lord Saye and Sele, with Lord Wharton and Sir Gilbert Gerrard, the army's Paymaster General, appeared before the Common Council at the behest of Parliament, ostensibly to inform it of the critical turn of events that now seemed to be leading to all-out war with the King, but also no doubt to scare the City in an attempt to get further financial assistance from it. They informed the Common Council of Parliament's desire to ensure the 'warr might bee kept afarr off from the Citty' but they needed further financial assistance from the City to finance their war effort. They also requested a loan of 6,000 muskets and 4,000 pikes from the City 'for the forces who are prsently [sic] to march forward' under the command of the Earl of Essex. If scaring the City into providing more material assistance was Parliament's aim, it worked.[2]

At the next Common Council meeting, on 1 September, a proposition was presented that an 'Aditional fforce [be] raised for the defence and Safety of this Citty in this tyme of iminent danger' and it was proposed that this force should consist of the two regiments of foot and four troops of horse that the Commons had suggested just six days previously. It continued by suggesting that this force was to remain in 'continous [sic] pay … untill this Court shall give order to ye contrary.' The matter was immediately sent to the Committee of the Militia to consider the most practical method of undertaking this venture, with instructions to send their report in writing to the Council.[3] The initiative for raising this new force might well have come from Parliament but the City was intent to control it and determine the duration of its deployment. The Common Council normally only met weekly but, as a measure of their concern of how rapidly events had progressed with the King's declaration of war, it met again the following day to consider the Militia Committee's proposal for this new force. Seriously concerned of the consequences that might follow an advance on the City by the newly raised Royal forces, the Common Council formally agreed to raise this new contingent. Recognising that such a force would be expensive the Council believed that 'the inhabitants of the said Citty will cheerfully subscribe … money and Plate' to pay for it. The Council then instructed the City Members of Parliament to seek an ordinance from Parliament granting the City authority to raise such a subscription, and in so doing the City was being careful to seek Parliamentary approval for their actions, even though they thoroughly intended that they, and not Parliament, was to control this force.[4] And so, as a result of the King's declaration of war and out of fear that London could be attacked and plundered, the City Horse were born.

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[1] *JHC 1640–1643*, Vol. 2, pp.738–739.

[2] *JCC Vol. 40*, f.35.

[3] *Ibid.*, p.35v.

Parliament does not seem to have provided a separate ordinance as the City had requested but the money and horses raised were administered through a mechanism established in June for a voluntary general subscription known as the Propositions. Under this scheme the citizens of London could loan money, plate or horses to Parliament, on the public faith, to be repaid at some unspecified future date, with interest.[5] On 26 August Parliament initiated a further round of collections under this scheme, with the intention of cajoling those who had not already voluntarily subscribed into contributing. Added onto this supplemental ordinance was the instruction that the four troops of horse to be raised 'shall be paid out of such Subscriptions as shall be made by the said City.'[6] However, it was only in mid-October that listings of subscriptions for the cavalry seem to have begun. A network of collectors had been established back in June in each of the City wards as well as in the parishes of Westminster and Southwark, and whose responsibility it was to go house to house and solicit subscriptions from the residents.[7]

Two broadsheets mention that the Militia Committee was in the process of selecting officers for the troops on or about 12 September but that this was still ongoing 12 days later, with one of them specifically stating that only freemen of the City were being considered.[8] According to the instructions received from Parliament the City was requested to raise only four troops of horse and yet it is quite apparent that when horses were listed by subscription starting from 11 October, there were more than this being raised, at least according to 'Horses and Armes listed under severall

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[4] *Ibid.*, p.36.

[5] Charles Harding Firth and Robert Sangster (eds), *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642–1660*, Vol. 2, (London: HMSO 1911) pp.6–9.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp.24–25.

[7] The National Archives, SP16/491, State Papers Domestic, Charles I: Letters and Papers, 1642, ff.123–126; *JHC 1640–1643*, Vol. 2, p.218.

[8] Stephen Bowtell, *England's Memorable Accident, 12–19 September 1642*, E.240 [2]; Humphrey Blunden, *Special Passages, 20 September–27 September 1642*, E.119 [2], p.55.

Captaines of the Cittye of London cheifly for the defence of the said Cittye.'[9] This list was compiled no later than April 1644 by John Smyth (Smith) and Thomas Richardson who had both been appointed as commissioners to receive horses for the main Parliamentary army of the Earl of Essex in June, and who were based at the open land at Moorfields, just outside of the City beyond Bishopsgate.[10] The document lists a total of 453 horses that were subscribed for the City Horse between 11 October 1642 and 4 July 1643, along with what equipment or weapons were provided and a total value for all. The list also indicates to which troop the horse was listed under. The methodology of raising these horses will be discussed later but from this manuscript it is noted that the troops to which these horses were apportioned were: [Edmund] Harvey – 96 horses, [Herriott] Washbourne – 93, [Philip] Skippon – 81, [Robert] Mainwaring – 69, [Peter] Willett – 53, [Richard] Browne – 49, Captain Buller – 9, Captains Clarke, ?Ireton,[11] and Langerish – 1 each.[12] In the body of the manuscript are nine horses allocated to a Captain Buller but his name is not listed in the summary. The dates that the first and last horse were listed for each officer were: Washbourne 11 October 1642 and 13 May 1643, Browne 11 October and 7 February, Mainwaring 11 October and 27 February, Harvey 17 October and 3 July, Skippon 19 October and 26 November, Buller 21 October and 2 January, Ireton and Clarke – 10 November, Langerish – 12 November and Willett 24 March and 4 July 1643. This document therefore provides the first evidence as to who the original troop commanders of the City Horse were. Ireton, Clarke, and Langerish can be discounted as none were troop commanders although it is unclear why they received horses in this manner. Buller was probably Anthony Buller. This leaves five troops (Washbourne, Harvey, Skippon, Mainwaring and Browne) all of whom started to receive horses between 11 and 17 October, which suggests that the City had decided to raise an additional troop by mid-October, while Willett's troop was only raised in March 1643. Browne's commission, dated 12 October, still exists and this clearly states he was to be commander of one of the four troops raised by the City.[13]

It is unclear why five troops were initially raised when Parliament had only authorised four. A possible explanation for this extra troop might be that Skippon had been appointed Major-General of the City Militia in January 1642 and so it is plausible that the City had previously decided to raise a separate troop of horse for him, as befitted his status and separate to the four that were to be raised at Parliament's request. When Skippon later transferred to Essex's army in late 1642 he certainly took his troop with him, for it was reported in *England's Memorable Accident* in late November that after Skippon had been transferred to the Earl of Essex's army 'the City hath given him a Troupe of Horse and a Company of Fooot [sic]'.[14] The troop was subsequently regimented in the Lord General's own regiment where it served until the creation of the New Model Army in 1645.[15] Despite Buller later receiving horses from the City there is no further evidence that Skippon's troop remained under the control of the Militia Committee, although it is clear that its later deployments remained of interest to the Committee.[16]

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[9] The National Archives, SP28/131 Part 5, Horses and Arms listed 11 October 1642–4 July 1643, 1643, ff.1–17.

[10] Robinson, 'Horse Supply in the English Civil War',p.51.

[11] The handwriting is unclear, and it is possible that this reads Juxon.

[12] TNA, *SP28/131 Part 5*, ff.1–17.

[13] The National Archives, SP28/144 Part 10, Miscellaneous receipts and vouchers, various dates f.18.

If this is correct then the commanders of the first four troops of the City Horse were Herriott Washbourne, Edmund Harvey, Robert Mainwaring, and Richard Browne. However, Browne did not remain in his post for long as he was appointed as colonel of a regiment of dragoons to be raised in London on 17 November and which was to form a part of the Earl of Warwick's intended army.[17] Unlike Skippon there is no evidence that Browne was able to take his troop with him and it seems likely that he did not, and that his troop of cavalry remained to become the troop commanded by Captain John Juxon. However, there is no direct evidence that Juxon took over Browne's troop although it seems likely. Only one more horse was apportioned to Browne's troop after 22 November, and this was on 7 February, which suggests that no further subscriptions were being canvassed for his troop within a week of his promotion to colonel and that his dragoons were raised through an alternative system,[18] while at the same time there is no mention whatsoever of Juxon receiving any horses from the subscription. It is plausible that Juxon was in fact Browne's lieutenant, and he was promoted on the troop commander's transfer, which would explain his involvement with the troop in October that he was to later command, but this is unproven. The first mention of Juxon in any of the troop financial accounts was in May 1643.[19] To add further uncertainty a Parliamentary Ordinance dated 8 February 1643 listed the City officers responsible for enforcement of Proposition money as Colonel Randall (Randolph) Mainwaring,[20] Colonel Richard Browne and Captains Harvey, Robert Mainwaring and Washbourne.[21] This Ordinance does not suggest that the five were specifically cavalry commanders, Randall Mainwaring certainly was not, and Browne was still commanding the City dragoons raised the previous autumn, but the fact that only three of the known troop commanders were listed and not the fourth does nothing to confirm the commander of the fourth troop.

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[14] JCC Vol. 40, f.16v; Stephen Bowtell, *England's Memorable Accident, 14–21 November 1642*, E.242 [19].

[15] Alan Turton, *The Chief Strength of the Army: Cavalry in the Earl of Essex's Army*, (Leigh-on-Sea: Partizan Press, Undated) p.62. My thanks to Keith Roberts for supplying this reference.

[16] *A True Relation of the Severall passages Which Have Happened to Our Army Since it Advanced Towards Glocester*, 1643, E.67 [13], p.4.

[17] The National Archives, SP17/F, State Papers Domestic, Charles I Large Papers, 1642, f.11.

[18] TNA, SP28/131 Part 5, f.13.

[19] The National Archives, SP28/146, Army Accounts, Miscellaneous receipts and vouchers, 1642, f. 133.

[20] No relative of Captain Robert Mainwaring.

[21] England and Parliament Wales, *Die Mercurij 8. Februar. 1642. An ordinance of the Lords and Commons in Parliament. For the better levying and receiving of moneyes assessed by vertue of the late ordinance of 29. Novemb. 1642*, 1643, 669.f.5 [127].

Little is known about Buller's early military career. Only seven horses were listed under his name, which has led one historian to suggest that it was intended that he raise a troop but that insufficient mounts could be found for it, and it remained unmounted until March 1643 when it was taken over by Captain Peter Willett and horses then found for it.[22] This seems unlikely however for it is probable that Willett's was a new troop raised in the spring of 1643. This Buller was almost certainly Anthony Buller, son of Sir Richard Buller, MP. It seems likely that Buller was Skippon's lieutenant when the troop was first raised and that he would have commanded it in Skippon's absence. He served in the troop during 1643, after it had transferred to Essex's command, and was wounded but in 1644 was serving in Hans Behre's regiment. He later served under Edward Massey and later still served in the English army in the West Indies in 1655.[23]

Despite the uncertainty surrounding the troop commanders it is known that the actual troops were active as early as the end of October, even though they were not yet fully recruited. As Harvey later recounted 'in or about the end of the month of October 1642' he, Captain Richard Browne, Symon Hackett (his lieutenant), a certain Mr Francis Allen, and Sir John Conyers, then Lieutenant of the Tower of London, seized five carbines which he retained for the use of his troop.[24] At this point the troops were un-regimented, as were the cavalry in the main field army when initially raised, and it is only in the spring of 1643 that evidence survives showing that they were formed into a regiment. Both Harvey's own troop and Juxon's (presumably Browne's old troop) received pay for the month of November,[25] while the officers of Harvey's troop received the sum of 421l for mounting money that month as well. At the time the officers of Harvey's troop comprised:

Captain Edmund Harvey
Lieutenant Symon Hackett
Cornet William Fletcher
Quartermaster Gregson
Corporals Inbins, Austen and Charteris
Trumpeters Thomas Basset, Robert Yates, Edward Flowers
Farrier George(?) Hanset[26]

The strength of Harvey's troop was not given but other records show that in October and November it had been issued with 60 saddles, pistols and carbines, which suggests it was at full strength.[27]

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[22] Nagel, 'Militia',p.11.

[23] Turton, *Chief Strength of the Army*, p.62; Richard Symonds (Charles Edward Long, ed.), *Diary of the Marches of the Royal Army During the Great Civil War*, Vol.74, (London: Camden Society, 1859) p.73; Paul Sutton, *The Anglo-Spanish War 1655–1660. Vol. I: War in the West Indies*, (Solihull: Helion & Co, 2021) pp.102–104.

[24] The National Archives, SP28/27 Part 1, Warrants issued by army committees, military commanders, Jan 1645, f.9.

[25] TNA, SP28/146, f.133.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] TNA, SP28/27 Part 1, f.9.

Herriott Washbourne's troop was also active that month for they seized a total of 20 horses plus an assortment of weapons from suspected Royalist sympathisers, including one at the Bear Inn in Greenwich, when he was accompanied by 'Coll Harris[28] & Captain Player[29]'. On another occasion Washbourne seized three horses when he was with Robert Mainwaring, which implies that the latter's troop was also active that month.[30]

On 12 November, Prince Rupert's forces attacked the Parliamentary outpost at Brentford, held by the regiments of Denzil Holles and Lord Brooke, during the Royalist advance on London. Holles' regiment had been mainly recruited in and around London and was virtually destroyed in the subsequent desperate fighting. The remnants of the garrison fled back towards London where a relief force under John Hampden was organised and quickly set out to help stem the Royalist advance that evening.[31] It would seem that an element of the four troops were present at Brentford, for at least one horse was recorded as being lost there.[32] It would seem doubtful that they took part in the actual defence of the town (although it is possible) and were more likely hastily assembled and sent as reinforcements along with Hampden, or maybe later that night as Skippon brought out the London Trained Bands. Alternatively, the reference might also refer to the events of the following day when the Earl of Essex with his entire army faced off against the King at Turnham Green. Nevertheless it is certain that the City Horse played some role in the defence of the City during those tense few days in November 1642.

Over the next month, with London in state of some political flux, Harvey and his troop were called upon to maintain law and order within the City on numerous occasions. On 5 December, some unruly, and probably drunk, soldiers at the Globe Tavern in Holborn threatened to ransack the establishment unless they received their pay arrears. A detachment of the Trained Bands were called in to calm the group down and these were supported by men from Harvey's troop, who apprehended one of the soldiers.[33] On 9 December a crowd of some 400 protesters occupied the Guildhall and demanded that a petition they had prepared, which called for an immediate accommodation with the King, be submitted by the Common Council directly to Parliament. Isaac Pennington, the Lord Mayor, would have none it and called out the Trained Bands. Harvey's troop was again called upon to assist and on his arrival at the Guildhall 'the sound of his trumpet' was sufficient to disperse the mob. Another witness commented that when Harvey arrived the crowd shouted out 'Knock him downe, knock him downe.'[34] Unperturbed, the protesters were back at the Guildhall on 12 December when Harvey and his troop were once more called upon to quell the unrest as scuffles broke out and swords were drawn. Upon the arrival of Harvey the protesters barricaded themselves inside and only agreed to disperse after Randall Mainwaring, now commander of the City forces after Skippon's departure, and Harvey brought up two cannon to force open the doors. During the altercation it was recorded that some of Harvey's troopers were roughly handled by the mob who at one point cried out 'shall we maintaine a company of Rogues (meaning Captaine Harveyes Troope) to cut our throats. Let us goe home and Arme."[35] On 3 January 1643, a large gathering of the City's apprentices marched on Westminster to deliver a petition to the House of Lords and Harvey was once again dispatched to provide protection should the crowd become unruly and hostile, which they did not on this occasion.[36]

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[28] Possibly Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Harrison of the Yellow Regiment of the London Trained Bands.

[29] Possibly Captain Thomas Player of the White Regiment of the London Trained Bands.

[30] TNA, SP28/146, f.168.

[31] *England's Memorable Accident, 14–21 November 1642* ,p.82; Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *History of the Great Civil War, 1642–1649*, Vol. 1, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1886), p.66.

[32] TNA, *SP28/27 Part 1*, ff.6–7.

[33] H. G., *Diurnall Occurrences, 28 November–5 December 1642*, E.129 [2], p.7.

While the four original troops of City Horse in 1642 were most certainly the creation of the City government a second unit raised in London that autumn were definitely not. The Earl of Essex might well have had the support of Parliament in the lead up to the first major battle of the Civil War at Edgehill on 23 October, but there were many that lacked confidence in the Earl. In early October some inside Parliament were concerned that Essex, whose army was by then concentrated in the Midlands, might not be able to stop the King at the head of his army from marching on London. Should that happen, the war would be over in an instant and the reforms that Parliament had sought over the past decades would be lost, and the City stood to lose significantly for its support of Parliament. As a greater measure of protection the idea was flouted that a second army be raised to protect the capital if Essex be defeated or outmanoeuvred. The House of Lords welcomed the suggestion, and on 21 October it commissioned the Earl of Warwick to command a new army, to be raised primarily from London and the county of Essex, where Warwick's vast estates and resources were located.[37]

The fear of a Royalist attack on London were further heightened when news of the inconclusive fight at Edgehill reached London along with confirmation that the King was continuing his march south. As the King moved inexorably closer, near panic gripped both the capital and Parliament, causing leading moderates in both the Commons and the Lords to open negotiations with the King to find a peaceful settlement before he arrived in London.[38] Discussions began with the King but still the Royalist Army moved towards the capital. The more radical sections of the London population were fearful that Parliament would falter, lose its nerve and agree to peace with the King on any terms as an alternative to a forceful assault on the capital by the Royalist Army. Essex, at the head of his army, marched into London on 7 November while the King was at Windsor, but this did little to allay the fear that was gripping the City. On 11 November, a group of London citizens and ministers delivered a petition to Parliament demanding that 'no accommodations be made' with the King and that Essex take the field immediately to defend the City. The citizens also demanded a new 'army of 6,000 horse presently [be] raised to pursue the enemy incessantly until the work be finished.'[39]

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[34] John Grismond, *A Perfect Diurnall of the passages in Parliament, 5–12 December 1642*, E.244 [8]; *The Image of the malignants peace*, 1642, E.244 [12]; *The humble petition and remonstrance of divers citizens, and other inhabitants of the City of London, and borrough of Southwarke*, 1642, E.83/22; *The Lord Whartons Speech, to the petitioners for peace: on the eighth of December, at Habberdashers-hall, in London.*, 1642, E.129/33.

[35] *The Image of the malignants peace*; *The humble petition and remonstrance of divers citizens, and other inhabitants of the City of London, and borrough of Southwarke*; *The Lord Whartons Speech, to the petitioners for peace: on the eighth of December, at Habberdashers-hall, in London.*

[36] John Grismond, *A Perfect Diurnall of the Passages in Parliament, 2–9 January 1643*, E.244 [45].

[37] *Journals of the House of Lords, 1642*, Vol.5, (London: n.d.) p.416.

On 12 November, the Royalist Army reached Hounslow and that night stormed Brentford, killing many of the Parliamentary garrison, most of whom were Londoners. To the City radicals Brentford demonstrated the King's deceit to attack while still engaged in peace negotiations with Parliament. London was now in a frenzy as fear and panic swept the City, forcing Essex to march his army, along with the City Trained Bands, to confront the King at Turnham Green the following day. In this atmosphere of fear another group of militant citizens descended on Parliament, just as Essex was deploying his army on the open land around Turnham Green on 13 November, led by the radical Londoner Richard Shute. Shute repeated the offer that the citizens of London had made just two days before of their willingness to form a new army, consisting of some 1,000 horse and 3,000 dragoons, an offer that was gladly accepted by a panicked Parliament.[40] Furthermore, Parliament also agreed that all sums of money already raised, and to be raised, by individuals in London for the raising of such forces would have such sums repaid, with interest, on the public faith, which was to be administered by organs of the City government.[41]

It is important to note that the initiative for the formation of this cavalry force in London came not from Parliament, nor from the government of the City but from the radical London citizens who feared Parliament would capitulate under the pressure of the advancing Royalist Army. These radicals, supported by the 'New Merchants' and zealous religious ministers, now had an ambitious political and religious agenda that would be dashed if Parliament wavered in its dealings with the King. They wanted an aggressive waging of the war with no compromise and were prepared to not just raise forces under their own initiative but also to commit the wealth of London to finance it.

Barely a week later Shute once again led a delegation of citizens to insist Parliament establish a more effective method of financing the war, which the radicals fully intended would be fought to the end. Then on 22 November Shute proposed that Parliament levy money from malignants and those individuals that had as yet not voluntarily subscribed money and plate to the cause and even suggested a mandatory weekly assessment, first on London and then on the entire country, to provide a sufficient, regular, and reliable income with which to prosecute the war.[42] John Pym grabbed the opportunity that Shute had provided him with and on 26 November the Commons passed legislation that established a national Committee for the Advancement of Money which was to sit in the Haberdasher's Hall and which created a system of enforced collection in London from malignants and those who had failed to voluntarily contribute to the war effort. This was to be administered by a London sub-committee that sat at the Weaver's Hall to raise these extra funds. The mechanism that this established was subsequently used in February 1643 when the mandatory Weekly Assessment was introduced and which remained the basis of financing the war effort and government until the Restoration of 1660.[43] Again, it was the City radicals that were the initiators of this and they, with their New Merchant allies, fully intended to dominate the fiscal machinery that was created and through this exert influence over how the war was to be administered and the political settlement that would be drafted once the war had been successfully concluded. The initiative for raising forces in London was shifting away from the City government and into the hands of unelected radical citizens.

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[38] *JHC 1640–1643*, Vol. 2, p.832.

[39] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1641–43*, pp.404–405; the National Archives, SP16/496, 'State Papers Domestic, Charles I Letters and Papers 1642', f.135; *JHC 1640–1643*, Vol. 2, p.845.

[40] *JHC 1640–1643*, Vol. 2, pp.847,850; *JHL 1642*, Vol. 5, p.446.

[41] Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of the Proceedings of the Committee for Advance of Money, 1642–1656*, Vol.1, (London: HMSO 1888) p.1.

By now emboldened the City radicals submitted yet another petition to Parliament on 1 December, once again led by Shute, but this time accompanied by the fiery ministers Hugh Peter and John Goodwin. The petition again demanded that no accommodation be made with the King, and it criticised those Members of Parliament that were attempting mediation. They claimed that it was London that was contributing the most to the war effort but much of their contribution was wasted by inefficiency and poor generalship, and if Londoners were expected to continue to pay for the war, they demanded to see better results than they had hitherto. The petitioners also threatened to 'look to their owne safties, and forebeare to contribute to their own Ruine' if elements within Parliament continued with its attempts to seek an accommodation with the King.[44] This was a clear threat by the radicals. Either Parliament renounces negotiation with Charles and prosecute the war more vigorously or London would withhold money and make its own arrangements for continuing the armed struggle.

While this was an extreme call by vocal radicals it cannot be assumed that it represented the majority view of the capital's inhabitants, for there were many within the metropolis that were eager for peace and an accommodation with the King to cease the war. Within days of Shute's petition others were being circulating demanding Parliament negotiate a settlement with the King and soon a groundswell of popular support for peace efforts swept the City, with numerous demonstrations and rallies many of which turned violent and troops of horse were called in to disburse the demonstrators.[45] These peace demonstrations continued into the New Year and the pressure of the calls from the population led Parliament to again attempt negotiations with the King at Oxford in February 1643.

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[42] *JHC 1640–1643*, Vol. 2, pp.857–859..

[43] Everett Green (ed.), *CAM*, Vol.1, p.1.

[44] *A true copie of the remonstrance and petition, presented to the Honourable the House of Commons assembled in Parliament. By Sir David Watkins Knight, Mr Shuite, and others*, (London, 1642). TT E.130 [7].

It was during these anxious days in November that Richard Browne's regiment of City dragoons was established, at the instigation of the City radicals. Richard Shute's petitions of 11 and 13 November called on Londoners to raise their own mobile army, but it is likely that his grass roots radical movement had already started to collect money for the force he was seeking Parliamentary approval to establish before he even approached Parliament. A self-appointed urban committee had been recently established that was led by Shute and which included fellow radicals such as Joseph Vaughan, John Pocock, Edward Storey, Arthur Dew and William Pennoyer. Pocock was a merchant with extensive business interests in the American colonies, a close business associate of the leading colonial merchant Maurice Thompson and he already had experience with raising public funds, having served on the Committee that oversaw voluntary subscriptions of money, plate and horses in London in the summer of 1642. He also served on the Militia Committee installed by the new republican government in January 1649.[46] Pennoyer was a merchant of some substance and a long-time business associate of the Thompson clan, who involved himself with commerce in North America, the West Indies, and the Levant and was an active investor in inter-lopping and privateering concerns. He also later attained positions of prominence within the City government and the Commonwealth government after 1649.[47] None of the members of this Committee held any formal positions within the City government and all held their posts as a result of their zeal and willingness to support the aggressive stance of the radicals to prosecute the war. In fact, the Committee had the look and feel of the revolutionary committees of self-appointed militants of later eras.

It is clear that the Committee and its supporters had an effective grass roots organisation that allowed them to collect money quickly throughout London, possibly based around congregations of the independent churches. It is known that as early as 18 November Shute and his associates were disbursing cash in substantial amounts for the raising of Browne's regiment. On that day alone over 250l was disbursed with a further 400l the following day. It was only on 3 December that the responsibility for the payment of the regiment was transferred from this volunteer committee to the City government when the Parliamentary Committee of Safety instructed the Lord Mayor to provide funds to reimburse Shute and his colleagues to the sum of 3,400l that they had already spent on raising the regiment. This was clearly a measure to rein in the radicals and to ensure control of this force by the City and not its citizens. A further 1,200l was given to Shute between 26 January and 9 February 1643 to reimburse him for the balance of money that his committee had already spent to raise the regiment. It is clear that Shute and his supporters had access to large sums of ready money.[48]

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[45] *The humble petition and remonstrance of divers citizens, and other inhabitants of the City of London*, (London, 1642), TT E.83 [22].

[46] Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, pp.227, 430n, 551.

[47] *Ibid.*, pp.135, 137, 153, 543, 546, 553.

Shute's committee seems to have regularly convened at the Nag's Head tavern on Cateaton Street, just off Coleman Street.[49] Coleman Street was notorious as the centre for religious Independency and radical dissent in London both before the Civil War and throughout the Interregnum. This movement had grown up around St Stephen's Church, which was the first church in London that was allowed to elect its own vicar in 1624 and who subsequently elected the radical preacher John Goodwin in 1633. Goodwin was a fierce critic of Archbishop Laud's Episcopalian views and consistently called for disestablishment of the English church. Coleman Street became synonymous with religious dissent and preachers flocked there to expound their views to all that would listen. In fact in 1657 St Stephen's was even referred to as 'the Divinity-School in Coleman-University'.[50] Further proof of the militancy of Coleman Street, along with the political and religious sympathies of its residents, is clearly demonstrated for it was to here that the five Members of Parliament fled in January 1642 when King Charles attempted to arrest them in Parliament.

The Nag's Head was owned by the widow Ann Wilson and from 1639 onwards was frequented by religious and political militants of the period. It was the venue where Samuel How in 1640 famously declared that anybody that was a Christian was allowed to preach and they needed neither training nor government approval – a very radical call at that early date. It was also a place that John Goodwin frequented and met with religious and political opponents of the State prior to the Civil War.[51] So famous was the Nag's Head it even featured in a 1641 poem by John Taylor in which he described How's sermon there the previous year:

> And at the Nags head, neare to Coleman-streete,
> A most pure crew of Brethren there did meete,
> Where their devotion was so strong and ample,
> to turne a sinfull Taverne to a Temple.[52]

It is likely that Shute and his associates were frequent patrons of the Nag's Head, where he could scheme and consort with likeminded radicals and it would have been the logical location, close to radical heart of London, from which to organise and raise Browne's regiment in the electrifying days of the early winter of 1642.

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[48] Everett Green (ed.), *CAM*, Vol. 1, p.3. TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.28.

[49] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.32.

[50] Marchamont Nedham, *The Great Accuser Cast Down; Or, a Publick Trial of Mr John Goodwin of Coleman-Street, London, at The Bar of Religion & Right Reason*, (London: 1657), E.920 [1]. See also Adrian Johns, 'Coleman Street', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, Vol. 71, No.1, 2008. and D. A. Kirby, 'The Radicals of St Stephen's, Coleman Street, London, 1624–1642', *Guildhall Miscellany*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1971.

[51] Como, *Radical Parliamentarians*, pp.58, 62.

[52] John Taylor, *A Swarme of Sectaries, and Schismatiques: Wherein is Discovered the Strange Preaching (Or Prating) of Such as are by Their Trades Coblers, Tinkers, Pedlers, Weavers, Sowgelders, and Chymney-Sweepers*, (London: 1641), TT E.158 [1], p.8.

Exactly how Shute set about raising his force, which would only comprise a single regiment of dragoons and not the 4,000 men he boasted of, is unclear, but he was evidently efficient. The original intention was that the force was to be deployed in Warwick's embryonic army under the command of Philip Skippon but Essex refused to allow Skippon to join Warwick, instead appointing him Major General in his own army.[53] Instead Browne was commissioned on 17 November by Warwick to be 'Collonell and Commander in Cheife of all those Companys of Dragoons already raised and to be raised by the Citye of London.' He was permitted to march his regiment into Kent and surrounding counties and there to recruit 'such well affected Souldiers as will follow you.' He was instructed to 'secure the severall fforts, Ports and Castles … for the Safety of the King Parliament and Kingdome.' Browne was to protect these locations 'from spolie and rapine.' He was to march his forces into the surrounding counties 'where yu may best infest and destroy the enemy.' He was to appoint officers and men as he saw fit, and they were 'to obey you as theyre Collonell & Commander.'[54] There is no record that a subsequent commission was issued after Warwick's resignation barely a week later and at that time it seems the regiment became part of Essex's own army.[55]

The following officers[56] are mentioned in the accounts of Shute's committee which suggests that there were a lot of companies in the regiment. A standard dragoon regiment of the period had 10 companies of 100 men each, plus officers.[57] Whether that the regiment had this many companies when it took the field in early December is doubtful. Perhaps some of the officers were in fact replacements for some that chose not to serve, or they might refer to other units that Shute was hopeful of raising.

Colonel Richard Browne
Major Nathaniel Whetham
Captain Salmon Nuttall
Captain John(?) Everett [58]
Captain Turner[59]
Captain Francis Barker
Captain Joshua Browne
Captain John Bagshaw
Captain William Jarman
Captain John Okey

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[53] *JHC 1640–1643*, Vol. 2, pp.847, 850.

[54] TNA, SP17/F, f.11.

[55] *JHL 1642*, Vol. 5, p.446.

[56] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, ff.28–34, 2–7.

[57] Firth, *Cromwell's army*, p.44.

[58] Perhaps John Everett of St Botolph Bishopsgate. See Tai Liu, *Puritan London : a Study of Religion and Society in the City Parishes*, (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1986) pp.81, 93n.

[59] Possibly Richard Turner, junior.

Captain John Gother
Captain Robert Terrerr/Terry
Captain Henry Harbottle
Captain John Clotto
Captain Willerman

On 26 November, the troops of Whetham, Joshua Browne, Bagshaw, Okey, Gother, Nuttall, Willerman, Harbottle, Clotto and Terry all drew pay, and the same troops drew pay at Windsor on 6 December.[60] Pay was also disbursed to the regiment on 28 December, although these records are more fragmentary, but interestingly pay was issued to the hitherto unknown Captain John Hale. The other troop commanders that received pay that day were Clotto, Willerman, Nuttall, Whetham and Okey.[61] Then on 6 January Bagshaw, Terry, Nuttall, Hale, Okey and Harbottle only were issued with pay.[62] From these pay records it seems clear that 10 companies (11 if Browne himself had a company but there are no pay records that show that he did) were present with the regiment when it joined Sir William Waller's army in early December. Hale is only mentioned as a company commander after the storming of Winchester and so he might well have been promoted to command the company of the unknown captain who had been killed in that attack, who might have been either Joshua Browne or John Gother. Jarman was with the regiment in January but no other trace can be found for Everett, Turner or Barker so it is unclear if they actually served or not.

Despite Browne's regiment being raised on the initiative of a radical political movement of citizens within the City, there is little evidence that its officers were overtly radical. Browne was to emerge as the darling of the moderate City Presbyterian movement after 1647 and although he was certainly a popular political activist in 1642 there is little to suggest he held similar radical beliefs as Shute. Whetham seems to have been a close acquaintance of Browne's and while he served the Interregnum government there is again nothing to link him to the radicalism of Shute. Richard Turner, if he was a company commander, certainly gravitated towards radicalism in 1643 and so was probably a kindred spirit of the committee. Of all the known officers it was John Okey who was the most overtly radical, both in religion and politics, being both a Regicide and playing a leading part in the army's last desperate attempts to stop the Restoration in 1660. His beliefs eventually led him to be executed by a unmerciful Charles II.

Of the known company commanders Okey's accounts are the only ones that have survived, and from these it can be shown that his company composed the following in December 1642:

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[60] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, ff.1, 3.

[61] *Ibid.*, p.3; The National Archives, SP28/267 Part 2, Committee for Petitions; cases 1647–1648, ff.34–35.

[62] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f. 5.

Lieutenant Robert Dennis
Cornet Richard Parkhurst
Sergeant Henry Errick
Sergeant Smyth
Corporal Thomas Maddison
Corporal Starie
Corporal Gurney
Drummer Robert Simpson
Drummer Philip Norton
111 Troopers.[63]

It was not long before Browne's regiment was deployed, and its movements are shown on Map 2. Browne's commission, issued by the Earl of Warwick, specifically gave him the authority to march into Kent if required. This was a direct reference to the perceived threat that the King might bypass London and blockade the capital from the south, allowing him to receive supplies and possibly reinforcements from the Continent. A threat that was magnified when a letter from the Queen was intercepted in November 1642 suggesting a force invade Kent to receive the supplies she was amassing in Europe to support her husband. Despite this specific intent it seems Browne's dragoons played no part in quashing the Royalist revolt in Kent at the end of November when he was himself to the north-west of London. In late November Browne was supposed to have intercepted a convoy of plate belonging to wife of the Earl of Carnarvon bound for Oxford, and then on 1 December it was reported that the regiment had left London and attempted to fall upon a Royalist outpost at Marlow, but seeing themselves outnumbered they withdrew to Aylesbury, where the Earl of Essex had his main headquarters.[64]

In early December Sir William Waller, who had just returned to the Lord General's army after capturing Farnham, was dispatched with a force of cavalry and dragoons to occupy Marlborough to pre-empt its occupation by the Royalists. Waller's force was to consist of four regiments of horse and two of dragoons, one of which was Browne's regiment.[65] On 8 December, Waller approached Marlborough only to find it already occupied by Royalist force under Lord Grandison and an uneventful day was spent as both sides faced each other near Wantage, before Waller returned to Newbury and Grandison headed on towards Winchester. During the day some of the dragoons clashed with the Royalists and some wagons were captured.[66] After spending the night in Newbury, Waller followed Grandison's force towards

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[63] TNA, *SP28/267 Part 2*, ff. 34–35.

[64] Stephen Bowtell, *England's Memorable Accident, 28 November–5 December 1642*, E.242 [37], pp.104,102; Humphrey Blunden, *Special Passages, 29 November–6 December 1642*, E.129 [5], p.144.

[65] *Truth in two letters by a man worth from the regiment of Colonell Browne*, (London, 1642), TT E.83 [11], pp.3–4; John Adair, *Roundhead General: A Military Biography of Sir William Waller*, (London: MacDonald, 1969) p.50.

[66] *Truth in Two Letters 9 and 17 Dec., from the Regiment of Col. Browne*, pp.4–5; John Vicars, *God on the Mount, or a Continuation of Englands Parliamentary Chronicle*, (London, 1643), TT E.73 [4], p.237.


N
Brill
27 Jan 43
Oxford
London
Windsor
6 & 26 Dec 42
Reading
Newbury
8 Dec 42
Marlborough
Winchester
13 Dec 42
Havant
Chichester
7 Dec 42
Arundel Castle
20 Dec 42
Isle of Wight
0
10
20
30
40 miles

Map 2 : Colonel Richard Browne's Regiment on campaign, December 1642.

Winchester, during which an inconclusive skirmish was fought '5 miles wide of Winchester, toward Salisbury way,' after which Grandison was chased into the City.[67]

Waller attacked Winchester on 13 December and, according to one member of Browne's dragoons, the regiment led the attack. According to this anonymous writer:

> The most part of the Regiment assaulted the City at one side of it where the wall was broken downe, which yet notwithstanding (with no small dificulty we entred) and in regard of the exceeding high and steepe passage to it, so steepe that we had no other way to get up, but to creepe upon our knees and hands, the Enemy all the while playing with their Musqueteers upon us, but slew but three men in our getting up, and one of our Captaines that followed me as he was entring the breach, after I had led in some twenty men; the bullets all this while flew thicke about us.[68]

Who the slain officer was cannot be ascertained but was perhaps either Joshua Browne or Gother? One later account recounted that

> here Colonell Brownes Sergeant Major [Whetham] deserved much honour in this Service, he himself being one of the first that forced upn the breach into the Towne, though the enemies bullets flew thick about them; upon sight of whose even invincible valour all the rest of his company followed close, and drove the Cavaliers before them into the midst of the town.[69]

The town itself was soon captured and the Royalist garrison withdrew into the more defensible castle. Overnight, Waller prepared to storm the castle but, in the morning, Grandison offered to surrender, and generous terms were agreed when over 600 Royalists surrendered. Despite Waller's agreement that neither the surrendering Royalists nor the town would be plundered he was powerless to stop his soldiers who quickly ran amok in the city. The anonymous writer was to comment, with a sense of bitterness, 'doubtless many have had good booties of money and cloths, beside many brave horses, but for my part I have neither.' But with greater pride he added 'Colonell *Brownes* Regiment had the honour to take the *City* and enter the breach. Give praise to *God*, for my preservation.'[70]

By the 17 December the regiment was in Havant making preparations to attack Chichester, but just two days later they heard news that they were to return to Essex's army, but these orders were quickly countermanded and the regiment remained under Waller's command for the time being.[71] It seems that though Browne's regiment did march with Waller to Chichester on 20 December, and perhaps was present at the capture of Arundel Castle *en route*, they were then recalled and returned to Essex and so did not take part in the capture of the town in late December.[72] Okey was certainly in Windsor on 26 December when he collected pay for his troop and five other troop commanders also drew pay for their men two days later, but they were then in Winchester.[73] Parliament was greatly concerned about the build-up of Royalist forces at Brill, one of the outpost towns the King had fortified during the winter of 1642 to protect Oxford and barely 15 miles from Essex's occasional headquarters at Aylesbury. So concerned was Parliament that in early January it called for a muster of all local forces in Hertfordshire at Aylesbury 'for the surpressing and punishing those Forces at *Brill*.'[74] It was most likely for this reason that Essex recalled both Browne's dragoons and the cavalry regiment of Arthur Goodwin to create the nucleus of this force that Goodwin was to command, and which was to be based in Aylesbury.

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[67] *The Latest printed newes from Chichester. Windsor. Winchester. Chester. Manchester, and Yorke, &c.*, (London, 1642), TT E.83 [8], p.3.

[68] *Truth in two letters...*, p.6.

[69] *God on the Mount*, p.228.

[70] *Truth in two letters...*, pp.7–8.

[71] *Ibid.*, p.8.

In mid-January, a force from Aylesbury surprised a troop of Royalist horse at Piddington, only a few miles to the north of Brill, capturing them all, but there is no evidence that Browne's regiment were present although they were certainly under Goodwin's command at the time.[75] Goodwin was perhaps too emboldened by the success of this raid and planned to follow it up with an all-out attack on Brill itself. However, the town was to prove to be well defended, having newly constructed 'out-workes, half Moones and Redoubts, the like not to be found in any Towne in England,' while also having just been reinforced by another regiment of horse.[76] Goodwin's force, which only seems to have consisted of John Holmstead's regiment of foot plus Browne's dragoons and probably Goodwin's horse regiment, was woefully inadequate for such a well defended objective. Goodwin had some artillery but being two small sakers they proved inadequate to batter the town's defences. Goodwin underestimated the strength of the Royalist garrison and the natural protection that the terrain afforded the defenders, and the attack was a fiasco.

Goodwin arrived before the town's outworks on the morning of 27 January and after an ineffectual bombardment by his field guns Holmstead's regiment launched themselves against the defences to make a breach, who Browne's regiment was tasked to support. The infantry had no chance to breach the earthworks, which were so high that the advancing Parliamentarians could barely see the tops of the defenders' heads. A Parliamentary account of the attacked blamed a Scottish officer for providing contradictory orders during the attack but it is clear that Goodwin was at fault for the failure. After a few hours of futile fighting Goodwin was forced to withdraw to Aylesbury but his retreating column was followed by jubilant Royalist cavalry who fell upon the stragglers. One Parliamentary witness reckoned only 10 men were lost but the Royalist estimated closer to 70 were killed. Included amongst the dead was Captain Jarman of Browne's regiment.[77]

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[72] Josiah Ricraft, *A Perfect List Of The Many Victories Obtained (Through the Blessing of God) by the Parliaments forces...* (London 1646), TT 669.f.10 [59]; *God on the Mount*, p.231; *The Latest Printed Newes from Chichester. Windsor. Winchester. Chester. Manchester, and Yorke, &c.* ,p.2.

[73] TNA, SP28/267 Part 2, f.38.; TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.11.

[74] *A Declaration of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament, for the defence and preservation of Hertfordshire,* (London, 1643), TT 669. f.5 [124].

[75] *God on the Mount*, pp.256–257.

[76] *The Latest Intelligence of Prince Ruperts Proceeding in Northampton-Shire: And also Colonell Goodwins at Brill,* (London, 1643), TT E.88 [3], p.5; *Ibid.*, p.7.

Browne's dragoon regiment did not long survive the fracas at Brill for on 12 February it was converted to infantry and it then seems it was disbanded and the soldiers used to recruit other regiments.[78] Browne returned to London, Whetham was later appointed Governor of Northampton, Okey moved to Waller's army, Clotto joined Philip Skippon's regiment while Hale joined Thomas Rainborowe's regiment.[79] Although Browne was later Governor of Abingdon where he commanded an infantry regiment, there is no evidence to link that with his London dragoons of 1643.

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[77] *Ibid.*, pp.5–6; *Ibid.*, pp.7–8.

[78] Major-General Richard Browne's Regiment of Foot. Available from <https://wiki.bcw-project.org/parliamentarian/foot-regiments/browne> [Accessed 15 June 2021].

[79] *Ibid.*

3

Colonel Edmund Harvey's Regiment 1643

When originally raised the City Horse were independent troops but by the summer of 1643 they had been formed into a regiment under the command of Colonel Edmund Harvey, but when exactly this occurred, and when Harvey was promoted to colonel, is unclear. In the subscription lists previously cited Harvey was still noted as being a captain on 14 February 1643 but on 9 March he was referred to as a major, while on his final mention (3 July) he was referred to as colonel.[1] Despite this in April he was being referred to by the House of Commons as a captain,[2] but in a document signed by Essex dated 4 June he was referred to as a colonel.[3] Most likely he was appointed colonel and the troops formed into a regiment at some point in either April or May 1643. At this time, the regiment consisted of the troops of Harvey, Mainwaring, Washbourne and Juxon plus the newly raised troop of Captain Peter Willett, a draper from Lombard Street who had been politically active in supporting the establishment of the Militia Committee the previous year.[4] A sixth troop, commanded by Captain Robert Norwood, was raised in 1643 but it is unclear exactly when. Possibly it was raised after July as there is no mention in the subscription lists, but it had certainly been established by October.

Exactly when Juxon assumed command of Browne's troop is unclear, but it might have been as late as the summer of 1643. Browne himself, as has been shown already, had been promoted to the rank of colonel and commanded a regiment of dragoons during the winter, serving with Waller, and then in July 1643 he was sent to Kent to put down the Royalist uprising there. There is no evidence that he had this troop with him during this period. Pay records for the Earl of Essex's army from May 1643 show that his troop, referred to specifically as that of Colonel Richard Browne, were being paid by the main army treasurers which was authorised by Essex himself. These records do not show where the troop was at the time, but as Essex had just captured Reading, it is possible that the troop was serving with the Earl in Berkshire. The officers that received this pay on behalf of the troop from the treasurer was certainly not Juxon; one being Cornet Henry Binckney, and the other George Cooke (no rank given). Cooke is also recorded as receiving further pay for the troop on 10 July, again in the name of Browne's troop. Interestingly, the accounts for Harvey's own troop show that he received constant pay up to and including 12 July 1643, and thereafter the accounts include pay for Juxon's troop as well. It is therefore possible that it was only in mid-July that the troop ceased being referred to as Browne's and henceforth was referred to as Juxon's. But this also raises the possibility that if Juxon was Browne's Captain-Lieutenant (though there is no firm evidence to support this) then perhaps Juxon was never promoted to the rank of full captain before his death at Newbury, which might explain why Juxon's troop continued to be attached to Harvey's until 1644. Possibly then it remained Browne's troop until the summer of 1643.[5]

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[1] TNA, SP28/131 Part 5, ff. 14, 14r, 16r.

[2] *Journals of the House of Commons: 1643–1644*, Vol. 3, (London: HMSO, 1802) p.48.

[3] The National Archives, SP16/497, State Papers Domestic, Charles I Letters and Papers 1643, f.165.

[4] The National Archives, SP28/131 Part 3, London Horse Accounts 1642–1643, f.10; Lindley, *Popular Politics*, p.207.

It is also unclear precisely what the troops were doing during the first half of 1643. It is recorded that at least part of the regiment accompanied a convoy with 15,000l in money from London to Reading 'to prevent the seizing of it by the Malignauts [sic], who have done may robberies upon that rode,' probably in early May.[6] Most likely they were involved with seizing horses and arms from suspected Royalists in and around London, providing protection for the Guildhall when unruly mobs threatened to disturb the peace and presumably mounted guards on the newly constructed defences around London, both by day and by night. A Parliamentary Ordinance dated 27 March had given the City authorities the power to seize property and valuables of any person they believed had contributed money towards the Royalist cause, who were Catholic or who were currently fighting for the King. This effectively gave them the authority to indiscriminately plunder anybody suspected of being a Royalist sympathiser, without even having to prove that they were one. The proceeds were then to be utilised to fund Parliament's burgeoning military expenditure.[7] That same day the Earl of Essex sent a warrant to the Militia Committee granting authority to Harvey, along with future City Horse Colonel Richard Turner, 'aided by their soldiers, to search for and seize such horses, arms, ammunition, money, or plate, in the hands of Papists or those who bear arms against Parliament, or refuse to pay the taxes assessed on them, living within 30 miles of the city, and to secure their persons if cause require.'[8]

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[5] The National Archives, SP28/7, Warrants by army committees, military commanders, May-June 1643 ff.1, 43; the National Archives, SP28/8, Warrants by army committees, military commanders July 1643 f.93; TNA, SP28/146, f.134.

[6] *Joyfull Newes from Plimouth...* (London, 1643), TT E.102 [9].

[7] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.106–117.

[8] The National Archives, SP16/539 Part 2, State Papers Domestic, Charles I Addenda f.50; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, Charles I Addendum*, (London: HMSO, 1897) p.648.

Certainly, the City Horse troops were active at the end of May and in early June raiding the houses of suspected Royalist sympathises in London. On 29 May Harvey's own troop commander, Captain-Lieutenant Gregson, along with Cornet Theo. Barnard raided the house of Mr Peter Prestwood in Cornhill, seizing 239l in cash and over 25l in silver plate.[9] The following day, Lady Mary Gage's house in Kingston was raided and over 250l was seized along with some 'popish trinketts.'[10] Such was the randomness and energy of Harvey's attacks on suspected malignants he frequently overstepped the bounds of decency. Lady Mary Gage, possibly the wife of Sir Thomas Gage, obviously complained to the Earl of Essex himself about her mistreatment for he had one of his staff write to Harvey on 6 June asking him to return the 100l she said was taken 'if you think fit.' Harvey, no doubt taking the hint, returned it to Lady Mary shortly thereafter.[11] Sometimes Harvey's targets had influential friends who could assist to protect themselves from Harvey's zealousness, such as Doctor Donne who had 12 rings containing sapphires, emeralds, and diamonds seized in early June. Donne petitioned Oliver St John, John Pym, Sir Henry Vane and Sir Gilbert Gerrard for restitution and they were happy to instruct Harvey to return them, which he did on 20 June.[12] On 31 May over 300l was seized at St Martin-in-the-Fields, on 5 June Corporal Warren of Harvey's troop was in Beaconsfield, Buckinghamshire where they seized 17l 2s 6d from Mr Walker, while on the same day 21l was seized from Jasper Goodwin in Surrey. More raids were conducted throughout June in the City, at Limehouse, Kingston and Sheen.[13] On 4 June the Earl of Essex appointed a committee of 25 people, including both Harvey and Richard Turner, who had just been commissioned to raise a second regiment of cavalry for the City, as well as some of their own officers, other militia officers and some Common Councillors who were to supervise the distribution of the proceeds. Essex ordered that, 'The troops of horse under Col. Harvey are to be maintained and paid first out of the proceeds, and the remainder to be employed in the service of the state as shall be ordered.'[14]

In July news reached London of another Royalist uprising in Kent and, with the Earl of Essex's army to the west of London, Parliament had no regular forces nearby with which to suppress it. It was further rumoured that a large body of Royalist cavalry was advancing through Surrey and heading to support the Kent uprising. To quash the Kent revolt Colonel Richard Browne was ordered to lead a force of the London militia into Kent, while Harvey and his regiment would head for Farnham Castle to dissuade any attempted Royalist uprising in Surrey and to block an advance of Royalist forces into Kent. Harvey left the City on 20 July and headed into Surrey 'with five troops of gallant horse,' but not before seizing money from suspected Royalists at Kingston and Richmond *en route.*[15] He was presumably responsible for plundering the Richmond house of the Countess of Roxburghe at this time as well for he was ordered by the House of Lords on 22 July to secure the house and ensure nothing was removed.[16] Harvey then used Farnham as a base from which to send reconnaissance patrols across the region to establish if there were any Royalist cavalry operating in the area, to discover if there were signs of an uprising and to let any Royalists in the area 'feel the strength of his London *Boyes*.'[17] It would not have taken long for him to learn that there was no evidence of Royalist activity in the county but still the rumours persisted and were believed, for on 26 July Harvey was reported to be preparing to fall upon a party of 2,000 Royalists the following day at Guildford.[18] Despite the nonappearance of the Royalist cavalry Harvey's troops did manage to seize money and plate from a suspected Royalist near Guildford on 23 July, and the following day a patrol violently seized 57l in Godalming from the widow Morley.[19] In 1645 the personal consequences of this raid were still being felt when Judith Morley petitioned to have her money returned, she being 'a poor Widdow and conformable to all taxes of ye Parliamnt.'[20]

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[9] The National Archives, SP28/135 Part 3, Army accounts, Surrey, Sussex 1643–1649, 1643–1649, f.20.

[10] *Ibid.*, p.21.

[11] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1641–43*, p.466.

[12] TNA, SP16/539 Part 2, f.64.

[13] TNA, SP28/135 Part 3, ff.22–23.

[14] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1641–43*, p.466; TNA, SP16/497, f.165.

These raids might well have been in cooperation with Richard Norton's Hampshire cavalry regiment who were undertaking similar activities in Hampshire at the time, and who were themselves at Greywell, near Odiham on 29 July.[21] The two regiments were certainly working together on 31 July when they, along with 'a ragged rabble of Dragoons', made a speculative attack upon Basing House, the seat of the Marquess of Winchester. Since the fall of Winchester, Farnham Castle and Reading to Parliamentary forces, Basing House had become isolated but with no garrison under his command the Marquess had appealed to the King to provide a small force to hold his imposing edifice. A small garrison was duly dispatched from Oxford that arrived only on the morning of 31 July, just hours before Harvey and Norton descended on the Marquess's ancestral home, thinking the house undefended. With no supporting infantry or artillery, Harvey and Norton were unable to seize the house and were easily checked as they attacked through the park to the south of the grounds 'and we so bravely driven off by the Foot that they ran all quite away.' Norton retreated that night to Portsmouth while Harvey retired to the safety of Farnham Castle, barely 15 miles away.[22] The

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[15] Thomas Bates, *Mercurius Civicus, 13–20 July 1643*, (London, 1643) TT E.61 [11]; John Dillingham, *The Parliament Scout, 13–20 July 1643*, (London, 1643), TT E.61 [13]; TNA, SP28/135 Part 3, f.23.

[16] *Journals of the House of Lords, 1643–1644*, Vol.6, (London, 1807). p.144.

[17] John Dillingham, *The Parliament Scout, 20–27 July 1643*, (London: 1643), TT E.61 [26].

[18] Thomas Bates, *Mercurius Civicus, 20–28 July 1643*, (London: 1643), TT E.62 [4].

[19] TNA, SP28/135 Part 3, ff.24 & 26–31.

[20] *Ibid.*, p.402.

[21] Derek Hall and Norman Barber, 'Norton's Horse: The History of a Hampshire Regiment during the First Civil War 1642–1646.', *Proceedings of the Hampshire Field Club & Archaeological Society*, Vol. 41, 1985, p.239.

[22] *A Description of the Seige of Basing Castle; kept by the Lord Marquesse of Winchester, for the Service of His Maiesty: Against, the Forces of the Rebells, under Command of Colonell Norton, Anno Dom. 1644*, (Oxford, 1645), TT E.27 [5], p.2; Peter Heylyn, *Mercurius Aulicus, 5 August 1643*, (Oxford, 1643) TT E.65 [13], p.416; Hall and Barber, 'Norton's Horse', p.239.

City Horse's first taste of real combat had been a failure, but they would have opportunity to perform better shortly.

While Harvey had been in Surrey the strategic situation of the war had changed dramatically and this was to afford his regiment with its first opportunity to join Parliament's main army and to fight in a proper campaign. Sir William Waller's Parliamentary Western Army had been destroyed at the Battle of Roundway Down in Wiltshire on 13 July and then on 26 July a Royalist Army under Prince Rupert captured the strategically important city of Bristol, and with its capture almost the entire west of England had now fallen to the Royalists. To follow up this success the King decided to besiege the Parliamentary garrison of Gloucester in an attempt to secure the entire Severn Valley, opening up a secure route into Wales, which was already proving to be a source of vast numbers of recruits for the Royalist armies. With defeats in Yorkshire during the summer of 1643 the military outlook was looking bleak for Parliament. Should Gloucester fall, the King would be free to march on London again and perhaps win the war. The fall of Bristol and its strategic consequences were to directly impact Harvey's regiment, not just in 1643 but throughout 1644 as well.

The siege of Gloucester began on 10 August, and it was not long before the news reached London. Despite its strategic value Parliament initially did little to assist its Governor, the young and dynamic Edward Massey, other than send him messages of encouragement. Possibly it was assumed that the city would fall quickly, as Bristol had done, but also Parliament realised that its main field army, under the Earl of Essex, was currently too understrength to attempt a relief, having been decimated by disease earlier in the year during the ultimately successful siege of Reading. However, by late August news was received in London that Massey was still holding out, and this galvanised Parliament into action who ordered Essex to immediately mount a relief attempt with his army. To bolster Essex's army a substantial force of the City of London trained bands, now being treated as a strategic reserve, was to be attached to it, including the regiment of Edmund Harvey.

As the siege at Gloucester commenced, elements of Harvey's regiment were in and around Reigate, seizing money and plate, they then made their way back into London on 13 August via Kingston and Sheen.[23] Previously, on 8 August, a group of women protesters attempted to enter Parliament with a demand that peace be made immediately with the King. They were easily disbursed by the Trained Bands that were guarding Parliament, but the women returned the following day in greater numbers and the demonstration soon turned violent, with a number being shot. At one point two troops of horse were deployed to disperse the group, which by now included men as well.[24] While Harvey's troops had before been used to disperse demonstrators at

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[23] TNA, SP28/135 Part 3, f.25.; Bruno Ryves, *Mercurius Rusticus or, The Countries Complaint of The Barbarous Out-Rages Committed by The Sectaries of This Late Flourishing Kingdome*, TT E.1099 [1], p.128.

[24] William Ingler, *Certaine Informations, 7–14 August 1643*, (London, 1643) TT E.65 [8], pp.231, 232; TNA, SP28/135 Part 3, f. 25.; Peter Heylyn, *Mercurius Aulicus, 12 August 1643*, (Oxford, 1643), TT E.65 [26], pp.432, 434.

Parliament there is no evidence to suggest these two troops belonged to him, but it is possible. It is known that elements of the regiment were in Surrey on 9 and 10 August, while some were in Kingston on 10 August, so it is not implausible that some of the troops were in London on those dates and used to disperse the crowd before Parliament. At the time it was widely believed that the women's revolt was 'sett on and backed by some men of rank and quality'[25] and in particular by one Earl, a belief that was only reinforced on 12 August when a certain Mrs Jordan appeared before the House of Commons appealing for a permit to leave the country for her own safety. While she declared she had played no part in the tumult she informed the Commons that a great Earl of the land was involved and that this accusation would be attested to by a certain Master Knowles of Chancery Lane.[26] The matter was referred to a committee to ascertain the truth of the accusation and they quickly found that the Earl in question was in fact the Earl of Holland, who had subsequently fled to Oxford.[27] It was surely no coincidence that on the day after Jordan's petition in the House of Commons a part of Harvey's regiment raided the house of a Mr Walker in Chancery Lane, looking for Sir Ralph Canterill. Unable find him, and according to the Royalist *Mercurius Rusticus,* they tortured Canterill's former servant by burning his fingers with match, as they tried to get him to tell them of Canterill's whereabouts. The servant was unaware of where his former master was, and the troopers left empty handed. How accurate a description this report is uncertain, but it is entirely plausible that elements of Harvey's regiment raided the houses of suspected Royalists in their attempts to locate Holland and his associates in the days after the women's revolt.[28]

On 15 August, the Earl of Essex finally agreed to mount a relief attempt upon Gloucester and began organising his army accordingly but without reinforcements from London he would be unable to field an army sufficiently strong enough to make the attempt. On 18 August Parliament issued yet another ordinance to raise a loan from the citizens of London with which to pay for the expedition, while at the same time John Pym, who was at the time the *de facto* leader of the Parliamentary cause, held talks with the City government seeking their approval to use City forces to supplement Essex's army.[29] With the City's approval obtained to both finance and supply forces, the City government notified its citizens on 21 August that all shops were to be closed until Gloucester be relieved for 'the City of London and parts adjacent cannot be long in safety, if that City be lost' and that a contingent of both horse and foot from the City's forces were to be sent with Essex's army.[30]

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[25] Quoted in A. M'Arthur Ellen, 'Women Petitioners and the Long Parliament', *The English Historical Review,* Vol. 24, No. 96, (London, 1909), p.704.

[26] Samuel Pecke, *A Continuation of Certaine Speciall and Remarkable Passages from Both Houses of Parliament, 10–18 August 1643,* (London, 1643), TT E.65 [21], pp.5, 6; *JHC 1643–1644,* Vol. 3, (London: HMSO, 1802), p.203.

[27] William Ingler, *Certaine Informations, 14–21 August 1643,* (London, 1643). TT E.65 [24], p.238.

[28] *Mercurius Rusticus* ,p.128.

[29] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O,* Vol. 2, pp.251–254; Hexter, *The Reign of King Pym,* pp.148–149.

[30] *Whereas the Committee for the Militia in the City of London by vertue of an ordinance of both houses of Parliament, ... have power to command the shutting up of all shops,* TT 669.f.7[33].

Parliament subsequently issued a similar ordinance on 23 August, legislating what had been previously agreed with the City but adding that this force would include 'Fifteen Hundred Horse, or any less Number.'[31] With Turner's new regiment barely established the only cavalry force available to the City was Edmund Harvey's regiment.

The City forces that had been selected for the Gloucester expedition, the Red and Blue Regiments of Trained Bands plus the Red, Blue and Orange Auxiliaries, mustered at the New Artillery Grounds on the morning of 23 August and immediately marched out of the City towards Brentford.[32] Harvey's regiment is not specifically mentioned as departing with the main London force and his regiment probably left separately, with Norton's Hampshire regiment and some other county troops, and this column only joined up with Essex after he had left Aylesbury with his main army on 1 September. It is probable that Harvey was given command of this composite brigade.[33] There is some evidence to suggest that Harvey's brigade was attacked on 30 August in the vicinity of Thame, just as they came off the Chiltern hills heading north. In a letter written at Harvey's behest to the Militia Committee providing them with an update of the regiment's progress on 6 September, reference was made to a previous letter written in which had been described the march from Wokingham to Thame, during which the writer describes what befell Harvey's cornet 'who came off from the Enemy by whom he was set upon.'[34] Unfortunately this first letter does not survive but from other accounts it is known that the Royalist Lord Wilmot, who was commanding a covering force of cavalry to the south of Banbury, did engage with Parliamentary forces in the region of Thame on 30 August.[35] According to Wilmot this was a force from Kent, Hampshire and Sussex of less than 2,500 horse and foot. He informed Prince Rupert 'A party of mine met with their *avant-couriers*, took five prisoners, and killed more.'[36] Nothing else is known about this clash but certainly Harvey's force came out second best even though the Royalists were unable to stop him joining Essex's main army around Bicester, probably on 1 September. (see Map 3)

Essex intended to march his army across the Cotswold Hills to the north of Cheltenham, then head south towards Gloucester, avoiding the Royalist capital at Oxford and their garrison in Banbury to the north as he marched from Bicester. On the night of 1 September, the army was quartered in a string of villages around Bicester, with Harvey's regiment in Somerton, some seven miles to the north-west. With Wilmot's cavalry lurking on the plain

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[31] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 2, p.260.

[32] Henry Foster, *A true and exact relation of the marchings of the two regiments of the trained-bands of the City of London*, (London, 1643), TT E.69 [15].

[33] *True Relation...Glocester*,p.1; *Two letters the one from his Excellencie, Robert Earl of Essex, to Anthony Nicoll, Esquire, a member of the House of Commons : the other from Warwick-castle to Sir Samuel Luke at his quarters, concerning the state of the city of Gloucester*, 1643, E.337.

[34] *True Relation...Glocester*, p.1.

[35] Edward Hyde, *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England*, Vol. 4, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, New Edition, 1836), p.230.

[36] Eliot Warburton, *Memoirs of Prince Rupert and the Cavaliers*, Vol. 2, (London: Richard Bentley, 1849) p.230; Allen B Hinds (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, 1643–1647*, Vol.27, (London: HMSO, 1926), p.18.


N
Upton-upon-Severn
Tewkesbury
14 Sep
Hook Norton
2 Sep
Somerton
Adlestrop
Cornwell
3 Sep
Southam
Naunton
Stow-on-the-Wold
1 Sep
Prestbury
5 Sep
4 Sep
6 Sep
Gloucester
Aylesbury
Oxford
Thame
Cirencester
15 Sep
Cricklade
16 Sep
Swindon
17 Sep
? Aug
London
Windsor
Reading
Aldbourne Chase
18 Sep
28 Sep
Newbury
Hungerford
20 Sep
Wokingham
0
10
20
30 miles

Map 3: Colonel Edmund Harvey's Regiment on Campaign, Summer 1643 before the Cotswold Hills this was always going to be a tense time. According to a letter Harvey wrote to the Militia Committee, some 2,000 Royalist horse spent that night facing him in the fields, necessitating his regiment remaining alert all night. No fighting resulted as the terrain was too difficult for cavalry to operate in, but his men were kept from their refreshments and sleep for a good part of the night.[37] The following day there was some skirmishing between Wilmot's cavalry and the Parliamentarians, but this did nothing to slow the advance of Essex's army. That night Harvey's regiment spent an uneventful night in the small village of Hook Norton at the foot of the Cotswolds.[38] The following day, 3 September, they rode up onto the hills but only as far as Cornwell where they spent the night, with the weather starting to turn unseasonably cold. The next day Harvey's regiment was bringing up the rear of the army as it trudged its way towards Stow-on-the-Wold. When they reached the village of Adlestrop in the late morning, they saw a body of Royalist horse descend the hill at a place that Harvey called Emlard, which is probably Evenlode. Having some artillery with his composite brigade Harvey 'fired his Demi-Culverin three or four times successively: with the first and last shot we conceive we did some execution: upon this the Enemy retreated,' to be followed someway by other Parliamentary cavalry.[39]

The regiment spent a chilly night 'in the hilly open fields' beyond Stow 'without any refreshment.' Now they were in the hills it was much harder to forage for food. They marched all day on 5 September but by nightfall had only reached Naunton, some half a dozen miles away from Stow. On 6 September they headed for Prestbury, overlooking Cheltenham, where the Cotswold Hills end with a steep descent into the Severn Valley below. From atop of the Prestbury escapement Gloucester could be seen in the distance. But as they reached Prestbury in the afternoon the weather turned and the hills were drenched in heavy rain, soaking the by now cold, tired and hungry Londoners. At the bottom of the escarpment was waiting a large body of Royalist horse.[40] Essex was keen to get his army off the exposed and windswept hills and into the valley as quickly as possible. His artillery fired on the Royalists below who quickly moved away allowing his army to descend. He also fired some of his larger guns as a signal to the defenders in Gloucester that their relief had arrived. With night quickly falling and the rain incessant, it was too dangerous for him to attempt to bring his guns down the steep descent in the dark, so they remained on the hills overnight. Harvey's brigade was to come down the hill that night and quarter in the village of Southam to whence he, his cornet and a few others from the brigade went ahead to make the arrangements. It was now dark, and the army was edgy, knowing full well that there were Royalist cavalry about. In the darkness, Harvey and his small party were mistaken for Royalists by some soldiers under the command of Major Bourne and Captain Buller and were fired upon 'before we could make them understand who we were.' Harvey was eventually able to inform their assailants who they were, and the nervous firing stopped but not before Cornet Flesher was mortally wounded.[41]

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[37] *True Relation...Glocester*, p.2.

[38] *Ibid.*

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] *Ibid.*, p.3.

The following day the news started to trickle into Essex's army that the King, not wishing to fight in the Severn Valley with the unsubdued garrison in Gloucester at his back, had raised the siege the day before and marched, they believed, towards Bristol. In fact Charles had headed north, towards Worcester, where he aimed to cover any advance Essex might make towards Warwick and the west Midlands. Essex had fulfilled his objective and relieved Gloucester. Now he needed to get his army back to London, intact. The Royalists believed Essex would head for the Parliamentary garrison at Warwick for he could not take a southerly route home as this was too close to the Royalist garrison in Bristol and it was unlikely that he would retrace his steps over the Cotswold Hills, having already cleared it of what little provisions it contained. In fact Essex intended to headfirst for Cirencester, by crossing the Cotswolds by a more southerly route than he had taken previously, and then make for Swindon and beyond that to Newbury to follow the Kennett Valley back to Reading and safety. The Royalists had been unable to do much more than harry Essex on his advance from London with their cavalry as all their infantry were before the walls of Gloucester, but now that Essex had no option but to make a dash back to London for safety, the King knew he had an excellent opportunity to block his return and defeat him in battle. Victory would leave London wide open, bar Sir William Waller's small army that was shielding the capital. But for Essex to get his army away from Gloucester undetected would be no easy feat. Essex needed to convince the Royalists that he was going to take the logical route back to safety, which was via Warwick and into the Parliamentary controlled Midlands. To do this he sent most of his army north to Tewkesbury on 10 September, where they remained for four days. He then sent his cavalry farther north still, to Upton-upon-Severn on 12 September, where they clashed with Prince Rupert's cavalry, to reinforce the illusion that he would head for the Midlands. To the Royalists this seemed to be the only option Essex had and so they concentrated their forces around Evesham, where they planned to give battle when Essex made for Warwick. After reinforcing Gloucester, Essex rested his army for what he believed would be a desperate gamble. He and his entire army knew they would have to race for the safety of Newbury but if they were attacked by Rupert's superior cavalry as they were strung out along the route, it would surely end in disaster. There is no reference to the part Harvey's regiment assisted in the ruse at Upton, but they certainly played their part just by being there.

On the night of 14 September, Essex led his army away from Tewkesbury on an audacious march by which he hoped to hoodwink the Royalists, who still expected him to head for Warwick. They marched all night and all the next day, half expecting Rupert's cavalry to swoop down on them, but they never did. In the early evening of 15 September, his advance guard of cavalry stormed into Cirencester, totally overwhelming the minimal Royalist garrison there and capturing some wagons loaded with provisions. For a full day, the Royalists were blindly unaware that Essex had marched south but when they finally realised what had happened Rupert began the chase, with much of the Royalist's 5,000 cavalry plus 1,000 commanded musketeers, while the King followed with the rest of the army as fast as he could, heading for Newbury. Rupert arrived at Cirencester on the night of 16 September only to find it empty of Parliamentarians except for a few stragglers. Essex was by then between Cricklade and Swindon. On 18 September in the early morning he left Swindon and headed for Hungerford needing to cross the River Kennett to keep the river between him and the Royalists and from there get to Newbury as fast as he could. But by now Rupert was gaining ground as Essex's tired army and he fell upon the Parliamentary exposed rearguard at Aldbourne Chase later that day.[42]

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[41] *Ibid.*

The Parliamentary rearguard, which included Harvey's regiment, was commanded by John Middleton. A force of about 1,000 Royalist fell upon the rearmost Parliamentary units that afternoon, who turned to defend themselves but were quickly disordered and forced to retire into the units behind them, which had also turned to protect the main body of the army. The Royalists did not immediately follow up their advantage and so Middleton was able to launch a counter-attack that drew more of the Parliamentarian cavalry into the *melee* in the valley bottom. Rupert then sent in another regiment to bolster his attack, and this resulted in Middleton throwing Harvey's and Norton's regiments into the fight. Harvey 'gave the *enemy a brave charge,* and was encountered with as much *gallantry* on the other side, so that they both retreated at one time.'[43]

Henry Foster of the Trained Bands described Harvey's charge,

> Then Collonell *Meldrum* and Colonell *Harvies* troops drew up in a body & gave the enemy a very fierce charge, which was performed with as brave courage and valour as ever men did, and then wheeled about to a Regiment of our foot that stood in the reer of them, the enemy pursued them in their retreat, skirmishing one at another all the way.[44]

It was at this point that Captain Peter Willett 'received a shot from the enemy, of which wound he is since dead: we lost no other man of note in this fight.'[45] Harvey's attack obviously failed to stabilise the by now chaotic Parliamentary rearguard and so Essex sent more cavalry from the advance guard to bolster resistance, which eventually discouraged Rupert from being more aggressive in his attack. The Royalist plan had been simply to slow Essex down sufficiently to allow the King and the Royalist infantry to get to Newbury ahead of him rather than fight a full scale battle without infantry or artillery, thus Rupert was content to just disrupt Essex's march as much as he could. The Parliamentary army straggled into Hungerford late that night after Rupert had called off his attack.[46]

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[42] *A True Relation of the Late Expedition of His Excellency, Robert Earle of Essex, for the Relief of Gloucester with the Description of the Fight at Newbury*, (London, 1643), TT E.70 [10], pp.9–11.

[43] *Ibid.*, p.11.

[44] Foster.

[45] Foster.

Essex at this point must have felt that he had made it to safety being now less than a day's march to Newbury, having the River Kennett between him and Rupert. Newbury was on the edge of Parliamentary controlled territory, and he knew the King would not risk following him beyond it towards the heavily fortified garrison at Reading. Essex sent out advance detachments to enter Newbury to arrange food and billets while he brought up his tired and hungry army, for he was certain he would receive a warm welcome in the town. It must have been an extreme shock to him therefore when, in the early afternoon of 19 September, these advance units were seen fleeing back towards his army with the terrible news that the Royalist Army had occupied Newbury.[47] After the fighting at Aldbourne Chase had not slowed the Parliamentary army's advance Rupert knew it was now just his cavalry that stood between Essex and escape. As soon as day broke on 19 September, he and his cavalry came off the Wessex Downs and raced along the north bank of the Kennett as fast as they could go. No doubt frantic messages were sent to the King, who was still on the Downs to the south of Wantage, advising him to get the infantry to Newbury as fast as he could. Somehow Rupert managed to get his fastest units into Newbury by early afternoon and these were quickly followed by the rest of the cavalry. Before long the Royalist infantry, with the King to the fore, flooded into the town. With the Royalist Army now blocking his route, Essex was in trouble. His army was exhausted and hungry. Almost the entire West Country behind him was in Royalist hands and the nearest Parliamentary garrison that could provide him with safety was Gloucester. He could not stay where he was as his army would soon starve. He only had one option: he had to attack the Royalist Army in Newbury and break through to the safety of the Reading garrison beyond or his army would be destroyed.

Early the next morning, 20 September, Essex marched his men towards the Royalist Army, which was by then deployed to the west of the town between the River Kennett and the smaller River Enborne. Between the two armies sat Bigg Hill and to its immediate south was Wash Common, neither of which had yet been occupied by the Royalists. Essex had little choice but to initiate an attack and he sent his infantry forward in the dawn light to occupy Bigg Hill, which he found devoid of Royalists. As daylight broke the Royalists advanced and attempted to capture Bigg Hill, and throughout the rest of the day infantry on both sides fought on and around the hill, but the stubborn Parliamentary foot could not be dislodged. On the more open Wash Common, Sir Philip Stapleton led the Parliamentary horse in an attempt to break through the Royalist lines but was attacked before he could deploy. Despite numerous Royalist charges during the early morning, the Parliamentary horse held their line, and the Royalists were unable to capitalise on their numerical superiority. At some time during the morning Stapleton brought Harvey's regiment into action on Wash Common to help stabilise the Parliamentary position, after which 'the *enemy* with their whole body charged upon them bravely and were as well received.' In the ensuing *melee* the Parliamentary horse were pushed back while the cavalry of both sides was 'all mixed together and in this confusion many were slaine on both sides, and our men at last were forced towards the lanes end where they first came in.'[48]

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[46] *True Relation...Newbury*, p.12.

[47] *Ibid.*

Despite being forced back, the Parliamentarian line was not broken and some scrappy fighting continued for the rest of the day, with neither side being able to break through and so both sides fought themselves to an exhausted standstill. The King, desperately short of ammunition and losing his nerve, withdrew from the battlefield overnight and into Newbury, leaving Essex's route to Reading and safety open. The following day as he marched past Newbury, Royalist cavalry attacked his rearguard, but it seems Harvey's regiment was not one of those units attacked. The Royalists were unable to press home this attack and it was soon brushed off and by nightfall the Parliamentary army was safe. The Earl of Essex had performed the unthinkable. He had marched his army to Gloucester, relieved Massey and then got his army safely back to the Thames Valley, though not without incident, and with Harvey's regiment with him every step of the way. The City Horse regiment, along with the rest of the City forces, marched triumphantly back into London on 28 September, many of them wearing 'green boughs in their hats in signall of victory.'[49]

Prior to the Battle of Newbury the performance of the Parliamentary cavalry during the campaign had been reasonable. On the march to Gloucester they had guarded the infantry well and warded off Wilmot's numerous attempts to disrupt their progress. Once in the Severn Valley they had shielded Essex's resting army and were instrumental in convincing the Royalists that they intended to head for the Midlands, but it is also true that at no time were they severely tested. At Aldbourne Chase they had managed to fight off Rupert's attacks, although not easily and had Rupert been more assertive the Parliamentary cavalry might well have been defeated. At Newbury, the cavalry was on the defensive most of the day and were unable to launch any serious attacks upon the Royalists and after they were pushed to the edges of Wash Common during the morning, they played little role in the rest of the battle. Certainly, the Parliamentary cavalry gained no glory for themselves during the campaign, but they fulfilled their role adequately, which was a vast improvement on its performance during the Edgehill campaign a year before. The campaign was the first real test for Harvey's regiment, and they certainly did not excel during it. In the three recorded significant engagements with Royalist cavalry they engaged in, they came off second best on each occasion. It is telling perhaps that at both Aldbourne Chase and Newbury his regiment was kept in reserve and only committed to the fight when the regular regiments of the army were in desperate need of support, or exhausted. But this unremarkable performance cannot be surprising. It is doubtful that they had received much training in open warfare and its experience of war thus far was limited to plundering suspected Royalists of their wealth rather than more soldierly activities. Despite their far from stellar performance there is evidence that the regiment suffered considerably as a result of its involvement in the campaign.

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[48] *Ibid.*, p.14.

[49] Henry Whalley, *The True Informer, 30 September 1643*, (London, 1643), TT E.69 [14], p.11.

Assessing regimental casualties during the campaign is difficult. The strength of the regiment when it departed London at the end of August has not been recorded. It consisted of five troops, and so had it been at full strength it would have mustered about 350 officers and men. The accounts of Juxon and Harvey's troops provide a hint of the casualties that they suffered. With the death of Captain John Juxon his troop was linked with Harvey's own, possibly with Harvey taking over the role as troop commander rather than the two troops being formerly merged. On 9 September, the joint troop received pay amounting to 531l 1s 4d for the previous 16 days, giving it a wage bill of just over 33l per day. On 22 September, at Reading, it was paid 428l 14s 4d for the 13 days since their last pay date, which is equal to just under 33l per day. On 12 December, the troop was paid 275l for 9 days' pay, an average of just over 30l per day. Crude as this calculation is, it suggests that the strength of the two troops had barely diminished over the course of the campaign although afterwards its strength fell, presumably as it was unable to replace the wounded who left the troop on its return to London, plus desertions.[50]

A surviving manuscript in the National Archives sheds some light on the performance of both troops during the campaign.[51] The manuscript is severely damaged, with sections in the body missing on multiple folios, as well as having many of the edges torn, meaning that considerable parts of the text are missing or illegible. The manuscript was prepared in early 1645 and was intended to be a record of all horses and equipment received by Harvey's own troop (including Juxon's) and what happen to them all once the regiment had been disbanded. The first section lists losses apparently in date order (but these are extremely damaged with barely a single entire line having survived) while the back sections of the manuscript, which have survived better, list losses separately for horses, saddles, weapons and armour. Despite the fragmentary nature of this manuscript the following detail can be extracted, and this provides an indication of the losses incurred by the two troops during the campaign. On 5 October the Militia Committee issued 56 saddles, 96 pairs of pistols and 84 carbines to replace those lost during the campaign.[52] In July and August 1643, 70 sets of back and breast plates and pots were issued to the troop, while it was also recorded that 50 sets had been lost at the Battle of Newbury.[53] It is not clear but it seems that 10 horses were killed at Newbury, with some others killed at Aldbourne Chase.[54] In October and November 30 new horses were issued, suggesting that horses suffered a high wastage rate.[55]

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[50] The National Archives, SP28/147 Part 1, Army Accounts, Miscellaneous receipts and vouchers, 1642–1660, f.63; the National Archives, SP28/131 Part 7, Colonel Harvey accounts 1643–1644, ff.1–5. My thanks to Keith Roberts for our numerous discussions on the matter of the Harvey-Juxon troop relationship.

[51] TNA, SP28/27 Part 1, ff.2–10.

[52] *Ibid.*, ff.6, 9.

[53] *Ibid.*, f.10.

[54] *Ibid.*, f.7.

A list of those members of the troop 'wounded & Slaine' can also be found in the manuscript. It comprises names in two columns, the first of which is complete and clear, while the second column, next to the right edge of the folio, is incomplete where it has been torn, but it appears that the columns list the same number of names. The first column lists 18 names that can all be clearly read and the second column consists of 12 that can be partially read before a tear has obscured the rest of the list. The space that the tear has created might have listed another 4–6 names based on character size and positioning. And so it is clear that the joint troops incurred at least 30 casualties and perhaps as many as 36.

Only one name on the first column has the suffix 'Sla' written after it, which presumably means slain. On the second column only five names are written completely before the tear and so it is impossible to know if any of the names had this suffix at the end. Assuming this list is accurate, very few of the troop seem to have been killed though many were wounded. Without knowing the strength of the two troops prior to deployment it is impossible to ascertain the percentage of casualties but assuming they were both at full strength, which is doubtful, they would have mustered around 140 officers and men. Taking the maximum casualties listed (36) it would mean that the joint troop suffered around 25 percent casualties, though these were virtually all wounded rather than fatalities. If the strength was less than this, then the percentage rate would obviously be even higher. What is clear is that the two troops incurred high casualties on campaign and, if this were the same in the other three troops, the regiment would have been severely depleted upon its return to London.[56] Of those whose names can be identified as wounded or slain, 13 do not appear on the muster list of 12 December and so it may be assumed that their wounds were sufficient to incapacitate them from further service with the troop.[57] Interestingly, the first name on this list is Cornet Flesher, who was shot at Southam on 5 September when he was noted as being mortally wounded. In fact on this list it is not Flesher that has the slain suffix but a certain Sam Buckley. However, at a muster of the troop on 12 December 1643, Flesher is not mentioned as being the troop cornet and so was certainly a casualty.[58]

As fascinating as this manuscript is it cannot be relied upon to be entirely accurate, but it provides some insight into how the regiment was affected during the expedition. However, it suggests that while battle casualties were quite low, with few fatalities, the losses of equipment were disproportionately higher. The numbers of saddles lost ought to correspond closely to the number horses lost if no effort was made to remove them from dead or worn out horses, which was probably not a priority for the soldiers at the time. Nevertheless, only about half the number of remounts were issued on their return to London compared to the numbers of saddles lost, which might indicate carelessness in looking after the saddles rather than lost horses. Again the quantities of weapons and armour lost is also disproportionately high.

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[55] *Ibid.*, f.7.

[56] *Ibid.*, f.5.

[57] TNA, SP28/131 Part 7, ff.1–5.

[58] *Ibid.*, f.5.

Given such low casualties to lose this much equipment suggests that much of them might have been deliberately discarded at some point on the campaign. It was a common sight to see disorganised and routed troops throw their weapons away if they fled from a battlefield, although there is no evidence to suggest the regiment was routed at either Aldbourne or Newbury, but they would certainly have been severely disorganised. At Newbury it is clear that Harvey's regiment was pushed back some considerable way by the Royalist cavalry and so it is not implausible to suppose the troops threw away some of their equipment in their panic to find safety. An alternative scenario might be that they carried a surplus of equipment in wagons, and these were captured, possibly on the day after the battle when Rupert's cavalry was able to plunder the Parliamentary baggage train, leading to the need to replenish later or maybe even much of it was inferior quality and was unable to withstand the rigours of a campaign. In all likelihood the reasons for such disproportionate losses were a combination of all of these.

One fatality incurred by the troop is certainly not noted in the manuscript list, and that is Captain John Juxon himself, who was mortally wounded at Newbury and died of his wounds back in London. One account noted,

> His Horse was Shott by a Cannon bullet in the Forehead being Stunnd wth the blow, ran wth him violently right on, in to his Maties Army where the Horse fell down dead, & He was mortally wounded & left dead, but the body of the Army leaving the place left him too, & by that time he recovered his Sences, & was carried to London, & dyed wthin few dayes'[59] He died at the house of Mr Gethin's 'of his honourable wounds received at the fight at Newbury' and was buried at All Hallows, Bread Street on 6 October, 'Colonel Harvie, with his regiment of horse attending.'[60]

According to a manuscript copy of captured Parliamentary cavalry colours, Major Robert Mainwaring lost his cornet in the battle.[61]

Upon its return Harvey's regiment was not allowed to remain long in London. By now the regiment consisted of six troops; Harvey's own, Mainwaring's, Juxon's, Washbourne's, Norwood's and Captain Symon Hackett's (who took over Willett's troop). Juxon's troop, despite the death of its captain seems to have retained its establishment although it served under the command of Harvey as troop commander, although it seems not to have been formally merged into his troop.[62]

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[59] H. A. Dillon, 'On a MS. List of Officers of the London Trained Bands in 1643', *Archaelogia*, Vol. LII, Second Series, Volume II, 1890, p.138; The British Library, Ms Harley 986, 'The Notebook of Richard Symonds'; John Southerden Burn, *Registrum Ecclesiae Parochialis: The History of Parish Registers in England*, (London: John Russell Smith, 1862), p.107.

[60] Burn, *Registrum*, p.107.

[61] National Army Museum, London, Ms 1962-08-1, 'Standards Taken in the Civil Wars,' n.d, f.81.

Essex had felt the need to abandon Reading when he left it at the end of September and by early October rumours were circulating in London that the Royalists had occupied the town once more and were starting to fortify it. To retake the town the Militia Committee agreed to an Ordinance of Parliament that they provide seven infantry regiments and 'As likewise Fifteene hundred horse, or any lesse number' to immediately join Essex and Waller's armies at Windsor on 9 October.[63] No mention at this time was made that Harvey's regiment was to be a part of this force however as Richard Turner's newly raised regiment of City Horse was already with Waller it would seem they were necessary to make up the required numbers.[64] Nor was any duration for this deployment specified but later evidence suggests that the City forces, or at least the Trained Bands element, were only to be sent out for a month. On 20 October, it was rumoured in London that Harvey's regiment was shortly to join this growing force and he probably joined Essex shortly afterwards, for his regiment were reported as being quartered in Hertford on 22 October.[65] In fact, Essex and Waller had parted company, with the latter heading into Hampshire and Essex moving his army into Bedfordshire to protect London from any advance the Royalists might make from the north, as Prince Rupert had been active during this time in Northamptonshire and looked like he might try to advance closer towards London.

On 29 October, a force commanded by Philip Skippon that included some of the London Trained Bands, as well as both Harvey's and Turner's regiments, occupied the strategically important town of Newport Pagnell, which had been held by the Royalists since earlier in the year but recently evacuated.[66] Skippon's force had concentrated at St Albans on 25 October, before marching to Dunstable and Brickhill. On the night of 28 October a Royalist force tried to interrupt Skippon's march and fell upon Harvey's regiment, probably somewhere between Newport Pagnell and Brickhill. According to one London newsletter 'whereupon his [Skippon's] men being in a readiness pursued the Cavaliers, tooke five of them, and slew one of them, and had done great execution upon many of the rest, had not they fled away so fast.' Unperturbed, Skippon continued his march the following day only to find that the Royalists had abandoned Newport Pagnell prior to his arrival, allowing his force to occupy the town without any opposition.[67] It was possibly then that an undisclosed number of horses (though probably only one) were lost by Harvey's own troop at Brickhill 'in service'.[68] The Earl of Essex now had his headquarters at St Albans, while his army was spread out across Bedfordshire, northern Berkshire and southern Northamptonshire, blocking the route towards London. As such, Newport Pagnell, while not isolated, was certainly in an exposed position along the fluid frontline, probably marked by the course of the River Great Ouse at this point, with the Royalist forces in recently occupied Towcester to the west of the river as well as from their permanent garrisons in Banbury and Oxford. A small Royalist garrison was also established inside Grafton Hall, just six or seven miles from Newport Pagnell. With Harvey's regiment close to the front line it was only a question of time before they clashed with their Royalist foes.

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[62] The National Archives, SP28/131 Part 6, Colonel Harvey's Accounts, 3 Oct 1643–11 July 1644, f.2.

[63] JCC Vol. 40, ff.78v,79r; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol.1, p.306; William Ingler, *Certaine Informations, 9–16 October 1643*, (London: 1643), TT E.70 [29], pp.300–301.

[64] John Dillingham, *The Parliament Scout, 20–27 October 1643*, (London: 1643), TT E.73 [8], p.162.

[65] Henry Whalley, *The True Informer, 14–21 October 1643*, (London: 1643), TT E.71 [28], p.40; Thomas Bates, *Mercurius Civicus, 19–26 October 1643*, (London: 1643), TT E.72 [10], pp.169–170.

[66] Henry Whalley, *The True Informer, 21–28 October 1643*, (London: 1643), TT E.74 [1], p.47.

[67] Thomas Bates, *Mercurius Civicus, 26 October–2 November 1643*, (London: 1643), TT E.74 [14], p.178.

On 1 November, a force under the command of Harvey raided the nearby Royalist garrison at Towcester. Arriving by night they 'slew the enemies Sentinels' and then descended upon their quarters where they 'tooke two Colours, one and twenty prisoners' which they brought to Newport Pagnell. *Mercurius Civicus* claimed they killed at least 30 Royalists, but this is likely an exaggeration. The broadsheet also claimed 'This exploit was performed without losse of any of our souldiers, onely two of them were wounded, but yet so as there is hopes of their recovery'.[69] The following day a larger force, that included both Harvey's and Turner's regiments, plus Colonel John Middleton's regiment of Essex's army, attacked another Royalist outpost at Alderton, only three miles from Towcester and within sight of Grafton Hall. Here they 'slew 15 on the ground, took 22 prisoners, and many horses which were left behind, the riders shifting for themselves.' It was further noted that these captured horses were sold at a 'horse-Fayre' later that day in Newport Pagnell, the horses being sold 'good cheape for ready money'.[70]

Not surprisingly the Royalists quickly retaliated to these provocative raids. On the morning of 4 November a force believed to have been led by Prince Rupert himself, descended upon Harvey's brigade in their quarters at Olney after making a risky all night march avoiding the Parliamentary garrisons at Northampton and Newport Pagnell. The town of Olney, sitting astride the River Great Ouse, was some way behind the front line and so it was likely that Rupert was not just retaliating but also making a statement that he could hit the Parliamentarians no matter where they were nor how safe they thought they were. One Parliamentary newsletter claimed Rupert had 1,500 cavalry with him while Harvey himself estimated he had 'seven or eight Regiments of their Horse, foure hundred Dragooners, and two hundred commanded Musqueteers, mounted behind the Troopers'.[71] Harvey's force comprised of his own regiment, Richard Turner's, John Middleton's and the Red Regiment of the London Trained Bands. The town contained the main road running in a north to south direction with others branching of it, a bridge across the river at the southern end of the town which led to a small

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[68] TNA, SP28/27 Part 1, f.7.

[69] Thomas Bates, *Mercurius Civicus, 2–9 November 1643*, (London, 1643), TT E.75 [18], p.186.

[70] *The Happy Successe of the Parliaments Armie at Newport and Some Other Places*, (London, 1643), TT E.75 [19].

[71] *Ibid.*; Edmund Harvey, *A Letter from Colonell Harvie...* (London, 1643), TT E.75 [24].


N
Northampton (P)
Olney (P)
River Great Ouse
Towester (R)
Grafton Hall (R)
Alderton (R)
Newport Pagnell (P)
Banbury (R)
Stony Stratford (R)
Brickhill (P)
Dunstable (P)
Oxford (R)
St. Albans (P)
Skirmish/Siege
(P) Parliamentary garrison
(R) Royalist garrison
0
10
20
30 miles
London

Map 4: Colonel Richard Turner's and Edmund Harvey's regiments on campaign, Dec 1643 to Jan 1644.

island in the river, and then on to a second bridge which carried the road towards Newport Pagnell. One eyewitness described the length of the two bridges and the causeway between them as being 'as long as a man might hardly sling a stone from end to end … without any railes or wals on either side.'[72]

After the attack Harvey admitted that his scouts were caught unawares but they subsequently 'gave us the Alarum some what too late, not above a quarter of an hour before their body appeared within Musquet shot of the Townes end' when they arrived 'about seven in the morning.' Despite this, Harvey deserves credit for being able to rouse his men quickly and get at least part of his force mounted and deployed in the fields to the north of the town by the time Rupert arrived. Harvey's scouts informed him that the Royalists numbered less than 500 men and which knowledge 'imboldned me to draw forth, our Troope into the Field.' However once deployed he quickly realised there were considerably more than this facing his outnumbered command, which at this point consisted of 'but eight Troopes.'[73]

As Rupert's force deployed, and it became apparent to the Parliamentarian cavalry that they were significantly outnumbered, they lost their nerve and, as Harvey himself explained in a letter to the Earl of Essex, which was published on 11 November, this 'occasioned ours to retreat too fast and disorderly into the Towne, and some much farther.'[74] Harvey would have us believe that his force put up some resistance in the town itself and even checked Rupert's advance 'with a very small number' before he was forced across Olney bridge and onto the meadows to the south of the river. He was certainly almost immediately ejected from the town, but it is doubtful that he put up the spirited resistance that he informed his commanding officer about. George Payne of the Red Regiment noted that Harvey and Mainwaring desperately attempted to halt their fleeing troops through the village, evening firing on some of the men to make them stand, while his major 'broke his pistoll about their heads, but such was the spirit of feare that had possest them that nothing might prevaile.'[75]

If Harvey is to be further believed he was able to rally 'all we could prevaile with to stand,' around 200 in total, in the meadows beyond the bridge and faced around 60 Royalists that ventured to cross the bridge. Harvey then charged the Royalists, so he claims, with only 60 of his own men, and who 'most hastily retreated over the Bridge, we pursuing them, where many of them were wounded, slaine, and tumbled over the Bridge.' A Trained Band officer commented that Harvey's charge was 'with such violence'[76] he initially cleared the bridge but after this Harvey then notes his force was quickly beaten back by the Royalist musketeers 'to the end of the Bridge next Newport,' where they regrouped and then made another advance on the more northerly of the two bridges into town. This time, he claims, the attack was more successful for 'despight of them, entred into the Towne, and advanced, and kept the Towne, and cleared it, and drew out into the Field, and faced them.' He concluded his recounting of the battle by claiming at this point the Royalists 'In great haste and fear ... marched away.'[77]

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[72] George Captaine Paine, *A True Relation of all the Skirmishes Between Our Forces and the Cavaliers at Owlny*, (London, 1643), TT E.76 [3], p.2.

[73] *Harvey Letter.*

[74] *Ibid.*; *True Relation...Owlny.*

[75] *True Relation...Owlny*, p.2.

[76] *Ibid.*, p.3.

Another description of the battle, which was published in London on 10 November, essentially agrees with Harvey's account in broad detail but adds some more specifics, which may or may not be accurate.[78] This account suggests that Harvey put up a more spirited defence when Rupert first attacked that was received 'stoutly by our men, untill we could orderly retreate to the Bridge, which with ease we made good against them.' At this point, the account continues, the Royalists 'had no list to stay so long' and they then retreated only to be attacked by a relief force that had set out from Northampton. A postscript to this account adds some more detail of Harvey's apparent role in the fighting. It claims that Parliamentary musketeers were able to delay Rupert's initial charge sufficiently for Harvey to draw up 'an indifferent body of Horse together, who came bravely in the Enemy' but were then forced to withdraw through the town. Apparently, this was a 'very hot incounter ... not exceeding halfe an houre' before Rupert broke through but they were 'stopped before they came to the Bridge' and then retreated back towards Towcester.[79]

The Parliamentary newsletter *Mercurius Civicus* later claimed that as Harvey had 'timely intelligence' of the raid he was able to draw his forces into a body 'a s[m]all distance from the Towne, and upon the enemies approach discharged violently against their forlorne hope and repelled then' but was eventually forced to retire by 'the multitudes of the enemy.' Harvey then counter-attacked 'and forced them to quit the Towne.'[80] Another London broadsheet, the *Parliament Scout*, perhaps hinted at the truth when it acknowledged that there was 'a report that our horsemen ran away (but the horsemen say the foot ran) and left their Officers, or a great many of them.'[81] Not surprisingly the Royalist *Mercurius Aulicus* newsletter gave its readers an alternative narrative. It claimed, rightly, that the Parliamentary force consisted of three regiments of horse and upon Rupert's advance 'the Rebels drew themselves up into a body as though they meant to fight, His Highnesse did the like, but presently perceiving that the Rebels drawing up was to gaine an opportunity of stealing out of the Towne.'[82] Rupert then attacked whereupon 'the Rebels fled, except some few Commanders' to the river where 'there was a long cause[wa]y at the end of the Towne (and that full of flying Rebels).' Here the Parliamentarians 'turned upon His Majesties Forces, who...beat the Rebels quite out of the Towne.'[83]

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[77] *Harvey Letter.*

[78] *Happy Success.*

[79] *Ibid.*

[80] *Mercurius Civicus, 2–9 November 1643*, (London: 1643), p.186.

[81] John Dillingham, *The Parliament Scout, 3–10 November 1643*, (London: 1643), TT E.75 [22], p.172.

[82] Peter Heylyn, *Mercurius Aulicus, 4 November 1643*, (Oxford, 1643), TT E.75 [37], p.629.

[83] Peter Heylyn, *Mercurius Aulicus, 11 November 1643*, (Oxford, 1643), TT E.75 [28], p.633.

From the extant sources it is difficult to ascertain the true course of the battle. The newsletters were written as propaganda to magnify one side's perceived success against the other, while Harvey's letter to Essex sought to downplay the mediocre performance of his forces, and thus none can be considered completely reliable. But from these a general sense does appear as to what most likely occurred that morning in the otherwise sleepy north Buckinghamshire town. With Essex's army behind the River Great Ouse as far back as St Albans, the bridge at Olney was an important crossing point that needed to be secured and which explains why an entire brigade of Parliamentary cavalry were quartered there. The road north from Olney led to the Parliamentary garrisons at Northampton and Bedford, while the road to the south provided a gateway into the rear of the Parliamentary garrison at Newport Pagnell. The capture of Newport Pagnell barely a week before had extended the Parliamentary presence perilously close to Royalist held Towcester, which was itself an entrance into the Royalist heartland around Oxford. Rupert, who had been farther west when Newport Pagnell fell and the raids around Towcester began, was determined to discourage further Parliamentary incursions in the area by conducting a large reprisal raid on the relatively lightly defended crossing at Olney. The make up of his force was mobile, without artillery or infantry (other than musketeers mounted behind some of his horsemen), which suggest it was purely meant to be a hit and run raid, for he lacked the strength to secure and defend the town, if he captured it. Leaving Towcester during a night that had a barely visible quarter moon, his force would have traversed the (still) lightly populated, and dark, terrain between Newport Pagnell and Northampton, arriving to the north-west of the town at sunrise, around 7 o'clock.

Harvey's scouts only raised the alarm as Rupert arrived, allowing him just enough time to hastily assemble a force in the fields to the north of the village. Probably this force fled back into Olney without putting up much resistance and towards the safety of the two bridges across the river, and the road to Newport Pagnell. The accounts imply that that when Rupert did attempt to cross the bridges it was only with a small portion of his force. Given that he had in excess 1,000 men with him he could easily have deployed more men to capture the bridge had he chosen to. Most likely he chose to not force the bridge crossing as he had no tactical reason to do so. The purpose of the raid was purely to create panic and disorder. The only reason to capture the bridge south would have been if he intended to attack Newport Pagnell from the rear, which would have been a very rash move and one that could have easily led to his unsupported force being surrounded, with the river to his rear. Most likely Rupert decided that once he had raided the town his mission had been accomplished and he ordered his forces to retire in the face of the rally that Harvey had managed in the meadows between the two bridges. He then conducted a fighting withdrawal from Olney and back to Towcester, escaping before the Northampton garrison was able to send a meaningful relief to Harvey.[84]

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[84] My thanks to Stephen Ede-Borrett for his comments and suggestions regarding the fighting at Olney.

Harvey's performance at Olney was hardly exceptional. He had no regular military experience prior to the war, though he was a member of the Honourable Artillery Company, but despite this he was rapidly made not just a colonel in the summer of 1643, but also given the command of a brigade on the march to Gloucester, and was commanding another one in November. Undoubtedly, this was due to political reasons as the army and Parliament wished to express their gratitude to the City for the use of their forces. Middleton was an experienced Scottish officer, who had served on the Continent before the war and who went on to senior command in the Parliamentary, Scottish and Royalist-Scottish armies and so was evidently an officer of some ability, and certainly a better choice as a brigade commander than the novice Harvey. By his own admission, Harvey was caught unawares when Rupert attacked, though he had sufficient notice of the attack not to be caught still in bed. Perhaps a more experienced commander would have set a better *picquet* line or even had patrols out in the fields in the gap between Northampton and Newport Pagnell, the obvious direction from which a Royalist attack would come. He seems to have shown a degree of personal bravery in mustering his outnumbered forces if his own account is to be believed. It is also clear that those elements of his brigade that he did manage to deploy performed poorly and fled almost as soon as Rupert advanced and, while they rallied once on the safety of the other side of the river, the ease with which they were to reoccupy the town had more to do with Rupert's tactical withdrawal than the soldiers fighting ability. It is impossible to know if the more experienced Middleton would have performed better had he been in command of the brigade.

Estimates of the casualties incurred during the fight vary considerably. Harvey informed Essex that about 19 men of both sides were killed with at least two Royalist officers captured. Amongst the Royalist dead were 'three persons of quality.' He claimed his force lost eight or nine men taken prisoner, with as many as 40 horses lost (which suggests some of the horses were probably still stabled when the Royalists attacked).[85] Another Parliamentary account stated eight or nine Royalists were killed with just five Parliamentarians dead but with 'many wounded on both sides.'[86] A Parliamentary eyewitness claimed that in Harvey's troop one soldier was killed with eight wounded while in Norwood's 7 or 8 were slain.[87] *Mercurius Aulicus* characteristically exaggerated the Parliamentary dead at 60–80 with around 40 captured.[88]

There is insufficient evidence to ascertain the specific part Harvey's regiment played in the fighting, but some clues exist that hint at their experience. In early December, the regiment was paid for the first time since its deployment with Essex's army and the records for Harvey's own troop show that two men had been killed since the last pay day, with one of them, John Lumber, having his pay arrears paid over to his wife. At the same time Toby Overton, a trooper in Harvey's own troop, was paid 1l 'for dressinge wounded men.' Neither of these two references specify that these casualties were incurred at Olney but they certainly date from November 1643. A more specific reference is the sum of 5l paid to the regiment 'by way of incoragement for their service att Oulny.'[89] Another document exists that shows that in the month before December 1643, Harvey's troop recorded that they lost nine sets of saddles, pots, pistols and carbines which were either 'Run away or lost Slaine & taken prisoner' and which must have occurred while on this deployment, most likely at Olney.[90] There is no suggestion in Harvey's troop accounts that they lost any horses at Olney but they are, admittedly, badly damaged so it is possible that they did. As records for the other troops in the regiment do not exist it is unknown how they fared. Robert Hubbard, a trumpeter in Hackett's troop was also killed at Olney.[91] The pay records for Hackett's troop indicate that on 27 October the troop consisted of 50 troopers, on 3 November it still mustered 50, but on 9 November there were only 47, suggesting his troop probably lost at least three men at Olney.[92] On 3 November, Thomas Pate, also of Hackett's troop was paid as a trooper but on 9 November he had been promoted to corporal, replacing Nathaniel Lawford who, while still serving with the troop, had reverted to being a private trooper which suggests that during the week of the Olney raid he had done something to warrant a demotion.[93] Hubbard's trumpet was probably also lost when he was killed for a new trumpet banner was purchased shortly afterwards, as were new coats for the remaining trumpeter (Richard Hubbard, Robert's son) and the newly promoted Edward Fox. [94] A manuscript at the National Army Museum in London purportedly contains sketches of Parliamentary cavalry cornets captured by the Royalists. It includes the drawing of a plain red cornet with the caption 'This Cornett was taken at O[l]ney when the Prince went to Tossestter [Towcester] in November last.' It is unclear who this cornet belonged to but it is possible that it belonged to Harvey's regiment, which did carry red colours, although there is no other reference to it losing a cornet there.[95] While sources are fragmentary it is clear that Harvey's regiment did incur casualties both at Olney and throughout the time they spent with Essex's army, though perhaps not considerable.

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[85] *Harvey Letter.*

[86] *Happy Success.*

[87] *True Relation...Owlny,* p.5.

[88] *Mercurius Aulicus, 4 November 1643,* p.629.

After the attack on Olney, Harvey continued to receive intelligence of Royalist troop movements in and around Towcester and he was convinced that an attack upon Newport Pagnell was imminent.[96] The Parliamentary *Weekly Account* provides an account that Harvey's regiment attacked a Royalist outpost at Stony Stratford, also on 4 November, but the date given is highly questionable. It is doubtful that the regiment was able to launch an attack some 10 miles away on the same day they were badly mauled at Olney. If the attack upon Stony Stratford happened at all, and only this newsletter actually reported it, it most likely happened before Olney when Harvey was in that general vicinity or possibly some days later.[97]

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[89] TNA, SP28/131 Part 7, ff.3, 4, 5.

[90] TNA, SP28/27 Part 1, f.9.

[91] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, ff.150,160.

[92] *Ibid.*, pp.148–150.

[93] *Ibid.*, pp.149,150.

[94] *Ibid.*, p.160.

[95] National Army Museum, Ms 6208-1, Standards Taken in the Civil Wars (aka 'The Ilchester Ms.'), n.d., f.77.

[96] *Harvey Letter.*

No further mention is made in the existing sources of how Harvey's regiment was employed for the rest of November. As no further raids are mentioned it is probable that the regiment remained around Newport Pagnell, possibly even in Olney, patrolling and guarding the Parliamentary line along the River Great Ouse. Back in London the Militia Committee was anxious for all of the City forces to come home. On 20 November it petitioned the House of Commons requesting their forces be returned as the agreed deployment for one month had by then elapsed.[98] Receiving no response they followed up their request 10 days later along with a demand that Parliament promptly pay their forces.

In response, Parliament ordered the sum of 5,000l be set aside to pay the City forces then with Essex, but they also asked that the City permit that their forces remain with Essex.[99] The City informed Parliament on 30 November that they were in agreement to keep their forces with the Earl of Essex 'a while longer'.[100] Presumably as a result of these dealings money was made available for the City Horse, because in early December Harvey's regiment was paid 729l, but for just nine days pay.[101] There is no evidence that Harvey's regiment was included in Skippon's force that attacked and captured Grafton Hall on 24 December but as this force consisted of London Trained Bands, and Turner's regiment was also present, it is likely that they were. Harvey was certainly still in Newport Pagnell on 8 January when he sent a letter to the House of Commons.[102] Harvey's regiment marched back into London on Friday 13 January with the rest of the City Brigade and three days later they were paid once again by the Militia Committee, their first since being paid by Essex in early December.[103]

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[97] Bernard Alsop, *The Weekly Account, 1–8 November 1643*, (London 1643). TT E.75 [10], p.5.

[98] *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol. 3, p.315.

[99] *Ibid.*, p.323.

[100] *Ibid.*, p.325.

[101] TNA, SP28/131 Part 6, f. 2.

[102] *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol. 3, p.362.

[103] Henry Whalley, *The True Informer, 6–13 January 1644*, (London, 1644), TT E.81 [31], p.130; TNA, SP28/131 Part 6, f.2.

4

Radical Politics, 1643

Political tensions in both the City and Parliament were running high in the summer of 1643 and this turmoil led directly to the raising of the City's second regiment of horse. After the coup of early 1642 that had diminished the traditional power of the Court of Aldermen and which brought City governance by the Common Council to the fore, the City had established an informal alliance with John Pym's moderate faction in Parliament. Pym's followers, the so-called Middle Group that dominated the House of Commons throughout 1642 and early 1643, wished to pursue the war against the "King's evil advisers" to its end and then, in the peace settlement that followed, ensure Parliament obtained a greater role in national politics, especially in financial matters while at the same time gaining oversight in the appointment of Royal advisers. They also hoped to be able to dominate religious reform by dismantling the form of Arminianism that Archbishop Laud had championed and replace it with a moderate from of Presbyterianism, the curbing of bishop's power and influence but which provided little scope for broader toleration of more extreme dogma. Pym and his followers were no radicals, they were not republican in sympathy and in religion they sought to restrain the excesses of the more extreme followers of the gathered churches and sectaries.

Pym skilfully dominated the initial opposition to the King before the war and orchestrated the war effort from early 1642 until his death in December 1643. As leader of the Middle Group of moderate Presbyterians he was able to temper the enthusiasm of the smaller War Group, that included Henry Martin, Arthur Haselrig and William Strode, who wanted a more aggressive pursuit of the war with a more revolutionary political settlement after it had been won. At the same time he was able to restrain the Peace Party, led by Denzil Holles in the Commons, who constantly pushed for a settlement with the King on any terms. Pym knew he needed the money of the City of London to finance the war, along with the goodwill of the metropolitan populace to fill the ranks of the army, and so willingly forged connections with likeminded individuals in London. His views found common ground with many in the City establishment of wealthy merchants, financiers and traders, who were happy to see the curbing of both the King's and Episcopal power but who were not looking for any revolutionary change in government. While the

Common Council now included some individuals that sought more radical political change, most were actually relatively moderate in outlook. The Militia Committee, while less conservative than the majority of Common Council, were still far from radical either. There were still many moderate voices in government, as well as many crypto-Royalists who would willingly see the war concluded immediately and who were able to act to restrain any excesses that the radical minority might seek to implement.

Nevertheless there was a small but increasingly well organised and active group of radicals within London who believed that the war ought to be prosecuted more vigorously and who were concerned that Pym and the Lord General, the Earl of Essex, might conclude peace with the King without their more radical aspirations being satisfied. One historian has rightly called these 'the radical wing of the London Parliamentary movement'.[1] While caution needs to be taken when attaching broad political labels to individuals before the era of defined political parties, broadly speaking the leaders of the City radicals belonged to a social strata that included both the newly affluent traders, the 'New Merchants', and their associates, who had made their money over the past several decades despite the monopolies on commerce of the guilds and overseas trading companies; and also the middling sorts whose voices were perennially never heard by the ruling elites. They were predominately what would shortly be called Independent in religious outlook, meaning they opposed the rigidity of Presbyterianism and wanted greater toleration to allow them to practice their faith in their gathered, separatist churches, which rejected the need of an established clergy to administer their needs. Politically they desired a greater role for themselves and their section of society in all levels of politics at the expense of the traditionally governing elites, with some even calling for the establishment of a republic, universal franchise and redistribution of wealth.

Within this broad spectrum there were many opposing views and conflicts of ideals. This was certainly not a homogeneous grouping with a defined and shared political agenda. These radicals found a natural ally in the vociferous preachers that abounded in London at the time, many of whom openly questioned the nature of God, who defied the traditional forms of religious establishment and who constantly espoused the importance of the individual. Not surprisingly some of the poorer, more dispossessed segments of society gravitated towards the ideals of the radicals and their preachers, who seemed to be their only champions in their daily struggle to survive. Unsurprisingly the radicals saw Pym as an ally who could be used, at least in the short-term, to help establish their political credentials and influence while the wily politician recognised the need to keep these well organised groupings in check through maintaining good relations with them, while attempting to curb any excesses of them and their more politically aligned friends of Martin's War Group.

However, this informal alliance of self-interest was constantly under strain, and it was the position of Lord General Essex that led to the first cracks appearing between the City and their Parliamentary friends in the summer of 1643. It was also these strains that led directly to the second regiment of City Horse being raised. Pym had seen the Earl of Essex in 1642 as the best candidate to lead Parliamentary armies. He was a reasonably experienced soldier, Presbyterian and more likely aligned to Pym's Middle Group than the House of Lords dominated Peace Party or the more radical firebrands like Henry Marten's War Party, who preferred a more revolutionary approach to politics and a recklessly aggressive prosecution of the war. Despite Essex's very obvious shortcomings as a commander he was deemed safe to the moderates in Parliament and as such Pym made every effort to bolster his support and provide the assistance he needed. The Committee of the Militia, for the most part, supported Pym's moderate approach and were comfortable with Essex having nominal command of City forces by virtue of his commission as Lord General of all Parliamentary forces.

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[1] Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, p.427.

Despite this, some of the impatient City radicals, in late 1642 and early 1643, openly called for Essex's removal and replacement by a more capable general, while others went even further and called for the City's forces to be completely independent of Essex. These more radical views were checked in early 1643 by the ongoing peace negotiations with the King, but when these broke off in mid-March resentment of Essex and greater calls for London to control its own forces soon grew. With no hope of a peace on the horizon Pym once again approached the City for a loan to finance the upcoming spring military campaign but was informed by Pennington, at the behest of Common Council, that the City was struggling to raise money previously committed, that no new loans could be collected and that no further recruits could be expected from the City.[2] Possibly Pennington and his radical allies were playing a far-sighted game of bluff with Pym. By orchestrating the rejection of the money by Common Council, not hard to do as many of its members were far from happy to finance the war either themselves or through the City, he was creating an opening for the more radical of the City activists to fill the void and establish a platform from which to project their own political agenda.

On 15 March Alderman John Fowke, a later clearly defined political Independent and probably with Pennington's tacit support, submitted a petition to Common Council stating that as 'divers well affected citizens' of the City were prepared to raise and finance at their own expense a force of three regiments of horse and seven of foot, some 10,000 men in total for 'the better safety of the City', he suggested that a new committee be established to form this new army.[3] As Fowke's proposal suggested this new army be made of part-time volunteers, to be paid only when on duty, the offer seemed a cost effective way for the City to fulfil its obligations to Parliament at a minimal financial cost to the City. The proposal was immediately accepted by Common Council in a clearly manipulated about face and who then recommended the proposal to Parliament, which duly endorsed it on 12 April. However, Fowke's proposition made no mention that this new army ought to be controlled independently from the Militia Committee nor did it imply that if the well-affected citizens of the City were able to raise such a force, it would be natural for them to expect to control it. With the majority of the supporters of the scheme recognised as radicals and opponents of the more traditional forces in the City government, their suggestion of a new committee to manage it would create a significant power base for those in the City who desired greater political and religious reform at both municipal and national level. And so when Parliament enacted an Ordinance on 12 April authorising the creation of this force it also granted the right for a sub-committee, albeit subservient to the main Militia Committee, to be established to oversee it. The Committee was to meet at Salters Hall in Bread Street and subsequently became known as the Salters Hall Committee. The City radicals had cleverly used their connections with Pennington and in Parliament to add this proviso to the scheme without the knowledge of Common Council, who would have immediately recognised the threat it posed to their own dominance over the Militia Committee. But not only this, the City radicals had also obtained from Parliament the authority to raise a new army beyond the traditional jurisdiction of the City of London, in the City of Westminster, Southwark, the Liberties and the parishes of Surrey and Middlesex that lay within the Lines of Communication and the Bills of Mortality. The suburbs were always areas of social discontent and a welcome home for the ideals that the radicals ascribed to and so in one easy measure they obtained a legitimate mechanism of control and organisation across the entire greater London area. The Salters Hall Committee was to control a recruiting ground larger than the Militia Committee had been granted. [4]

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[2] JCC Vol. 40, f.54v.

[3] *Ibid.*, p.55v.

Secure in the knowledge that Parliament would accept the London radicals offer of a new army, which in turn would establish a power base from which they could operate, the radicals wasted no time in publishing what amounted to a manifesto of their demands. On 30 March, a group of citizens, led by John Towse, John Warner, John Fowke and Thomas Andrewes, radicals all, and whom the Royalist *Mercurius Aulicus* called 'the most seditious in the whole pack',[5] delivered a petition to Common Council with a request for it to submit a remonstrance of their desires to Parliament, known as the *Remonstrans Redivivus*. The previous day the fiery preacher Hugh Peter had railed against the weakness of Parliament, had espoused the fallacy that the King was being led astray by evil councillors but that it was the King himself that was to blame the current confrontation with Parliament, and that the supreme power of the nation lay with the people, through the elected Parliament and not in the King. He also preached that Parliament therefore needed not the assent of the King to govern. Peter also demanded that only politically dependable men should be employed in government, no peace ought to be negotiated with the King without the agreement of the people and that a national covenant be prepared. These were radical claims indeed and only one step away from a call for a republic, and they were certainly contrary to Pym's moderate tones, but they represented the views of many of the ordinary Londoners who the City radicals, Independents and Puritan divines believed they represented.[6] Peter's preaching's were clearly the basis of a coordinated strategy of the City radicals which became clear when the remonstrance was submitted to Common Council with him watching on. Common Council, while prepared to accept the suggestion of a new army was unprepared to countenance the militants demand for an overthrow of the existing mode of government and *Remonstrans Redivivus* was rejected on 18 April, quashing the radical's political agenda for the time being.[7]

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[4] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O* Vol. 1, pp.130–131; *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol. 3, p.40; Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, pp.444–449; Pearl, *London*, p.260.

[5] Peter Heylyn, *Mercuricus Aulicus, 8 April 1643*, (Oxford: 1643), TT E.97 [10], p.170.

The London radicals, frustrated by the dismissal of their political agenda turned their attention to extirpating the authority that the Militia Committee was to have over their base in Salters Hall. In early May the Salters Hall Committee broadcast their intention to start raising the forces approved by Parliament, but without due consultation with the Militia Committee. Furthermore, they notified their intention to raise funds for the new force by arranging a voluntary weekly collection of money equivalent to the cost of a single meal through a network of collectors and treasurers nominated by them, and without any prior approval from Common Council.[8] In effect the sub-committee was declaring its intention to operate without oversight or control of the main Militia Committee, a move unlikely to go unchallenged. The Militia Committee countered by preparing a petition to Common Council seeking confirmation of its sole right to manage and control the military forces of the City and which was intended to clarify the Salters Hall Committee's subsidiary nature to the main committee. The radicals pre-empted this by petitioning Common Council themselves on 9 June seeking their confirmation that as per Parliament's ordinance of 12 April that their Committee had the right and sole authority to manage and control the new forces. However, the forces of reaction were well mustered this time and Common Council instructed a small committee of trusted moderates and crypto-Royalists to review the matter. This Committee, naturally, found in favour of the Militia Committee's right to control all military forces in the City and effectively destroyed the Salters Hall Committee's claim for independence. As a sop they recommended that seven members of the Salters Hall Committee be admitted to the Militia Committee, so at least the radicals obtained a considerable presence on main committee.[9] But once again the radical's political agenda was frustrated. Strengthened by victory, in early July Common Council sought Parliament's approval that the Militia Committee had the sole authority to control City forces, which was duly granted, as was the confirmation that the Militia Committee also had authority over those places within the Lines of Communication and of the Bills of Mortality, even though much of this was outside of the jurisdiction of the City of London, giving them control over the suburban militias as well. The Militia Committee had seen off the challenge of the City radicals and even had their own authority expanded as a result.[10]

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[6] JCC Vol. 40, f.57r; *Remonstrans Redivivus: or, An accompt of the remonstrance and petition, formerly presented by divers citizens of London, to the view of many...* (London: 1643), TT E.61 [21]; *Mercuricus Aulicus, 8 April 1643,* (Oxford: 1643), pp.170–171; Pearl, *London*, p.261; Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, pp.444–448.

[7] Como, *Radical Parliamentarians*, p.167.

[8] *A Declaration and Motive of the Persons Trusted, Usually Meeting at Salters Hall in Breadstreet to all Well Affected Persons in the Severall Parishes Within London...* (London: 1643), TT 669.f.7 [10].

[9] JCC Vol. 40, ff.62v, 63r, 67r.

Despite many of the radicals aims being thwarted the recruiting of this volunteer army continued throughout the summer of 1643, when seven infantry regiments were raised, which became known as Auxiliaries and which comprised, for the most part, of young men and apprentices.[11] The Salters Hall Committee continued to oversee the recruitment of these regiments and influence the choice of their officers. While they lost the right of independence, they still exerted enormous influence and were thus still a force of significance within the London area. The genesis of Richard Turner's regiment of City Horse is to be found within the power struggle that occurred between the Salters Hall Committee and the main Militia Committee during the summer of 1643. Turner was himself a prominent City radical who sat on the Salters Hall Committee from its inception, had supported the *Remonstrans Redivivus* and was one of those appointed to the Militia Committee in June.[12] At least three of his troop commanders can be also identified as radicals. The Salters Hall Committee remained in existence for some time afterwards and in early 1644 it again made a play to control additional units of auxiliaries that were raised in London, but once again their plans were thwarted by the Militia Committee.

The ambitious radicals, not content with trying to dominate the City forces and force a national political agenda, also made attempts to subvert the authority of the Earl of Essex during the summer of 1643, who they saw as too politically unreliable to command the Parliamentary armies. Essex had achieved little so far for all the money Parliament (and London) had spent on his army. His capture of Reading in April 1643 could not be followed up due to a shortage of men and money and he remained inactive in the Thames Valley, while his army was wracked by disease.

Elsewhere, the Parliamentary cause seemed to be faltering as a Royalist Army under Sir Ralph Hopton had cleared Cornwall and Devon and was by June threatening Parliament's garrison in Bristol, the nation's second most important city. In the Midlands Prince Rupert and his cavalry seemed to be able to maraud at will. In the North of England, the Royalist Earl of Newcastle had defeated the Parliamentary forces under Lord Fairfax and was threatening to advance into East Anglia, while Queen Henrietta Maria had returned from Europe with a massive supply of arms and ammunition for the Royalist cause. In early July, a Royalist revolt erupted in Kent, which threatened even the safety of London. Another hammer blow followed in mid-July when news of the defeat of Sir William Waller's army at the Battle of Lansdown was received in London followed by the destruction of his army at Roundway Down by Royalist cavalry sent from Oxford, and it seemed now that Bristol was doomed. Waller blamed Essex for not stopping the Royalist force that defeated him and there were many others willing to blame the Lord General as well. In London, the mood was despondent, with many believing the war was lost, for it was now only a matter of time before the King marched once again upon London, and with Essex's army depleted and mutinous, there seemed little that could be done to protect the capital. London shuddered when the news that Bristol had fallen reached it at the end of July.

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[10] *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol. 3, p.171.

[11] Nagel, 'Militia', pp.75–89.

[12] TNA, SP16/497, f.143; JCC Vol. 40, ff.57r, 67v.

Essex was a poor politician and many believed him to be an equally poor general, and he was unable to effectively deflect the constant snipping at him. With the death of Colonel John Hampden in June he lost the benefit of his practical advice and sound political acumen, while Pym also lost a moderate ally. In early July, a dejected Essex wrote to Parliament suggesting more peace proposals be sent to the King as he saw no way to counter the growing success of the Royalist armies. The letter sent shock-waves around Parliament with many fearing Essex might even defect to the King and for a time Pym, the Lord General's most ardent supporter, lost control of the political agenda in Parliament. While some in the Peace Party welcomed Essex's lame proposal, the more resilient Parliamentarians began considering that replacing Essex might be the best course of action to reverse the military decline that was clearly apparent, and quickly the name of Sir William Waller was on everybody's lips as the likely replacement.

In early July, and most likely at the instigation of the City radicals, proposals were issued and circulated across London calling for a new army of 10,000 men be raised which was to be independent of Essex.[13] These demands echoed the calls of November 1642, which led to the creation of the Earl of Warwick's short-lived army, but this time a core of recruits were available in the shape of the City Auxiliaries. On 20 July, a group of Londoners appeared before Parliament demanding that their petition, with as many as 20,000 signatures for a new army to be created from a general raising of the entire population, be accepted. The petition called for a committee to be immediately established to form this new army and it even listed who the committee members ought to be, a list that contained almost exclusively staunch War Party supporters and radicals. Parliament, intimidated by the aggressive nature of the petition, which came at such a dire time of military misfortune, instantly acquiesced to the demands and the Parliamentary committee was established.[14] This committee, headed by the fiery Henry Marten, met on 27 July and unanimously appointed Sir William Waller commander of this soon to be raised army, an appointment immediately ratified in Parliament, which then initiated the process of enlisting men and collecting money. The City radicals, despite their earlier setbacks, now seemed to be on the verge of obtaining their independent army along with a commander in which they could trust and a radical Parliamentary committee to control it. With this new army the radicals would have a force at their bidding to help implement the more revolutionary polices that it had espoused in *Remonstrans Redivivus* earlier in the year.[15]

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[13] *Instructions and Propositions Drawne up and Agreed on by Divers Well Affected Persons in the City of London...* (London 1643), TT E.59 [15].

[14] Pearl, *London*, p.270.

A temporarily weakened Pym was unable to stop the creation of the Committee for the General Rising through a combination of bad timing, a backlash against his stout support of Essex following the latter's incendiary letter, and illness but he was determined to minimise its influence. Only two days after the meeting on 27 July, Pym and his allies in the City were able to mitigate Marten's General Rising Committee's influence by having Parliament appoint Waller to be the new commander of all the City of London forces, while at the same time granting the City authority to raise yet more forces.[16] By virtue of this appointment Waller become responsible to the Militia Committee and through it, to Parliament, thus removing at a stroke his independence of action. This naturally created a conflict as he was commander of both the intended army of the General Rising and the City forces, which created sufficient confusion and friction to scupper much of the radicals' plans. Despite Marten's bellicose rhetoric and the preachers of London exhortations, the radicals had overestimated their ability to cajole the London masses to join this new army. With no financial foundation with which to pay for the army they soon found that Londoners were unwilling to contribute funds to pay for it and with no support from the City government forthcoming, the recruitment fizzled out with barely a few hundred recruits mustering. Martin squabbled with everybody and unrealistically demanded the combined City forces march immediately to confront the King, while the City insisted that the army's role was to defend London itself. Martin was publicly humiliated by the lack of support for his proposed army and with that Pym sensed an opportunity to be rid of his antagonist. When Martin called for the execution of the King in mid-August Pym was able to orchestrate his arrest and subsequent confinement in the Tower of London. With a lack of recruits and Martin's arrest, the proposed army simply disintegrated along with the radicals hopes of an independent power base. The radicals had over played their hand and lost. Henceforth, they remain marginalised in City politics until 1647 when a radically minded New Model Army started to interfere in national politics.

With the collapse of the Committee for General Rising tensions within London's military establishment eased somewhat. Waller was now nominal commander of the City forces, with the implied knowledge that such a command was subsidiary to the Militia Committee and Parliament, and therefore he was under the command of Essex as well. The Lord General initially refused to approve Waller's commission and it was only after Pym, once again in control of events at Westminster, had promised him money, recruits and the leading role in the summer campaign that he finally agreed to issue Waller with his commission, but protracted and public negotiations over this clearly put Waller in his place. By mid-August Waller had his commission to command an army, but none existed for him to lead. Eventually with the backing of Parliament and the Militia Committee he was able cobble together a composite force, initially intended to protect London while Essex advanced to the relief of Gloucester, from the remnants of his defeated Western Army and county association troops from Hampshire, Surrey and Kent. Lacking sufficient infantry he was obliged to request from the Militia Committee regiments of the City Trained Bands and only when these were provided was able to take to the field in October 1643. The deployment of Waller's army provided the opportunity for the newly raised regiment of cavalry commanded by Richard Turner to take the field.

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[15] *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol. 3, p.183; *A Declaration of the Honourable Committee of the House of Commons at Merchant-Taylors' Hall, August 3, 1643*, (London 1643), TT E.1058 [1], pp.281–282.

[16] *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol. 3, p.187; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O* Vol. 1, pp.211–213.



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Colonel Richard Turner's Regiment, 1643–1647

The regiment of Colonel Richard Turner was formally established on 24 August 1643. The preamble to Turner's accounts, that he prepared in August 1645, mentions that the regiment was formed 'upon an order of the honble [sic] House of Commons in or about the month of August 1643 together wth certayne propositions tendered to the Committee for the Militia of London'.[1] However, the origins of the regiment can be traced to at least the previous month when, on 25 July, reeling from the news that Sir William Waller had been defeated at Roundway Down, Parliament passed an ordinance authorising a mobile force of 6,500 cavalry be speedily raised and to be placed under the command of the Earl of Manchester. This force was to be raised across the counties of East Anglia, the modern Home Counties and within the City of London and surrounding areas. The Cities of London, Westminster and the County of Middlesex were instructed to raise 1,500, who were required to muster at Tothill Fields in Westminster on 28 July. The ordinance specified that 'the Troopes of Trained Horse of each County are to bee accompted as part,' which clearly implies that the bulk of this new force was to comprise of militia units from the localities. The Militia Committee was delegated the responsibility to raise the cavalry around London and under the ordinance were granted the authority 'to take and seize the Horse or Horses of any person' within their authority and to fine anybody who might 'show himselfe opposite or refractory unto this service.'[2]

It is doubtful that London and environs were able to muster any horse on that date with Harvey's regiment in Hampshire at the time, but nonetheless the Militia Committee duly attempted to raise horses for this force and by early August some horses had been raised. On 10 August Manchester wrote to the Militia Committee informing them that they were to transfer 1,000 of the horses they had raised, with their riders, to the command of Sir William

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[1] The National Archives, SP28/132 Part 1, The Accompt of the raysing, arming, paying and reducing Colonell Richard Turner his Regiment of horse, 1645, f.1.

[2] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.215–219.

Waller who at that time was forming an army for the defence of London.[3] Evidently the Militia Committee had been struggling to raise such a number of horses for on the following day they petitioned Common Council for assistance as they 'found difficultie in raising soe many horses' and requested the Council's assistance in raising more.[4] Common Council formally declared that within its jurisdiction any person that lent or had horses seized would receive satisfaction from the City.[5] The Militia Committee was then able to instruct the Salters Hall Committee to appoint 25 of its members, including Charles Gheste and Timothy Whiting, both of whom were to be troop commanders in Turner's regiment, to commence the raising of horses within London.[6]

There is therefore a credible link between the radicals of the Salters Hall Committee and the formation of Turner's regiment, while Turner himself had been a prime instigator in the formation of the Committee back in April. It is possible that the core of Turner's regiment was formed even before the Parliamentary Ordinance of 25 July. The London militants that had forced the creation of the Salters Hall Committee in April had made it clear that the volunteer force they wished to raise was to include cavalry as well as infantry. As they immediately set about raising the infantry that would become known as the Auxiliaries, it is plausible that they made similar efforts to raise cavalry at that early date as well, though firm evidence is lacking. However, in early June Richard Turner, along with Edmund Harvey, was commissioned by the Lord General to seize horses and plate in and around London, which might imply that Turner had the forces available to him for this, and that they were as mobile as Harvey's men.[7] Turner, Richard Salwey, Charles Gheste, Edward Storey and George Thompson, each of them troop commanders in the regiment, were all connected to the radical movement within the capital that had solidified around the Salters Hall Committee, thus it is again plausible they were appointed within the three months prior to the 25 July ordinance.

It is telling though that Turner's accounts specifically state that the officers were 'nominated & appointed' by the Militia Committee, which clearly illustrates how the Salters Hall Committee had had their wings clipped by early July.[8] Certainly Gheste's troop was active in July 1643, some weeks before the formal establishment of the regiment, while Whiting's troop was receiving horses as early as 7 August and Salwey's just a few days later.[9] Perhaps if they were raised prior to 24 August 1643 they acted as independent troops and were only regimented in the third week of August. It should be remembered that the original City troops raised in 1642 were only regimented under Harvey as late as July 1643. Interestingly, a manuscript containing illustrations of City Horse cornets produced in late 1646 implies that Turner's troop was raised in 1642 but no other evidence to corroborate this has been found.[10]

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[3] TNA, SP16/497, f.257.

[4] JCC Vol. 40, f.71r.

[5] TNA, SP16/497, f.256; TNA, SP28/132 Part 1, f.1.

[6] TNA, SP16/497, f.256.

[7] TNA, SP16/539 Part 2, f.50.; Nagel, 'Militia', p.112.

[8] TNA, SP28/132 Part 1, f.1.

[9] The National Archives, SP28/9, Warrants by army committees, military commanders August 1643, 1643, ff.309, 327; the National Archives, SP28/139, Part 10, Accounts of Captain Charles Gheste, 1643–1649, f.109v.

The initial troop commanders of Turner's regiment were:

Colonel Richard Turner[11]
Major Richard Salwey
Captain George Thompson
Captain Edward Hooker
Captain Timothy Whiting
Captain Charles Gheste
Captain Beale
Captain Edward Storie (Storey) (joined the regiment on 23 October 1643).

Furthermore, troops commanded by Major [?William] Underwood, Captain Bonnell and Captain [?Walter] Boswell were all issued with at least one horse in September by Thomas Walker, horse commissioner for the Salters Hall Committee, but whether these were meant to be part of Turner's regiment is not clear. Underwood was certainly radical enough to have been attracted to the Salter's Hall Committee, as indeed was Boswell. There was a 'Mr Bonner' listed on that Committee in mid-August and this may be Captain Bonnell. It is possible that at some point before the regiment deployed the following month, they were all appointed to command troops and subsequently replaced or were unable to serve.[12]

Turner was a City merchant who lived on Watling Street, almost next door to Salter's Hall, where his regiment was first conceived by the London militants. Salwey was the son of Worcestershire MP Humphrey Salwey and who had married the daughter of Richard Waring, a colonial merchant, City radical and close business associate of Maurice Thompson.[13] Thompson was the younger brother of influential 'New Merchant' Maurice and, like his brother, later a religious Independent. Hooker, despite his early radical leanings in 1642, was to prove to be an ardent Presbyterian and was later to suffer for his stance.[14] Little is known about the other troop commanders and none of them seemed to have continued to serve in the regiment after Turner left in the spring of 1644. Whiting was active within the parish affairs of St Pancras, Soper Lane and was probably the same person who was renting a house in Soper Lane, Cheapside, assessed at 20l rent per year in 1638.[15] Storie, who was an ironmonger by trade, had been on the Salters Hall Committee in early 1643 and continued to play a minor role in the Presbyterian City government in 1645 and 1647, while in 1653 he signed a petition calling for the recall of the Rump Parliament. After this was recalled in July 1659, he was appointed to the Militia Committee and again in March 1660, but he refused to serve as major in Richard Browne's cavalry regiment.[16] Nothing at all is known about Charles Gheste, nor about Beale, not even his Christian name. Clearly nearly all of the senior officers had radical political leanings when they were appointed.

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[10] The Bodleian Library Oxford, 'London in Armes Displayed', Ms. Rawlinson B.48, c.1646, f.14.

[11] Appointed Colonel 23 October 1643, prior to that he held the rank of both captain and major, SP28/132 Part 1, f.4.

[12] The National Archives, SP28/10, Warrants by army committees, military commanders Nov-Dec 1643, 1643, ff. 49, 50 & 52; *A Paire of Spectacles for the Citie*, (London,1648), E.419 [9], p.8; TNA, SP16/497, f.256.

[13] Charles Harding Firth, 'Richard Salwey (1615–1686)', *ODNB*.

[14] More detailed biographies of these officers appear below.

[15] Liu, *Puritan London* p.237; T. C. Dale (ed.), *The Inhabitants of London in 1638: Edited from Ms 272 in the Lambeth Palace Library*, Vol. 1, (London: The Society of Genealogists, 1931). p.173.

According to Turner the regiment spent the first month of its existence 'guarding the Avenues of this City.' Probably this entailed day and night attendance at the Court of Guards that protected important parts of the City.[17] The rather vague accounts produced by Captain Charles Gheste suggest that his troop at least spent some time in Kent and Surrey (Vauxhall and Camberwell), most likely in August and September.[18] It is probable that the different troops had, just as Harvey's had done barely a month before, been engaged in seizing money, horses and plate from suspected Royalist sympathises in the vicinity of London. There is no evidence that shows them involved in controlling the demonstrations in the City at the time, but it is likely that they did so.[19]

Gheste's troop was certainly active in Surrey during this period, when it was used by the Committee of Sequestration to help dispose of property seized from suspected Royalists. They were involved with the dismantling of the Royal gun foundry in Vauxhall and the subsequent disposal of the equipment and some of the pieces of ordnance that were found there.[20] At the same time Gheste involved himself with the sale of some woodland on Croam Farm, held by Whitgift Hospital which was part of the Archbishopric of Canterbury's estate in Croydon, and which had also been seized by the Committee. He seems to have negotiated the sale of the woods on behalf of the State.[21] Perhaps sensing an opportunity for personal gain Gheste then became engaged in the disposal of Camberwell Woods when they were sold, also by the Committee. It is unclear who the owner was at the time, but the woods were deemed 'commons' and their disposal was complicated by 'the multiplicity of the poore that laye upon them.' Under instruction of the Committee Gheste engaged a surveyor to assess the woodland and consider how best to maximise the return to the State. It was concluded that the woods were in such a poor condition that they ought to be given over to tillage and the land offered for lease on that basis. However, no offers greater than 15l per annum were received for the land, which Gheste believed to be much less than it was worth. Gheste then offered to lease the land himself for 20l per annum, with the intention of acquiring some partners to invest with him, but who subsequently did not materialise. The Committee accepted Gheste's offer but writing in February 1645 he commented 'I have not gott one penny by it … And doe not expect to gett by it hereafter worth my paines labor and expense.'[22]

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[16] Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, pp.492 & 636; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 2, pp.1293–1298, 1455–1458; John Patrick Prendergast, *The Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland*, Second (Enlarged) edn., (Dublin: McGlashan & Gill, 1875) p.429; LMA, CLC511MS00186, Copy of Minutes of the Commissioners of the Militia of London, 1659–1660, pp.xxxv, xxxvi.

[17] TNA, SP28/132, Part 1, f.1.

[18] TNA, SP28/139, Part 10.

[19] *Ibid.*, ff.105, 113, 115.

[20] W. H. Thorpe, 'The Marquess of Worcester and Vauxhall', *Transactions of the Newcomen Society*, Vol. 13, 1932, p.82.

[21] TNA, SP28/139, Part 10, ff.116r & 117v.

With the Lord General undertaking the relief of Gloucester in early September the only Parliamentary army that could either assist Essex, or protect London in his absence, was the new army that Sir William Waller was struggling to raise. Not surprisingly it was proposed that London provide forces for this new army and on 9 September Common Council authorised the Militia Committee to arrange to send forth some Auxiliaries to assist Waller. While no mention was made of cavalry in this instruction, just a week later Turner was ordered to mobilise his regiment and on 22 September it mustered at Windsor and formally passed under the command of Waller.[23] The strategic situation then changed quickly. Essex had fought the Battle of Newbury two days previously, after which he brought his army safely first to Reading and then back into London on 28 September, having first evacuated Reading.

In early October, Essex made plans to retake Reading, which had been quickly re-occupied by the Royalists, with his and Waller's armies, and the Militia Committee agreed to provide a sizeable force to assist.[24] In August Essex had reluctantly agreed to Waller's independent command but now, with the Lord General basking in the success of the Gloucester campaign, he fully intended to put Waller in his place once more. On 3 October, Essex informed the House of Lords that he wanted Waller's forces to be put under his command and in so doing making Waller subordinate to him. Four days later the matter was debated in the House of Commons who gave their agreement that Waller was to be placed under Essex's command, but it took a delegation from Parliament and a threat by Essex to resign, before Waller's demotion was made official on 9 October.[25] On the same day Parliament ordained that a force of seven infantry regiments of the London Trained Bands and up to 1,500 cavalry from the City were to join Waller and Essex, who jointly were instructed to retake Reading.[26] Despite both officers' declarations that they would willingly work together for the good of the cause, it was clear that this was unlikely and Essex soon decided to send Waller into Hampshire while he would take his own army to the north-west of London to capture the Royalist outpost of Newport Pagnell.

Turner's regiment was then transferred to the Lord General's army and immediately joined the composite force of Londoners commanded by Philip Skippon. (See Map 6 for its subsequent movements.) Storey's troop had not been at Windsor with the rest of the regiment and only joined on 23 October

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[22] *Ibid.*, f.115r.

[23] JCC Vol. 40, f.73v; TNA, SP28/132, Part 1, f.1.

[24] *Certaine Informations, 9 -16 October 1643*, pp.300–301.

[25] *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol. 3, p.266; *JHL*, Vol. 6, pp.242–243, 246–247.

[26] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, p.306.


London
Windsor
Newport Pagnell
29 Oct 42
Brickhill
? Oct 43
Olney
4 Nov 43
Grafton House
1 Nov 43
Towcester
Alderton
2 Nov 43
Cropredy Bridge
29 Jun 44
Worcester
Oxford
Faringdon
Radcot
7 May 46
27 Oct 44
Newbury
29 Mar 44
Winchester
Cheriton
Bishops Waltham
6 Apr 44
Isle of Wight
Melksham
Devizes
10 Mar 45
? Mar 45
11 Mar 45
Shaftsbury
? Sep 44
4 Apr 45
Bruton
Langport
Isle Moor
9 Jul 45
Taunton
Tiverton
Oct 45
English Channel
Bristol Channel
N
0
10
20
30
40
50 miles

Map 6: Turner, Thompson, Popham & Starr's regiments on campaign, 1643–1646 when it arrived from London.[27] The regiment was present at the taking of Newport Pagnell on 29 October but how it was deployed is unknown. Possibly it participated in the Royalist raid the night before, when Harvey's regiment fought near Brickhill and perhaps they were also present when Harvey attacked the Royalist garrison at Towcester on 1 November.[28] The regiment certainly took part in Middleton's raid on Alderton on 2 November, when Gheste's troop lost a horse, rider and all his weapons.[29]

The regiment was at Olney when Prince Rupert beat up the Parliamentary quarters in the early morning of 4 November. Of the three extant sources that describe the skirmish only one,[30] written by Captain George Paine of one of the Trained Band regiments, mentions Turner's involvement. It is perhaps telling that Harvey's own account fails to mention their presence. Paine described the chaos and confusion of Rupert's initial attack and the withdrawal of the Parliamentary force across the river and then Harvey's counter-attack. He then states:

> All this while Colonel Turner, Captaine Norwood, Captaine Tompson, &c. were supposed to be lost, and indeed were in much danger, having not above twelve or fifteene men, yet bravely made charge upon three Colours of the Enemy, and forced them out of the market place.

At this point, according to Paine, Harvey's counter-attack was beaten back across the river

> Where Colonel Turner and some few of our men were mixed among them [the Royalists] upon the Bridge, and durst not discover either to other who they were: for though their fingers itched to be doing one with another, yet durst not stirre for fear of falling off the Bridge: at last Colonel Turner came clear off without any harme.

In the ensuing *melee* the Royalist force withdrew back towards the town followed closely by Turner, Norwood and Thompson who 'cleansed the Towne and kept it.' In this action

> Captaine Thompson performed bravely: but Colonel Turner was so much troubled to see his tropes make such a long wheele, as never all day to come back being led by his Cornet; that after, neither his owne Cornet, not any of the Yellow Colours were seene in the field, which much discouraged him.[31]

How accurate this description of the fight is cannot be judged now but the confusion on the bridge is entirely plausible, while the absence of the regiment from the main battle has the ring of truth about it. From what little that can be gleaned about the role of the regiment in the fight it seems that they fled as soon as the Royalists attacked. At least 17 horses were lost from Turner's own troop during the raid, while Gheste lost a further 10 from his. Another was lost by his rider and in the confusion was confiscated by the troop of Herriott Washbourne, who retained it. These suggest that the regiment was badly mauled. Turner's troop lost 24 horses, about a quarter of their number, between 22 September and 2 December of which 17 were at Olney. If this number were typical of the entire regiment, it is clear they came out of the engagement savagely beaten up.[32]

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[27] TNA, *SP28/132 Part 1*, f.1.

[28] *Mercurius Civicus, 26 October–2 November 1643*, p.178; *Mercurius Civicus, 2–9 November 1643*, p.186.

[29] *Happy Success*; TNA, SP28/139 Part 10, ff.106 & 107.

[30] *True Relation...Owlny.*

[31] *Ibid.*

A review of the pay records for Turner's own troop shed some light on their casualties at Olney. Corporal Clarke had been with the troop since at least the Windsor muster but received no pay after 6 November. Trooper Mathew Farm, on the other hand was promoted to corporal effective 6 November, which suggest he replaced Clarke, who most have either died or was wounded sufficiently to leave the regiment.[33] John Price and John Langley both stopped receiving pay on 4 November suggesting that they were also killed.[34] William Hall, William Kirks, Robert King and William Boone all stopped being paid from 6 November, which also suggest they left the regiment on that day as a result of the skirmish.[35] Turner's troop probably never mustered more than 60–70 men when it was first raised and so these losses equate to around 10 percent of its strength, quite a significant loss for such a minor engagement. These losses were soon made up however, as 12 new recruits joined the troop before January.[36]

As with Harvey's regiment the movements of Turner's men after Olney are unclear. They were present when Skippon captured Grafton House on 24 December, when they lost two horses, but no mention of their presence can be found in extant descriptions of the siege and so presumably they acted only as a close protection for the attacking infantry.[37] Turner's regiment returned to London with the rest of the City forces on 13 January 1644.[38]

By January 1644, the ever fluid political situation in England had changed once more. In August 1643 Parliament and the Scottish government had signed the Solemn League and Covenant, a military alliance in which the Scottish promised to provide an army to fight on behalf of the English Parliament, at the English expense, in return for which Parliament promised to abolish episcopacy and reform the national church along Presbyterian lines. As part of the alliance a committee was to be established in London to command and control the joint war effort, comprising members from both nations and which soon became known as the Committee of Both Kingdoms. Essex, understandably, rejected the idea of a joint committee, feeling he solely was responsible for commanding the Parliamentary forces by virtue of his commission as Lord General, but with Pym now dead he lacked the political support he once had and Parliament reaffirmed the role of the committee, with the proviso that Essex was still responsible for tactics once upon campaign, at least for his army. The English delegates included the generals of the three main armies, Essex, Waller and Manchester but the remainder comprised 'War Party' men, including Sir Henry Vane, Lord Saye and Sele, Oliver Cromwell and Sir Arthur Haselrig.[39] Without Pym's steady hand, and imperceptibly at first, control of the Parliamentary armies was shifting towards radicalism as men of a more radical political disposition, many of whom were by religious temperament separatist in nature, gained ascendancy.[40]

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[32] TNA, SP28/132 Part 1, f.1; TNA, SP28/139 Part 10, ff.106 & 107.

[33] TNA, SP28/132 Part 1, f.3.

[34] *Ibid.*, ff.3–4.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] *Ibid.*, f.4.

[37] *Ibid.*, f.1; W. B., *A True Relation of the Taking of Grafton House by the Parliaments forces*, (London 1643), TT E.79 [24].

[38] *The True Informer, 6–13 January 1644*, p.130.

Waller would certainly have been happy at the new committee's composition, being more politically inclined with the majority of its members' views of a more active prosecution of the war and no doubt thinking he and his army would get more attention from it than under the previous system, dominated by Essex as it was. Waller had been appointed commander of the army raised in Hampshire, Surrey, Sussex and Kent at the end of 1643, and had spent the last months of the year campaigning in the South-East of England. At that time, his army contained a large force of London Trained Bands, which had joined him in October, but when Turner's regiment joined the Lord General's army that month, he had none of the City Horse with him. Waller put his army into winter quarters in January and returned to London to seek political support for the spring campaign that he intended to direct against the Royalist Army of Lord Hopton, which by March 1644 was quartered around Winchester.[41] On 12 February the Commons considered a draft ordinance that would provide the financial resources to pay and equip Waller's army but wrangling about the amounts each county would pay delayed its passing until 30 March.[42] Perhaps it was this uncertainty of how to pay for the recruiting of Waller's army and the threat posed by Hopton that led the Committee of Both Kingdoms to write to the Militia Committee on 4 March enquiring as to 'the best information of the state of the regiment of horse now or late under the command of Co. Turner' and requesting both Turner and George Thompson attend the Committee forthwith.[43]

The regiment had returned to London only on 13 January after its service at Olney and Grafton House. On its return it was paid 800l for the soldiers pay arrears, and a further 750l in February but whether they were on duty during that month is unclear.[44] Despite this regular pay being provided by the Militia Committee, Common Council was concerned that it was having to finance both Turner's and Harvey's regiments themselves. And so on 17 February the Council agreed to submit a petition to the Commons requesting 'some present supply of money for mainteynance of the two Regimts of horse raised wtin London'.[45] This request obviously got the Commons attention for on 20 February 1,000l was ordered to be sent to the Militia Committee and then on 24 February a further 2,000l was ordered from the proceeds from sale of tin from the West Country for 'the recruiting, reducing, and setting forth Colonel *Turner*'s Regiment, with Sir *Wm. Waller*.'[46]

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[39] *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol.3, p.391.

[40] *Ibid.*

[41] Adair, *Roundhead General*, p.135.

[42] *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol. 3, p.396; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.413–418.

[43] William Douglas Hamilton (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, Charles I, 1644*, (London: 1888), p.33.

[44] *The True Informer, 6–13 January 1644*; TNA, SP28/132 Part 1, f.3r.

According to Turner's accounts the Militia Committee struggled with 'the burden and Charge of mainetayning' the regiment, and so it was agreed that 'Committee of the west' would 'procure' the regiment for its own service and take on the responsibility of maintaining it. It was at this point that the 2,000l of tin money was provided and distributed to each troop to settle their arrears. Then the regiment was 'reduced' on 3 March and formally reconstituted under the command of Colonel George Thompson.[47] The regiment was not disbanded although all the troop commanders except Thompson and Clutterbuck (Turner's Captain-Lieutenant) seem to have resigned their commissions, and it was reduced from eight troops to four. The inference is that with this the regiment ceased to be under the control of the Militia Committee and was thus no longer a regiment of City Horse. When this occurred the troops' commanders are believed to have been:

Colonel George Thompson[48]
Major Thomas Roe
Captain Robert Thompson
Captain Benedict Clutterbuck.[49]

Thomas Roe (Rowe) was a City merchant and probably a relative of Owen Rowe the Regicide, and Colonel Francis Roe of the Trained Bands. Robert Thompson was the Colonel's brother. Clutterbuck may have been a person of substance for he was referred to as a gentleman when he subscribed a horse valued at 25l for Essex's army on 3 July 1643. In 1638 he was probably living in Milk Street.[50] He had previously been the lieutenant in Turner's troop and then took command of it on 3 March 1644, at which point it numbered 42 men who had previously served under Turner, plus an additional 12 new recruits.[51]

In early 1644 there was no Parliamentary Western Association in existence as most of the western counties were under Royalist control, but a committee had been established in October 1643 to better oversee the needs of those counties. The Committee was not made up of influential Parliamentarians but they did play some role in raising funds for what few Parliamentary forces were in that region, particularly Waller's army.[52] Turner is most likely incorrect when he states that the regiment was offered to the Western Committee in early March and that on this basis it was no longer the responsibility of the City of London, but it is true, however, that on 7 April 1644 the Committee of Both Kingdoms offered the use of the regiment, now under Thompson's command to 'the gentlemen of the western parts' on the condition that the regiment was 'to be paid by them accordingly.'[53] Nonetheless, there is no clear evidence that the Militia Committee formally surrendered control of the regiment on 3 March, or at any other time. In fact there is abundant evidence that implies that the regiment remained under the nominal control of the City, at least until November 1645.

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[45] JCC Vol. 40, f.90r.

[46] *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol. 3, pp.402, 407.

[47] TNA, SP28/132 Part 1, ff.1v & 3r.

[48] The National Archives, SP28/38 Part 3, Warrants issued by army committees, military commanders, etc. May-June 1646, 1646, f.245.

[49] HMC, *The Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland, 14th Report Part Two*, Vol.3 p.107; Laurence Spring, *Waller's Army: The Regiments of Sir William Waller's Southern Association*, (Farnham: The Pike and Shot Society, 2007) pp.140–142.

[50] TNA, SP28/131 Part 3, f.129; Dale (ed.), *Inhabitants* Vol.1, p.137.

[51] TNA, SP28/132 Part 1, ff.3–4.

There was an orderly transfer of the regiment to the new officers on 3 March 1644 and Turner's accounts demonstrate a clear handover of horses, men and equipment from his own troop to Benedict Clutterbuck, who then commanded it.[54] On 10 April 1644 when Thompson's regiment was returning to London without orders it was to the Militia Committee that the Committee of Both Kingdoms wrote instructing them to order Thompson to return to Waller's army. The following day the Militia Committee was asked to appear before the Committee of Both Kingdoms to provide an explanation as to what was to be done with both Thompson's and Harvey's regiments. Then on 26 April the Committee of Both Kingdoms informed Waller that the Militia Committee had agreed to provide a brigade of infantry to his army under the command of Richard Browne, and that it had been further agreed with the Militia Committee that Thompson's regiment would accompany them. This was followed up on 8 May in an instruction, which in the same sentence, informed Waller that Harvey's regiment and two troops of Thompson's regiment would shortly be joining him.[55] It is therefore clear that at least into the summer of 1644 Thompson's regiment was still considered as belonging to London, while in April 1645 a London newsletter clearly called the regiment, then under the day-to-day command of Lieutenant-Colonel Thorpe,[56] 'the City Regiment'.[57] However, the most compelling evidence to confirm that the Militia Committee retained command over the regiment until at least 10 November 1645 can be found in a certificate written by Adam Bancks, who styled himself 'the Clerk of the Militia Committee', dated 1 May 1646. The certificate states that George Thompson, Esq. had been appointed colonel of a regiment of horse on 4 March 1644 and 'Continued Colonell of the said Regmt untill the 10th day of November 1645 during all wch tyme the said Regiment was in actuall service for the Parliamt'. He ended with the statement that the certificate was issued 'by order of the said Committee of the Militia London.'[58] Nominally at least the regiment retained a connection with London, even if the City no longer had the responsibility to maintain it.

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[52] *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol. 3, p.291.

[53] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, p.102.

[54] TNA, SP28/132 Part 1, ff.1–3.

[55] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, pp.107,108,136,153.

[56] Thorpe took over command of the regiment after Thompson was wounded at the Battle of Cheriton, although Thompson remained titular colonel.

[57] Richard Collings, *The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, 8 –15 April 1645*, (London 1645), TT E.278 [8], p.760.

During the winter of 1643 Waller's army remained in winter quarters spread across southern Sussex, with two regiments of London Trained Bands under Richard Browne quartered at Midhurst. It is not known precisely when Thompson's regiment left London to join Waller, but it was probably around 9 March, which was when Waller himself left London and returned to his headquarters at Arundel Castle. Whether the regiment went to Arundel or joined their City comrades in Midhurst is also unclear. It is known that a general muster of the army was held at East Meon on 26 March, and it was certainly present then.[59] The strength of the regiment at the time is unknown but as it only consisted of four troops it is doubtful that it was much more than 200 officers and men strong. There is no reference to what part the regiment played during the Battle of Cheriton on 29 March when Hopton's Royalist Army was defeated by Waller, and it is pointless to speculate. It was, however, present as Thompson himself was wounded and news of his injury was widely reported. Elias Archer, a Londoner in Browne's brigade wrote 'Col: *Tompson* (a brave man) is shot with a Drake, and his Leg is cut off, we are in great hopes of this recovery'.[60] Captain John Jones, another Londoner, wrote to a friend on the day of the battle that 'Col: Tompson hath lost his leg, glory to God alone.'[61] Back in London Thomas Juxon was to write in his diary when hearing of the news 'Colonel Thomson of horse lost a leg, yet so far from being discouraged that he said he had another leg to lose for Jesus Christ.'[62]

The following day, when news of the victory arrived in London, the Committee of Both Kingdoms immediately offered Waller their congratulations and suggested that he follow up his victory by advancing into the West Country. Knowing his army was in arrears with their pay the Committee promptly ordered money be sent to further encourage his soldiers, but the London troops under Browne were on the verge of mutiny, having been away from London since September. Harvey was to command this convoy of money but refused to serve under Waller.[63] In the week after the battle Waller's army pursued the defeated Royalists in a multitude of directions. Some of this cavalry caught up with a part of it at Newbury while Waller attacked another group near Christchurch, but there is no mention of the role of Thompson's regiment in this.[64] On 6 April, Browne's brigade captured Bishops Waltham and so it is plausible that the City Horse were with their fellow Londoners, but there is no proof.[65] The London brigade immediately set off for London, without orders, and this news reached London. On 7 April, the Committee of Both Kingdoms suggested Thompson's regiment be transferred permanently to the Western Committee, although they had failed to ask the soldiers if they were willing to sever their ties with London.[66] Just three days later the Committee of Both Kingdoms was informed that Thompson's regiment was marching back to London, probably with Browne's brigade and without orders, and they implored the Militia Committee to order them to return to Waller.[67]

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[58] TNA, SP28/38 Part 3, f.245.

[59] HMC, *HMC Portland*, Vol. 3, p.107.

[60] E. A, *A Fuller Relation of the Great Victory (Obtained Through Gods Providence) at Alsford, on Friday the 28. of March, 1644,* (London, 1644), TT E.40 [1].

[61] Captain Jones, *A Letter from Captain Jones, to a Worthy Friend of his Dwelling in Bartholmew Lane. Being a More Full and an Exacter Relation of the Particular Proceedings of Sir William VVallers Armie,* (London, 1644), TT E.40 [12].

[62] Keith Lindley and David Scott(eds), *The Journal of Thomas Juxon, 1644–47* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.49–50.

[63] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, pp.82–83.

[64] Adair, *Roundhead General*, pp.149–150.

It is unclear whether Thompson's regiment actually returned to London or not. Browne's brigade did towards the end of April, but there is no reference to Thompson's being with them. The Committee of Both Kingdoms in a flurry of letters on 21 April to the Militia Committee requested them to quickly dispatch Harvey's regiment, the newly raised Maiden Troop and Colonel Turner's regiment to Waller. Turner no longer commanded the regiment, and it is doubtful that Thompson's would even have been back in London let alone be in any position to take the field again. Possibly the Committee in their haste were confused and made mention of Turner's regiment by mistake.[68] On 26 April, the Committee wrote to Waller informing him that a new brigade of City forces was to join him and that it was their desire 'that Col. Thompson's regiment of horse may in some more particular manner attend and be assisting to that brigade in regard of the relation which those horse have to the City'.[69] On 8 May the Committee was to inform the Commons that two troops of the regiment were to march with Harvey to join Waller, which implies that the regiment was no longer with the General, but again there is no evidence as to where the regiment was at the time, or if the regiment was subsequently reformed with the other two troops.[70]

With Thompson wounded at the Battle of Cheriton, day-to-day command of the regiment passed to Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Thorpe on 1 June 1644, and he was to command it until 30 April 1645.[71] However, as has already been shown, Thompson retained his rank of colonel and nominal command, despite losing his leg at Cheriton and thus incapacitated from serving with it.[72] Thorpe had previously been a major in the regiment of cavalry raised in Sussex for Sir Richard Grenville at the end of 1643, but when Grenville deserted in early March 1644 that regiment passed to Colonel Edward Cooke, who also commanded an infantry regiment. Thorpe had commanded Cooke's regiment at Cheriton. Cooke's regiment was disbanded around April 1645, when another regiment was raised for him, and Thorpe was transferred back to command it.[73] Under Thorpe's command Thompson's regiment seems to have served continually in Waller's army until his army was disbanded in April 1645.

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[65] HMC, *HMC Portland*, Vol. 3, p.110.

[66] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, p.102.

[67] *Ibid.*, pp.107, 108.

[68] *Ibid.*, pp.131, 132.

[69] *Ibid.*, p.136.

[70] *Ibid.*, p.153.

[71] The National Archives, SP28/135, Army accounts, Surrey, Sussex 1643–1649, f.43v; *The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, 8–15 April 1645*, p.760.

[72] TNA, *SP28/38 Part 3*, f. 245.

There is no evidence that the regiment did in fact return to London after Cheriton and was probably with Waller when his army mustered at Farnham on 13 May. Its strength at the time is unknown.[74] After mustering, the army proceeded to Bagshot from where Waller rode to Henley to discuss the plans to encircle Oxford with the Earl of Essex. On 21 May, the army skirmished with the Royalist garrison of Basing House before marching towards Abingdon.[75] Essex and Waller, unable to cooperate with each other, soon separated their forces, with Essex heading into Cornwall while Waller fruitlessly chased the King's 'Oxford Army' around the Midlands for a few weeks. On 29 June, the two armies finally clashed along the River Cherwell at Cropredy and Waller's Army was badly mauled at the battle. It is known that the regiment was present at the battle for, according to *The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer* in April 1645, Thorpe:

> commanded the City Regiment … was commanded upon the Reareguard with his Regiment, where he stood and faced the Kings Army, till our whole Army was drawn off, he did there behave himselfe with so much Gallantry, that the enemy observing him, made them so fearfull, that they durst not advance towards him so he wheeled and retreated in such good order, that he came off without any losse at all, and brought divers scattered and hurt men off with him, which were wounded in the fight before.[76]

Licking his wounds, Waller withdrew to Northampton where part of the regiment received pay, while Browne's London brigade mutinied, and even assaulted their commander.[77] The following day Browne's, by now calmed, brigade attacked Greenland House although it is unknown if Thompson's regiment was present.[78] By the end of July Waller's Army was back in Abingdon, defeated, dejected and mutinous. With his army disintegrating around him Waller was unable to do anything to save Essex's army from the disaster that it encountered in Cornwall, but in early September he was able to send a force of cavalry westwards that did meet with the remnants of Essex's retreating cavalry, but there is no evidence that Thompson's regiment was part of this force. Waller's main army was able to follow his cavalry in an attempt to disrupt the return march of the King's army. At Shaftsbury

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[73] Spring, *Waller's Army*, pp.58–59.

[74] *An Exact Diarie. Or A Breife Relation of the Progresse of Sir William Wallers Army Since the Joyning of the London Avxilliaries with his Forces: Which was the Twelfth of May 1644. Untill Their Returne Homeward on Thursday the 11 of July*, (London, 1644), TT E.2 [20], p.1.

[75] *Ibid.*

[76] *The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, 8–15 April 1645*, p.760. For a fuller account of the Cropredy campaign see Doctor Margaret Toynbee and Brigadier Peter Young, *Cropredy Bridge 1644: The Campaign and the Battle*, (Kineton: The Roundwood Press, 1970) and Adair, *Roundhead General*, pp.151–166.

[77] TNA, SP28/135, f.44v.

[78] Adair, *Roundhead General*, p.164.

Waller deployed in front of the advancing Royalist Army but was too weak to force an engagement, though the opposing armies skirmished frequently. In one such clash at the end of September Benedict Clutterbuck, then Major of the regiment and having presumably replaced Roe, was killed. He had been with the regiment since its formation and was proof of the still tangible link between the regiment and the City of London. Waller was to write that 'he was religious and valliant, we have cause to lament his loss.'[79] Around this time the regiment was mustered at Shaftsbury where some pay was distributed, while on 11 October Thorpe was in Winterborne Stoke when he attended a Council of War, and presumably the regiment was close by.[80]

The Committee of Both Kingdoms at the time was attempting to concentrate the depleted armies of the Earl of Manchester, Waller and the elements of Essex's army that had escaped from Cornwall, in a final attempt to bring the King to battle before he could return to Oxford. The armies clashed once again at Newbury on 27 October.[81] What role Thompson's regiment played in the battle is, yet again, unknown but it is known that it was present. During the battle Patrick Ruthven, Earl of Forth and overall commander of the Royalist armies, was wounded and was left in Donnington Castle with his wife and entourage when the Royalist forces withdrew after the battle.

On the night of 30 October and under cover of night Ruthven, his wife and about '96 mounted men, three coaches and a coach-wagon, with 30 led horses' broke out of the castle and made a dash for Oxford. According to the Parliamentarian Colonel John Birch, he personally spotted the fleeing party and gave chase with the nearest cavalry he could find, which included a party commanded by Thorpe.[82] Birch and Thorpe gave chase with a party of 'some fourty men and horse from the guard.' Lady Ruthven was captured after a pursuit of about eight miles, along with 'some prisoners of quality with her, three Coaches, and about fifty horse and men, a wagon with much goods in it' but her husband escaped.[83] There is no way of knowing if the pursuing force included others from the regiment but it would seem likely, for in Thorpe's accounts there is a reference to him purchasing 26 of the captured horses for the use of his troop.[84]

While Birch's account sounds fanciful it is clear that the pursuit happened much as Birch and Thorpe described.[85] It is also known that Thorpe retained some of the items captured from the German-born Lady Ruthven. On 6 March 1645, both Houses of Parliament ordered that certain letters and papers 'of very high Concernment to the State', captured with Lady Ruthvin and in the possession of Mrs Thorpe at the officer's house in London, be immediately brought to the House of Lords and that Mrs Thorpe 'do give her Husband Notice' accordingly.[86] There is an interesting reference in *The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer* that describes the chase when Captain-Lieutenant Evans is referred to as being part of the pursuit.[87]

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[79] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, p.545.

[80] TNA, SP28/135, ff. 44v, 45r.; John Adair, 'The Court Martial Papers of Sir William Waller's Army: Proceedings Against John Boreman and Others', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Vol. XLIV, No.180, (London,1966), p.219.

[81] See Adair, *Roundhead General*, pp.167–176 for a description of the battle.

[82] John Webb (ed.), *Military Memoir of Colonel John Birch, Sometime Governor of Hereford in the Civil War Between Charles I. and the Parliament*, (London: The Camden Society, 1873), p.17.

[83] *The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, 8–15 April 1645*, pp.760–761.

[84] TNA, SP28/135, f.43r.

[85] William Douglas Hamilton (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, Charles I, 1644–45*, (London: 1890), p.83.

After Newbury, Waller moved his army into winter-quarters along the Sussex border to protect against a surprise Royalist advance and it is probable that the regiment was there as well. On 6 November, the Committee of Both Kingdoms instructed Waller to send a force of some 1,000 cavalry to relieve Taunton, which had been under siege by the Royalists since early October. This relief force, that only left Chichester in early December, advanced through Dorset collecting reinforcements from the county troops. There is no evidence that Thompson's regiment was part of this force, however it is thought George Starr of Sherborne, Dorset joined the regiment around this time as its Major (see below), probably with his own troop of county horse, and so it is plausible that the regiment formed part of the relief force. Also present in the relief force was Colonel Edward Popham, who was to later command the regiment after Thorpe's departure. This is the first tentative evidence of a connection between the regiment and Dorset, a connection that was to become more apparent in the spring of 1645.[88]

In early January 1645, Parliament again authorised Waller to raise a new force and march into the West to forestall any likely advance by the Royalists from that direction.[89] Hardly had Waller received these orders when a Royalist force under Lord Goring swept into Hampshire and even occupied Farnham before retiring back into Wiltshire.[90] Waller was only ready to respond in early March when, accompanied by a force commanded by Oliver Cromwell, he advanced into Wiltshire with the intention of marching towards Taunton, which was again besieged by Lord Goring. Thompson's regiment, its strength and structure unknown, but still commanded by Robert Thorpe, accompanied the two generals, forming part of Waller's command which he himself noted consisted of but 'a body of horse, and a few dragoons'.[91]

According to *The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer* as Waller's force marched past Winchester they were attacked by some of the Royalist garrison from the castle. The seemingly vigilant Thorpe 'was commanded upon the Guard: the Enemy sallied forth of the Castle upon them, but they lost by their attempt.' Thorpe then 'killed a Lieutenant Colonel, and six Troopers on that place, A Lieutenant Col. And eight Trooprs taken prisoners. This was done only with the losse of one man, and two wounded.'[92] On 10 March, intelligence was received that a regiment of Royalist cavalry under Sir James Long was heading towards Devizes and Waller decided to intercept them. The following morning a part of Waller's force clashed with scouts belonging to Long's regiment near Devizes but with the element of surprise gone he was unable to assault the town. Long drew his regiment up, probably to the south of Devizes, while Waller split his force into three divisions. Waller's own force, along with Cromwell's, faced Long, while a third body under Sir Hardress Waller was dispatched to the west of the town to cut off Long's retreat towards Bath.[93] The following day Long attempted to escape from Devizes but, trapped between William Waller and his cousin Sir Hardress Waller's force, he was cornered at Melksham, and after a brief resistance surrendered his entire regiment.[94] *The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer* noted Thorpe was present 'at the taking of Col. Longs Regiment, where he had very good successe.'[95]

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[86] *Journals of the House of Commons: 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, (London: 1803), p.71; *Journals of the House of Lords, 1644–1645*, Vol.7, (London: n.d), p.266.

[87] TNA, SP28/132 Part 1, f.2r.

[88] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, pp.102, 113–114; Emanuel Green, 'The Seige and Defence of Taunton, 1644–5', *Proceedings of the Somersetshire Archaeological and Natural History Society*, Vol.25, 1879, pp.35–36; Prendergast, *Cromwellian Ireland*, p.429.

[89] *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, pp.20–21.

[90] Adair, *Roundhead General*, p.177.

[91] Sir William Waller, *Vindication of the Character and Conduct of Sir William Waller, Knight ... Explanatory of his Conduct in Taking up Arms Against King Charles the First*, (London: 1793), p.18.

With the surrender of Long's regiment, Cromwell's detachment continued further west towards Taunton, while Waller with his force briefly advanced upon Bristol, as he had heard rumour that the city was willing to surrender to Parliament. These rumours were ill-founded, and Waller soon retired and headed for Salisbury. As he again passed Devizes, probably on 23 March, the Royalist garrison sallied forth to attack him but, as Waller was to write a few days later, 'we charged them, beat them into the town pell-mell with them.... We took a Lieut. Colonel, and divers officers, and 200 verre good Horse.'[96] Once again it was reported that Thorpe played a prominent role in the events, which, interestingly, compares very well with Waller's own account:

> At the Devizes he was commanded to face the Enemy close, where he had a hundred and thirty Horse out of his own Regiment, the Enemy advanced to charge him with 300 Horse, and a party of Foot: He then observing his opportunity, thought it was more advantage to give them a charge, than to receive it: the word was, God with us, And so he was; For they charged them so bravely, that they routed them immediately, and took 200 Horse, and ... rescued divers prisoners which were taken before, and took all their Arms.'[97]

From Salisbury, Waller marched to Cerne Abbas where he reunited with Cromwell and part of the Taunton garrison, now available after the town's relief. This joint force then headed north into Somerset with Lord Goring's Royalist forces ahead of them, blocking any move they might make towards Bristol. On 4 April, the two forces clashed outside of Bruton, but neither were strong enough to mount any sustained fighting. Goring retired towards

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[92] *The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, 8 -15 April 1645*, p.761.

[93] *A copie of Sir William Wallers letter, &c. A Great Victorie Obtained by Sir William Waller, and Lievtenant-Generall Cromwell, against Colonell Sir James Long*, (London, 1645), TT E.274 [4], p.2.

[94] *Ibid.*, pp.3–4. See also Adair, *Roundhead General*, pp.178–179.

[95] *The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, 8–15 April 1645*, p.761.

[96] Quoted in Adair, *Roundhead General*, p.181.

[97] *The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, 8–15 April 1645*, p.761.

Glastonbury while Waller, short of provisions and lacking infantry, fell back to Salisbury. By now Waller's force was short in numbers and equipment since he was starved of support with all available resources being provided to the newly established New Model Army. It was now only a matter of time before Waller would be recalled under the terms of the Self Denying Ordinance, and so he returned to London at the end of the month.[98]

As part of the reorganisation of the Parliamentary armies Thorpe was transferred into Cooke's second cavalry regiment on 30 April. Thompson's regiment, still nominally under his command but losing its connection to London more with every passing day, was transferred to the Western forces of Colonel Edward Massey, to be commanded by the prominent West Country Parliamentarian Colonel Edward Popham, later to become a General-at-Sea during the Commonwealth. What the strength or structure of the regiment was at this time is unclear. In August 1645, George Starr was referred to as being 'Major to Colonel *Popham* some time, but last Major of Colonel *Thomsons* Regiment of Horse'.[99] Starr was from Dorset and had served in William Sydenham's regiment of horse in 1643 and 1644. That regiment had served with Waller in December 1643 and in March/April 1644 before returning to Dorset where he served throughout 1644. It is possible that Starr was appointed major to Thompson's regiment sometime after the death of Major Clutterbuck at the end of September 1644, when he was known to be serving in Waller's army. Starr was reported by Anthony Ashley Cooper in two separate letters to have been present at the storming of Abbotsbury in early November and was then referred to as a captain.[100] If Starr was present and had already joined the regiment by then it might be that Thompson's regiment was present as well. Cooper mentions that at least some officers belonging to Waller were present so this is plausible, however, it would seem unlikely as the battle took place only days after the second Battle of Newbury where Thompson's regiment did fight, and it would seem unlikely that it could have got to Dorset so quickly.

Possibly Starr's connection with Thompson's regiment began in December 1644 during the relief of Taunton, but it is clear that Waller knew of him prior to that. In a letter dated 11 November 1644, Waller lamented his prior experience and disobedience of the Dorset county troops and 'I could never draw above one small regiment of Col. Fitz-James' and one troop of Capt. Starre's into the field, when the King's whole army advanced upon me'.[101] He obviously remembered Starr to be a reliable officer and so he was perhaps the ideal candidate to promote to major. Whether he took his troop with him into Thompson's regiment is unknown. He seems to have served as major to Popham until November 1645, when he took over command of the regiment.[102] Robert Williams, also a native of Dorset, claimed in 1646 to have served with Starr from December 1643 until September 1645, while Samuell Bull is recorded as stating that he had served in Sydenham's regiment in January 1644 but then under Starr's command from 1 April 1645 until 31 July 1646. Both of which suggest that either Starr transferred to the regiment with his troop, or Thompson's regiment was recruited from these Dorset veterans in 1645.[103]

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[98] Adair, *Roundhead General*, pp.182–184.

[99] John Dillingham, *The Moderate Intelligencer, 21–28 August 1645*, TT E.298 [17], p.204.

[100] Quoted in William Douglas Christie, *A Life of Anthony Ashley Cooper, First Earl of Shaftesbury, 1621–1683*, Vol.1, (London: MacMillan and Co., 1871), pp.62–64, 67.

[101] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, p.114.

[102] Spring, *Waller's Army*, pp.133, 141.

Another Dorset link to the regiment is Captain Robert Pelham. Pelham may have been a relative of the minister at Halstock and Turner's Puddle, near Bovington, and was certainly captain of a troop of county horse.[104] He seems to have joined the regiment in January 1645 and remained with it until 23 October 1646, but whether he brought his troop with him is also unknown.[105] Pelham was later to command a troop of militia cavalry raised in the Eastern Association in 1651.[106]

The regiment was clearly strengthened by West Country drafts in 1645, with at least two troop commanders being transferred from Dorset county troops while the new Colonel was himself native to both Wiltshire and Somerset.

In November 1645, the troop commanders were:

Colonel Popham (Captain-Lieutenant John Evans commanded the troop)
Major George Starr
Captain Richard Nichollets
Captain Thomas Roe
Captain John Strachan
Captain Robert Pelham
Captain Arnold Cooper[107]

Evans had held the same rank in October 1644 when he was part of the pursuit of Lady Ruthven.[108] Nichollets had been lieutenant to Gheste and took over Clutterbuck's troop.[109] Roe had been major in early 1644 and thus seems to have been demoted, while Cooper might have been a relative of Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper, who was another native of Dorset. Strachan also seems to have been from Dorset, he was commissioned on 4 May 1645 and served until 10 September 1646.[110] The regiment was losing its London connection but there were still links between Popham's regiment and Turner's City Horse.

The regiment remained in the West Country until it was disbanded in October 1646. Edward Massey, who was appointed Major-General of Parliamentary forces in the West Country on 24 May 1645, confirmed that the regiment was part of his Western Association forces from 4 May 1645 until September 1646.[111] When Waller's army was disbanded at the beginning of May the regiment was in Surrey. At that time it was ordered to join the New Model Army of Sir Thomas Fairfax, which was then preparing to march into the West Country to relieve Taunton.[112] Unable to undertake the relief himself Fairfax instead sent a brigade of infantry under the command of Colonel Ralph Weldon, with a large cavalry force, which included Edward Popham's regiment, and the town was successfully relieved on 12 May.[113] Weldon and his force remained in Somerset and clashed with Goring's Royalist Army at Ilchester on 19 May but soon retired back into Taunton and quickly found himself besieged in turn. This siege was only half-heartedly pressed by the Royalists but by early June Parliament was mobilising further troops for yet another relief attempt. This time Massey was placed in command[114] and he concentrated his forces, including Popham's regiment[115] at Shaftsbury at the end of June but was soon overtaken by Fairfax with the entire New Model Army, who had just decisively defeated King Charles at the Battle of Naseby.

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[103] Charles Herbert Mayo (ed.), *The Minute Books of the Dorset Standing Committee, 23rd Sept., 1646, to 8th May, 1650*, (Exeter: William Polland & Co. Ltd., 1902), pp.62, 114–115.

[104] *Ibid.*, pp.25, 46, 386.

[105] Spring, *Waller's Army*, p.142.

[106] Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1651*, (London: 1877), p.514.

[107] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.116.

[108] *The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, 8–15 April 1645*, p.760.

[109] Spring, *Waller's Army*, p.142.

[110] The National Archives, SP28/167 Part 1, 'Assessment, loans and contribution, 1642–1660', f.118.

It is unclear when Popham's regiment returned from Taunton, but it seems that it did not become part of Weldon's besieged garrison in the town. Massey himself did not arrive in the West Country until the end of June and the regiment was in Romsey on 17 June and joined with Massey only on 26 June.[116] The Royalist Army under Goring, facing growing attacks from the Somerset Clubmen and the advance of both Fairfax and Massey, lifted the siege on 4 July. Massey and his brigade attacked the retreating Goring at Isle Moor on 9 July where many Royalists were slain and when 'nine Colours and 300 horse [were] taken'.[117] The following day Goring was soundly defeated by Fairfax at the Battle of Langport, though what part Popham's regiment played in this crucial victory is unknown.[118] Fairfax followed up this victory by storming Bridgewater on 21 July and then Bristol on 10 September. After Bristol fell Fairfax, with half the army marched into Devon and Cornwall to end Royalist resistance in the West Country, while Cromwell returned to the South-east and stormed Winchester Castle and Basing House.[119]

Massey's brigade of some 2,000 cavalry played no part in the capture of Bristol, having been deployed along the Somerset-Devon border to cover

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[111] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol.1, p.685; TNA, SP28/167 Part 1, f.118.

[112] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, p.459; *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, p.132.

[113] Joshua Sprigge, *Anglia Rediviva, Englands Recovery being the history of the motions, actions, and successes of the army under the immediate conduct of His Excellency Sr. Thomas Fairfax...* (London: 1647), p.17; *A Great Victorie obtained against the enemy, at the raising of the siege before Taunton, on Sunday last, May 11*, (London: 1645), TT E.284 [11]; *A Narration of the expedition to Taunton; the raising the siege before it, and the condition of our forces, and the enemies, at this present in the west*, (London: 1645), TT E.285 [10]; Green, 'SASP 25', p.47.

[114] *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, p.159.

[115] David Sidney Evans, 'The Civil War Career of Major-General Edward Massey (1644–1647)', (Unpublished PhD Thesis, King's College, London, 1995), p.187.

[116] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, p.598; Evans, 'Massey', p.187.

[117] Sprigge, *Anglia Rediviva*, p.64.

[118] *Ibid.*, pp.64–66.

[119] William Douglas Hamilton (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, Charles I, 1645–1647*, (London: 1891), p.167.

Goring, who had retreated farther west after his defeat at Langport.[120] When Fairfax marched into Devon he sent Massey with his brigade, including Popham's regiment, ahead to secure the town of Tiverton, which they quickly achieved but it needed Fairfax's main force to arrive before the castle was captured.[121] Massey was still at Tiverton on 18 November[122] and so might it be assumed was his brigade. It is believed that Popham left the regiment on 12 November and was replaced then as colonel by Edward Starr.[123] Massey shortly after returned to London but the brigade remained with Fairfax.

Fairfax's Army remained in Cornwall over the winter and after Cromwell returned in January, he was able to crush the last Royalist Army at the Battle of Torrington on 16 February 1646 and then capture Exeter on 13 April. There is no evidence if Massey and his brigade remained with Fairfax after Tiverton though, and they were perhaps superfluous once Cromwell returned anyway, but they might have been retained. Or perhaps they returned to Somerset/Dorset and assumed garrison duties there. One historian has noted that at least Cooper's troop was in the garrison of Lyme at the end of 1645 but provides no evidence for this.[124]

It was during this time that Massey's brigade gained the unenviable reputation for being disorderly and poorly disciplined through lack of pay, while their numbers diminished, and their condition deteriorated from neglect. As early as June 1645 one troop of Massey's own regiment was accused 'of the intolerable miscarriage of your troopers under Major Buller, whereby great disservice is done to the Parliament by the robbing, spoiling, and plundering of the people, they also giving extreme offence by their swearing, drinking, and all kind of debaucheries.'[125] In January 1646 men from Fitzjames' regiment were accused of robbing a party that included the preacher Hugh Peter, despite them having a pass from Fairfax himself. Peter had been with Fairfax in Cornwall and he brought a letter from the General at Dartmouth to Parliament in January and this robbery must have taken place when he returned to London from there.[126] In March Fitzjames informed Massey in a letter of the parlous condition of his brigade when he noted 'Your ragged, poor, yet faithful officers and soldiers expect you … they must have either your owne self, or money speedily, or their hearts will break. Truly sir I never saw such dejected spirits in my life'.[127] Even the Royalists commented how men from his brigade were constantly deserting.[128] Then in August 1646 Parliament received reports from Worcester of 'Murder, and other Misdemeanors, committed by them' while another complaint from Somerset accused Massey's soldiers of abusing the local population when they 'robb them, kill them, and wound them, and undoe them'.[129] While Starr's regiment was not specifically mentioned in these accounts it is likely that they were as much responsible as the rest of the brigade, given the lack of pay there were suffering.

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[120] Samuel Pecke, *A Perfect Diurnall of some passages in Parliament, 28 July–4 August 1645*, TT E.262 [37], pp.834, 836; Evans, 'Massey', p.190.

[121] John Rushworth, *The taking of Tiverton, with the castle, church, and fort, by Sir Thomas Fairfax, on the Lords-day last, Octob. 19. 1645.*, (London: 1645), TT E.306 [1], p.3; Sprigge, *Anglia Rediviva*, pp.134, 143–144.

[122] Sir Edward Massie, … *a coppie of a letter from Maior Generall Massie*, (London: 1645), TT E.311 [12], p.6.

[123] Spring, *Waller's Army*, p.140.

[124] Robert KG Temple, 'The Massey Brigade in the West', *Somerset and Dorset Notes and Queries*, Vol. 31, No. 322, 1985, p.10 n51.

[125] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, p.561.

[126] *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, pp.415, 483–484.

[127] Quoted in Evans, 'Massey', p.197.

[128] Thomas Swadlin, *Mercurius Academicvs, 23–28 February 1646*, TT E.324 [8], p.103.

In late March 1646 elements of Massey's brigade left the West Country as part of a cavalry force commanded by Commissary Henry Ireton, who had orders to join the other Parliamentary forces that were beginning to converge upon Oxford with the aim of finally capture the King's wartime capital. At the time this force was noted as consisting of three regiments, but which three were not recorded.[130] The core of Massey's brigade in November 1645 consisted of his own regiment and those of Edward Cooke, John Fitzjames, Sir Francis Drake (Plymouth Garrison) and Edward Popham, plus a couple of companies of dragoons.[131] As the pay records for the brigade do not exist after November it is impossible to tell if the composition had changed by mid–1646 but it is clear that Colonels Cooke, Fitzjames and Drake were all still associated with the brigade when it was disbanded, as of course was Massey's own regiment, as their officers petitioned the House of Lords for further arrears in July 1647. The only officer from Starr's regiment that signed this petition was Arnold Cooper and his name was placed with the petitioners of Cooke's regiment.[132] It is plausible that Starr's regiment was reduced into Cooke's in late 1645 or early 1646, which would explain why none of the officers were noted in the 1647 petition. Where the fourth regiment was (if it still existed) is unclear. If this is true, then the remnant of the regiment's connection with London was by then even more diluted.

Massey's brigade, commanded in his absence by Edward Cooke, took part in the initial stages of the siege of Oxford in May. The city itself was surrounded by a network of lesser garrisons that needed to be captured, or at least contained, before Oxford could be effectively besieged. Cooke was ordered to blockade the village of Radcot containing an important bridge across the River Thames, just a few miles north of the larger Royalist garrison at Faringdon.[133]

On 7 May the Royalists in Faringdon sortied out of the town surprising Cooke's brigade and the infantry that was supporting him. According to one report the cavalry immediately fled and 'left the Foote'. Another corroborated this claim but hinted at the ill-discipline of the brigade by suggesting that they were refusing to leave the West Country until their commander returned from London. These claims seem to have a ring of truth to them for shortly afterwards the brigade was ordered to Worcester, it mutinied.[134] The brigade probably headed towards Worcester however, before returning back to the West Country, for in August Parliament received reports from Worcester of atrocities being committed by them. Bulstrode Whitelock[135] noted that it was their idleness that caused their insolence and ill-discipline and *The Scottish Dove* concurred when it wrote in late June that they had 'little to doe, nor little to spend, they wanted pay, and were become there owne takers, they must not starve, but they were much complained of they got better repute while they had an enemy to fight with then being idle'.[136] There seem to have been some attempts at least by the officers to discipline their soldiers, for some were executed while others had their tongues bored as punishment for their frequent and heinous crimes.[137]

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[129] *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, pp.538, 540; John Dillingham, *The Moderate Intelligencer, 6–13 August 1646*, (London: 1646), TT E.350 [6], p.592.

[130] John Dillingham, *The Moderate Intelligencer, 2–9 April 1647*, TT E.332 [3], p.383.

[131] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, ff.114–119.

[132] Temple, 'Massey Brigade', pp.3–5.

[133] John Rushworth, *Historical Collections of Private Passages of State, Weighty Matters in Law, Remarkable Proceedings in Five Parliaments. Beginning the Sixteenth Year of King James, Anno 1618, and Ending the Fifth Year of King Charls, Anno 1629*, Vol. 6, (London:1701), pp.276–277.

By the summer of 1646 with the war over, consideration was being given in Parliament to disbanding Massey's brigade. Despite a financial imperative to reduce the costs of the army there were also political forces at work. The Presbyterian party at Westminster schemed to diminish the power of the Independents by sending elements of the New Model Army to restore English authority in Ireland. Fairfax, on the other hand, retorted by suggesting that it was county forces, like Massey's and who were more aligned to the Presbyterian cause, that ought to be sent and so the remnants of what had been Turner's City regiment were caught up in the political fight during the summer of 1646.

On 11 July, the pro-Independents in Parliament instructed that Massey's brigade be disbanded, without full settlement of their pay, however a sum of 20,000l was ordered to be sent to Sir Thomas Fairfax from which he was to settle their arrears, but this took some months to be allocated. Those willing to serve in Ireland could be duly re-enlisted.[138] However, as the political game of football developed throughout the summer the brigade was only finally reduced in Devizes on 23 October, with the men receiving barely six weeks' pay.[139] His brigade was told that any that freely chose to serve in Ireland could re-enlist immediately, though almost to a man they declined.[140] In February 1647 some 700 disgruntled soldiers from the brigade descended upon Westminster and petitioned the House of Commons for further relief, and the sum of 1,000l was granted but this was insufficient to satisfy them. Whether any of these had served in the regiment is not known but the brigade had certainly set a precedent as disbanded soldiers flocked to the capital over the next few months to petition in person for their arrears.[141] In July, 113 of the brigade's officers petitioned the House of Lords for fairer treatment for them and their men, but of these only one, Arnold Cooper, can be identified as having served Starr's regiment.[142]

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[134] John Saltmarsh, *Perfect Occurrences of Both Houses of Parliament, and Martiall Affairs, 15 May 1647*, TT E.337 [22], p.v2; John Dillingham, *The Moderate Intelligencer, 7–14 May 1646*, TT E.337 [18], p.438.

[135] Bulstrode Whitelock, *Memorials of the English Affairs from the Beginning of the Reign of Charles the First to the Happy Restoration of King Charles the Second*, Vol. 2, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1853), p.33.

[136] Laurence Chapman, *The Scotish Dove, 24 June–1 July 1647*, E.342 [11], p.711.

[137] *Truth Discovered from the West, Concerning the Cariage of Major Generall Massies Brigade There*, (London: 1646), TT E.349 [18].

[138] *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, pp.577, 581, 615.

[139] The National Archives, SP16/514 Part 2, State Papers Domestic, Charles I. Letters and Papers 1646, f.27; *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, p.728; Sprigge, *Anglia Rediviva*, p.310.

[140] *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, p.630; Kishlansky, *The Rise of the New Model Army*, p.115.

With the disbanding of Massey's brigade it is assumed that the remnants of Richard Turner's former regiment of City Horse, then commanded by Colonel George Starr, were disbanded. How many Londoners were discharged in Devizes is impossible to know but there is no evidence that any of the troop commanders had any connection with London by that time, and so it is perhaps safe to say that very few of the ordinary troopers remained from the original City regiment either.

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[141] *Journals of the House of Commons: 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, (London:1802), p.75.

[142] The National Archives, HL/PO/JO/10/1/237, House of Lords Main Papers, July 1647. Transcribed and published in 'Massey Brigade'.

6

Colonel Edmund Harvey's Regiment, 1644

By the beginning of 1644, the strategic situation of the war had changed somewhat in Parliament's favour. The summer of 1643 had been the nadir of Parliament's fortunes with defeat in the West Country, the loss of Bristol, Gloucester besieged, with Essex's army disintegrating from disease, and much of the North lost after Lord Fairfax's defeat at the Battle of Adwalton Moor in June. However, the successful relief of Gloucester, with the safe return of the main Parliamentary army and the successful shielding of London from any Royalist advance in the late autumn, coincided with the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant with Scotland, which brought with it the prospect of a large Scottish Army entering the war on Parliament's side in the New Year.

Direction of the Parliamentary war effort was now to be in the hands of the Committee of Both Kingdoms sitting in London and which consisted of both English and Scottish commissioners. A new army was to be raised by Sir William Waller in the south-eastern counties of England while the Eastern Association counties formed another under the Earl of Manchester. A newfound confidence was apparent in London as the English and their Scottish allies laid plans for the 1644 campaign, which it was intended would see the armies of Essex, Manchester and Waller cooperate and besiege Oxford, hopefully trapping the King inside, while the Scots and the army of Lord Fairfax re-took the North of England. If Oxford, and perhaps the King, could be captured the war might be brought to a successful conclusion that year. Despite the establishment of Waller's new army and the recruitment of Essex's, both would still be reliant on the strategic reserve of City forces to take the field and so it was soon apparent that the City Horse would be needed once again as the Parliamentary armies took to the field. Parliament's strategy was no secret for it was published in at least one London newsletter in mid-April, as was the part Harvey's regiment play in it.[1]

Upon the return of Harvey's regiment in late January 1644 it was demobilised for the winter, though not disbanded. The troopers were allowed to return to their homes while the horses were stabled throughout London until such time as they were needed again.[2] The Militia Committee, concerned where the money was to come from to pay for the maintenance of the regiments of Harvey and Turner, sent a petition to Parliament on 17 February requesting money.[3] As innocuous as this request was, it was actually part of a broader strategy of the City government to establish the means to pay for their forces without having to dip into the City's coffers. Having accepted the need that their forces be used for the common good, the City was determined that Parliament ensure a revenue stream be created to cover the costs of their deployment. As Parliament demanded more auxiliary forces be raised in London the Common Council naturally needed access to more money to pay for them. The City, though wealthy, jealously guarded its treasure and while it was happy for its citizens to be taxed to pay for their forces, the government of London would prefer that it did not carry this burden from their own sources of income. The City itself had limited opportunities to raise revenue and so was reliant upon Parliament to create a mechanism that would ensure the adequate collection of funds with which to pay them. And so, once again, the City Horse were affected by the politics of the day.

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[1] Richard Collings, *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 10–16 April 1644*, TT E.42 [28], pp.402–403.

At the end of March Parliament ordained a new levy be raised on London's population requiring them to contribute the value of a single weekly meal with which to finance these new forces. While the 'weekly meal' was not designed to pay for the City Horse directly, it was actually intended to be used to pay for the Trained Bands, the petition of February helped put pressure on Parliament to consider how the cavalry were also to be funded. As a result of this pestering on 24 March, when the Committee of Both Kingdoms informed the Militia Committee that Harvey's regiment needed to be recruited so that it would be available for the forthcoming summer campaigning season, it at the same time urged Parliament to pass an Ordinance to raise the sum of 3,000l from the estate of Lord Petre in Essex with which to pay for it.[4]

In late March, Harvey noted that 'part of my Troope with others of the Regiment' were commanded to accompany a convoy of money into Hampshire for Sir William Waller's army, and he proceeded as far as Portsmouth, once more in the company of Sir Richard Norton's regiment. One horse fell lame during this march and was left behind. Once this duty had been performed the men returned to London.[5]

On 28 March, the Committee of Both Kingdom ordered that Harvey's regiment, which it estimated to be 500 men, 'presently' be sent to join Essex's army that was being recruited from a multitude of different sources.[6] Such was the rush to get the regiment out of London that the Committee wrote to the Militia Committee just two days later asking to know when the regiment would be ready and informing them that they had been led to believe that money had been provided.[7] However, on 30 March news was received that would substantially alter the Committee of Both Kingdoms plans – they learnt that the previous day Sir William Waller's army had roundly defeated a Royalist Army under Lord Hopton at the Battle of Cheriton.[8] The Committee decided that with Waller's victory they needed to quickly reinforce the general so that the 'fruit of the victory [not] be lost' and suggested to the Militia Committee on 3 April, that instead of Harvey joining Essex he be sent to join Waller, with Harvey to command a brigade.[9] Many in Parliament were critical of Essex's handling of the war effort and so Waller's impressive victory afforded them the opportunity to raise him up at the expense of the Lord General, who rightly saw greater support for Waller as a snub to him. Once again politics was to affect the City Horse.

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[2] TNA, SP28/131 Part 6, f.3.

[3] JCC Vol. 40, f.90.

[4] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, p.70; *JHL*, Vol. 6, pp.518,519.

[5] TNA, SP28/27 Part 1, f. 7.

[6] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, p.77.

However Harvey, who clearly had an affinity with Essex and a distaste for Waller, had no intention of complying with the Committee's instructions to serve under Waller, although how he was able to justify this position with the Militia Committee, and retain their support, is unclear. Harvey must have decided that his prospects were better served by his open support of Essex in his increasingly public disagreements with the newly formed Committee of Both Kingdoms, who Essex believed was undermining his authority as Lord General.[10] Thomas Juxon, no friend of Harvey's, claimed he 'utterly refused' to serve under Waller declaring 'he would rather carry a musket under his Excellency [Essex] than have a charge under Waller'.[11] The subsequent spat between Harvey and the Committee became very public and was even known to the Royalists in Oxford when in May *Mercurius Aulicus* gleefully noted Harvey would 'rather to lay down his Commission, than serve under *Waller*.'[12] Possibly the source of this animosity was Harvey's claim that he 'had a commission before him to command the counties that he [Waller] then did', possibly referring to a 'commission pro tempore for the expedition to Gloucester, but no longer'.[13]

Throughout April, Harvey simply refused to do as he was ordered, despite numerous requests from the Committee of Both Kingdoms, via the Militia Committee, to proceed. On 11 April the Committee, having received no response to their original suggestion requested the Militia Committee to give them an explanation as to what they thought ought to be done with both Harvey's and Turner's regiments. On 13 April, sensing the uncooperative attitude of the Militia Committee was due to the non-payment of wages to the regiment, the Committee of Both Kingdoms authorised a month's advance pay be given to Harvey's men. This had no effect, leading a frustrated Committee to write again to the Militia Committee on 21 April 'reminding them of speeding away Col. Harvey's regiment of horse' along with the newly raised Maiden Troop of City Horse (see below), and demanding that Harvey appear before the Committee the following day to provide an explanation for the delay. They further informed the Militia Committee of the urgency of sending Harvey's regiment to Waller and that they ought to 'consider how ready the enemy will be to revenge their late defeat and regain their former reputation by a retribution of the like kind whereunto we will add no further arguments, hoping you will lose no time in a matter which so much concerns the good of the public service'.[14] It is not known if Harvey actually attended this meeting but a week later he was again ordered to appear before the Committee to explain himself, which suggests that he did not.[15]

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[7] *Ibid.*, p.83.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.*, p.92.

[10] Michael Mahony, The Presbyterian Party in the Long Parliament, 2 July 1644–3 June 1647, (Unpublished D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1973), p.60.

[11] Lindley and Scott(eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.53.

[12] Peter Heylyn, *Mercurius Aulicus, 18 May 1644*, TT E.50 [6], p.285.

[13] Lindley and Scott (eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.53.

On 2 May, the Committee of Both Kingdoms once again wrote to the Militia Committee imploring them to ensure the regiment be ready to march for:

> The action of Sir Wm. Waller being hindered for want of horse and he continually calling upon us for supply thereof, and we having been put in hope by you that Col. Harvey's regiment and some others should have been before this time ready for that service, we have intimated so much to him, and he expects their march. We therefore desire you that with all expedition that regiment may be made ready to march, and that you will give us notice in what readiness it is, and as we understand the Mayden troop is complete we desire it may immediately march.[16]

But with still no progress being made, Harvey was yet again ordered to appear before the Committee on 7 May, but again it is unclear if he complied. The following day the Committee was still hopeful that the regiment would soon be ready, but to obtain assurances they called the troop commanders of the regiment, excluding Harvey, to meet with them on 9 or 10 May.[17] By now the dispute had escalated to the House of Commons who, on 10 May, intervened by ordering the officers of the regiment to meet with the Committee of Both Kingdoms 'and to confer with them that Regiment may march, if in case Colonel Harvey still refuse to march in Person, under the Command he is designed to go'.[18] This very much looks like the politicians were attempting to separate the officers from Harvey's influence, suggesting there was reason to believe that they did not support the regimental commander's stance. Later Washbourne seems to have had no problem when he was ordered to serve with his troop under Waller instead of Essex. Then on 12 May the House of Commons instructed the Committee of Both Kingdoms to secure 'the Horse and Arms belonging to Colonel Harvie's Regiment' in a not too subtle attempt to wrest control of the regiment from its errant commander.[19] On 15 May, the Commons ordered Harvey to release 'Part out of the Recruit Monies assigned unto him, unto Colonel Washbourne, to complete his

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[14] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, pp.108, 115, 131.

[15] *Ibid.*, p.136.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp.144, 145.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp.150, 155.

[18] *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol. 3, p.488.

[19] *Ibid.*, p.490.

Troop with Horse and Arms',[20] which was individually ordered to join Waller on 25 May.[21] Almost as soon as the Commons intervened and threatened to remove control of the regiment from Harvey, it seems that a compromise was found when Essex himself intervened to settle the dispute, by ordering that Harvey should join his army and that a comparable amount of cavalry be provided for Waller from an alternative source.[22]

This whole episode did little to ingratiate Harvey with his political masters. Had he not been an officer of the London forces, such a crucial element to the Parliamentary army at the time, he would surely have been removed from his post or even court-martialled. The Committee of Both Kingdoms had sound strategic reasons for ordering Harvey's regiment to join Waller after Cheriton and his intransigence imperilled Waller's ability to exploit the changed circumstances in southern England. Harvey's continued refusal to abide by the wishes of the Committee challenged its authority and embarrassed Parliament, while the Militia Committee seems to have been unable, or perhaps even unwilling, to curb his insolence. Thomas Juxon claimed the Committee of Both Kingdoms, well aware that they needed to be as inoffensive to their London allies as possible 'used him with great respect and civility' but Harvey in turn 'carried himself extreme insolently to them'.[23] By mid-May Parliament's patience was exhausted and it was only when they attempted to turn his fellow officers against him and wrest control of the regiment themselves, and it seemed that Harvey was about to lose his command, that he was prepared to compromise when Essex offered a face saving solution. No doubt there were many in London that cheered Harvey's performance in thumbing his nose at Parliament as he, perhaps inadvertently, challenged Parliament's authority over the City. But he did himself no favours and he was now marked as a troublemaker and it was not long before the enemies he had made were to seek their revenge on him.

Despite this unnecessary internal conflict, the first half of 1644 saw considerable changes in Harvey's regiment. It began mobilisation towards the end of March when it first received orders to join the Earl of Essex. On 16 March, the Militia Committee paid the second instalment of stabling charges for the entire regiment, which suggests that mustering the regiment was imminent. However, at this point Harvey's squabble with the Committee of Both Kingdoms affected the concentration of the regiment, for as late as mid-May the horses were still not all mustered.[24] The Militia Committee had provided funds to pay for the quartering of the regiment's horses only until the end of March and so now, two months later, there was the matter of the additional stabling charges to be paid. Recognising that this was likely to be yet another impediment, the Commons sent two of its members to the Militia Committee on 24 May with the request for them to 'discharge Colonel Harvey's Quarters, to take his Musters, and to dispatch his Pay unto him, in such manner, as that Colonel Harvey and his Regiment may be gone away'.[25] The following day the Committee of Both Kingdoms informed Essex of a further delay:

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[20] *Ibid.*, p.493.

[21] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, p.169.

[22] Lindley and Scott (eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.53; Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, pp.168, 176.

[23] Lindley and Scott (eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.53.

[24] *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol.3, p.170.

> By reason of some difference about the discharge of the quarters of Col. Harvey's regiment, it cannot be ready to march this night as we expected. The Militia [Committee] have not present money, and the poor people will not part with the horses without it, but the Militia have promised to do their uttermost to despatch them.[26]

The amount involved could not have been great as the quartering charges in February were only 350l and in March 300l[27] but they were significant to those providing the stabling, who were evidently refusing to release the horses until their bills had first been settled. These charges were apparently paid quickly, but then another problem became apparent when the old soldiers of the regiment refused to march forth unless they received their 28 days advanced pay. No doubt having learnt from their experiences of the previous year this time the soldiers demanded a full four weeks' pay up front, without which they refused to march. This was probably not an unexpected turn of events and must have been brewing for some time, so the Committee sent two of its members to meet with the Militia Committee on 27 May to find a solution, which must have been found promptly for the regiment left the City later that day after being paid the money they demanded.[28]

As Harvey departed London, he led a regiment recently re-equipped and reasonably up to strength. The troop commanders were:

Colonel Edmund Harvey
Major Robert Mainwaring
Captain Symon Hackett
Captain John Blackwell[29]
Captain Robert Norwood
Captain Herriott Washbourne

At a muster of the regiment in July it consisted of 72 officers and 389 troopers and so must have been virtually at full strength when it departed the capital.[30]

As the regiment left the City, they took with them a convoy containing pay and ammunition for Essex's army, which it was desperate for, and these extra few days wasted over settling the regiment's quarters angered him greatly.[31] In the two months since Cheriton the strategic situation in southern England had again changed considerably. The loss of Hopton's army had quashed any likelihood of an attack on London through Surrey, while a critical shortage of infantry in the King's main Oxford Army saw the Royalists abandon first Reading, and then Abingdon, as they concentrated what infantry they had in Oxford. Parliament was hopeful that besieging Oxford and capturing the King was a viable objective for the summer even though the Earl of Manchester and his army had headed north to assist in the siege of York.

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[25] *Ibid.*, p.505.
[26] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, p.170.
[27] TNA, SP28/131 Part 6, f. 1.
[28] *Ibid.*, p.2; Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, p.175.
[29] This was the newly raised Maiden Troop – see below.
[30] Symonds, (C. E. Long, ed.), *Symonds Diary*, p.73.
[31] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, pp.175, 200; Lindley and Scott (eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.53.

Essex and Waller's armies had both been reinforced with large components of London forces and by mid-May both were marching towards Oxford, Essex to the east and Waller from the west.[32] On 28 May, Essex occupied Islip, six miles to the east of Oxford, then attempted to cross the River Cherwell to the north of the Royalist capital to block any escape by the King from that direction, while he waited for Waller to seal off the western side of the city. These attempts initially failed with Essex using up much valuable ammunition and so he was relieved when Harvey finally arrived at Islip, probably on 2 June, with both reinforcements and the much-needed ammunition.[33] So anxious was Essex to receive this ammunition that he sent two of the Parliamentary appointed civilian commissioners attached to the army to meet Harvey at Aylesbury, to expedite his arrival with the army.[34] With Waller making progress to the west of Oxford the noose around the city was tightening and the King needed to decide whether to remain in the city to withstand a siege or escape with his cavalry and then wait for Prince Rupert to march south to relieve Oxford. The King decided on the latter and fled Oxford on the night of 3 June by heading towards the upper River Severn valley and relative safety. Essex realised the King had escaped the following day and both he and Waller concentrated their forces in a belated attempt to intercept him.[35] On 6 June Waller and Essex met, probably at Chipping Norton, and the outcome of this meeting was to have dire consequences for Edmund Harvey's regiment of City Horse.

The logical next step, given that the King had escaped with the cavalry from Oxford, was to besiege the city and force the King to attempt to relieve it, rather than suffer the humiliation of seeing his wartime capital surrender, and this was precisely what the Committee of Both Kingdoms expected Essex to do.[36] However, when Essex and Waller met on 6 June, the decision was made by the Lord General that instead of the two armies cooperating and besieging Oxford, Waller would be left to shadow the King as best he could, while Essex marched into the West Country with the aim of relieving the Parliamentary garrison of Lyme Regis, currently under siege by an army under Prince Maurice.[37] This was an inexplicable decision as it tore up the agreed strategy for the summer campaign and was to prove disastrous for Essex and his army. The Lord General was to later lamely justify this decision based on an instruction he had received from the Committee dated 30 May telling him to send a relief force to Lyme Regis, after which the Committee

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[32] Toynbee and Young, *Cropredy Bridge*, pp.25–28.

[33] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, p.200.

[34] The National Archives, SP16/503, State Papers Domestic, Charles I. Letters and Papers 1644, f. 8.

[35] Toynbee and Young, *Cropredy Bridge*, pp.38–46.

[36] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, p.228.

[37] *Ibid.*, p.214.


N
Chipping Norton
6 Jun
2 Jun
Aylesbury
Islip
Oxford
London
Lambourn
10 Jun
Bristol
Bristol Channel
mid Jul
Barnstaple
Tiverton
Chard
Crewkerne
23 Jun
Cullompton
Honiton
2 Jul
Axminster
Blandford
14 Jun
Exeter
Lyme Regis
Weymouth
16 Jun
Isle of Wight
26 Jul
Horsebridge
Tavistock
24 Jul
Lostwithiel
Saltash
5 Oct
Plymouth
Aug
Fowey
31 Aug
English Channel
0
10
20
30
40
50 miles

Map 5: Colonel Edmund Harvey's Regiment on Campaign, Summer 1644 optimistically believed the entire West might be recovered. However, there was nothing in these instructions that even hinted that Essex was to take his entire army to achieve this. A smaller force could have been detached to comply with these orders while the main armies encircled Oxford.[38]

Essex wrote to the Committee on the same day he met Waller, informing them of his decision to march his entire army towards Lyme. He immediately set off and by 10 June he and his army were at Lambourne in Wiltshire, and by 14 June they had reached Blandford in Dorset.[39] It was at Blandford that Essex received direct orders from the Committee not to proceed any further and to return to Oxford, but the general chose to ignore the order and pushed on towards Dorchester, which he reached with the main body of his army on 16 June. He had previously sent a large body of horse ahead of him in the direction of Lyme Regis and upon their advance Prince Maurice lifted his siege and retired towards Plymouth on 14 June.[40]

On 16 June, Essex dispatched a mounted force under Sir William Balfour towards Weymouth and it seems probable that Harvey's regiment was part of this detachment, for just a few days later it is recorded that Harvey and some of his officers were in Weymouth. Upon his arrival before the town Balfour summoned the Royalist garrison under Colonel Ashburnham to surrender. Without a sufficient force to resist, Ashburnham evacuated the town and retired to the Isle of Portland, but then losing his resolve he immediately surrendered to Balfour. The Royalist officers were allowed to march off towards Exeter with horses, swords and pistols but the common soldiers were allowed to march away with only staffs in their hands. Balfour captured a significant quantity of arms and ammunition as well as 'around Sixty Sail of Ships of all sorts' in the port.[41]

In the days after the capture of Weymouth the Parliamentary authorities scoured the town and the shipping in the harbour for arms, ammunition and anything of value that could be confiscated and sold to provide funds for their war effort. One vessel seized contained a cargo of wine and 244 bags of expensive Spanish Segovia wool belonging to a Bristol merchant called Joseph Juxon and his business partner in London, Benjamin Whitcomb.[42] Dr Isaac Dorislaus, the Judge Advocate of Essex's army, under a commission from both the Lord General and the Earl of Warwick, the Lord High Admiral, arranged to sell the consignment of wool by public auction in Weymouth Town Hall on or about 20 June, and duly publicised the auction by beat of drum within the town. Over two consecutive days there were no bidders for the wool, which was rumoured to be water damaged, although nobody at the auction had actually seen it. This was perhaps not surprising given that the auction did not take place in the Town Hall as advertised but in a small room elsewhere. On the third attempt to sell it Harvey's major, Robert Mainwaring, successfully bid for it but, lacking ready funds, promised to pay for it in London for the sum of 4l 2s per hundredweight, considerably less than the 1,000l value it had been assessed at.[43] Accompanying Essex's army were four civilian commissioners appointed by Parliament whose role, amongst others, were to oversee the disposal of prize goods captured by the army and when they learnt of Dorislaus' actions one of them, Captain John Potter, immediately intervened. Not only did Potter believe Dorislaus lacked the authority to auction prize goods, it being a mandate of the commissioners, he also suspected that the State was being defrauded as the sale price was suspiciously low. When he publicly confronted Dorislaus about the validity of the auction Edmund Harvey immediately came the judge's defence.[44]

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[38] *Ibid.*, p.182.

[39] *Ibid.*, pp.211,220.

[40] *Ibid.*, p.239.

[41] *Ibid.*, pp.244–245, 368; *A Perfect List of the Many Victories Obtained (Through the Blessing of God) by the Parliaments Forces..*; John Rushworth, *Historical Collections of Private Passages of State*, Vol. The Third Part Volume Two, (London: 1692) p.683.

[42] TNA, SP16/503, ff. 147,47.

According to Abraham Webb, Essex's own 'Apothecarie', Potter and Thomas Herbert, who was also a fellow Commissioner, met Harvey and Dorislaus on the street in Weymouth when Harvey:

> without any provocation on ye Comm[issoners] part either by word or gesture, the said Collo. Harvey did in greate passion breake out into unseemly gesture and words, walking up and downe with his Cane staff in his hand, branded the said Gentlemen for about half an hour's space before a multitude of Souldiers & ye inhabitants.[45]

Harvey demanded by what authority Potter was intervening, and insisted he see Potter's commission, he then verbally abused Potter and, allegedly, Dorislaus physically assaulted him.[46] Potter, angered by Harvey's refusal to acknowledge his authority, is said to have responded that he would only produce his commission to 'A better man than you' to which Harvey replied, according to his own cornet Christopher Charteris who witnessed the incident, that unless Potter presented his commission to prove his authority 'I shall give you as much and no more respect then I doe to one of my Common troopers.' Incensed, Potter responded that 'I scorne you & your troopers' to which Harvey retorted 'rule your tonge better.'[47] Thomas Herbert claimed that when Harvey was instructed not to proceed with the sale he cried out that 'Jews & Turks shall have fairer before Englishmen' with the 'Townesmen & Souldyers greatly observing us.'[48] At one point in this very public altercation Dorislaus is alleged to have 'layed hands' on Potter and said 'I must committ you to prison' while saying moreover, 'That if hee saw anything done tending to a Mutenie, it was his office to committ them.'[49]

Potter immediately reported the incident to the Lord General who, upon review, nullified the auction and demanded that the wool be sent to London for sale. The entire event had the taint of fraud to it, from the rumours of water damage, the changing of the location and the eventual sale at a heavily discounted rate. Potter formally accused Dorislaus, Harvey and Mainwaring of fraud as well as, it would seem, accusing Dorislaus with assault.[50] It was not long before this news reached London and Parliament quickly became involved, not least because of the affront given to one of their appointed Commissioners.

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[43] *Ibid.*, pp.149, 46.

[44] Dorislaus was a resident of Cheap Ward in 1638 and so was most likely well known to Harvey before the war. See National Archives, SP16/453, List of the Principal Inhabitants of the City of London, 1640, f.144.

[45] TNA, SP16/503, f.122.

[46] *Ibid.*, f.127.

[47] *Ibid.*, f.7.

[48] *Ibid.*, f.147.

[49] *Ibid.*, f.122.

On 27 June, Parliament received details of the 'Affronts and Carriages that much obstructed and discouraged their [the Commissioners] Proceeding' directly from Potter himself.[51] Shocked by this outrageous behaviour, on 1 July Parliament wrote to Essex insisting that both Dorislaus and Harvey be sent immediately to London to answer for 'several public and scandalous affronts' against their Commissioners and promptly authorised the committee that oversaw Essex's army to investigate further.[52] Before 11 July,[53] Harvey had ignominiously left the regiment. The subsequent investigation led to numerous witnesses being examined as Parliament sought to understand what had happened. The investigations were led by many of Essex's political opponents, who were only too happy to discredit the general and his handling of the army.[54] These investigations went on until at least October after which they suddenly ceased.[55] It is possible that Potter instigated civil proceedings against the two as well. That these investigations were politically motivated against Essex, and egged on by his main antagonist Sir Henry Vane, seems likely for they ended at the time that Essex was being effectively ousted as commander of the Parliamentary army during the debates on the Self Denying Ordinance and as the dispute between Manchester and Cromwell reached a head later in the year. Although Essex only resigned his commission in April 1645 there was perhaps nothing further to be gained by investigating the abuses and negligence within his army in late 1644.[56]

It is impossible to know how complicit Harvey was in the alleged fraud but the knowledge that he readily and vocally defended Dorislaus, in front of numerous witnesses, is suggestive that he was instrumental in it. Furthermore, the fact that he was imprisoned during the Protectorate on another case of substantial fraud is telling of his character. Harvey had won no friends by his insolent and disrespectful behaviour towards Parliament in the spring and so Parliament had no qualms about demanding his recall and subjecting him to a humiliating investigation while he received what many would have seen as his due retribution. Essex, whom Harvey had loyally if naively supported when he refused to serve under Waller, it seems did nothing to protect the errant officer and neither did the Militia Committee. For his role in this saga Harvey was removed from the command of his regiment, although whether his commission was revoked, he resigned or if the matter was just quietly forgotten about, is unclear. If there can be any doubt as to which side Parliament supported in this dispute it was made clear when Potter's role as a Commissioner to the army was re-affirmed in October of that year.[57]

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[50] *Ibid.*, f.127.

[51] *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol. 3, p.543.

[52] HMC, *The Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland, 13th Report Appendix, Part One*, (London: HMSO, 1891) p.179; *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol. 3, p.555.

[53] TNA, SP28/27 Part 1, f.8.

[54] TNA, *SP16/503*, ff. 7, 93, 122, 127, 129, 136, 147, 149.

[55] William Douglas Hamilton (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, Charles I, 1644–1645*,(London: 1890)p.70.

[56] My thank to Stephen Ede-Borrett for bringing this to my attention.

Harvey certainly orchestrated his own downfall when his ego and overblown sense of self-importance overtook him. Unbeknown to him at the time he had backed the wrong political horse in Essex, for with the fall of the Lord General later in the year, followed quickly by the Earl of Manchester, the stage was set for Sectaries and Independents, such as Cromwell, to ascend to dominance in both Parliament and in the army. The self-important Harvey would have seen how the political sands had shifted in late 1644 as he was dumped and humiliated in public but, his sense of self-preservation saw him later switch sides when the opportunity presented itself in 1647. He then became a vocal supporter of the ascending political Independents, so much so that in 1648 Clement Walker was to disdainfully write of him that he converted from being an 'asurious [sic] *Presbyter*, to a Bedlam *Independent*.'[58] What sanction Mainwaring received, if any, for this role in the affair is unknown, but the accusations against Dorislaus were later quietly dropped.

Despite this distraction, Harvey's regiment remained part of Essex's army and was with it when the Lord General made perhaps the biggest mistake of his military career. However, while the consequences for the regiment of Essex's decision to march farther west are easily discerned the specific role they played in the ensuing campaign are not. At a Council of War held in Weymouth, probably on either 18 or 19 June, Essex made the decision, supported by the Earl of Warwick and Lord Robartes, to advance farther west, to relieve Plymouth, maybe even capture the Queen who was then at Exeter having recently given birth to a daughter and to more generally have the region 'quickly reduced to the Parliament's obedience'.[59] Essex's letter notifying Parliament of his decision was received and read in the House of Lords on 22 June, which no doubt reluctantly agreed to this substantial change of plan, as did the House of Commons on 25 June.[60] With that, Essex marched his army farther west towards disaster. Days later, Waller's army was defeated by the King at the Battle of Cropredy Bridge, which allowed him to follow Essex without fear that Oxford would be threatened in his absence.

Essex arrived at Crewkerne on 23 June, and the following day marched into Chard, where his army rested for almost a full week.[61] While in Chard the army's senior officers felt the need to write to Parliament in support of Essex's controversial decision to invade the West Country, with Edmund Harvey being one of those that showed his support for the Lord General by signing the letter.[62] The army left Chard on 30 June and arrived in Cullompton in Devon on 2 July, by way of Axminster and Honiton.[63] The following day Essex wrote to the Committee of Both Kingdoms informing them that while he was going to head for Tiverton with the main body of the army he was sending a force of horse and foot towards Barnstable, on the north coast of Devon, which he had received intelligence was occupied by part of Prince Maurice's Western Army and, according to the less than reliable John Vicars, the local population pleaded with Essex to help them overthrow the Royalist forces in the town and which was subsequently then easily captured 'with all the Ammunition therein'.[64] Essex gave no indication as to the composition of this force, but in a later letter, dated 10 July from Tiverton, he mentioned that the force was commanded by Lord Robartes and consisted of three regiments of foot (possibly including London's Yellow Auxiliaries) and two of horse.[65] It is certain however that elements of Harvey's regiment were present at the taking of the town, for in the accounts prepared by Harvey himself, he mentions that his troop was mustered at Barnstable in early July, while at least two horses belonging to Blackwell's troop died there.[66] What role Harvey's regiment played in the reduction of the town and how long they remained there is not known.

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[57] *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol. 3, p.682.

[58] Clement Walker, *Anarchia Anglicana: Or, The History of Independency*, (London:1649) p.13.

[59] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, p.251.

[60] *JHL*, Vol. 6, pp.601,602–603; *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol. 3, p.542.

[61] Symonds (C. E. Long, ed.), *Symonds Diary*, Vol. 74, p.98.

[62] *JHL*, Vol. 6, pp.616–617.

Essex was only able to continue his march from Tiverton on 20 July[67] as presumably he was waiting for Robartes' force to return to him. Most likely the regiment was in Barnstable when Harvey received orders to return to London and answer for his conduct in Weymouth. There is no evidence that Mainwaring was recalled so it seems likely that he commanded the regiment for the rest of the campaign, although similarly there is no evidence either that he remained. While the regiment was at Tiverton a muster of the entire cavalry force was made, the details of which were soon to fall into the Royalist hands.[68] It is possible that as Harvey's regiment was in Barnstable for much of this period the regiment mustered there, while the rest of the army was mustered at Tiverton. In part the reason for the muster was to calculate the pay for the regiment, which they received on 24 July when the army was at Tavistock.[69] From Tiverton the army bypassed the Royalist garrison at Exeter and headed further into Devon via Crediton, Bow, Okehampton, Tavistock, reaching the River Tamar and the border with Cornwall at Horsebridge on 26 July.[70] Sir Richard Grenville, commander of the Royalist Cornish Army, who had been besieging Plymouth, had withdrawn into Cornwall upon Essex's approach.

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[63] Symonds (C. E. Long ed.), *Symonds Diary*, Vol. 74, p.98.

[64] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, p.303; John Vicars, *Gods Arke Overtopping the Worlds Waves, or The third part of the Parliamentary chronicle*, 1645, E.312 [3], pp.265–266; Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. The Third Part Volume Two, pp.684–685; *A Perfect List of the Many Victories Obtained (Through the Blessing of God) by the Parliaments Forces...*

[65] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, p.335.

[66] TNA, SP28/27 Part 1, ff. 9,10.; National Archives, SP28/22, Warrants by army committees, military commanders, undated, 1642–1660, f.278.

[67] Symonds (C. E. Long, ed.), *Symonds Diary*, Vol. 74, p.98.

[68] *Ibid.*, p.73.

[69] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.502.

[70] Symonds (C. E. Long, ed.), *Symonds Diary*, p.98.

The King, having decided in early July to follow Essex west despite hearing of Prince Rupert's defeat at the Battle of Marston Moor, followed the Lord General at a faster pace than the Earl was moving. The King entered Exeter on 26 July, the same day Essex reached the River Tamar. Barely stopping, the King followed almost the same route that Essex had the week before through Crediton and into Okehampton, which he entered on 30 July.[71] Essex incredibly now found himself between two Royalist armies, hundreds of miles from home and with only Warwick's fleet to keep him resupplied, as it followed him along the Devon coastline but instead of turning back to face the King now that he had relieved Plymouth, he chose to enter Cornwall believing 'there was no other way of reducing the west to the obedience of the Parliament than by clearing of Cornwall.' Having made this incredulous decision Essex soon found himself in trouble when, contrary to his expectation, there was no mass uprising of support for the Parliamentary cause in the county and he was forced to draw his army around the town of Lostwithiel on the River Fowey, which he intended to defend while being supplied by the fleet and awaiting the relief that he expected was coming in the shape of his old nemesis, Sir William Waller.[72]

The King, having now joined forces with Grenville, had Essex hemmed in. During August, the Royalists forces gradually encircled Essex, forcing him into an ever smaller pocket. Few of the remaining accounts for what became known as the Battle of Lostwithiel make much reference to the role of Essex's cavalry in the month they were hemmed in by the Royalists. Essex's own description of the events sent to Parliament on 3 September noted that in the first days of the battle 'for the most part of the time the Fight was altogether Horse, in which we beat them every day, though three for one, and the Enemy durst never appear but with Musqueteers'.[73] Certainly the fighting later was for the most part between the infantry, as the Parliamentary cavalry had an ever decreasing amount of space in which to operate, and once they were completely surrounded they were unable to even forage for provisions. What little account Essex gives of the role of his cavalry relates solely to the unit he brought from the Plymouth garrison and so it is impossible to know how Harvey's regiment was employed in the tightening noose Essex had led his army into. Essex does mention that he deployed some of his horse on the left bank of the River Fowey around St Blazey, from where they could protect his exposed left flank, and until occupied by the Royalists, they could forage in the countryside beyond.[74] It is known though that Harvey's regiment did receive a small amount of provisions, issued by Deputy-Commissary Robert Woolsey of Essex's army, while around Lostwithiel. On 11 August, it was given biscuit worth 1l 10s, on 28 August more biscuit valued at 1l 16s along with some cheese valued at 1l 12s.[75] While this does not seem much it is in line with similar quantities that Woolsey issued to other cavalry regiments at the same time, although he issued the infantry regiments of the army with significantly more, and varied, provisions. This disparity might simply be because Woolsey was just one of several commissaries with the army and his colleagues might well have issued greater quantities to the regiment, which have not been recorded, or it might reflect the cavalry's greater ability to forage for themselves and so the infantry was provided with more as a priority.

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[71] Sir Edward Walker, *Iter Carolinum, Being a Succinct Relation of the Necessitated Marches, Retreats, and Sufferings, of His Majesty Charls...* (London: 1660), pp.10–11.

[72] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, pp.398–399.

[73] Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, The Third Part, Volume Two, p.701.

[74] *Ibid.*, p.702; *The Copie of a Letter from the Lord Generall his Quarters*, (London: 1644), TT E.8 [22].

By the end of August it was clear that Essex's army was on the verge of surrender. Waller had failed to materialise (although he had belatedly sent Colonel John Middleton with a brigade of horse westwards in a lame attempt to provide relief), Warwick was unable to either provide sufficient supplies or even evacuate his army and with the King content to starve him into submission[76] Essex had run out of options. At a Council of War, probably held on 30 August, the decision was made that the horse would attempt to break through the Royalist lines and head for Plymouth, while Philip Skippon commanding the infantry would sue for terms and surrender. Essex chose to flee by rowing boat to a nearby Parliamentary warship and take his chances with the consequences of his epic failure. That night Balfour, commanding the cavalry, broke though the Royalist lines and headed along the road towards Liskeard and Plymouth, taking Harvey's regiment with him. How much fighting the cavalry had to do to get through the Royalist lines is a matter of some conjecture and the attempt was not without considerable risk, but Balfour got the vast majority of them through, and they were safe in Plymouth by the following night.[77] Skippon subsequently surrendered the rest of the army on 2 September.

There is no way of knowing what role Harvey's regiment played both during the fighting around Lostwithiel or in the breakout on the night of 30 August, and it is pointless to speculate. It is certain that the regiment was present throughout and that it took part in the dramatic escape of the Parliamentary cavalry. It is even recorded that during the breakout a part of the Earl of Cleveland's Royalist cavalry brigade gave chase to the fleeing Parliamentarians but were able to do 'little or no hurt to the Rebels, other than the taking of a Lieutenant of Major Manwaring in Collonel Harvie's Regiment, with some few other Troopers'.[78] Blackwell lost 20 of the 57 horses he had previously purchased while in Cornwall, many of them no doubt when 'breaking through the Enemy'.[79] Harvey and Juxon's troops lost horses in Cornwall as well but the manuscript record is too damaged to read clearly although they had lost some 116 saddles, 108 pairs of pistols and 105 sets of body armour in the days since Harvey left the regiment when they were at Barnstable.[80] It is not known if these were lost in the breakout but it would seem probable that this is when most were lost. However this is a suspiciously high number. When the troop mustered for pay at the end of May before leaving London it numbered 190 officers and men of which 16 immediately deserted, while at the Tiverton muster the troop had just 126 officers and men.[81] From Hackett's troop, Sebastian Houlden, John Houey, Nicholas Blayton, Nicholas Russell, and John Westmoreland were all taken prisoner by the Royalists in Cornwall. Richard Hubbard the trumpeter was wounded, Arthur Johnson died during the campaign, though how is not recorded, and Arthur Fox and Thomas Guye were both killed.[82]

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[75] The National Archives, SP28/128 Part 28, Robert Woolsey, one of commissary Bond's deputies. Account for provisions supplied, 1644, f.25.

[76] Although at this time significant amounts of food were being landed, at least until 29 August, as per Commissary Woolsey's accounts in *Ibid.*, pp.1–29.

[77] See Stephen Ede-Borrett, *Lostwithiel 1644 – The Campaign and the Battles*, (Farnham: The Pike and Shot Society, 2004) pp.38–40 for a detailed discussion on this.

[78] Sir Edward Walker, *Historical Discourses, Upon Several Occasions...* (London: 1705), p.71.

[79] TNA, SP28/22, f. 278.

A curious comment in Blackwell's accounts suggest that perhaps not all of the troop escaped with Balfour from Lostwithiel. When detailing the horses 'un-avoydably lost in Cornwall' it adds 'Others – being in Partyes from the troope had their horses taken away contrary to the Articles, and their Armes according to the Articles made wth the Enemy'.[83] The cavalry escaped before Skippon surrendered the infantry to the Royalists and so the main body of cavalry were not covered by the terms of the surrender articles, they being long gone by the time they were signed. Essex informed Parliament that he only retained the horse from the Plymouth garrison with the army when Balfour left. Blackwell's comment can only refer to the surrender articles signed on 1 September and if he subsequently lost horses contrary to these surrender terms then it must mean that some of the troop ('being in Partyes from the troope') for some reason were not involved in the break out. The actual surrender terms did not in fact specify how the cavalry were to be treated, which is not surprising given that most had already departed, but they did state that officers above sergeant were allowed to retain their horses as were *reformado* officers.[84] It is therefore questionable whether the plundering of Blackwell's mounts was in fact contrary to the terms of the capitulation, although much of Essex's infantry were robbed as they left, which was certainly in contravention of the terms, so it is perhaps a moot point. However, if part of the Maiden Troop failed to escape with the rest of the regiment it is unclear why. Perhaps they tried and failed to escape, or perhaps they were sick and wounded and so unable to hazard the attempt. Maybe they were unaware of the plan, could not rendezvous in time or possibly they were deliberately ordered to remain.

The fleeing Parliamentary cavalry arrived in Plymouth on 31 August and Essex himself arrived by boat the following day. Recognising that it was only a question of time before the victorious Royalist Army appeared before the town, Essex ordered his cavalry to leave on 3 September and head for safety, while he sailed to Portsmouth to await the arrival of whatever was left of his army. Before he left Plymouth, he ordered that Harvey's regiment remain in the Plymouth garrison. He explained to the Committee of Both Kingdoms on 11 September that, 'I left Col. Harvey's regiment of horse there with a fortnight's pay, I left them 2,000l, in money paid them their own demands for sick and wounded men of ours, that were at Plymouth, in victuals, which amounted to 300l or 4001. to my best remembrance, and left great store of victuals besides.'[85] At the same time he appointed John, Lord Robartes to be Governor of the Plymouth garrison. Why Essex chose Harvey's regiment to remain is unclear. Possibly the garrison was short of horse now that he had left one regiment of cavalry and some dragoons with Skippon and it was therefore unlikely that it would be of any further use to the garrison after it surrendered at Lostwithiel and in fact they still had not returned by early October.[86] Maybe Essex thought Harvey's regiment expendable, preferring to retain his regular, more experienced, cavalry with his army rather than some of them being wasted on garrison duty.

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[80] TNA, SP28/27 Part 1, ff. 9,10.

[81] TNA, SP28/131 Part 7, ff. 34–39.; Symonds (C. E. Long, ed.), *Symonds Diary*, p.73.

[82] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, ff. 142–143.

[83] TNA, *SP28/22*, f.278.

[84] Peter Heylyn, *Mercuricus Aulicus, 7 September 1644*, TT E.10 [20], pp.1152–1553; Walker, *Historical Discourses*, pp.78–79.

There is evidence that confirms that at least Blackwell's troop was paid the 14 days' pay by Essex in Plymouth, as he had previously informed the Committee of Both Kingdoms.[87] Interestingly, Blackwell disbursed pay to 39 troopers then but retained the pay for five others who were presumably not present at the time, which suggests that they were missing. The troop consisted of 44 troopers when it was paid at the end of May in London and the same number when it was paid at Tiverton on 24 July (although the number is the same, they were not all the same soldiers). This suggests that the troop only incurred five losses throughout the entire campaign, which seems suspiciously low.[88] Curiously, for the two other troops for whom extensive pay accounts remain (Harvey/Juxon and Hackett) none of them record any pay being issued after the Cornish disaster. The exception being pay for 35 troopers in Harvey's troop dated May 1645, but these were all for new recruits raised in May 1644 and seem to be arrears of pay only, while Hackett received 7 days provisions *in lieu* of wages for his troop in Plymouth. Blackwell's accounts list nothing after the 2 September payment. This might simply mean that the pay accounts were recorded in other documents now missing, but it could equally mean that no pay was issued because there was no longer a regiment to pay. It is known that the Militia Committee sent money to Southampton and Portsmouth to pay the returning Trained Bands, but no mention was made of money for Harvey's regiment.[89] For the troops whose accounts still exist all actually continue after the escape from Cornwall, but it is just that there was no pay included in them. Hackett's accounts show he received an allowance (not pay) from the Plymouth committee for 13 weeks but nothing for his troop (other than the provisions mentioned above). In Mainwaring's accounts he shows nothing recorded after May 1644. If the remnants of Harvey's regiment continued to receive pay when they were in

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[85] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, pp.493–494.

[86] TNA, SP28/128 Part 28, ff.25 & 28.; Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, p.12.

[87] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, ff.502–503.

[88] *Ibid.*

[89] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, pp.514–515.

Plymouth this is certainly not shown in the regimental accounts prepared later, while only fragmentary accounts survive for the garrison, none of which even indicate the presence of Harvey's regiment there.

What happened to the regiment in Plymouth is far from clear. In Blackwell's troop at least 11 troopers enlisted into the garrison under the command of Lord Robartes and took their mounts and arms with them, while some other horses were 'killed and Lost upon the Guard … at Plymouth.' It seems that certainly for a time his troop remained as a body and during that time nine horses were 'taken by the Enemy at Plymouth', while seven of their riders were captured and five of them imprisoned in the infamous Lydford Castle.[90] A Royalist account written by Sir Edward Walker regarding the siege of Plymouth, which was resumed almost as soon as Essex's army had surrendered, confirm that Blackwell's troop played the active role in the defence of the City that his losses in horses and equipment suggest. On 4 October, the garrison attacked and captured Saltash on the Cornish side of the River Tamar, while the following day Millbrook, farther south, was also occupied. On 5 October, the Royalist Sir Richard Grenville launched a ferocious counter-attack upon Saltash, which he re-captured three days later with as many as 500 Parliamentarians killed and 300 captured. According to Walker one of the Parliamentary units involved was 'the Rebels Maiden Troop of 80 Horse', who were 'all either slain or taken'.[91]

After this incident nothing further is mentioned of Harvey's regiment, nor of the individual troops' subsequent service, in the historical record. Hackett's personal pay accounts indicate that he claimed, and received, pay as captain of the troop from 3 October 1643 until 18 December 1644. He further claimed pay as captain from 18 December 1644 until 1 April 1645 on the basis that he had not been discharged. This pay was not allowed and nor was his claim for wagon money for the same period.[92] In Hackett's case at least it would be reasonable to suppose that he remained in command of his troop until at least mid-December 1644, and this might indicate the date they returned to London and were disbanded. A side note in Hackett's report of what became of some of the horses he was provided with, states that some were 'lost in Plymouth when the men came away about [?]December [the word is almost illegible and might even say November] 27: 1644.'[93]

What little evidence that remains suggests that Hackett's troop certainly, and presumably the rest also, left Plymouth in December. How they returned to London is not known. It is known that reinforcements were sent into Plymouth at various times by sea, and so it is possible that this was how they returned, which would make sense given the high loss of mounts the regiment suffered. Intriguingly a comment in Hackett's accounts records that part of his troop's equipment were handed over to the 'Magazine of Collonell

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[90] TNA, SP28/22, f.278.

[91] Walker, *Historical Discourses*, pp.104–105; Peter Heylyn, *Mercurius Aulicus, 19 October 1644*, TT E.244 [30].

[92] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.145.

[93] *Ibid.*, p.143.

Jones for the States use.'[94] Nothing in the record mentions where this occurred or when, but internal evidence suggests it occurred when the troop was disbanded, probably in December 1644. The only Colonel Jones that can be identified as serving in the Parliamentary army at that time in southern England was the commander of the Farnham Castle garrison. If some of the troop's equipment was delivered into the Farnham magazine this would suggest that at least some of the regiment returned to London overland. What is clear, however, is that Edmund Harvey's regiment ceased to exist as an organised military unit after the escape from Lostwithiel. Its colonel was not present to see its demise, which had come about as result of that fateful decision to march into the West Country made by the Earl of Essex, only days after the regiment joined his army. Ironically, the destruction of the regiment was caused by the man that Harvey had so loyally stood by earlier in the year and who was to later abandon Harvey to his fate when he returned to London. Despite this it is evident that Harvey retained the highest of regards for Essex and he no doubt deemed it an honour and a privilege to be a part of the funeral procession for the Earl when he died in 1646.

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[94] *Ibid.*

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The Abingdon Garrison, 1644–1646

As has been previously noted, Parliament's strategy for 1644 was for the combined armies of Essex and Waller to encircle Oxford to capture the city and, better yet, capture the King as well. With Charles occupied defending his wartime capital the Parliamentary northern forces and their Scottish allies would retake the North of England. The Earl of Manchester's Eastern Association army would clear Lincolnshire and from there could head south to assist Essex or go north to assist the Scots, as necessary. For a while, the manoeuvres of Essex and Waller in May kept the King occupied in the Midlands and he was in no position to provide relief to the besieged Royalists in York to which Manchester had recently marched. However, when the King escaped from Oxford with most of his cavalry on 3 June before Essex could encircle the city, this caused a dilemma for Parliament. With such a large mobile force at large there was concern that the King might invade the counties of the Eastern Association and perhaps threaten London from its less protected eastern side. Such an invasion would force Manchester to return with his army leaving their plans to recapture the North in tatters.

The Committee of Both Kingdoms therefore decided that to counter any incursion by the King into the East of England a new force of county based troops would be created to shield the eastern counties, while also being able to provide support to both Essex and Waller. Accordingly, on 7 June Richard Browne was commissioned Major-General of the counties of Oxfordshire, Berkshire and Buckinghamshire with the objective of reducing 'the City of *Oxon*, the Town and Castle of *Wallingford*, the Fort of *Greenland* House, and the Town and Castle of *Banbury*'. For an army he was optimistically instructed 'to draw forth of the said Counties such well-affected Soldiers, as will follow him for the Service aforesaid'.[1] Inevitably Parliament was aware that there would be insufficient 'well-affected soldiers' to be had in those counties and so the request had been previously made to Common Council that a force of the Trained Bands be provided to form the nucleus of Browne's army, to which they assented on 5 June.[2]

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[1] *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol. 3, p.522.

Browne was able to concentrate his London forces during the third week of June, by which time Essex and Waller had separated with the Lord General heading west and Waller following the King around the Midlands. At this point it looked very much like the King would head for the Eastern Association and so, on 24 June, Browne was ordered to march to Hertford in an attempt to block any Royalist advance and he then mustered the Trained Bands of Essex and Hertfordshire at Leighton Buzzard on 1 July.[3] In the meantime, Waller had been given a bloody nose at Cropredy Bridge while Rupert had been decisively defeated at Marston Moor, but Parliament was still concerned that the counties of the east were vulnerable. Thus on 12 July, Parliament ordered that a new force be raised across the counties of the East of England, the Midlands and the South-East, which was to include a force of 200 cavalry to be raised in London and Middlesex.[4] Hardly any of this grand army ever materialised but, as ever, the City of London responded to Parliament's call and raised the force of horse required of it, and this force, small though it was, served under Browne until August 1646.

Initially a force of 100 horse were raised within the City, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel William Underwood, previously of the Blue Regiment of the City Trained Bands. The sum of 2,000l was allocated from the receipts of the Weekly Meal Tax to pay for the troop's recruitment and equipping.[5] There are no accounts for the troop extant, nor is the troop structure known, but it is clear that the Middlesex component was not incorporated into the troop. According to Browne when the troop joined him at Abingdon it numbered 70 troopers excluding officers.[6] When exactly Underwood's troop was ready for deployment is unclear. The money for their recruitment was ordered to be made available on 2 August but the next reference to the troop that can be found is 15 October when they were in Abingdon under Browne's command. Browne himself had been ordered to Abingdon on 13 August where he had taken over the garrison and the forces that Waller had left there when he had returned to London.[7] Most likely Underwood joined Browne at the end of August or in early September.

Once Underwood's troop had been raised and sent to Abingdon, Common Council was concerned by London's lack of available cavalry, as both Harvey's and Thompson's regiments were deployed with the field armies. On 7 September, the Council considered petitioning Parliament for the authority to raise additional horses and riders, but it is unclear whether a proposal was actually sent to Westminster at that time.[8] However, it is clear that a second troop of horse was sent to Abingdon but there is no record of how or when it was raised. On 4 October, the Committee of Both

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[2] JCC Vol. 40, f.99v.

[3] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, pp.268, 297.

[4] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol.1, pp.472–475.

[5] JCC Vol. 40, f.104r.

[6] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.24.

[7] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, p.45; Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, p.426.

[8] JCC Vol. 40, f.105v.

Kingdoms advised Browne that a brigade of the City Trained Bands was to march imminently from London to join him at Abingdon and that it was to be accompanied by a troop of horse under the command of Herriott Washbourne.[9] Washbourne, of course, was captain of a troop of horse in Harvey's regiment and this troop had been present with Essex in Cornwall. While it is conceivable that Washbourne's troop returned unscathed from Cornwall in September and was then immediately redeployed in early October, it seems improbable. It has already been shown that some of the troops of Harvey's regiment virtually disintegrated in Cornwall and it seems unlikely that Washbourne's did not as well. Even if it had escaped intact from Lostwithiel it would not have had time to return to London, recruit, remount and be ready to deploy barely four weeks after the cavalry had escaped from Cornwall. A more plausible alternative is that this troop was raised around the same time as Underwood's using the same Parliamentary Ordinance and perhaps as a result of Common Council's desire for more cavalry in early September.

The ordinance had called for 200 cavalry to be raised in London and Middlesex. A full strength cavalry troop was between 60 and 70 men and so this would equate to three troops. Underwood's troop numbered around 70 men plus officers when it joined Browne and it is also known that the Middlesex troop mustered only 29 men but was recruited shortly after arriving by a further 30 men.[10] It would therefore be logical to assume the remainder of the 200 men comprised a third troop, and that this was the troop commanded by Washbourne, and it was the troop that was ordered to join Browne in early October, but it was not the same troop that had served in Harvey's regiment. Washbourne, in fact, is almost always referred to as a colonel because of his command of the Westminster Auxiliaries in 1643. It is plausible that he did not personally serve with his own troop in Harvey's regiment in the West during the summer of 1644 and that he remained in London during that time, and was then appointed to command this new troop. Alternatively, he served in Cornwall but returned to London in September and was then selected but there is no evidence to support either alternative. Despite his orders to proceed to Abingdon in October it seems Washbourne only arrived there at the end of December when Browne recorded that his troop numbered just 40 men plus officers.[11]

Along with the reinforcements and supplies that came with Washbourne, he also brought money to pay Browne's near mutinous garrison. The King had abandoned Abingdon in the early summer of 1644 when he needed its garrison to supplement the infantry of his army for the upcoming campaign. Essex was quick to occupy it himself and from then until the end of the war it was to prove to be 'a continuall Thorn in the eyes, and Goad in the sides of Oxford and the adjacent Royal Garrisons, putting them to perpetuall

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[9] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, p.11.

[10] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f. 24.

[11] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, p.195; JCC Vol. 40, f.117r.


N
Aylesbury (P)
early 45
Headington
Oxford (R)
River Thames
early 45
Bessels Leigh
30 Dec 44
Buckland
Abingdon (P)
early 45
Chalgrove
Faringdon (R)
early 45
11 Jan 45 &
1 Mar 46
Wallingford (R)
Jan 45
River Thames
Windsor (P)
Reading (P)
(P) Parliamentary garrison
(R) Royalist garrison
0
10
20 miles

Map 7: Major-General Richard Browne's raids from Abingdon garrison, 1644–1646 losse and vexation'.[12] The credit for this belongs almost entirely to Browne who was Governor until the end of the war, and who, with a diminishing force of county troops, chronically underpaid, ill-supplied while being in an almost constant state of mutiny, was able to maintain pressure on Oxford and the surrounding areas for the rest of the war. As one newsletter boasted he 'fortified it just under the enemies noses, and defended it most valiantly against all the power the King then had in his chiefe Garrison of Oxford'.[13]

Underwood's troop was involved almost immediately it arrived, when at least two of his troopers were captured and held captive in Wallingford until they were able to escape in October.[14] On the night of 30 December 1644, Browne successfully sent a party to attack the fortified manor at Bessels Leigh, owned by Speaker Lenthall and which had just been occupied by a party of Royalists. Afterwards he demolished the walls and doors to 'preserve it from further violence.'[15] In February 1645, he attacked Faringdon where '27 horse-load of Corne, Cheese and other provision' were captured, all desperately needed by the Royalists in Oxford. A raid on Headington in early 1645 captured a further four or five carts of provisions bound for Oxford, while a raid against Chalgrove resulted in wine, sack and sugar being seized.[16] On another occasion Browne chased a Royalist force from Buckland, near Faringdon, whom 'he overtook, bravely fought with them & discomfited then, took a Captain prisoner, with 3 Officers more, and 10 other prisoners'. Immediately afterwards he attacked a force coming from Devizes where he 'took a Colonell prisoner, a Serjeant Major, 3 Captains, 3 Lieutenants, and divers other prisoners' who he sent to Abingdon for safety.[17]

Then, in January 1646, Browne attacked a force of Royalist cavalry from Wallingford, capturing the town's deputy governor and 50 others, while at the same time rescuing '30 horse of ours, which the enemy had taken before in other places'.[18] The aggressive stance of Browne with his continual raiding and harrying 'continually weakend and impoverished all the enemies Garrisons round about him'.[19] Both Underwood and Washbourne's troops were with Browne throughout this time and while it is impossible to know what role they played in these raids, it is certain that they were involved and so contributed in some way to the successes that Browne gained, and which did much to increase his reputation and standing as a commander. It is known that in May 1645 Browne was cooperating first with Oliver Cromwell and then with Sir Thomas Fairfax in their efforts to besiege Oxford, but it is unknown whether any of his Abingdon forces participated in this very short-lived offensive. His garrison certainly provided some forces in April 1646 when Oxford was once again besieged but these seem to have been infantry rather than cavalry, so again it is unknown what role the City Horse played during these last days of the Civil War.[20]

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[12] John Vicars, *England's Worthies Under Whom all the Civill and Bloudy Warres Since Anno 1642 to Anno 1647 are Related*, (London:1647), p.101.

[13] Josiah Ricraft, *The Civill Warres of England Briefly Related from His Majesties First Setting up his Standard 1641...* (London: 1649), p.109.

[14] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, p.45.

[15] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, pp.204, 205.

[16] Vicars, *England's Worthies*, pp.101–102.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp.102–103.

[18] *Ibid.*, p.103.

[19] *Ibid.*

Not surprisingly the Royalists were unprepared to suffer the thorn in their side that Abingdon quickly became under Browne. In late 1644 they tried to induce Brown to desert the Parliamentary cause with a promise of a baronetcy and other rewards.[21] When this failed Prince Rupert launched a surprise attack on Abingdon on 11 January 1645. A coordinated assault saw him attack from the south across Culham Bridge while troops from Wallingford attacked from the north, but neither could dislodge the resilient Browne. After a four hour fight amongst the meadows to the south of Abingdon, Rupert was forced to withdraw in some haste although Browne lacked the soldiers to follow up his victory.[22] Neither Underwood nor Washbourne are mentioned in any of the accounts written after the engagement although as both troops were known to be in Abingdon before and just afterwards, it is reasonable to suppose they were present that day but in what role is impossible to say.

A year later, the Royalists attempted another surprise attack on Abingdon. By then Browne had returned to London and had become a 'recruiter' MP in Parliament but he still retained his commission as Major-General and overall authority for the garrison in Abingdon. He had appointed George Payne, a City merchant and officer in the Trained Bands, as his deputy in November.[23] The remnants of the three City Auxiliary Regiments that had been in Abingdon since the summer of 1644 had returned to London in December 1645 along with Underwood's troop, while Washbourne's was retained until August 1646.[24] This time a force of around 1,000 cavalry and infantry from Oxford attacked the town from the east on the night of 1 March 1646. Using Barton Court as cover, the Royalists remained undetected until they swarmed over the earthworks around the Abbey and quickly moved towards the centre of the town in an attempt to capture the bridge over the River Thames. At this point Payne had mustered the garrison and a series of frantic charges through the streets of the town managed to push the Royalists back across the earthworks. During this counter-attack Payne noted, in a letter to Browne later that day, that 'Major Blundell and Colonell Washburne came in good time, charged gallantly through the thickest of them, which so terrified them, that being on all sides beset, they quit their ground, [and] tumbled over the workes.' During the fighting 'Col. Washburne had his great bay horse slaine under him.'[25] Whether the rest of Washbourne's troop fought as valiantly as their commander is reputed to have done is not known but they certainly must have played some part in the defence of the town. The Royalists retreated back to Oxford and were never again to challenge Abingdon. The fight at Abingdon was to be the last action that the City Horse fought during the First Civil War.

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[20] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, pp.420, 445, 460, 476, 497; Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1645–1647*, p.407.

[21] Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, The Third Part Volume Two, pp.808–816.

[22] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, pp.245–246. See also Samuel Harsnet, *A Full Relation of the Defeate Given, and Victory Obtained Upon Saturday last, by our forces at Abbington: commanded by that noble and faithfull commander, Major Generall Browne*, (London: 1645), TT E.24 [14]; Richard Browne, *A Letter Sent from Major-Generall Brown, to His Excellency the Earle of Essex. Containing, a true relation of a great victory obtained against the Kings forces neere Abingdon, upon Saturday last, Janu. 11. 1644*, TT E.24 [20].

[23] *JHL*, Vol. 7, p.680; Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, p.218.

[24] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, pp.257, 262.

While at Abingdon, Underwood's troop quickly earned a reputation for ill-discipline. On 30 October 1644 Browne informed the Committee of Both Kingdoms that the day before '80 of Major Underwood's troop ran away from us to London, pretending want of pay, although they were not above 4 or 5 weeks behind.' He added that they ought to be made an example of for 'they never were nor will be serviceable as soldiers.'[26] While the number who deserted seems improbably high it was not a one-off occurrence and by 18 November Browne was complaining that almost half of Underwood's troop had deserted.[27] In February 1645 Browne was concerned that when some money was sent to pay just Washbourne's troop he feared Underwood's unpaid men would incite the entire garrison to mutiny.[28]

Once Oxford surrendered in June 1646, the Civil War was virtually over and Parliament began the process of disbanding their supernumerary forces across the country and it seems that the county forces that comprised the Abingdon garrison were discharged in August. When the two City troops returned home is not known. On 10 October 1645, both troops were still in Abingdon when the House of Lords were informed that the Committee that managed the Abingdon forces no longer had need of them and they could be returned to London.[29] Underwood was certainly in London with his troop on 18 December when the House of Commons ordered they be paid 200l to enable them to return to Abingdon.[30] Whether they returned is unclear but it seems doubtful. Washbourne was still in Abingdon in March 1646, when he helped repel the Royalist attack after which the Commons voted to give him 100l gratuity for his services.[31] Presumably his troop was discharged in August, if not earlier.

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[25] *A letter from Colonell Pane Governour of Abbington, to Major Generall Browne: concerning the gaining of Abbington by the enemy, and its recovery by our forces*, (London: 1646), TT E.325 [23], p.2.

[26] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, p.84.

[27] *Ibid.*, p.132.

[28] *Ibid.*, p.282.

[29] *JHL*, Vol. 7, p.631.

[30] *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, pp.379–380; Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1645–1647*, p.257.

[31] *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, p.485.

8

The London Brigade, 1645

In the aftermath of Essex's disastrous Cornish campaign, antagonism towards the Lord General once again surfaced amongst those in Parliament that doubted both his commitment to the cause and his military ability. As a result his handling of the army came under scrutiny, which soon led to some questioning Parliament's entire approach to winning the war, a situation only inflamed by the inferior performance of the combined Parliamentarian armies at the second Battle of Newbury in October 1644. At the same an ideological and theological rift was widening between Oliver Cromwell and the Earl of Manchester as their differences, simmering in private all year, became public, with both blaming each other for failures at Newbury. Cromwell, a religious Congregationalist, called for a more vigorous prosecution of the war with a radical political settlement at its conclusion, along with the replacement of moderate commanders like Essex and Manchester. Cromwell had established a large following of likeminded officers in the army of the Eastern Association and as he and they joined with the remnants of Waller's and Essex's armies, their religious and political ideals and supporters quickly spread. This led to a polarisation within the Parliamentary coalition between the dominant political moderates, led by Denzil Holles and who were generally Presbyterian, and those more politically radical who were broadly congregational or Independent in their religious views. This split was subsequently mirrored both in Parliament and in the City government, while by the end of 1644 the terms Presbyterian and Independent were being popularly used to describe the adherents of both factions throughout the nation, and at the same time both sides increasingly became more vocal and bitter in their attacks on the other, exacerbating the rift further.[1]

As a result of these divisions Parliament firstly established a single, unified army consisting of the merged and reformed remnants of Essex's, Manchester's and Waller's armies, in early 1645 under the command of Sir Thomas Fairfax, known to history as the New Model Army. Secondly, it passed the Self Denying Ordinance in April 1645, which barred members of both Houses of Parliament from serving within the military forces of Parliament, effectively placing the military in the hands of professional soldiers appointed on merit. Despite Cromwell being a Member of Parliament, he eventually received an exemption and was allowed to retain his commission, but he was also instrumental in approving the officer corps for the cavalry, in which he gave preference to fellow Independents and political radicals.[2] The New Model Army of 1645 was not the cradle of radicalism it was to become within a few short years but the foundations for this had certainly been laid. Perhaps not surprisingly, this turn of events was to be welcomed by the political radicals in London, marginalised since late 1643, and who immediately started to forge connections and alliances with those in the army that held similar views. These relationships were to mature over the next few years, and in 1647 burst forth onto the wider political stage impacting once again on London and its City Horse.

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[1] Como, *Radical Parliamentarians*, pp.294,308.

The beginning of 1645 saw the Parliamentary cause still in a precarious position. The great victory at Marston Moor the previous summer had brought most of England beyond the River Trent into Parliamentary hands but defeats at Cropredy Bridge and Lostwithiel had virtually destroyed two armies in southern England. The remnants of both, plus Manchester's army, were all but defeated at the second Battle of Newbury in October. The commanders of the Parliamentarian armies descended into an open squabble with each other, and the army, short of money and equipment, dwindled away while the fragile alliance with the Scots was beginning to falter. In London, the citizens were more war weary than ever, resenting the increasing financial demands made upon them. Despite this there was still a war to fight, and the City was concerned, as always, for its safety. With Harvey's regiment having disintegrated after the Lostwithiel debacle, two troops in the Abingdon garrison, and Turner's regiment now serving under the Western Association, the City of London had no cavalry to call upon if needed.

With the onset of summer necessity soon came calling and again it was the Somerset town of Taunton that led to the City Horse once more becoming involved. The town itself was of minimal strategic value but its location in the heart of the Royalist dominated West Country made it important to Parliament, for it had become a symbol of resistance and hope. Almost as soon as Essex had departed the west of England in the autumn of 1644 it had been besieged by the Royalists, but this first siege was raised in December when a relief force arrived. The town was besieged again in early April 1645, and such was the importance of saving it, that Parliament instructed Sir Thomas Fairfax and the newly formed New Model Army to march to its relief. Fairfax was soon called back to besiege Oxford however, but the force he sent under Ralph Weldon marched into the town on 12 May, as the town was on the verge of capitulation (see Chapter Five). After the inconclusive skirmish at Ilchester on 19 May, Weldon retired into the town but quickly found himself under siege. In London Parliament once again demanded Taunton be relieved but with Fairfax occupied attempting to force an engagement with the King's main Oxford Army, there was no field army available to rescue the town for a third time and they needed to cobble together a relief force from what little forces they had in the West.

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[2] *JHL*, Vol. 7, p.303; *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, p.16. See also Wedgwood, *The King's War 1641–1647*, pp.348–409 for a general overview, and Kishlansky, *The Rise of the New Model Army*, pp.26–51 for a more nuanced and scholarly description of these events.

On 24 May the Committee of Both Kingdoms ordered Edward Massey, Governor of Gloucester, to draw his forces towards Bristol in an attempt to frighten the Royalists in Somerset into raising the siege, while on the same day Parliament ordered a voluntary collection of money 'in the Cities of London and Westminster and adjoining parts for the relief of the distressed inhabitants of Taunton'.[3] Gloucester, however, was loath to let Massey leave the town fearing it would prompt another Royalist assault, and so the civic authorities wrote to the Parliament requesting them to reconsider using their Governor for such an enterprise. Seemingly, this petition was never considered by Parliament and in desperation the mayor of Gloucester then wrote directly to Common Council asking it to intercede with Parliament on its behalf, imploring the City to assist in the relief of Taunton and to preserve Gloucester from an expected attack should Massey leave it under-defended.[4] This letter, read to the Common Council on 9 June, was the catalyst for the formation of yet another regiment of City Horse, although this time they were to be dragoons.

That same day Common Council agreed to sponsor Gloucester's petition to Parliament, but that also came to nothing. At the same time they instructed the Militia Committee to consider what forces the City could provide for the relief of Taunton and suggested perhaps a force of 500 mounted musketeers could be sent. The Militia Committee responded by stating that it had no mounted forces available, but suggested that a new force could be raised by a new subscription. Later that day Common Council approved the suggestion and immediately legislated for a new round of voluntary subscriptions, which seem to have started to be collected the next day.[5]

The regiment of 500 dragoons that the City thus aimed to raise was to be commanded by Colonel William Webb.[6] On 13 June, the necessary ordinance was read, and passed, in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords.[7] Incredibly, it was reported on 15 June that this regiment of dragoons had departed London and on 17 June that they were already in Guildford, awaiting further instructions.[8] It seems improbable though that the regiment could be formed and dispatched in barely a week. The Committee of Both Kingdoms had been attempting to concentrate a mobile force of county troops to assist Massey from Surrey, Hampshire, Middlesex, Kent, and Sussex since at least 6 June, and this force was ordered to meet at Romsey on 13 June.[9] On 15 June the Committee mentioned that this force now included some 500 dragoons for the City of London.[10] It would seem likely that the suggestion that London contribute towards this force was floated sometime before Common Council formally assented to it and that by that stage the recruiting was underway, as it was not uncommon for legislation to be ratified sometime after the actual decisions had been made. Indeed, on 11 June, two days before Parliament ordained that London provide dragoons for the Taunton relief, the Militia Committee was instructed to appoint 100 dragoons to accompany a convoy of money to the army at Aylesbury, which further suggests that the dragoons were being raised prior to the formal approval being given.[11] As there is no previous mention in any of the extant records that suggest that London had a force of dragoons prior to this it seems probable that Webb's regiment was actually raised in early June, but this still implies a rather hurried creation. Nothing is known about the composition of Webb's regiment. The strength of the regiment when it left London is also unknown, but the Militia Committee were authorised to raise 500 dragoons and was probably close to full strength, for in September it was noted that 360 horses were returned after the regiment came back from Taunton.[12]

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[3] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, p.519; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, p.685.

[4] JCC Vol. 40, f.132r.

[5] *Ibid.*, p.133r; *Subscription Receipt*, (London: 1645), TT E.261 [2].

[6] *JHL*, Vol. 7, p.430; *Subscription Receipt.*

[7] *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, pp.173, 174; *JHL*, Vol. 7, p.429.

[8] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, pp.595, 598.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp.573, 580, 584.

The regiment was at Guildford on 17 June when it received orders to proceed to Romsey with the rest of the county troops who marched under the command of Edward Popham, but after reaching Romsey they were placed under the command of Massey.[13] However, once again the strategic situation had changed dramatically with the defeat of the King at the Battle of Naseby on 14 June. With the King's army in flight Fairfax was free to march back into the West Country, which he did at the end of the month. At some point Massey's force, which must have included Webb's dragoons and Popham's cavalry, joined up with Fairfax and Taunton was relieved on 4 July. Six days later the Royalist Army was soundly defeated at the Battle of Langport, and the reduction of the western counties began, but what role Webb's regiment played in all of that is uncertain. It is clear, however, that the regiment was not deployed in the West for long, as it was recorded by Common Council on 2 September that the regiment had already returned to London.[14] It also seems that it was not the entire regiment that was dispatched to Taunton, probably as it was still in the process of completing its recruitment. On 1 July the Militia Committee was ordered to provide an escort of 40 dragoons to take money to Hatfield for the Scottish Army.[15] Most likely Webb's regiment returned to London immediately after the relief of Taunton and the regiment was disbanded, although there was some discussion of raising an infantry regiment in its place, also to be commanded by Webb, but this did not eventuate.[16]

With the defeat and rout of the King's main army at Naseby in June, Common Council requested the Militia Committee to review what forces

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[10] *Ibid.*, p.595.

[11] *Ibid.*, p.586.

[12] JCC Vol. 40, f.143r.

[13] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, p.617.

[14] JCC Vol. 40, f.143r.

[15] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1645–1647*, p.2.

[16] JCC Vol. 40, f.144v.


Newark-on-Trent
Shelford Manor
Wiverton Hall
3 Nov
Nottingham
Loughborough
Leicester
Newport Pagnell
St. Albans
London
Oxford
Abingdon
Reading
Guildford
Romsey
Taunton
4 Jul
0
25
50 miles
N
Colonel Webb's dragoon regiment Summer 1645
London Brigade Sep-Dec 1645

Map 8: The City Horse on campaign, 1645

the City might contribute to exploit this victory.[17] With some City forces still serving under Browne in Abingdon it seemed appropriate that help be provided to assist in clearing the Royalist garrisons in Oxfordshire, Buckinghamshire and Berkshire, and so, on 18 July, Parliament passed yet another ordinance requiring the counties in the south of England to provide a force of horse and dragoons to assist with this.[18] This time London and Middlesex were to raise a combined force of 163 cavalry and 82 dragoons, of which the City's share was to be 127 horse and 64 dragoons and which forces were to be under the overall command of Colonel William Webb, although it is unclear whether they were intended to be independent of Webb's first regiment or not.[19]

This small London force consisted of a single company of dragoons, commanded by Captain Francis Hanson, and probably two troops of horse. Hanson's company was quickly raised and first mustered at Henley on 15 August, where it consisted of:

Captain Francis Hanson
Lieutenant Nicholas Woolmott
Cornet Nicholas Griffin
Quartermaster Robert Fletcher
Two sergeants
Two drummers
One farrier
Three corporals
70 private soldiers.[20]

The inhabitants of the City of Westminster had contributed at least 183l to provide horses and equipment for this force, but it is unclear if this money was spent on the dragoons or the cavalry.[21]

Common Council informed the London citizens that these troops would only be deployed for the 'space of six weeks or two monthes at the furthest for the blocking upp of such Garrisons of the Enimy' around Oxford and that each solider was to receive two weeks' pay upon their mustering.[22] In Hanson's case it would seem that the majority of the company was disbanded on 14 September 1645. While Hanson, Woolmott, Griffen and Fletcher were paid until 22 May 1646, only 20 of the common soldiers served past 14 September, and of these only 8 served beyond 30 September.[23]

What exactly this force did during its deployment is unclear but most likely they joined with the other county troops raised under the same ordinance. Possibly they were sent to Barnet on 25 August in an attempt to block any advance of the King into the counties of the Eastern Association.[24] On 2 September, the Militia Committee was ordered to provide 20 dragoons to escort a convoy of provisions to St Albans, who were to be paid on their return.[25] After this there is no further record of these forces and so it can be assumed that if they were not disbanded they were merged into the new force of horse and dragoons that the City was ordered to raise in September.

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[17] *Ibid.*, ff.134r–134v.
[18] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol.1, pp.735–736.
[19] JCC Vol. 40, ff.137r–137v.
[20] The National Archives, SP28/131 Part 8, Captain Hanson pay and muster roll, 1645, ff.2–3.
[21] The National Archives, E179/253/12, Monies raised by the Committee of the Militia of the Savoy, 1643–1646, f.35.
[22] JCC Vol. 40, f.140v.
[23] TNA, SP28/131 Part 8, ff. 2–3.

The last units of City Horse established during the First Civil War were raised in September 1645. On 27 February both House of Parliament passed an ordinance authorising the Militia Committee to raise yet more cavalry although the text of the ordinance is no longer extant and nor does it seem that the City made any attempt to raise this new force at the time.[26] Possibly a new round of subscriptions was initiated but then quickly suspended for some unknown reason, for on 2 September Common Council called for those that had pledged horses to provide them now. On the same day Common Council also informed the Committee of Both Kingdoms of its willingness to provide a force of 400 cavalry and 500 dragoons that, if accepted, they would raise as soon as Parliament passed the necessary legislation, which they obligingly did on 9 September. However, the City did not wait for Parliament to legislate before it started to raise the horses and funds needed, as the first contributions were recorded on 2 September.[27]

In fact so quickly was this force raised that by 10 September the Committee of Both Kingdoms was able to instruct the Militia Committee to send them 'forthwith' to Reading, where the next day they were ordered to convoy supplies to the main Parliamentary army at Malmsbury.[28] It seems hardly likely that the force could be raised and deployed so quickly and in reality it probably was not. The cavalry component, which was a regiment commanded by Colonel Robert Mainwaring, received cash contributions between 2 and 27 September, with all but 36l of the 3,828l total raised for it raised by 19 September. 313 horses were purchased between 20 and 23 September, while 214 pairs of pistols, 250 sets of armour, 194 swords along with 312 saddles and accoutrements were bought before 26 September. Further horses were later purchased but no more arms or armour, which suggests those horses were remounts implying that the regiment was only completely raised by the end of September and thus was not fully established when it was ordered to Reading on 10 September.[29] The dragoon regiment, once again to be commanded by Colonel William Webb, was allowed by Common Council on 2 September to use the 360 horses that had recently returned with Webb to London, from the Taunton expedition.[30] Despite this offer it is unclear whether these horses were utilised or not. The commissioners that oversaw the provision of horses stated in their records that a total of 500 'naggs &

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[24] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1645–1647*, p.83.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp.106 & 107.

[26] *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol.4, p.64.

[27] The National Archives, SP28/162 Part 1, Assessments, Loans and Contributions, London and Middlesex, 1642–1660, f.2.

[28] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1645–1647*, pp.130, 131.

[29] TNA, SP28/162 Part1, f.12.

[30] JCC Vol. 40, f.143r.

mares' were provided for Webb, and that they were valued at 3,000l but they do not state if the horses were actually purchased by them or not.[31]

It is doubtful that any part of this force ever went to Malmsbury however, and probably it was unable to depart London until the end of September, or early October. Certainly Mainwaring's regiment marched to Windsor initially, for the sum of 6l 5s was later paid to carry arms there, but what date they marched is not recorded.[32] Both regiments had been deployed by 6 October, since on that date the Committee of Both Kingdoms wrote in response to a joint letter sent by them previously, but unfortunately it gives no indication as to where they were at the time although they might still have been in the Windsor vicinity.[33] From this point onwards the two regiments constituted a brigade of London horse.

Little is known of the composition of either regiment. When Mainwaring's regiment returned to London in early December the horses were to be assessed and valued by Edward Cludd, the muster-master for City forces, but if a horse had been lost in service a certificate was required, presumably from the troop commander. From these certificates it is possible to establish the probable troop commanders in the regiment.[34]

Colonel Robert Mainwaring
Major Symon Hackett
Captain Edward Waring
Captain William Hubbard (also referred to as Hobert)
Captain [Thomas] Kempe[35]

Hackett, possibly from St Martin Vintry parish, had been an ensign in a trained band regiment in 1642 and then a captain in Harvey's regiment, as had Mainwaring of course.[36] Hubbard is possibly Richard Hubbard, a trumpeter in Hackett's troop at Olney in 1643 and who was later wounded in Cornwall. The other troop commanders cannot be positively identified. There was certainly a strong connection with Harvey's regiment, and it is possible others in the regiment had previously served under Harvey, and perhaps even Turner. The regiment seems to have numbered only around 300 men, based on the equipment issued, rather than the 500 men that were authorised to be raised.[37]

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[31] The National Archives, SP28/132 Part2, Commissaries John Smith and Thomas Richardson accounts, Sept 1645-Nov 1648, f.82.

[32] TNA, SP28/162 Part1, f.14.

[33] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1645–1647*, p.177.

[34] TNA, SP28/132 Part2. See also, London in Armes/Bod, ff.16–18.

[35] Possibly a relative of Francis Kempe, Common Councilman for St Dunstan in the West in 1641. Liu, *Puritan London* p.184; Wren, 'Disputed Elections', p.45; Alan R. Young (ed.), *The English Emblem Tradition: Volume 3: Emblem Flag Devices of the English Civil Wars, 1642–1660*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), p.40.

[36] Liu, *Puritan London* p.233; *The names, dignities and places of all the collonells, lieutenant-collonels, serjant majors, captaines, quarter-masters, lieutenants and ensignes of the City of London vvith the captaines names according to their seniority and places*, (London: 1642), TT E.669.f.6 [10].

[37] TNA, SP28/132 Part 2.

In 1646 four of the troops (excluding Kempe) were recorded as carrying blue cornets (see Appendix IV).

Even less is known of the composition of Webb's regiment. There is no evidence that Francis Hanson's company served in this regiment, even though he had served with Webb only a few months before and that a handful of his officers and men remained on the payroll until May 1646. It is possible that members of the regiment Webb commanded at the relief of Taunton served in this regiment but there is no evidence of this either. The only officer mentioned in regard to this regiment is John Warren who was recommended to be commissioned as major of the remnants of the regiment in December 1645, but it is unclear if he was in the regiment prior to this or if his commission even happened.[38]

On 24 September 1645, the King's attempt to relieve Chester failed when Major-General Syndenham Poyntz defeated the Royalist Army at the Battle of Rowton Heath. The King retreated into North Wales but with Chester now doomed the only remaining Royalist garrison of significance in the North of England was Newark, and he quickly moved to there, with the little forces he now retained. Charles reached Newark during the first few days of October and the news of his approach to Newark arrived in London on 6 October.[39]

With Fairfax and the New Model Army in the West Country and the Scottish Army well north of Newark, Parliament had no army available to either pursue the King or attempt to encircle him in Newark, other than Poyntz's small army that was already following the monarch. When the news reached London of the King being at Newark, the Committee of Both Kingdoms hurriedly sent out orders to whatever troops were available north of London to march to join with Poyntz as quickly as possible. On 6 October, Mainwaring and Webb were accordingly ordered to proceed to Leicester, from where they were to 'keep intelligence with Poyntz, from whom you are to receive orders for this service.' On 10 October, the two colonels were informed that money to pay their forces was to be sent from London but it seems it still had not been dispatched five days later.[40] On 15 October, the brigade was at Loughborough but exactly when they joined with Poyntz, probably at Nottingham, is not clear.[41]

Poyntz intended to besiege Newark from the southern side of the River Trent while the advancing Scottish Army was to blockade the city from the north. But before he could approach from the south he needed to subdue the small, but well located, Royalist garrisons at Shelford Manor and Wiverton Hall. On 3 November his forces, under the command of Colonel John Hutchinson, attacked and captured Shelford Manor and it is recorded that the London brigade took part in this attack.[42] After capturing the fortified church Hutchinson split his forces, with the Londoners attacking the manor from one side while he, with the main force, stormed the other. According to a later account written by the colonel's wife, Lucy, her husband was successful in breaching the defences on his side but 'the Londoners were beaten of on the other side, and the maine force of the garrison turn'd upon him [Hutchinson].'[43] Despite this the manor was captured with many of the garrison being massacred, and the manor was then thoroughly plundered. According to a letter that one of Poyntz's officers sent to London later that day, it was commented that 'The forces generally behaved themselves gallantly, the *London* Brigade … performed their duty with much valour.'[44] What causalities the brigade suffered, if any, are unknown. The following day Poyntz marched on Wiverton Hall, but this garrison meekly surrendered.[45]

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[38] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1645–1647*, p.257.

[39] *Ibid.*, p.176; TNA, SP28/132 Part 2, f.13.

[40] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1645–1647*, pp.177, 186, 193; TNA, SP28/132 Part 2, f.13.

[41] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1645–1647*, p.205.

[42] Lucy Hutchinson, *Memoirs of the life of Colonel Hutchinson : Governor of Nottingham Castle and Town, representative of the county of Nottingham in the Long Parliament, and of the Town of Nottingham in the first Parliament of Charles II, etc*, Vol. 2, 4 edn., (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown, 1822) pp.80, 81; TNA, SP28/132 Part 2, f. 13.

With two Parliamentary armies approaching Newark, Charles decided on the night of 3 November to flee once again rather than become trapped inside, and he arrived safely in Oxford two days later with several hundred cavalry. Poyntz soon learnt that the King had escaped but was unaware of his destination and initially believed he was returning to Chester in another attempt to relieve that town. Poyntz immediately sent, 'Col. Maynwaring with the London Brigade, and foure Regiments more of Horse and Dragoons under his command' to Chester to join the forces already there to prevent any relief attempt.[46] The Committee of Both Kingdoms was less certain that the King would head for Chester, however. They were much more concerned that the King would attack the undefended counties of the Eastern Association, a fear only compounded when they heard on 7 November that he was back in Oxford. They immediately sent a flurry of letters north to Poyntz instructing the London brigade to immediately return south to Newport Pagnell.[47]

Whether the brigade ever left for Cheshire is unclear, but it seems unlikely as they were soon marching south but, much to the consternation of the Committee of Both Kingdoms, instead of stopping at Newport Pagnell they kept on heading for London. On 21 November, the Committee wrote admonishing the two colonels for not keeping them informed of their progress and that it had been brought to their attention that they were at St Albans and heading home 'for which we have given no order.' Instead they were ordered to march immediately to Great Wickham to 'oppose any incursions of the enemy into the quarters of the Parliament if they should attempt it' and to support the London garrison in Windsor Castle as needed. The two commanders were lambasted 'not to suffer the brigade or any soldier thereof to come nearer to London, whereby the regiments will be in danger to be lost' but to observe the movements of the nearby Royalists 'and order yourselves accordingly.'[48]

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[43] Hutchinson, *Hutchinson Memoirs*, Vol.2, p.81.

[44] *A Catalogue of the Names of the New Lords Created by the King, since the great seal was carried away from the Parliament by the Lord Littleton together with major generall Poyntz his summons to Shelford House*, (London: 1645), TT E.308 [30], pp.7–8; TNA, SP28/132 Part 2, f.13.

[45] John Vicars, *Magnalia Dei Anglicana. Or, Englands Parliamentary Chronicle.*, TT E.348 [1], p.316.

[46] *New Lords*; TNA, SP28/132 Part 2, f. 13.

[47] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1645–1647*, pp.221, 223, 228.

On 27 November the Committee ordered that the brigade be placed under the orders of Richard Browne in Abingdon but on the same day countermanded this when news was obtained that a force of Royalist cavalry was marching towards the Eastern Association. The brigade was instead ordered to head east and join with forces under Colonel Whalley and 'to follow that party wherever they go until we give further order.'[49] This proved to be yet another ill-found rumour that left the brigade in limbo, for over the next few days the Londoners were then ordered by the Committee to remain where they were (believed to be somewhere around the Oxford-Buckinghamshire border near Thame) and to await further orders, while money would be sent to them.[50]

Despite these orders it seems that both Webb and Mainwaring were actually either in, or on their way to, London for on 5 December the Committee ordered both of them to return their units forthwith.[51] It would seem that the regiments, short of pay, provisions and already past the two months service required of them, had decided to march home and presumably refused to stop at Newport Pagnell. Perhaps the colonels had returned to London to plead the case for the brigade to be allowed to return once orders had been received to remain indefinitely around Thame. Certainly, it seems clear that by 5 December the Committee was aware that they would be unable to keep the brigade in the field any longer, for on that day they ordered Mainwaring's regiment to 'return forthwith to be mustered in or near the City.' At the same time they ordered the two colonels the following day to 'muster and pay so many dragoons as will stay and let them know that they shall have constant pay during such time as they are employed.' Those that chose to remain were to be commanded by a major and two captains, which suggests that Webb no longer wished to continue to serve.[52]

From this point the demise of the two regiments was swift. By 9 December the horses of the regiments were handed over to Edward Cludd at Hounslow and Brentford, at which time it was noted that of the 500 provided in September, 173 had been either lost or had died during their two month deployment. Of those that were returned, 23 subsequently died before their value and condition could be assessed.[53] Presumably the men were formally discharged from the regiment on the same day, but there is no extant record that shows how much pay they received. The following day it was noted that 300 of Webb's dragoons had agreed to continue to serve and the Committee of Both Kingdoms wrote to the House of Commons requesting that they 'make provision for them' and that a commission be issued to John Warren to take command of them.[54] The Commons decided on 16 December that instead the three hundred would be reduced and the men taken on as recruits into Sir Thomas Fairfax's army.[55]

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[48] *Ibid.*, pp.233, 234; TNA, SP28/132 Part 2, f.13.

[49] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1645–1647*, p.239; TNA, SP28/132 Part 2, f.13.

[50] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1645–1647*, pp.244, 245, 246, 247.

[51] *Ibid.*, p.249; TNA, SP28/132 Part 2, f.13.

[52] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1645–1647*, pp.249–250.

[53] TNA, SP28/132 Part 2, ff.13, 82.

[54] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1645–1647*, p.257; TNA, SP28/132 Part 2, f.13.

While some dragoons continued to be employed by the City after this date there is no evidence to suggest that they belonged to this regiment. On 12 December, the Committee of Both Kingdoms requested that 50 be provided to escort a convoy to Stamford for the Scots Army, though it still had not left by 16 December, and the following day the destination was changed to Grantham. A similar request was also made on 12 January 1646.[56] In both instances it is unclear if the dragoons were ever dispatched and if they were what subsequently happened to them, or indeed who they even were. Hanson's company existed until May 1646, although in a much-reduced form, and does not seem to have ever formed a part of Webb's regiment and thus most likely these references refer to this company rather than the remnants of Webb's regiment.

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[55] *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, p.379.

[56] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1645–1647*, pp.261, 267, 268, 306; TNA, SP28/132 Part 2, f.13.

9

Politics, 1646–1647

As 1646 approached it was clear to all, except perhaps King Charles, that the war had been won by the Parliamentarian side and it was only a question of time before the remaining Royalist forces were either defeated or surrendered (or both). With the New Model Army triumphant there was little need for further forces from the City of London to assist the war effort. In the New Year, the only mounted forces that London retained were Washbourne's troop in Abingdon and the much-reduced company of dragoons under Francis Hanson. Despite what seemed to be the imminent victory, the City was concerned for its safety 'in this time of imminent danger,' perhaps concerned more with the danger to London in the aftermath of the war than from any Royalist threat. It was therefore proposed in Common Council on 3 January 'that a certaine number of horse shalbe raysed within this Citie and Liberties thereof not exceedinge the number of 500'. The proposal was agreed, and the Militia Committee instructed to seek the necessary authorisation from the House of Commons.[1] The Commons concurred with this proposal and duly passed an ordinance on 19 January allowing for the raising of yet more City Horse.[2] Unfortunately, no records have been found that relate to the raising of this new body but it is clear from later sources that it was formed and was still in existence in March 1647. Most likely this new regiment was also commanded by Robert Mainwaring and comprised the same five troops that had served in the regiment in late 1645.[3]

On 5 May King Charles surrendered himself to the Scots Army before Newark and with that the fighting of the Civil War virtually ended, but the quest to find an acceptable political settlement had only just begun. It was to be a long and tortured process lasting a further 14 years, during which the City Horse were still destined to play a part. Perhaps as a form of victory celebration a muster of the entire City militia forces was held in Hyde Park on 19 May. The muster was attended by the leading dignitaries of the City of London, Members of Parliament and a large crowd of the local citizenry. This impressive force drew up in battle formation and fought a mock battle.

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[1] JCC Vol. 40, f.159v.

[2] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.822–825.

[3] London in Armes/Bod, ff.16–18; JCC Vol. 40, f.205v.

As one observer commented 'it is a gallant shew: I pray God we have no other use of such things but for a shew.' The City forces that day consisted of some 18 regiments of infantry and '8 Troopes of Horse'.[4] It would seem likely that the eight troops mentioned were the five of Mainwaring's regiment plus the three suburban troops listed in a contemporary manuscript containing watercolour images of the City Horse cornets.[5] The suburban troops consisted of:

Captain Elias Taylor – City of Westminster[6]
Captain John White – Tower Hamlets
Captain John Ashley – Southwark.

This body of City Horse participated in an altogether more sombre display on 22 October 1646 during the funeral of the Earl of Essex at Westminster Abbey. After the Earl's body had lain for a month at his London residence, Essex House, it was carried from there to the Abbey for a State Funeral, with the City forces playing the leading role in providing a guard of honour, both along the route and at the church itself. The funeral procession was led by 'The Major part of a Regiment of Horse with their Field Officers, Captaines, Cornets and Trumpets marching in a body before the Proceeding'.[7] This description of the funeral was published by order of Parliament and while it does not specify that the cavalry were the City Horse they must surely have been, for throughout the procession it was the London militia that were the only military formations that participated. The route was lined by five regiments of the Trained Bands, while behind the cavalry marched four more regiments of infantry from the City, the procession included the entire Militia Committee while the Abbey was ceremonially guarded by yet more of the Trained Bands. This was a highly choreographed event, managed by the City of London and in which the City forces played the dominant role and so it would seem inconceivable that the cavalry involved were not City Horse. Edmund Harvey, who had so publicly demonstrated his loyalty to Essex in 1644, played a role by carrying a banner emblazoned with the ancient Bouchier family coat of arms, from whom Essex was directly descended. The City Horse, when the Earl's body arrived at the Abbey, fired a salvo of their pistols in the air as a mark of respect.[8]

Other than these two events there is no other mention of the City Horse in 1646. The imminent danger that so concerned the Common Council in January was perhaps more a fear of the future and the unknown of what the aftermath of the war might bring, rather than a clear and present threat to its safety. London was a wealthy metropolis and England was a country full of weapons and would likely very soon be full of unemployed men that knew how to use them, thus the City might well become a target for desperadoes, opportunists or even a disillusioned army or their Scottish allies. These new troops of City Horse, whoever commanded them, might well have been the first true militia cavalry that London raised. Part-time citizen soldiers that belonged to a recognised military formation that they were obliged to serve for a limit period of time, whose only role was the immediate defence of its environs and who then returned to the jobs and trades when their time had been served. London in 1646 had no need to send troops to supplement the main Parliamentary army and so had no need of a full-time cavalry force but the City elders were, as always, wary of any potential threat to the peace and tranquillity of their city and needed the safety net that the cavalry could provide in times of need. With such an unsettled political outlook it was impossible to know what the immediate future might bring and barely 12 months after the King surrendered to the Scots, London found itself under the threat of military occupation and all the horrors to life, liberty and property that might come with it, but this time the threat was to come from a very unlikely source.

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[4] Laurence Chapman, *The Scottish Dove, 13–20 May 1646*, TT E.337 [28], p.664; John Dillingham, *The Moderate Intelligencer, 14–21 May 1646*, BL E.337 [32], p.453; Thomas Bates, *Mercurius Civicus, 14–21 May 1646*, TT E.337 [33], p.2249.

[5] London in Armes/Bod, ff.18–19.

[6] Taylor also commanded the Westminster troop in 1659, cf Chapter 12.

[7] William Marshall, *The True Mannor and Forme of the proceeding to the funerall of the Right Honourable Robert Earle of Essex*, (London: 1646), TT E.360 [1], p.1.

[8] *Ibid.*, passim.

In late 1646, with the war won, Parliament turned its attention to finding a political settlement with the King while at the same time it planned to both disband the New Model Army and raise a new army to be sent to Ireland, to pacify the rebellion that had erupted in 1641. The King, initially in the hands of the Scots, attempted to play them off against Parliament while exploiting the growing rift between the predominantly Presbyterian Parliament and an increasingly more Independent and radically minded army, in his attempts to regain his authority. At the same time he discussed with the Scots an alliance to provide a Scottish army to invade England in return for the establishment of a Scottish style of Presbyterianism in England. Many in Parliament, led by Denzil Holles and a coalition of the former 'Middle Group' and 'Peace Group' adherents, were happy to consolidate its political gains and find a moderate accommodation with the King that would see the establishment of Presbyterianism across the nation. With the war won these moderate policies were now acceptable to the former 'Peace Party' who had previously called for peace at any price and together these two factions now dominated the House of Commons. These Parliamentarians wanted a speedy settlement with the King and a prompt disbanding of the army, that was rightly seen as a financial burden on the country, but also now a nascent political threat.

The English Army, however, was concerned that their arrears of pay should be settled, and their other grievances addressed before any thought of further service in Ireland, or disbanding, be entertained. Furthermore, many of the senior officers, such as Oliver Cromwell, now openly referred to as Independents, had become increasingly concerned that Parliament would conclude a political settlement with the King that would lead to either a modified Episcopal or Presbyterian system in England which excluded sufficient religious toleration, neither of which was acceptable to the Independents that were now increasingly the dominant force within the army. Added to this a radicalism was beginning to spread through the ranks of the army as the soldiers began to clamour for social reform, greater personal freedoms and even a complete change in the form of government. Republicans began to call for the King to be deposed, the Levellers demanded greater democracy along with a more equitable distribution of wealth, while the various religious sectaries called for even more radical systems of belief to be tolerated.

Inevitably the disparate political demands of all concerned led to turmoil, further division and a hardening of attitudes. By early 1647 the Scottish Army had been placated with the settlement of its pay arrears, after which they handed the King over to Parliament and their army returned to Scotland, but they continued their discussions with Charles as they sought to influence the eventual political settlement in England. The English Army during the first half of 1647 became increasing disgruntled with their political masters in London as only limited arrears of their pay were settled in return for a partial disbanding of the army. This, however, allowed the Independent leadership to purge itself of those that they deemed politically unreliable officers and many of the more moderate Presbyterians were forced out. During this time some units mutinied, others refused to agree to serve in Ireland but all the time the army was becoming increasingly more active and involved with the politics of the nation. The army leadership, now unhindered by political moderates, became increasingly suspicious of the Presbyterian dominated Parliament and felt that only their direct intervention would get them the political settlement they demanded. In June 1647 the army seized the King to ensure he was unable to conclude any form of settlement with Parliament without its agreement. Then, in an attempt to pressurise Parliament to settle their arrears and to actively involve them in the political settlement process, the army gradually moved towards the capital spreading fear and panic amongst Londoners who dreaded that the capital would be occupied, or even plundered.

The City of London was undergoing political change during this period as well. After 1643, the influence of the radicals had declined with the election of successive moderate Lord Mayors, while subsequent Common Council elections brought more moderate voices. By 1647 the make up of the City government was predominantly religiously Presbyterian and politically aligned with the moderates in Parliament. With the war won, the City government was less inclined to tolerate radicals with their disruptive ideas, and were increasingly content to find a settlement with the King that would return trade and commerce to a more predictable and stable level.

Most Londoners probably held Presbyterian religious views, notwithstanding the large, vocal, and obvious, Independent minority. There was a general feeling across the capital that the introduction of a national Presbyterian system for the established church, shorn of religious excess, subservient to Parliament, and with limited toleration would, along with the abolition of episcopacy, be an acceptable settlement, even if it ignored the demands of the Independents. Many of the City leaders had become increasingly concerned at the rise of the Independents and sectaries in the army and their demands for political involvement in the nation, so they looked with a growing consternation at the army, and what it might do in the future. The Militia Committee of early 1647 still contained many of the same individuals that had revolutionised City government in 1642, but it had lost much of its power and influence simply because the militia played a diminishing role in the Parliamentary war effort after the creation of the New Model Army in 1645. There were also many in the City government who resented the 'upstarts' that had upset the natural order of civic government. The City leaders were by now sympathetic with Holles and his followers in Parliament and shared his concerns about army involvement in politics, but this attitude was to put the City firmly on a collision course with the triumphant army.

On 21 March 1647, a party of commissioners sent by Parliament met with Sir Thomas Fairfax, Lord General of the Army, and his senior officers at Saffron Walden in Essex. The Parliamentary delegation had been sent to the Army to inform it of Parliament's plans for its disbanding, for the paying off the soldiers and for the raising of another army for the pacification of Ireland. One of these commissioners was the former City Horse officer Richard Salwey. During the commissioners' stay in Saffron Walden they were to obtain a first-hand understanding of the state of army and, more importantly, how it was likely to react to the proposals that were being considered by their political masters in London.[9] This meeting was to have important ramifications for the history of England, as a series of events unfolded as the English Civil War gradually became the English Revolution, for within just a few years of this meeting England would experience regicide and the establishment of a republican government, followed by other experiments in national government building. Even after 1660, and the restoration of the monarchy, a precedent had been set for the future: monarchs could be replaced if the people, or their representatives, believed that they acted tyrannically, as King Charles I's younger son, James, was to find out in 1688!

What the commissioners learnt from their visit was that elements within the army were disgruntled with how they were being treated by Parliament, and that it was rumoured that a petition was being circulated amongst the soldiers which, if endorsed by the senior commanders, called for it to submitted to Parliament as the formal grievances of the soldiers and a demand for redress. Parliament saw the army as a tool it had crafted to do its bidding in the war against the King, and it was not expected to do anything but follow orders; it certainly had no right to demand of its masters any form of redress. However, it was not the petition that led to revolution but Parliament's reaction to it. When news reached Parliament on 29 March that the petition was genuine, Denzil Holles was livid and immediately issued a formal reply on behalf of both Houses, in which the army was informed that any soldier who continued with this petition would be deemed 'Enemies to the State and Disturbers of the Public Peace' who would be dealt with accordingly.[10] This reaction sparked a series of events that led directly to the army's participation in the politics of the country and to the military coup of August 1647, which in itself ultimately led to the execution of the King and all the events subsequent to that. As England moved inexorably towards political revolution, the City Horse were to play their part in the events that followed. Salwey played no real part in the Saffron Walden meetings, in fact there is no evidence that he contributed anything at all to them, but this ex-officer of the City Horse was a witness to the birth of the English Revolution, and so once again somebody intimately connected to the City Horse was directly involved with the momentous events of the time.

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[9] Waller, *Vindication*, pp.44–45.

[10] *Journals of the House of Lords, 1646–1647*, Vol. 9, (London: n.d) p.115.

Following the Saffron Walden meeting events moved quickly. On 5 April, Parliament appointed Philip Skippon as commander-in-chief of the army for Ireland, with Edward Massey to command the cavalry component.[11] To help finance both the disbanding of the New Model Army and the new army for Ireland, in early April a delegation from Parliament, which included Edmund Harvey, was sent to negotiate a loan of 200,000l from the City, but the City was not prepared to loan its money without significant concessions.[12]

The City had long pushed to expand its influence and control over the nearby suburbs in Surrey and Middlesex, a measure granted in part under the Militia Ordinance of July 1643 by which it won the temporary right to control all the militia within the Lines of Communication.[13] Expedient as this was at the time, Parliament was unwilling to cede to the Militia Committee permanent authority over the suburban militia. Despite accepting the City's proposal of October 1644 that control would remain with the London Militia Committee in any negotiated settlement with the King at Uxbridge that winter, by late 1645, with the war almost won, Parliament had refused to countenance these demands any longer and, in early 1646, it decided that the City would not have authority over the suburban militia.[14] When Parliament came to borrow money in April 1647, the City demanded the restoration of its right to control the suburban militia, as well as the right to appoint its own Militia Committee, as the price to be paid for its agreement to provide the money that Parliament was so desperate for. Holles, who took the lead in negotiating the loan, saw these as acceptable concessions and the loan was promptly agreed in principle in mid-April, although it was only promulgated by Parliament on 13 May after Common Council approved the final draft on 8 May.[15] In return the City was granted the authority to select the members of the Militia Committee itself on 16 April, for a period of one year.[16]

With this the political dynamic once again changed in London, for on 27 April in a solemn ceremony held in St Lawrence Jewry, 31 (mostly) Presbyterian and therefore politically moderate individuals were elected to the Militia Committee, immediately replacing the more radical members that had sat since it was established in early 1642. This new committee, which included previous City Horse commanders such as Philip Skippon, Robert Mainwaring, Edward Hooker and Richard Turner, was more politically aligned with Holles' dominant faction within Parliament than it was to the majority on Common Council but it was still one that was elected by Londoners. Nevertheless, it naturally opposed many of the revolutionaries of the 1642 Committee and, more importantly, the Independent controlled army. Parliament had no hesitation in ratifying these nominations on 9 May.[17]

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[11] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.133.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.221–223.

[14] *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol.3, p.680; Nagel, 'Militia', pp.242–245; Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, p.502.

[15] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol.1, pp.928–935; JCC Vol. 40, f.217v.

[16] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol.1, pp.924–925; Lindley and Scott (eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.153.

With funds now available to disband the New Model Army as well as for the raising of the new army for Ireland and the City of London militia now in more politically reliable hands, Holles was able to move against the army. Parliament decreed that the first regiment would be disbanded on 1 June at Newmarket, with the rest to be progressively reduced throughout the rest of the month.[18] However, the army was not prepared to be so easily cast aside, at least not without full settlement of their arrears and redress of their other grievances. At a Council of War held on 30 May the officers voted to not disband in defiance of Parliament's instructions.

On 2 June, Cornet Joyce and some other Agitators seized King Charles from his quarters at Holdenby House in an attempt to frustrate any attempt at settlement between the monarch and Parliament without the approval of the now politically aroused army.[19] The following day a nervous Parliament, fearing what the army might do, voted a full settlement of all common soldiers arrears of pay, as well as that of all officers that were no longer in service, although no effort was made to settle the arrears of the active officers. To further placate the army the House of Commons voted to expunge from the official record its response to the army petition of 29 March, in which it decreed anybody that petitioned to Parliament be enemies of the State.[20]

Since the beginning of the year disbanded soldiers had found their way to London to seek settlement of their pay arrears, and their numbers steadily increased in May and June as many, reluctant to remain with the increasingly radical New Model Army, sought redress. On 3 June Parliament ordered an immediate payment of 10,000l to those constantly clamouring around Parliament for action, but this simply led to a deluge of further petitions, for which there simply was insufficient cash to pay, as more disbanded soldiers headed for London to try their luck at getting paid.[21] None of this helped placate the army however, as it was more concerned with obtaining redress for its current soldiers rather than for those in London who had already left its ranks.

With thousands of ex-soldiers thronging the streets of London and the fear that the New Model Army might march on the capital, both Parliament and the City were becoming seriously concerned about their safety. Imperceptibly at first, a potential new force to counter the New Model was emerging within the nation's capital, comprising the disaffected reformados and disbanded soldiers, the embryonic new army for Ireland, and the City militia, now safely in the hands of the Presbyterian dominated Militia Committee. In early June Randall Mainwaring, long a militant spirit within the City and openly supportive of the Independents, was replaced as adjutant of the militia forces by the more politically reliable and moderate William Webb, removing an obstacle to outright control of the City Militia.[22]

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[17] JCC Vol.40, f.215v; Samuel Pecke, *A Perfect Diurnall of the passages in Parliament, 26 April–3 May 1647*, TT E.515 [10], p.1570; Sharpe (ed.), *London and Kingdom 2*, Vol. 2, p.206; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, p.928.

[18] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.183.

[19] *The Parliamentary or Constitutional History of England, from the Earliest Times, to the Restoration of King Charles II*, Vol. 15, (London: 1763), pp.384–389, 414–419.

[20] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol.5, p.197.

[21] *Ibid.*

On 8 June, Common Council submitted a petition to the House of Commons requesting the authority to raise further cavalry within the City for its protection in this time of growing crisis and uncertainty. The petition was heard by the Members, and on 11 June they enthusiastically assented to the City's request to raise further militia cavalry for a period not exceeding 30 days.[23] The reason for the Commons enthusiastic response is easy to understand. The same day Parliament received a letter from Sir Thomas Fairfax and the senior officers of the New Model Army in which they explained their reasons for resisting Parliament and stating their intention to march on London to receive satisfaction of their demands.[24] The granting of power to the City to raise cavalry was just one response of the House of Commons to this news. A joint Committee of Both Houses, that included former colonel of the City Horse George Thompson, was constituted to sit with the Militia Committee 'to advise, order; and direct, How the Forces of London, Westminster, Lines of Communication, and weekly Bills of Mortality, may be put into a Posture of Defence, for the Suppression of all Insurrections and Tumults that may arise within the Cities of London, Westminster, Lines of Communication, and weekly Bills of Mortality, and for the Safety of the Parliament and City'. Edmund Harvey was hurriedly dispatched to the City to inform them of the imminent arrival of this group of Parliamentary dignitaries. This combined committee was to constitute a reformed Committee of Safety. Parliament was once again preparing for war and once again the City Horse were to find themselves at the centre of this new political maelstrom.[25]

Panic spread throughout London on 11 June. The Militia Committee, taking matters into their own hands and without the approval of Common Council, ordered the blockhouses in the perimeter defences be secured and guns be placed in the various forts, and that night the Lord Mayor instructed the militia to assemble the following morning on pain of death and that all the shops within the capital remain closed.[26] In the evening, as rumours and fear permeated across the City that the army was expected to arrive before London the following day, a multitude of reformados, loyal to Parliament, volunteered for service and were organised into regiments under John Dalbier, Sir Thomas Essex and Edwin Sandy.[27] Next morning the militia was mustered, though not in anywhere near the numbers desired or needed, as London stood on the brink of violence once again.[28]

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[22] Robert Ibbitson, *Perfect Occurrences of every dayes journall in Parliament, 28 May–5 June 1647,* TT E.515 [16], p.142; Charles Harding Firth (ed.), *The Clarke Papers: Selections From the Papers of William Clarke, Secretary to the Council of the Army, 1647–1649, and to General Monck and the Commanders of the Army in Scotland, 1651–1660*, Vol.1, (London: The Camden Society, 1891), pp.152–156; JCC Vol. 40, f.218r.

[23] JCC Vol. 40, f.218v; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol.5, pp.203, 206–207; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol.1, pp.954–956.

[24] *OPH*, Vol. 15, p.431; Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 6, p.555.

[25] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol.5, pp.207, 208; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, p.956.

[26] Lindley and Scott (eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.159; Firth (ed.), *Clarke Papers*, Vol.1, p.132; Samuel Pecke, *A Perfect Diurnall, 7–14 June 1647,* TT E.515 [19].

However, on 12 June calmer heads within the City government prevailed. Common Council, infuriated that the Militia Committee had acted in such a provocative and rash manner without its approval, immediately dispatched a conciliatory letter to the army, disavowing the raising of forces the previous day, requesting that the army halt its march on the capital, and desiring that a peaceful resolution of the army's demands be found. The letter was sent, along with a delegation from the City that was almost exclusively comprised of Independents and pro-Army supporters.[29] This letter, and another in a similar vein from the House of Commons, found Fairfax at St Albans where he had now established his headquarters, barely a day's march from the capital. The army, happy that both the City and Parliament seemed to be more accommodating now that the reality of the army's actions had been fully considered, were however far from happy that the City had started raising forces in an attempt to resist it. On the evening of 14 June Fairfax informed the Parliamentary commissioners of the army's displeasure that the City had started to raise forces and that it had enlisted 'Horsemen to very considerable Numbers' which he claimed had 'beget some Disorder in the Army, and doth draw the Soldiers into a very great Suspicion and Jealousy of what is intended'.[30]

In response to these aggressive moves against the army Fairfax and his officers submitted a comprehensive political manifesto on 14 June in which it demanded wholesale reform of government, in addition to their previous demands of a fair and reasonable settlement of grievances, and which also demanded that Parliament be speedily purged of members guilty of corruption or 'abuse to the State' along with an immediate ending of recruiting within London.[31] Two days later the army went further and demanded that 11 members of the House of Commons be arrested and who had 'jointly or severally, Invaded, Infringed, or endeavoured to overthrow the Rights and Liberties of the Subject of this Nation, in arbitrary, violent, or oppressive ways'. Those named included Denzil Holles, Sir William Waller and Edward Massey.[32]

Fearful of what the army might do if their demands were not met, thoughts of armed resistance were temporarily forgotten in London. On 15 June, Common Council called for an immediate suspension of the recruitment of reformados and the following day the Commons rescinded its order to raise forces within the City, and all reformados were ordered to leave London forthwith.[33] Despite these and other minor concessions, Parliament had made no effort to arrest the 11 Members or even debate the Army's manifesto, much to the annoyance of Fairfax and his officers. Holles was still in control of the Commons and orchestrating further resistance to the army, but it was becoming clear that his influence was waning in the face of the army's political onslaught. On 19 June the Commons, having regained its spirit of resistance, voted that those soldiers already enlisted need not be discharged and indeed actively encouraged the still growing throng of officers and common soldiers in London to enlist while ensuring money was found to pay them.[34] By now, however, the army's patience was running out. On 23 June it issued *An Humble Remonstrance* demanding a response to its earlier manifesto, the complete suspension of enlistments in London, the arrest of the 11 Members by the following day, and the acceptance that the army had a right to play its part in the settlement of the nation.[35] Once more under pressure, the Commons resolve wavered and on 24 June it again ordered that all reformados be discharged and ordered from London, but they still could not countenance the attack on their colleagues and the next day resolved that no charges could be accepted against the 11 Members without proof of their guilt being first provided.[36]

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[27] Lindley and Scott (eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.159; Firth (ed.), *Clarke Papers*, Vol. 1, p.132.

[28] Lindley and Scott (eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.159; Firth (ed.), *Clarke Papers*, Vol.1, p.132.

[29] *OPH*, Vol.15, pp.438–440; JCC Vol.40, ff.221r–221v; Lindley and Scott (eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.159.

[30] *OPH*, Vol.15, pp.449–450.

[31] Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol.6, pp.564–570.

[32] *Ibid.*, pp.570–571.

Holles' influence in Parliament might have been slipping as his nervous colleagues withered under the fear of the army, but outside, support for the Presbyterian party remained strong. The City feared the ramifications of an army takeover, and this emboldened them just as their Parliamentary brethren weakened, while at the same time the reformados also feared retribution from the army. Many of them had deserted the New Model Army when Parliament offered them amnesty, back pay and future employment in the Irish army, while others, especially the officers, had been purged for their political beliefs earlier in the year, and thus most were undoubtedly fearful of the army's move into the political arena, and frightened of the consequences should it occupy London. Many of them began to believe that their interests were best served by continued opposition to Fairfax and his cohorts.

The New Model Army, angered by Parliament's refusal to agree to its demands, once again moved towards London. On 25 June, it was menacingly close at Uxbridge, and this was sufficient for Holles and the other accused Members to panic and request a leave of absence from Parliament the following day, in a desperate attempt to avert what now seemed would be an army occupation of the nation's capital.[37] While this only partially defused the situation, it had become clear that without Holles' leadership Parliament had lost the will to resist the army. Parliament might have been cowed by the aggressive politicking of the army, however many Presbyterians in the City government, fearing the consequences of an Independent led coup on themselves and the City, were still prepared to resist. The Militia Committee, not necessarily reflecting the general mood of Common Council, had been systematically purging Independents and army supporters from the Trained Bands since May and when news of this reached the army, many were angry.[38] At the same time recruitment of reformados continued apace with some 16,000 rumoured to have be enlisted by early July, which the army construed as a direct challenge to its authority.[39] The City's belligerent stance was further strengthened on 7 July when Common Council sent a petition to Parliament requesting 20,000l for maintenance of the City forces and the extension of the ordinance allowing them to raise cavalry that had originally been passed on 11 June. In another change of heart, the following day the Commons consented and agreed to the City 'Raising of One Regiment of Horse, consisting of Six Hundred.'[40] Agitators within the army were angry that the City was taking such a provocative stance and a petition was drafted by them and sent to Common Council on 6 July, demanding the restoration of the previous Militia Committee – a demand that found some support amongst many of the Independent followers within London.[41]

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[33] JCC Vol.40, ff.222r, 223r–223v; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, pp.213, 216.

[34] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.217.

[35] Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 6, pp.585–591.

[36] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, pp.222–223.

[37] *Ibid.*, p.225.

With this petition, the call for the restoration of the previous Militia Committee, which contained many Independents and radicals favourable towards the army, gained momentum. It a sign that the rank and file of the army were now increasingly engaged and demanding their own say in the political debate. An army Council of War held on 16 July was hijacked by Agitators who demanded that the army march on London to force a political settlement on the nation, another of their demands was for the restoration of the Militia Committee.[42] For the sake of army unity the senior army officers agreed to support these demands and on 19 July Fairfax wrote to the City calling for, amongst other things, the restoration of the Militia Committee; a demand which was repeated in a letter two days later with additional proposals that the army demanded of Parliament.[43] The pressure on Parliament had become unbearable and without it Holles to steady it the Commons, on receiving these new demands, faltered yet again. On 22 July, in what can only be called a capitulation to the army and the end of its own independence, the House of Commons by 77 votes to 46 voted to restore the ousted Militia Committee, and the following day both Houses formally reconstituted the previous Committee.[44]

Parliament might have been intimidated by the army's 'bully-boy' tactics but the Presbyterians factions in London were not. On 24 July, a petition later known as *A Solemn Engagement* was presented by the citizens of London demanding an immediate settlement with the King and a lasting peace established across the Kingdom. This settlement was based on the so-called 'Newcastle Propositions' which had been presented to the King in 1646, but which had been entirely rejected by the army. The Commons, doing its utmost to appease the army, dismissed the petition out of hand and labelled any that supported it as traitors. But despite this, the petition had the support of a large section of London's population and so the Commons' casual rejection of it was not well received.[45] Emotions across the City were reaching boiling point. When the reconstituted pre-army Militia Committee attempted to meet, they were disrupted by a 'company of young men, who ... wished them to begone and not sit there, telling them if they caught them there again they would hang their guts about their ears.'[46]

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[38] Firth (ed.), *Clarke Papers*, Vol. 1, pp.152–156.

[39] *Ibid.*, p.152.

[40] JCC Vol. 40, f.233; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.236; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.987–989.

[41] Kishlansky, *The Rise of the New Model Army*, p.257; *The Humble Petition of the Wel-affected Young Men, and Apprentises of the City of London...* (London: 1647), TT E.399 [2].

[42] Firth (ed.), *Clarke Papers*, Vol. 1, p.171.

[43] Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 6, p.630; *The Parliamentary or Constitutional History of England, from the Earliest Times, to the Restoration of King Charles II*, Vol. 16, (London: 1763), pp.160–161.

[44] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.254; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.990–991.

On the morning of 26 July two petitions from London were presented to Parliament. One, from Common Council demanded that the recently ejected Militia Committee be reinstated and the second, from a mob of young men and apprentices, called for peace and the disbanding of the army, neither of which the Commons were willing to immediately consider.[47] That afternoon a third group of petitioners descended upon Westminster in support of the *Solemn Engagement,* and when they heard that the morning's petitioners, who were still demonstrating in front of Parliament, had been brushed aside, things quickly turned nasty. A group of petitioners burst into the House of Lords demanding to be heard, just as a letter from Fairfax was being read aloud congratulating Parliament on restoring the Militia Committee, which only incited the crowd further. The mob demanded the repeal of the ordinance of two days earlier declaring supporters of the *Solemn Engagement* traitors. Those few Lords present in the chamber had no stomach to protest or resist the invasion by the mob and immediately fled the hall. By now the growing crowd was in a frenzy as they chased the fleeing Lords. Many burst into the chamber where the Commons were sitting and demanded that they vote on repealing both that ordinance and the one restoring the previous Militia Committee. The mob refused to let the members follow Parliamentary procedure nor allow any debate, but insisted that the Speaker, William Lenthall, call that both ordinances be repealed. The Speaker, fearful for his life, duly called them repealed. With that the Commons descended into chaos as members fled and the mob remained triumphantly in occupation of the Palace of Westminster until late into the night. The events of that day are surely some of the most remarkable ever witnessed by the 'Mother of Parliaments', as a frenzied mob, for a short time at least, dictated the course of the nation and Parliament once more lost control of political events.[48] It is also notable that the Common Council chose to not send any militia to attempt to control the situation at Westminster, leaving Parliament completely unprotected.[49]

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[45] *Constitutional History*, Vol. 16, pp.163–166; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.991–992.

[46] Lindley and Scott (eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.162.

[47] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.258; JCC Vol. 40, ff.239r–239v.

[48] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, pp.258–259; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, p.992; Lindley and Scott (eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.162; Henry Walker, *A Perfect Summary of Chiefe Passages in Parliament, 26 July–1 August 1647*, TT E.518 [13], pp.9–13.

[49] JCC Vol. 40, f.240v.

It was rumoured at the time that influential Presbyterian members of the City government orchestrated this tumult, with Alderman James Bunce, a known Presbyterian and other members being identified as inciting the mob before Westminster. Whether true or not, it was certainly a view shared by Fairfax when he wrote the City a few days later admonishing it for the role it had played in the events.[50] The following day the City was acting as if it were now the dominant political force in the nation when it drafted a petition directly to the King, inviting him to London for the speedy negotiating of a settlement, and a letter to the army suggesting that it accept the restoration of the Presbyterian Militia Committee.[51] However, not surprisingly, the army was far from prepared to accept the usurpation of City rule. Fairfax had been receiving updates from army sympathisers in London and so was well informed of the events that had recently transpired when he wrote a scathing letter to the City on 29 July from Bedford, blaming it for the dissolution of the government of the nation.[52] When Parliament reconvened on 30 July as many as 57 Members and a handful of Lords had already fled to the army for protection, including the Speaker. The Commons was now faced with a stark choice – it needed to either support the City, now that it was dictating political events, or challenge it. Shorn of its pro-army supporters who had fled London and with Holles and the other impeached members now readmitted, the Commons chose to support the City and resist the army – with force if necessary.[53]

In a flurry of activity during the afternoon of 30 July the Commons strengthened the Committee of Safety, it wrote letters to the army demanding that it advance no nearer than 30 miles from London, and it empowered the London Militia Committee to put 'in Execution, all Ways and Means, which in their Judgments may be necessary for the Defence of the King, Kingdom, Parliament, and City'. It also granted the Committee the authority to appoint a commander-in-chief of the militia forces and the 'Power to raise and list Horses, as they shall think fit' as well as to provide guards for Parliament.[54]

The Militia Committee lost no time in preparing the City for the impending showdown with the army. On 29 July it had ordered that there were to be no more protests on the streets of Westminster and had called for the militia to be mustered the following day 'to defend the City'.[55] On 30 July, Edward Massey was appointed commander-in-chief of the City forces, including the reformados within the Lines of Communication, an appointment ratified by the Commons the following day. Also on 30 July the Commons ordered the blockhouses at Tilbury and Gravesend be secured.[56] The same day the Committee of Safety ordered that the 'Reformadoes, Officers and Soulders' be mustered the following day in St James Fields (modern day St James' Park) and there 'upon the view of their Numbers and Qualities, consider and agree of Field-officers, and others, as may put them in a condition fit for service in a Regimental-way: And that this Committee may bee certified thereof, and how they are mounted & armed.'[57] At the same time the City apprentices and journeymen were ordered 'upon beate of the drum to appeare in Compleate Armes for the defence ... of this Cittie, as they will answeare the Contrarie at their utmost perill'.[58] A call had also gone out to Trinity House for seamen to join the growing throng and some 10,000 were promised.[59]

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[50] Lindley and Scott(eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.162; *Constitutional History*, Vol. 16, p.189.

[51] Kishlansky, *The Rise of the New Model Army*, p.269; JCC Vol. 40, ff.240r–240v; Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 6, p.645.

[52] *Constitutional History*, Vol. 16, p.189.

[53] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.260.

[54] *Constitutional History*, Vol. 16, p.193; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.260.

[55] Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 6, p.646.

[56] JCC Vol. 40, f.244; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.261; *JHL*, Vol. 9, pp.371, 372.

On 31 July Parliament once again authorised the City to raise more horses by requisition but it was becoming clear that the makeshift army needed yet more horses, and that support from the general population in providing them was not as forthcoming as had been expected. This led Parliament the following day to grant the commissioner in charge of listing horses the authority to 'brake open Locks and Doors' should the inhabitants of London refuse to provide what was needed, while at the same time prohibiting any horses being removed from the City.[60] On 1 August, the Committee of Safety was given the power 'to grant Commissions to all such Commanders and Officer of Horse, Foot, and Dragoons, as they shall think fit, for the Service of the King, Kingdom, and City' as the rush to raise an army continued.[61] On 3 August, Sir William Waller's appointment as commander of all the cavalry within London was agreed by both Houses of Parliament.

Quite how many soldiers the City was able to muster at the end of July has never been fully established. The previous summer the City militia had mustered some 18 regiments of foot and 8 troops of horse[62], which, according to Sir William Waller was comparable to the forces mustered in July 1647. Waller claimed each of these regiments of foot were between 1,800 and 2,000 strong, but this is surely an exaggeration.[63] At full strength these regiments could probably muster no more than 1,000 men each but this would have been a formidable force, had they all mustered as ordered. On 31 July Parliament decreed a fine of 40 shillings to be imposed on any soldier of the Trained Bands who refused to muster, which suggests that not all of the militiamen were as enthusiastic in wanting to face the army as the politicians had hoped.[64] In addition to these militia units were the reformados who, in early July, the army had estimated at being 16,000 strong, but this is again likely to be a gross exaggeration. Waller claimed later that they in fact numbered between 4,000–5,000 men, all mounted, though it is unclear how well they were armed.[65] It is clear that there was still a large body of men under arms in London at the time and irrespective of how well they were armed or organised, this posed a significant threat to the army.

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[57] *Severall Orders and Votes of Both Houses of Parliament: Made on Friday and Saturday Last, for the Bringing of the Kings Majesty to Some of his Houses Neer London, to Receive Propositions from both Kingdomes, for Peace*, (London: 1647), TT E.400 [34], p.6.

[58] Quoted in Robert Ashton, *Counter-revolution : the Second Civil War and its Origins, 1646–8*, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1994), p.382.

[59] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.263; Lindley and Scott (eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.165.

[60] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, p.994; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.263; Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 6, p.647.

[61] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.263.

[62] *The Moderate Intelligencer, 14–21 May 1646*, (London:1646), p.453.

[63] Waller, *Vindication*, p.188.

[64] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.992–994.

As London prepared for war, the army, under Fairfax, edged closer to the capital. On 28 July it was at Bedford, the following night it quartered at High Wycombe and on 30 July was spread out between Hounslow and Colnbrook, where it halted to wait on further events.[66] On 30 July Parliament wrote to Fairfax informing him that the tumults in the capital had been suppressed and order had been restored, that the Members who had fled to the army could safely return, and that the army was not needed to provide for the safety of the City.[67] The army would have none of this, and on 2 August Fairfax fired off a concise declaration demanding that the settlement of the nation proceed on the basis of a lengthy set of proposals agreed by the army the previous day, while another declaration was issued the following day to justify their current march on London; attempts by Massey to scout close to the army were easily thwarted.[68] On 2 August, Fairfax sent a force around the north of London into the county of Essex, which then seized the blockhouse at Tilbury, while another force entered Kent and took the fort at Gravesend, scattering a small force of army deserters in the process.[69] With the capital surrounded and the army now arrayed on Hounslow Heath in full view of London and issuing none too subtle threats to occupy the capital, it is not surprising that the resolve of both Parliament and the City began to waver.

By 2 August dissent inside London was starting to appear when a group of peace protesters in the City were set upon by a force of reformados, during which confrontation many protesters were wounded and some reportedly killed.[70] That same day a delegation from the Borough of Southwark appeared before Common Council expressing the Borough's desire for peace and their intention that no forces to be raised within its jurisdiction were to be used against the army, and the Borough sought to distance itself from the actions of the City of London.[71] Opposition to the army was starting to unravel and the City began to recognise that it lacked the resources to defeat the army should fighting begin. During the night of 2 August in a conciliatory letter to Fairfax, the City informed the General of its desire to 'prevent the effusion of blood'.[72]

When the City delegation presented the letter the following morning, they were all but snubbed by Fairfax who had drawn up the entire army on Hounslow Heath, in full view of London. At the same time the Members of Parliament that had fled Westminster after the previous weeks' events, along with many of the Lords, met Fairfax and were warmly greeted by the army who eagerly played the role of protector of Parliament.[73] Those Members that had not fled to the army could see that they had lost their gamble and the following day submitted their own engagement to Fairfax, accepting that the army's reasons for a march upon London were 'full of Truth' and they suppliantly capitulated.[74] With this the rest of the Parliamentarians lost heart and the same morning the Commons adjourned until 6 August, during which time they made their peace with the army.[75]

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[65] Firth (ed.), *Clarke Papers*, Vol. 1, p.152; Waller, *Vindication*, p.189.

[66] *Constitutional History*, Vol. 16, p.189; Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 6, p.652.

[67] Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 6, p.654.

[68] *Ibid.*, pp.738, 744–750.

[69] *Ibid.*, pp.740,741; *Constitutional History*, Vol. 16, p.208.

[70] Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 7, pp.741, 750; Lindley and Scott (eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.166.

[71] Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 7, p.741.

[72] JCC Vol. 40, f.247r.

The City similarly quickly caved in. After the humiliation of their delegation that had been sent to Hounslow, Common Council wrote to Fairfax on 3 August and meekly agreed to allow such of the army as the General desired to enter the capital unopposed, and to bring with them those Members of Parliament that had sought the army's protection.[76] That night a large force from the army entered Southwark without any resistance and marched as far as the entrance of London Bridge, which they found closed and barred.[77] The London forces then withdrew from the City defences on 4 August, and which were immediately occupied by the army.[78] Meetings were held between the City, Parliamentary officials and the Army during 5 August, in which once again they accepted the necessity of the Army's actions, to which Fairfax responded by informing the City of his intention to occupy the capital the following day.[79] On 6 August the Army marched into London and symbolically returned those Members who had fled back to Westminster in full view of Parliament and the entire City government.[80] On the same day the Commons acknowledged its defeat by resolving that it 'doth approve of the Coming up of the General, and the Army, for the secure and safe Sitting of the Parliament: And that Thanks be given to the General and Army for the same.'[81] The Presbyterian alliance of City and Parliament was in tatters and both were humbled by the Independent led army, which was now the effective master of the political situation in London.

The army's retribution upon the City was swift. Massey and Waller, along with Holles and the rest of the impeached Members of Parliament, went into hiding before fleeing to the Continent later in August.[82] The Lord Mayor, the City Sheriffs and a handful of Aldermen were arrested and placed in the Tower of London in September,[83] in a show of defiance Fairfax was appointed Lieutenant of the Tower on 6 August,[84] and in October the army orchestrated the election of the pro-army Alderman John Warner as Lord Mayor.[85] The army then set about dismantling the London defences which had been constructed in 1643 but it was now too dangerous for them to be left standing,[86] and the Militia Committee was dismissed and replaced by a pro-army one that included Harvey, Turner, and Salwey. Separate committees were established in Southwark, Westminster and Tower Hamlets, ensuring that the City Committee would never again have the power to challenge the army.[87]

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[73] Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *History of the Great Civil War, 1642–1649*, Vol. 3, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1891), pp.175–176.

[74] Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 7, p.754; *Constitutional History*, Vol. 16, pp.237–239.

[75] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.268.

[76] JCC Vol. 40, f.250v; Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 7, p.751.

[77] Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 7, p.752.

[78] *Ibid.*

[79] *Ibid.*, p.756.

[80] *Ibid.*, pp.756–757.

[81] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.268.

[82] Waller, *Vindication*, pp.201–202; Sir William Waller, 'Recollections', in Hannah Cowley (ed.), *The Poetry of Anna Matilda*, (London, 1788), pp.114–115; Denzil Holles, *Memoirs of Denzil Lord Holles, Baron of Ifield in Sussex, from the Year 1641, to 1648*, (London:1699), pp.175–176; Lindley and Scott(eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.169.

[83] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.315.

Even though no fighting occurred during the struggle for London in 1647 the City Horse had a role to play in these momentous events. As has been shown, a regiment of cavalry existed in London during 1646 and this was probably commanded by Robert Mainwaring. It is not clear from the extant sources whether this regiment was formally disbanded in late 1646 or whether it was simply demobilised, its horses returned to their owners and the men sent home. The evidence for 1647 implies that the cavalry in the City were newly raised, however it is clear from the pay issued to the regiment on 23 July 1647 that the troop commanders were the same as had previously served in Mainwaring's regiment during the autumn of 1645.[88] Most likely Mainwaring's regiment was reconstituted some time in 1646, for on 23 February 1647 a motion was presented to Common Council 'in the name of the Officers of Horse belonging to the City under the Comand of Colonell Robert Mannwaring' calling for payment of the arrears of 'their allowances agreed upon by the Committee of the Militia towards their charges of keeping their horses and for their dayes of Excercise'.[89] It is probable that the regiment was demobilised sometime before the summer of 1647, perhaps after the election of the new Militia Committee, since on 8 June, fearful that the New Model Army might march on London at any time, Common Council petitioned Parliament for permission to raise a new force of cavalry for its safety. The request was granted three days later when it was given the authority to 'finde and maintaine horses with Riders and Furniture, at their proper charge, for the defence of the City and parts adjacent'.[90] It did not take long for the regiment to reform, it was mustered on 11 June and on the following day it was noted as consisting of 500 horse.[91]

There only seem to have been four troops in 1647, all of whom carried blue cornets, but what happened to Waring's troop is unknown:[92]

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[84] Holles, *Memoirs*, p.169.

[85] Gardiner, *Civil War*, Vol. 3, p.205.

[86] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.290.

[87] *Ibid.*, p.280; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.1007–1008, 1010–1012, 1057–1058.

[88] The National Archives, SP28/237, Part 1, County Committees, orders, accounts, and papers, London and Middlesex, 1642 – 1660, unpaginated; TNA, SP28/132 Part 2, f.13.

[89] JCC Vol. 40, f.205v.

[90] *Ibid.*, p.218v; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.954–956.

[91] TNA, SP28/237 Part 1, unpaginated; Robert Ibbitson, *Perfect Occurrences of Every Dayes Journall in Parliament, 11 -18 June 1647,* TT E.515 [20], p.158.

[92] TNA, SP28/237 Part 1, unpaginated.; London in Armes/Bod, ff.16–18.

Colonel Robert Mainwaring
Major Symon Hackett
Captain William Hobert (Hubbard)
Captain Thomas Kempe

The Parliamentary Ordinance of 11 June stipulated that the City only had the authority to raise and maintain the regiment for a period of one month, and therefore a second ordinance was issued on 11 July extending this power for a further two months.[93]

While there is no record of what role Mainwaring's regiment initially played when mobilised, the regimental pay records show that it was in service from 11 June until 6 August.[94] On 24 July Mainwaring's troop, or perhaps the entire regiment, was ordered to deploy before Westminster Palace to provide a guard for Parliament and, as mentioned, there were rowdy scenes in London in the days after the Commons capitulated and consented to restore the previous Militia Committee. It is unclear whether Mainwaring and his men obeyed this order.[95] Most likely the regiment spent these nervy days patrolling the streets of London, day and night, providing guards both in Westminster and the City and along the fortifications. What the officers and men thought of the events that were unfolding around them can only be guessed at. They, like the rest of the City militia, were stood down on 6 August when the army entered London and took over the responsibility for protecting the capital.

On 30 July Major-General Edward Massey, the hero of Gloucester, had been chosen by Common Council to be 'Commander Generall in Cheife pro tempore of the fforces raised and to be raised within this Cittie and Lines of Communication and weeklie bills of Mortallities and Hambletts of the Tower for the defence and safetie of the Kinge Parliament and Cittie.'[96] This was a City force that included cavalry, raised independently of the main army for the defence of London and Parliament, and so rightly ought to considered City Horse as well. The day after Massey's appointment by Common Council, Parliament provided the necessary ordinance granting the City the power to appoint such a general and then later in the day both Houses approved the City's choice.[97] This was a revolutionary decision.

During the Civil War Parliament had retained the responsibility to raise, maintain and deploy the army raised in its name, but this Act now delegated that vital task to the City of London, symbolising just how much authority and stature Parliament had lost and how dominant London had become in the political arena. Furthermore, Massey was granted command not just of the militia forces but of *all* forces raised, or to be raised, within the Lines of Communication, and this specifically included the new army based on the reformados that the City was intent on establishing. This was an incredible amount of responsibility and authority to be taken on by the Militia Committee and it is hard to imagine that any other civic body has held such enormous power before or after in the history of England, albeit it having a time limit of just a month.

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[93] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.987–989.

[94] TNA, SP28/237 Part 1, unpaginated.

[95] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.256; Samuel Pecke, *A Perfect Diurnall of Some Passages in Parliament, 19–26 July 1647*, TT E.518 [8], p.1669.

[96] JCC Vol. 40, f.244r.

[97] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.992–994; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.261; *JHL*, Vol. 9, p.362.

No record of the structure of Massey's intended army survives but it is clear that it contained a considerable proportion of cavalry. Waller claimed that he had a force of some 4,500–5,000 horse, but this was probably an exaggeration. He also stated his force consisted of 'all mounted by reformado officers, and gentlemen of quality'.[98] On 31 July Parliament rushed through yet another ordinance providing the Committee of Safety and Militia Committee the authority 'to seize and list Horses, for the Service of the King, Parliament, and City' for use of Massey's cavalry.[99] That the London authorities struggled to raise sufficient horses is evidenced by a further ordinance the next day giving the commissioners in charge of securing mounts the authority to break down the doors of any who refused to provide them willingly, demonstrating the desperation and urgency as London attempted to arm.[100] Indeed, such was the rush to requisition horses that charges were later made against at least one of the commissioners for acting without the legal authority. William Williamson was one commissioner who later claimed that as his authority to seize horses was revoked along with all other ordinances of Parliament once the army occupied London. He was subsequently intimidated by persons from whom he had requisitioned horses, who were demanding that he personally repay the 1400l that they claimed the horses were worth, and for which they were unable to gain restitution from the City government due to the revocation of the laws.[101]

Sir Edward Baynton, a Member of Parliament, was also not immune to the consequences of attempting to raise horses for Massey. On 4 September, he was charged in the House 'with the signing of a Warrant for raising of Horse in the City' and was subsequently temporarily suspended from the House, although he was back in the Commons by mid-November.[102]

Perhaps a clue as to the size of this mounted force that Massey and Waller were frantically attempting to raise can be gleaned from the order by the Militia Committee to the Ordnance Office in the Tower of London on 3 August to provide '4 thousand saddles and furniture [and] 2,000 cases of Pistells, and houlsters' which were to be 'imployed by the Militia of *London*'.[103] However, according to the hostile John Juxon, 'Massey declared in common council that he could not make 700 horse for to engage'.[104]

How these mounted reformados were organised is similarly not known. Waller was appointed commander of the cavalry on 3 August, but was evidently involved with the listing of recruits at St James Field on 31 July, and also possibly before that date.[105] Another officer present that assisted with the listings at St James on 21 July was Sydenham Poyntz. Poyntz had served in Europe as a soldier of fortune before returning to England, probably in 1644, and taking a commission in the Parliamentary forces. He had undoubted sympathies for Parliament in its argument with the New Model Army and his regiment was deemed sufficiently dependable to be retained by Parliament when most of the army was to be disbanded. In early 1647 he was based in York as commander of the northern army but in early July, Agitators from the main army infiltrated his regiment and orchestrated a coup in which Poyntz was arrested and sent to Fairfax at Reading, where he was charged with attempting to embroil the nation in another war. He was, however, released but immediately resigned his commission, returned to London at end of the month and quickly involved himself with Massey and Waller in raising their army.[106]

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[98] Waller, *Vindication*, p.189.

[99] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, p.994.

[100] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.263; *JHL*, Vol. 9, pp.365–366.

[101] JCC Vol. 40, f.262v.

[102] Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 7, p.800; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, pp.290,358.

[103] Robert Ibbitson, *Perfect Occurrences of Every Dayes Journall in Parliament, 30 July–6 August 1647*, TT E.518 [14], p.207.

[104] Lindley and Scott(eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.165.

Whether the cavalry was arranged into one or more regiments is unknown and how they were deployed is also not recorded. In fact, the only record of their use during the troubles occurred on 2 August at the Guildhall when they were used to clear protesters from the precincts. Their actions illustrate just how divided the inhabitants of London were and how polarising the opinions of both sides were. That day petitioners, which some accounts note as being several thousand strong, descended on Guildhall to lodge a petition for peace, but things soon grew ugly when Poyntz and some of the mounted reformados were called in to restore order, during which a few protesters were killed and many more injured. Undoubtedly the incident occurred, though there is no reference to it in the journal of Common Council for that day, but what is interesting is how it was reported and portrayed by the commentators of the time. Henry Walker's *Perfect Summary*, that had an editorial bias towards the army, wrote, 'a great number of Citizens came with a Petition in effect whereof was for Peace and called for no forces to be raised against the army.' His report ended by informing his readers that 'before an answer was obtained there grew a mutiny, Col. Poyntz and others in the [Guildhall] drew their swords, and many unarmed men were wounded and some of them are since dead.[107]

Samuel Pecke's *Perfect Diurnall*, no army supporter but also not afraid to criticise Parliament, produced a similarly moderate, but shocked, response and added that Poyntz men 'in a most cruell manner hackt and hewd many of them … So the Petitioners were forces to fly and Poyntz and the rest left to try much in their bloody designe.'[108] Both refrained from apportioning any political blame to one side or the other, while both rightly emphasised Poyntz's excessive reaction to the demonstration.

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[105] *JHL*, Vol. 9, p.372; Samuel Pecke, *A Perfect Diurnall of Some Passages in Parliament, 26 July–2 August 1647*, TT E.518 [12], p.1683.

[106] D Farr, 'Poyntz [Poynts], Sydenham [Sednham], (bap.1607)', *ODNB*.

[107] Henry Walker, *A Perfect Summary of Chiefe Passages in Parliament, 2–9 August 1647*, TT E.518 [15], p.19.

[108] Samuel Pecke, *A Perfect Diurnall of Some Passages in Parliament, 2–9 August 1647*, TT E.518 [16], p.1685.

However, within days of the incident both sides started to blame the other for the massacre and the political point scoring began. On 10 August, with the army now in control of London, a pro-Independent pamphlet entitled *A speedy Hue and Crie* hit the London streets in which it described 'a company of peacefull men … comming with a Petition for the good of this City' were then 'assaulted in the streets, killed, or cut limbe from limbe, cursed' and then 'abused in a shamefull and uncivill manner' by Poyntz 'and divers of his faction'. The writer then went to on demand that the 'offenders … be committed to safe custody, and tryed according to the knowne Lawes of the Land'.[109] In the similarly pro-Independent *The Disconsolate REFORMADO,* published in late August, the satirical portrayal of recent events paints the petitioners as pro-army 'friends' whose attempt to submit their petition was 'much interrupted, in so much that in the end, they fell foule one upon th' other'. At this moment Poyntz, who the anonymous writer sarcastically referred to as a 'Gallant Reformado, or a Commander in chiefe,' then performed 'there acts of Chivalry, killing one poore man, and hurting divers others.' The wit continued by claiming that 'Massey hearing of the combustion, came into the field, and crying out Col. Pyns [sic] was ingaged, and with that they came so thicke in Companies to Guield-Hall-Gate, shouting, hollowing: and crying for King, Parliament and City" Conveniently Fairfax heard of this altercation and 'fearing that Kingdome should bee imbroyled in a Warre' dispatched his ultimatum to the City which ultimately led to a de-escalation the following day.[110] Obviously these were propaganda pieces for public consumption, designed to paint the Presbyterians as cruel and oppressive but, as John Juxon's personal journal makes clear, these stereotypical descriptions were believed by many of the Independents. He wrote that 'many honest citizens went to Guildhall to persuade … the Lord Mayor to avoid a new war' but they were 'jostled' by some of the reformados on guard. Hearing of this Poyntz and Massey with 'many more' at the nearby New Artillery Ground (at modern Finsbury) 'mounting their men, came suddenly thither and with their swords drawn fell upon the naked men, whom they slashed and cut barbarously, and some killed outright, and followed them up and down the streets cutting them; and at last the horsemen came into Cheapside with their swords drawn, crying out for King Charles.' Full of the venom and hatred that had polarised the capital, Juxon ended his entry 'This was a sad sight to all true-hearted citizens and told them what they were t'expect from such fellows.'[111]

Not surprisingly the Presbyterians attempted to paint a quite different account of what happened on 2 August. In *An Outcry Against the Speedy Hue and Crie* circulated only 12 days after the pamphlet that it challenged had been printed, the anonymous writer argued that Poyntz, far from being the aggressor was in fact the victim, for the petitioners did 'ridiculously jostle him, most Independantly, like men of no government, until not onely patience, but valour it selfe, was so abused, that it must needs turne to fury.'[112] This theme of provocation and victimisation was further expanded upon in *The Army Anatomized*, a Presbyterian view of the narrative of the New Model Army's actions since the Battle of Naseby, when it was published in December 1647. In this version of events the petitioners were a 'rude rabble of Anabaptists, and such like seditious Sectaries and Schismaticks' who were intent on a 'colurable-peace, of their own making.' This 'rude multitude … basely abused valiant and wel-deserving Major General Poyntz, a brave and victorious Commander' who was accosted and 'intolerably abused by the Sectaries' at the Guildhall.

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[109] *A Speedy Hue and Crie: after Generall Massie, Col. Poyntz, Sir Robert Pye, William Pryn, and Many Other New-Modelled Reformadoes*, (London: 1647), TT E.401 [20], p.4.

[110] *The Disconsolate Reformado; or The Sad Look'd Presbyterian Jack. Or a True Relation of the Suddaine Change which hath Happned in the City of London, since the 30th of July, till the 4th. of August. Between the Renowned Sr. Thomas Fairfax's Army, and Major Generall Massey's and Col. Poyn's Reformadoes*, (London: 1647), TT E.404 [4], p.3.

[111] Lindley and Scott (eds), *Juxon Journal*, pp.166–167.

Upon seeing him they:

> cryed out, No Poyntz, no Poyntz, pull'd him violently by his scarlet Cloak, asking him, if he had payd for it, yea some of them … kicking him on his breech, yea and smiting him on his head, in high scorn and contempt, in somuch that the heroick-spirited Gentleman, as a Soldier, also, could no longer indure them, but that drawing his sword, other swords were also drawn, one was slain, and divers others wounded, and much hurt was done among them.[113]

While both sides attempted to put their own spin for political purposes on these events and it is now impossible to know the truth of how the massacre unfolded, it must not be forgotten that these were real victims who suffered in this attack by the reformados. Normally history does not allow the voice of victims such as these to be heard but in this instance a subsequent petition submitted to the House of Lords on 24 August on their behalf exists and through this, they can add their own account of what transpired that day. According to these petitioners, they were citizens who were 'deeply sensible of the destructive Designs of some who laboured to foment a new War' and 3,000 of them were determined to submit a 'Petition for Peace' that day at the Guildhall. Upon their arrival they found that Common Council was not yet sitting and so the petitioners waited by the entrance and appointed some who could present the petition and speak on behalf of the rest. At that point, an unnamed Alderman appeared and 'laid Hands on One of the Petitioners … and endeavoured by Force to pull him to the Committee of the Militia' who were then sitting, in an attempt to intimidate the petitioners. At this point, according to this version of events, 'the Lord Mayor … in a violent Manner, did strike and thrust some of the petitioners, urging to have the Petition from them, and bidding them to be gone.' At this moment Poyntz arrived with a group of reformados which approached 'with drawn Swords, and fell upon the Petitioners in the Yard, calling them 'Independent Dogs and Rogues;' [and] saying 'They would give them Peace;' and wounded above Thirty of them; killed One out-right; and another (if not more) is since dead.' Many were maimed in the scuffle being unable to work and so were 'put to great Pain, Charges and Expenses.' Massey then appeared with yet more reformados 'with their Swordes drawn' and in nearby Basinghall Street the petitioners were once again set upon. The petitioners were demanding not only restitution for their losses but also justice for 'Neither hath so much as Search or Hue and Cry been made after the said *Poynes* [sic] or the other Murderers.' The petition was signed by 26 citizens, and the two slain were recorded as William Turvill and Francis Chocker.[114] Whatever the truth, it is clear excessive force was used against unarmed civilians that day and these events can be seen as a black day in the history of the City Horse.

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[112] *An Outcry Against the Speedy Hue and Cry, after Generall Massey, Collonell Poyntz, and Many Other Renowned Reformadoes*, (London: 1647), TT E.402 [22], p.5.

[113] *The Army Anatomized: or, A Brief & Plain Display of the Humble, Honest and Religious Actings of the General Sir Tho. Fairfax*,, (London:1648), TT E.419 [6], p.24.

With the City's capitulation on 3 August, the army that Massey and Waller had attempted frantically to establish was no longer needed. Juxon gleefully noted 'All the reformadoes and grand incendiaries were in a moment slunk away and not to be found; and, which was observable, not an ingenious man that was engaged in it yet as willing to own it, all looking back upon the danger escaped.'[115] Or, as one broadsheet put it, 'The Reformadoes are vanisht'.[116] Massey, Waller, Holles and the other 11 Members all fled to Europe while Poyntz escaped to Scotland and from there journeyed to the West Indies.[117] However, the army's control over London and Parliament was to soon evaporate as political events once more dragged the nation into Civil War, and with the City Horse playing an active role yet again.

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[114] *JHL*, Vol. 9, pp.401–402.

[115] Lindley and Scott (eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.168.

[116] *Perfect Occurrences of Every Dayes Journall in Parliament, 30 July – 6 August 1647.*

[117] Evans, 'Massey', p.253; Poyntz [Poynts], Sydenham [Sednham], (bap.1607), ODNB.

10

The Second Civil War, 1648

Even after the occupation of the City of London by the army in the summer of 1647 it would not be true to say that a military government had been installed in England. While the army asserted influence over Parliament and the organs of government through proximity and intimidation, its main political aim was to ensure a reasonable accommodation with the King, an equitable settlement of its pay arrears and other demands along with the defence of the nation. Parliament, devoid of Holles' guiding influence, was still expecting to dominate the negotiations with the King regarding a political and religious settlement and there were still many in London that supported this moderate approach, while at the same time seething at the unjustness of the army's heavy-handed tactics towards the City. The City and the moderates in Parliament remained natural allies against an increasingly radical army that also expected to direct the peace settlement.

By early 1648, the Army Grandees led by Sir Thomas Fairfax, Oliver Cromwell and Henry Ireton still hoped for a political settlement with King Charles that would provide religious toleration for the Independents and sectaries, and guarantee the freedoms of Parliament while at the same time imposing some restrictions on how the monarch was able to govern the country and protecting the interests of the army. The majority of Presbyterians in Parliament hoped that the settlement with the King would lead to a moderate form of Presbyterianism, the end of Episcopacy, the retention of Parliamentary privilege and the political gains made so far, as well as granting Parliament the right to appoint and supervise the King's main political advisers. The more moderate Parliamentarians, who by now were sick of the war and the subsequent political upheaval, would have accepted any form of settlement dictated by the King as long as the country returned to normality. While outright Royalist supporters were in a minority in Parliament, they still retained prestige and influence throughout the country and were still a dominant force in the political proceedings, albeit far removed from the centre of national politics in London. These Royalists and the moderate Parliamentarians increasingly found common ground as both wished for an end to the turmoil and saw a full restoration of the King as the best and quickest solution to the political dilemma.[1]

Despite the willingness of the army and Parliament to negotiate with the King it became clear towards the end of 1647 that Charles himself was duplicitous and was increasingly being seen by many as untrustworthy. After his escape from Hampton Court on 11 November he travelled to the Isle of Wight and took up residence in Carisbrooke Castle from where he intended to continue his political negotiations with both the army and Parliament, but from where he could also escape to the Continent if he felt physically threatened by either party.[2] While he continued these negotiations he also entered into negotiations with Scottish representatives in early December, which ultimately led to the signing of the Engagement on 26 December. In return for Scottish support to regain his throne Charles agreed to impose a Scottish style Presbyterianism on England for three years, during which time a more comprehensive religious settlement would be considered. At the same time he agreed to suppress all heretical belief in the country, which included the various forms of Independent worship espoused by many in the English Army. This form of Presbyterianism would demand a Church independent of state control, making it naturally unpalatable to Parliament of course, but in the agreement there was no proviso that would ensure the final religious settlement would be Presbyterian, and it could just as easily lead to a return to the pre-war Episcopacy. The Scots also insisted that Parliament conclude a personal treaty with the King that would include the disbanding of the army. If these demands were not complied with, then Scotland would raise an army, invade England, and enforce this settlement upon the English.[3] While such an agreement, initially kept secret by both Charles and the Scots, might be supported by the English Royalists and even some of the extreme Presbyterians, it would never prove to be acceptable to the army, to most of Parliament nor to the majority of the country when the its details became generally known. Furthermore, the willingness of the monarch to agree to the invasion of England by a foreign power would have been seen as an act of treason by many. While these negotiations were ongoing with the Scots, Charles continued to foster rebellion at home by encouraging Royalists to stir up trouble and destabilise the country ahead of what he expected to be triumphant return to power.

Not surprisingly, the City of London mirrored the fractious politics of the country. Despite the army having replaced the pro-Presbyterian militia committee in the summer of 1647 with a more Independent-minded body, the City government was still controlled by the more moderate Presbyterians who remained closely aligned to their brethren in Parliament. At the same time, many of the old City Royalists who had maintained a low profile during the war were beginning to become more active in City politics and attain positions of influence again. While the City politicians were still insistent on a political settlement for the nation along the broadly Presbyterian party lines, there were many ordinary people in the capital that just wanted the turmoil to end and these were becoming more vocal and demonstrative on the streets, and if that meant an accommodation with the King then so be it. London was just as polarised as the rest of the country.[4]

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[1] See Underdown, *Pride's Purge*, pp.45–75 for a comprehensive discussion of the political situation in early 1648.

[2] Gardiner, *Civil War*, Vol. 3, pp.246–250.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp.272–275.

As street demonstrations became more frequent and violent over the winter it became apparent that the City, shorn of much of its military capacity in 1647, lacked the capacity to maintain law and order without the assistance of the army. This point was clearly illustrated on 9 April 1648 when rioting by an unruly mob of apprentices and young men broke out within the City. The rioters first challenged, and then overcame, a detachment of the Trained Bands that had been sent by the City authorities to restrain them. The mob, buoyed on by the retreat of the militia sent against them, marched on the Guildhall and demanded that the Lord Mayor petition the King for peace and his return to London ahead of a political settlement. The Lord Mayor, fearing for his safety, fled the building and it was left to a detachment of New Model Army cavalry under none other than Oliver Cromwell to disperse the unruly crowd later that evening. Despite this, the protesters congregated in various parts of the City that night and even broke into numerous houses searching for arms and weaponry. The protesters began calling for a mass uprising of the citizenry on the following day to demand peace. The army was not prepared to countenance a mob such as this controlling the streets of London and the following morning Fairfax sent in a much larger detachment of cavalry and infantry to restore order. The mob quickly dispersed and order was restored, but the event demonstrated how reliant the City was now upon the army for law and order, as well as how politically divided it still was. It was no coincidence that the day after the mob had been dispersed a petition was submitted to Common Council lamenting the City's failure to maintain law and order, while at the same time stating that this failure was in no small part a result of the fact that the City no longer had any militia cavalry to call upon in situations such as this.[5]

This riot in London was a precursor to the unrest that was about to grip the nation and which, in turn, led to the outbreak of the Second Civil War in the summer of 1648. By the spring it was commonly known that the King had negotiated with the Scots to invade England on his behalf, and that he was openly encouraging his supporters throughout the country to rise up and overthrow the forces of Parliament. In South Wales, the Parliamentary garrison of Pembroke Castle revolted on 22 February and declared for the King, and Royalist uprisings were planned in Ireland, Kent, East Anglia and other parts of the country to be financed in part by the Queen's attempts to pawn the Crown Jewels in France, while Royalist exiles in Scotland openly began clamouring for an invasion of England. The growing sense of danger was fuelled further by the King's failed escape attempt from Carisbrooke on 6 April. Then, on 25 April, news arrived from the north that the Scots had begun raising an army to invade England on behalf of King Charles.[6] The English Army sensed that it was beginning to lose control of the outlying regions of the country and knew that it had to prepare for yet another war. While Sir Thomas Fairfax readied the main Army in the south of England, on 1 May, he dispatched Oliver Cromwell with a large force towards Wales to put down the growing rebellion there.[7] The Army's problems increased on 21 May when news was received in London of a rebellion that was growing in Kent, ominously close to London, and one that the army needed to quash promptly before it could spread across the south of England and perhaps threaten the City of London itself. By now the army was stretched very thin with forces already dispatched to Wales and more sent north to confront the Scots. With the growing revolt in Kent seen as a priority it was imperative that Thomas Fairfax lead the rest of the army there to speedily put down the rebellion. To make matters worse, in May there were rumours that the loyalty of the navy could no longer be trusted and that it even might declare for the King.

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[4] *Ibid.*, p.336.

[5] JCC Vol. 40, f.267r; Charles Harding Firth (ed.), *The Clarke Papers: Selections from the Papers of William Clarke, Secretary to the Council of the Army, 1647–1649, and to General Monck and the Commanders of the Army in Scotland, 1651–1660*, Vol.2, (London: The Camden Society, 1894), pp.3–4; Richard Collings, *The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, 4–11 April 1648*, TT E.435 [16], pp.902–904.

The Army was now in a very perilous position. It was under military threat from uprisings in Wales, the North of England and Kent, it was preparing to resist an invasion by a Scottish Army while at the same time it seemed to be on the verge of losing the loyalty of the navy as well. The Army knew it could not rely upon the full support of Parliament nor the City of London, both still aggrieved at the events of the previous summer, but all three were forced into an uneasy mutual alliance of self-preservation. It was in none of their interests that a successful Royalist uprising, backed by some moderate Presbyterians, lead to political settlement on the King's terms, which would marginalise their influence and put at risk the gains made over the past decade. For this reason, the Army decided that it had no alternative but to evacuate the remnants of its forces from London on 25 May, leaving both Parliament and the City government to maintain political stability in its absence, but doing so in the full knowledge that it would later have to deal with the political ramifications of such a withdrawal.[8]

With no real alternative available, the army quickly went onto the offensive. By the time Cromwell had arrived in South Wales other forces loyal to Parliament had already defeated the main Royalist uprising, leaving Cromwell only to subdue the last remaining Royalist strongholds in the region. No sooner had he done this but he was forced to march north with his army to counter the invading Scottish Army which he subsequently defeated at the Battle of Preston on 17–19 August, after which he pursued the defeated Scottish Army back into Scotland and attempted to impose a political settlement with the Scots that would see them withdraw their support for the

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[6] Gardiner, *Civil War*, Vol. 3, pp.325, 328, 333, 340, 360; Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 7, pp.1067–1068.

[7] Gardiner, *Civil War*, Vol. 3, p.365.

[8] Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 7, p.1128.

King. He then returned to the North of England and spent the remainder of the year quashing Royalist uprisings that had occupied strategic strongholds across the region. Sir Thomas Fairfax had been equally successful, after concentrating his army to the south of London at the end of May, he marched into Kent and resoundingly defeated the Royalist insurgents at the Battle of Maidstone on 1 June, and then cleared the rest of the county of the hurriedly raised Royalist forces by the end of the month. The Royalists, after their defeat at Maidstone, under the command of the Earl of Norwich attempted to subvert the citizens of London into supporting the Royalist cause when they crossed the River Thames on 3 June, with the intent of entering the City and leading a popular uprising in support of the King. However, once they arrived on the outskirts of the City, they found the gates locked and the London Trained Bands mustered to prevent any attempt to enter the City. With this Norwich had no alternative but to withdraw and headed instead into Essex to support another rebellion there, but quickly got blockaded inside the city of Colchester, which was soon besieged by the pursuing Fairfax and where he remained until the city capitulated in August 1648. With the defeat of the Scottish Army and the surrender of Colchester it was only a question of time before the rest of the Royalist revolt was put down and this afforded the army the opportunity in the autumn to consider returning to London to impose a political settlement on the nation. This would entail dealing with a treacherous monarch that had invited a foreign army to invade England on his behalf, and dealing with recalcitrant Parliament and City of London, both of whom had embarked upon their own political agenda in the absence of the army that summer.[9]

The City government had been smarting ever since the army had occupied the capital the previous year, both humiliating it and diminishing its authority at the same time, so it was quick to recognise a political opportunity while the army was distracted. On 25 April, Common Council approved a petition that was delivered to Parliament two days later in which the City expressed their concerns that the safety of the City was endangered by a plot by some parts of the army to disarm the militia and plunder the capital. As a result of this fear, the City requested permission to re-install the chains across the streets of the City for its protection, and that Parliament appoint the ever reliable Philip Skippon as commander of all the London forces, including those in Southwark, Westminster, the Hamlets and adjacent parts of Surrey and Middlesex. The Commons only too readily agreed to both of these requests while also providing the London Militia Committee with the authority to investigate the claims of a plot to take over the City, which surreptitiously extended its authority over the entire capital region once more.[10] With Cromwell *en route* to South Wales and the army denuded of forces around London, Fairfax had no choice on 2 May but to grant the

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[9] Gardiner, *Civil War*, Vol. 3, pp.373, 430–448, 386–390, 449–469; Matthew Carter, *A Most True and Exact Relation of that as Honourable as Unfortunate Expedition of Kent, Essex, and Colchester...* (London: 1650), TT C662, pp.100–118.

[10] JCC Vol. 40, f.269r; Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 7, p.1073; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.546.

City of London militia the authority to provide the guards at Westminster, a move that both diminished the control of the army in the capital and also re-established the independence of the City.[11] Encouraged, the City quickly followed this up on 9 May with the formal request to the Commons that they be allowed to nominate their own Militia Committee, subject to the nominations being approved by Parliament, which the helpful Commons assented to the following day, and which was ratified on 18 May. Not surprisingly pro-army supporters such as Harvey, Turner, and Salwey were all instantly removed from their positions on the Committee.[12] These actions, added to the removal of Robert Tichbourne as Lieutenant of the Tower and his replacement by a City appointed officer and the insertion of a militia garrison, completely overturned the effects of the army settlement of the previous year and the City was, once again, in total control of its defences.

With the Presbyterians in Parliament again closely allied with the City and its new Militia Committee it was no surprise that almost immediately the two began discussions on how best to effect the defence of London. Ostensibly this was from the spreading Royalist threat in nearby Kent and Essex, but no doubt thoughts of protecting themselves from the army were also not too far from their minds. This alliance was further solidified after Denzil Holles and the other impeached Members were released from the Tower in early June. A joint committee of Parliament and the City met on 27 May, at which the forces to protect London were discussed and the question was asked as to what cavalry force ought to be raised within the City. The Militia Committee admitted that up until then it had had no time to consider what cavalry the City needed, but that it would be restrained from doing anything about it due to the high costs involved.[13] No decision was made on the issue that day and the matter was almost instantly forgotten in the panic of Norwich's aborted march on the capital a few days later. Then, after Norwich's retreat to Colchester and Fairfax's subsequent pacification of Kent and march into Essex, the urgency for such expensive measures dissipated and the matter was dropped, for the time being.

By June, and despite the threat of a Scottish invasion, the Army seemed to have regained no small measure of stability in the country. The Kent rebellion had been quashed, the remnants of Norwich's force was trapped in Colchester, the Royalist field army in South Wales had been defeated and those remaining were besieged in a handful of castles. Part of the navy had mutinied and sailed to join in Royalists in France but showed no signs of attempting any sort of attack upon England. Parliament on numerous occasions debated a comprehensive settlement of the national militia, undoubtedly an attempt to establish yet again a counterbalance to the Army, but little progress was made and little of the discussion concerned London. This all changed in early July when the threat of rebellion flared up again, and this time Parliament and the City were forced into raising yet another unit of City Horse.

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[11] JCC Vol. 40, f.272v; Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 7, pp.1099–1100.

[12] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, pp.555–556; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.1137–1139.

[13] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.575.

In early July, the Scots Army began to muster on the Scottish side of the River Esk border and prepared to invade England. The Scottish deployment encouraged further spontaneous uprisings in the North of England, creating yet more instability. Closer to London, the Earl of Holland was attempting to organise a Royalist uprising to coincide with the Scottish invasion, and was actively collecting and hiding horses for his planned plot, which seemed imminent when the Derby House Committee, the Parliamentary body now directing the war effort, learnt on 1 July that horses were being smuggled out of London.[14] That same day the Committee urgently wrote to Fairfax informing him of the danger while conceding that they 'having no forces in these parts which we can employ in that service' requested the use of a regiment of horse currently at Windsor.[15] With no cavalry force in London the committee was in a quandary and had no choice but to ask the army for assistance, despite Parliament's and the City's earlier attempts to remain militarily independent of the army. In response, on 3 July, the Derby House Committee requested that Parliament order the raising of a regiment of horse within the City, to which they assented that day, but which the Lords only consented to on 5 July.[16] Knowing that the raising of this regiment would necessarily take time, the Committee requested the Commons that in the interim they ought to allow any volunteers that wished to serve to be permitted to form a body of cavalry, to be placed under the orders of Philip Skippon, commander of the City forces. To this end the Derby House Committee had met that morning with Colonel John Butler and former Quartermaster-General Richard Fincher – both of whom were stoutly Presbyterian and had constantly clashed with the Independent senior officers in the Army before quitting it in June, and travelling to London.[17]

It is unclear what formal steps were taken to raise this body of horse at the time although it is certain that the volunteers under Butler and Fincher were quickly organised. Colonel John Moore, formerly of the Trained Bands, had been tasked to search and seize the property and horses of delinquents, Royalists and other enemies of Parliament in and around London. He was quick to provided sequestered horses to Butler and Fincher, who had taken up quarters in the Mews as they recruited their two troops.[18] On 7 July Butler was ordered to dispatch one of these troops into Surrey with 200 cases of pistols to cooperate with Sir Michael Livesey and Captain Pretty who, the day before, had repelled Holland's attempt to seize Reigate.[19] It is not clear if Butler did in fact send any of his men into Surrey, for later the same day the Derby House Committee wrote to Pretty instructing him not to rely on any horse from Butler.[20] Later that day Livesey routed Holland's force at Kingston, after which he and the remnants of the Royalist force fled north but were defeated once more at St Neots, bringing a swift end to Holland's uprising.[21]

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[14] Gardiner, *Civil War*, Vol. 3, p.407; William Douglas Hamilton (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, Charles I, 1648–1649*, (London: 1893), pp.151–156.

[15] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1648–1649*, p.151.

[16] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.622; *Journals of the House of Lords, 1647–1648*, Vol. 10, (London: n.d), p.362.

[17] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1648–1649*, p.152; Firth and Davis, *The Regimental History of Cromwell's Army*, Vol. 1, pp.178,84.

[18] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1648–1649*, p.166.

[19] *Ibid.*, p.169.

While it seems probable that Butler's small force was not involved in the clash at Kingston they were caught up in the aftermath. On 7 July, Butler was ordered to send 20 horse to Brentford and Hounslow to 'seize such persons, horses, and arms as have been engaged in this late action'.[22] The following day he was ordered to Brentford, Isleworth, Hounslow and Twickenham to 'suppress some stragglers of the enemy's forces', all those apprehended were to be sent to the Derby House Committee, 'to be disposed of as this Committee shall appoint.'[23] Then on 9 July, a Major Cooper was ordered to 'muster the horse under Col. Butler' which had been appointed to guard Parliament 'from day to day', for which service he was to be allowed 5s per diem.[24]

When a convoy of prisoners captured at Kingston arrived in the City during the night of 10 July it was set upon by a mob of Royalist sympathisers who attempted to release them, and Butler's men were needed to restore order. According to *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer* the mob was only dispersed, and the prisoners secured, when some companies of the Trained Bands, supported by 'three troops of horse ... immediately cleered [sic] the streets, and put a period to the tumult.' Presumably, this was Butler's force that supported the Trained Bands that night.[25] In a follow up move the next day, Butler was given orders to locate and apprehend Sir Edmund Bowyer for 'being in arms against the Parliament.'[26] It is also likely that it was Butler's men who were involved in quelling the disturbance at Covent Garden on 16 July that was reported in *The Perfect Weekly Account*. According to this report a soldier was pelted with stones by an unruly crowd of Royalist supporters that claimed he had verbally and publicly abused the King before fleeing to a nearby house for safety. A squadron of cavalry was dispatched to secure the unknown soldier but who were in turn bombarded with 'stones and brick-bats,' during which the cavalry opened fire on the crowd, killing one and wounding two others. The soldier was eventually arrested and imprisoned in Westminster while the furore was investigated.[27] It is clear from these events that there was a sizeable number of Royalist followers in London now who were becoming increasing more open in their support as well violent.

In addition to guarding Westminster Butler's volunteers were used in an auxiliary capacity when, on 20 July, he was ordered to send a force to Brentford to escort ammunition coming from Windsor into London and destined for the leaguer before Colchester. At the same time, Skippon was ordered to prepare an escort for the ammunition as far as Bow where a force from Fairfax's army was to receive it.[28] On 27 July they were once again tasked with tracking down some, suspected Royalists outside of the City, but were ordered to travel no more than 20 miles from the capital in their search, and were also ordered to seize any arms and horses that the suspects had with them.[29] After the defeat of the Scottish Army at Preston, numerous Scotch prisoners were brought south towards London, some of whom were to be transported to the West Indies as indentured labour, but some also escaped and Parliament was concerned that they might instigate further uprisings.

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[20] *Ibid.*, pp.169, 170, 171, 172.

[21] Gardiner, *Civil War*, Vol. 3, pp.410–412.

[22] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1648–1649*, p.175.

[23] *Ibid.*, p.176.

[24] *Ibid.*, p.178.

[25] Richard Collings, *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 4–11 July 1648*, TT E.452 [6], p.1008.

[26] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1648–1649*, p.184.

[27] Bernard Alsop, *The Perfect Weekly Account, 12–19 July 1648*, TT E.453 [19], unpaginated.

On 13 September, Butler was ordered to take a force up the Great North Road towards St Albans and Ware in 'order to stay such Scots as you shall find coming up. [And] cause them to be committed to the care of the next constable and return a list of their names and places where left.'[30] In a similar vein, two days later Butler was ordered to provide a convoy of six troopers to escort the son of the turncoat Lord Inchiquin, then a prisoner in the Tower of London, to either Bristol or Minehead. He was to be exchanged for officers loyal to Parliament being held by Inchiquin in Ireland. Butler was warned however, that 'The sum assigned for this service being so small you are to inform those employed that they are not to expect any money but their own standing salary and entertainment as guards here.'[31]

Butler's troop came to an unceremonious end on 2 December, the day the New Model Army again marched into London and once more wrested political power from Parliament. No doubt fearing a clash between the guards at Westminster and Fairfax's advancing veterans, Parliament lamely ordered 'That the Horse Guards attending on the Houses of Parliament, do remove their Quarters ... [with] the Thanks of this House ... for their faithful Services to the Parliament.'[32] And with that Butler's force of cavalry volunteers disappears from the historical record. Butler's force was originally placed under the command of Philip Skippon, meaning that it was nominally part of the City forces, but its origins lie entirely with the Derby House Committee and the members of the House of Commons themselves. Apart from the initial instruction placing Butler under Skippon's orders there is no further mention of the Major-General's involvement with the unit. Butler received his orders from the Derby House Committee and not the London Militia Committee and there is no evidence that the City contributed financially in any way towards either pay or arms. Nevertheless, Butler's men were not part of the regular army and were deployed as auxiliaries solely in the defence of Parliament and London while being used frequently for law and order duties within the capital, just as the other units of the City Horse had been.

Evidently Butler's men were financed, in part at least, by some form of subscription, part of which came from the Members of Parliament themselves. At least 260l was provided to Butler from this subscription and when this money was running low on 20 July, it was proposed that the seized estate of the Earl of Holland be used as a security to provide money to pay them, although it was believed at the time this was not feasible, perhaps because nobody was prepared to lend money using the estate as collateral. At the time there was no guarantee that the Royalist uprisings would be defeated, and so perhaps potential lenders were wary to take such a risk. Despite this it seems there was subscription money still available at the end of August, but when this ran out the treasury committee at Haberdasher's Hall were instructed to provide pay.[33] Better luck was had in October in getting Holland's rebellious associates to pay for the upkeep of Butler's men, when Parliament passed an Ordinance authorising a sum of up to 5,000l be provided from the proceeds of the estates of Holland's followers for the 'support and payment of the said Guards of Horse from time to time'. These funds were to be disbursed by the Committee for the Advancement of Money sitting at Haberdasher's Hall. The sum of 1,329l 12s 2d was loaned by five individuals against the proceeds of these sequestered estates and 1,200l was given to Butler and Fincher in November. It seems that these estates were not as valuable as had been anticipated, and the committee struggled to realise any profit from them with which to repay the lenders. By October 1650, the lenders still had not been repaid in full.[34]

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[28] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1648–1649*, pp.201, 207.

[29] *Ibid.*, p.218.

[30] *Journals of the House of Commons: 1648–1651*, Vol. 6, (London:1802) p.5; Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1648–1649*, pp.279–280.

[31] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1648–1649*, p.284.

[32] *JHC 1648–1651*, Vol. 6, p.93.

The composition of Butler's force is unknown, but it seems likely that it was only a single large troop that included some, perhaps many, reformados. The only known members of the force are Major Cooper, J. Intchin and Nicholas Chibbet who were recommended to 'ride' in Butler's troop in early August. Chibbet had been of assistance in identifying suspected Royalists listing horses in the City during the recent uprising and who were subsequently arrested, but not before they had physically assaulted him, and the Derby House Committee wanted Butler to take him on 'for his better protection'.[35] On 18 July, the Derby House Committee ordered the force to be limited to 120 men, that any men above this number be discharged and that 50l was to be provided to pay off the excess men. The following day it was established that Butler's personal daily allowance was to be 22s 6d, his lieutenant 13s 4d, the cornet 10s and the Quartermaster 9s. The ordinary troopers were allowed 5s per day to those 'who rode his own horse' while those 'as rode horses provided by members of the House, 2s. per diem.' With the usual chronic shortage of funds, just a week later the guard for Parliament was reduced to only 60 horse, who were to be paid the increased rate of 3s *per diem*, but then on 28 July Butler and Fincher were instructed to 'guard the Houses of Parliament with 80 horse apiece' for which the Haberdasher's Hall committee was to pay them 200l per week.[36]

Quartermaster-General Richard Fincher was to also experience independent command during these critical days. In May the republican

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[33] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1648–1649*, pp.167, 160, 174, 201, 245, 254–255.

[34] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.1221–1222; Everett Green (ed.), *CAM*, Vol. 1, p.72; *Ibid.*, pp.978–980.

[35] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1648–1649*, pp.227,228.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp.199, 200, 210, 221, 330.

Member for Parliament Henry Marten had started to raise cavalry in his native Berkshire, ostensibly under the authority of the County Committee, to secure the county against any Royalist uprising. In this he was supported by the notorious Leveller, William Eyre. Very quickly the two were seizing horses from all and sundry across the county while spreading revolutionary Leveller ideals of social justice and reform, much to the anger of influential inhabitants in the shire and Eyre's activities soon were brought to attention of an alarmed House of Commons. Marten and Eyre refused an instruction from the Commons to appear in person to explain their actions, and fearing the spread of such revolutionary notions the Derby House Committee was instructed on 21 August to send a force into Berkshire and put a stop to Marten's mischief. With but few troops available, the Committee instructed Fincher the following day 'to go down with 20 of your troop, such as you shall think fit', along with other county troops from Hampshire, Surrey, Oxford and surrounding counties, to disperse Marten and return the horses he had seized to their rightful owners.

Fincher wasted no time in carrying out his commission and was able to inform the Committee on 4 September of his success, after which he was ordered to remain in Berkshire a week longer just in case there was any further disruption. Evidently Fincher did not get the assistance he was expecting from Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Kelsey, Governor of Oxford, who blatantly refused to cooperate with him without the orders of the Lord General, which led the Committee to send him a stinging rebuke and the reminder that the Committee had authority over the General and not the other way around. No clear report exists as to what happened, but it seems that Fincher entered Berkshire but was unable initially to locate Marten and Eyre, who were actually heading north out of the county. Fincher at some point during the last week of August caught up with Marten and in the resulting attack the republican fled to Oxford and sought shelter from Kelsey, who was sympathetic to Leveller and the more extreme Fifth Monarchist views, before later joining forces with Cromwell. It was reported at the time that as a result of Fincher's attack he captured 100 of Marten's men. Presumably, Fincher had returned to London by mid-September.[37] On 16 October he was instructed to provide a guard of 20 cavalry to escort a convoy of money destined for the commissioners on the Isle of Wight who were negotiating with the King. Whether they did or not is unclear, but on 18 November a similar request was made to him to once more provide an escort to carry money as far as Kingston where forces from Surrey would take over.[38]

There no direct evidence confirming that Mainwaring's regiment was disbanded after the army occupation of London in the summer of 1647 but it would seem likely that it was, as the Independent dominated Militia

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[37] Christopher Durston, 'Henry Marten and the High Shoon of Berkshire The Levellers in Berkshire in 1648', *The Berkshire Archaeological Journal*, Vol. 70, 1979–80, pp.87–95; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.676; Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1648–1649*, pp.249–250, 268, 271, 272; Richard Collings, *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 29 August–5 September 1648*, TT E.462 [10], pp.1067, 1072; Bernard Alsop, *The Perfect Weekly Account, 30 August–6 September 1648*, TT E.462 [13]; Samuel Sheppard, *Mercurius Pragmaticus, 22–29 August 1648*, E.461 [17].

[38] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1648–1649*, pp.306, 327, 328.

Committee installed by the army reorganised the City forces, a point reinforced by Common Council's request of 11 April 1648 for the Militia Committee to consider the raising of 100 cavalry to prevent future unrest in the capital.[39] Whether a formal request was made from the City to Parliament for permission to raise this new cavalry force is unclear, but on 13 April the Commons authorised the raising of a further 400 men for the Tower Regiment of infantry under the command of the London Independent Robert Tichbourne. At the same time they ordered a force of 100 cavalry be added to the Tower's garrison 'for the Safeguard of the City', and then allotted money to provide bedding for the new arrivals.[40] Tichbourne had been a radical and leading Independent since 1642 who, along with Harvey and Browne, was referred to by *Mercurius Aulicus* as 'seditious' and who 'had committed severall outrages on His [Majesties] good Subjects' in London. Ever a willing servant of the Independent cause he was elected to Common Council in 1643, served in the City Auxiliaries, sat on the Salter's Hall Committee, was one of those selected to serve on the main Militia Committee in 1643 and was subsequently retained when the army selected its own committee in September 1647. He signed the death warrant of Charles I and later served the Commonwealth government in various senior roles, but was also later implicated with Edmund Harvey in a customs fraud. Fairfax appointed him Lieutenant of the Tower in August 1647 and with this position Tichbourne was given command of the Tower garrison and a new regiment for 600 men was raised for him from within London and surrounding areas.[41]

Despite Tichbourne's close connection with the City government through his position on the Militia Committee, the infantry regiment that was raised for him was not part of the City forces but part of the regular army establishment, and therefore crucially under the direct command of the Lord General and thus not militia forces, although at least some of his officers had previously served in the Trained Bands.[42]

What the relationship was between the City and the force of 100 horse added to the Tower garrison in April 1648 is also unclear. Given that the approval to add them to the garrison came within two days of Common Council suggesting a similar force be raised in the City is possibly too much of a coincidence for them to be different units. At the same time Common Council was pushing Parliament to grant it more authority over the defence of the capital and it seems likely that this force was an attempt by the City to wrest at least some power over London's defences from the army. How this force was raised, and who commanded it, has not been established, although it certainly seems that the troop was raised. On 18 May, Parliament ordered that Tichbourne be replaced by the moderate Colonel Francis West of the City Trained Bands, as Lieutenant of the Tower, and that the army forces in the garrison be removed, which they were by 28 May when it was reported that the troop of horse was with them.[43] This force was ordered first to join the regular army units quartered at the Mews and in Whitehall for the protection of Westminster, but then on 26 May the Commons ordered that all the forces in London be joined with the main army to suppress the revolt in Kent.[44] What happened to this troop of horse next is unclear. Certainly Tichbourne's foot regiment (now under the command of Simon Needham) served with Fairfax at the siege of Colchester, but the detailed composition of Fairfax' army in June makes no mention of the Tower troop serving with him.[45] It is possible that they did serve with Fairfax but were unrecorded or they could just as easily have been left behind in London, or even disbanded.

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[39] JCC Vol. 40, f.267r.

[40] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, pp.529, 532; Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 7, p.1061.

[41] Peter Heylyn, *Mercurius Aulicus, 22–28 January 1643*, TT E.246 [9], p.1; JCC Vol. 40, f.267r; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.1007–1008; Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 7, p.761; John Lilburne, *The Second Part of Englands New-Chaines Discovered*, (London: 1649), TT E.548 [16], pp.4–5. For more on Tichbourne's life see also Keith Lindley, 'Robert Tichborne, (1610/11–1682)', *ODNB*.

[42] Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 7, p.830; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.326; Firth (ed.), *Clarke Papers*, Vol. 1, p.153.

What is clear, however, is that with the departure of the Tower Regiment and the remaining army units from Whitehall and the Mews the only military forces left in the capital were the London militia forces. Nathaniel Rich's regiment of horse had been the only regular army cavalry unit quartered in London since the occupation in 1647, and it had been used in part to provide mounted protection for Westminster and adjacent parts. In fact it was men from this regiment that had been used to quell the riots on 9 April. When they left London on 28 May there were no cavalry left to provide mounted guards before Parliament and so concerned were the Members for their own safety that they gave immediate thought to raising yet another force of cavalry to guard Westminster. On 28 May, the Commons appointed the Presbyterian Colonel Edward Rossiter to be the commander of a troop of 120 horse to be immediately raised 'to be a Guard to the Parliament, for the present' and that the Derby House Committee was to make the arrangements.[46] Rossiter was able to deploy the troop that night to protect Parliament by utilising 96 reformados who were prepared to assist in providing security, which suggests that the idea had been mooted prior to this and the troop was already being organised before receiving the authority of the Commons to proceed. It is likely that the officers provided their own mounts and arms.[47] At this stage the troop seems to have been assembled on an *ad hoc* basis whenever it was needed for duty, for on 3 June Rossiter was once again asked to gather his troop together 'to be a Guard this Night.' This time his orders were to not guard Westminster but 'these Parts', meaning parts adjacent to London, while at the same time the Committee of the Army was instructed to consider how this troop could be financed in the future.[48] This order was in fact a panic reaction of the Commons who had just been informed that the remnants of Norwich's forces, defeated at Maidstone two days before, were believed to be heading in the direction of London and might attempt a crossing of the River Thames into Essex. During that day the Derby House Committee informed the City Militia Committee of Rossiter's intended muster that day at Tothill Fields, below Westminster on the banks of the river, and they were instructed 'if therefore you can send thither any number of horse from persons well-affected and mounted by [s]oldiers you can be confident of, it will be a good access of strength to that troop, and may be of very good use for this night's service.' The Committee was further informed that Rossiter had orders to secure the ferry at Chelsea that night as a precautionary measure.[49]

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[43] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.1007–1008; Henry Cary (ed.), *Memorials of the Great Civil War in England from 1646 to 1652*, Vol.1, (London: Henry Colburn, 1842), pp.435–436; Bernard Alsop, *The Perfect Weekly Account, 24-31 May 1648*, TT E.435 [20].

[44] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, pp.571,574.

[45] J. H. Round, 'The Tower Guards (1648) - Part One', *The Antiquary*, Vol. 9, 1884, pp.241–244; J. H. Round, 'The Tower Guards (1648) - Part Two', *The Antiquary*, Vol. 10, 1884, pp.54–58; *A Diary of the Siege of Colchester by the Forces under the Command of his Excellency the Lord General Fairfax*, (London: 1648), TT E.669.f.13 [6]; Anon, 'The Siege of Colchester', *The Antiquary*, Vol. 2, 1880, pp.21–25, 160–164.

[46] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.576.

[47] *Ibid.*, p.577; Zachery Grey, *An Impartial Examination of the Third Volume of Mr Daniel Neal's History of the Puritans*, (London:1737), App.125–127.

The following day the Derby House Committee wrote to Rossiter thanking him for his 'care and pains last night in guarding these parts, of which there was very good use.' The Committee went on to add their belief that some of the Royalist forces might skirt London to the south and then cross the Thames at Kingston before crossing above the capital *en route* to Essex, and he was warned that some of them might come his way. The Committee then, acknowledging that Rossiter was now acting under the orders of Philip Skippon in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the City forces, ordered him to send his troop to Bow 'where some of the enemy are,' to assist in protecting the eastern defences of London. Given the concern that Royalist forces might be heading his way the Committee added 'We leave it to your consideration whether it will be safe to send all of them thither and leave these parts (i.e. the areas around Westminster) naked, where we conceive there is so great need of their guard … it being our opinion that these parts should not be left naked.'[50]

Norwich, defeated at Maidstone on 1 June, headed with the remnants of his force towards the River Thames with the intention of trying to convince the moderates within London to support what was seen to be a national Royalist uprising. He had good cause to expect London to support him as it was no secret that Royalism was on the rise amongst much of the population, including moderate Presbyterians, who apparently welcomed the idea that a generous accommodation with the King would lead to an end to constant war and political turmoil. However, this enthusiasm was demonstrated to be misplaced on 1 June, when a petition of support for Parliament from divers citizens of London was submitted to Common Council with the request that it be duly passed to Parliament, where it was well received. No doubt this support was strengthened even further when the same day news was received of Fairfax' victory at Maidstone, barely 40 miles from the capital. With the City now firmly behind Parliament it was no surprise that when Norwich wrote to it on 3 June asking for its support, he was firmly rebuffed, or as one Royalist indignantly commented 'But they [London] (like a Dogge to his Vomit) turned to their old course of Parliament Service'.[51] In response Skippon mobilised the City forces, barricaded the gates and prepared to defend its walls against what was deemed to be an imminent attack. That night a force of Fairfax's pursuing cavalry fell upon Norwich's small and disorganised force at Blackheath, forcing some with their leaders into Greenwich. Norwich was able to get a few hundred of his men across the river and into Essex just east of the River Lea. The following day an uprising of Royalist sympathisers in Essex joined forces with Norwich and attempted to seize the bridge across the River Lea at Bow, that led to London, but were held by a force of the Tower Hamlets Trained Bands. Soon a much larger force of cavalry under the command of Edward Whalley, which had been sent in pursuit by Fairfax, fell upon Norwich who promptly retreated and made for Colchester.[52]

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[48] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.584.

[49] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1648–1649*, p.93.

[50] *Ibid.*, pp.94–95.

There is no evidence that part of Rossiter's troop actually went to Bow following the orders it received from the Derby House Committee while at Chelsea, or if it played any part in Norwich's pathetic attempt to force an entry into London, but it seems likely that it did. Rossiter was proving himself a competent commander and it seems unlikely that he would not have followed his orders, especially so as within a few days, and surely as a reward for the part he played in the defence of London, he was appointed to command a composite force in Lincolnshire to put down a suspected Royalist rising there, while also being given the authority to appoint his own replacement troop commander in London.[53] *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer* commented that present that day at Bow was 'a troop belonging to the City, under the command of Capt. *Cook*'.[54] Who this 'Captain Cook' was is unknown, as no officer of that name has been identified as serving in any of the City Horse units, nor is his name listed as one of the reformados recorded as serving with Rossiter at the time. However, it seems plausible that he was referring to Rossiter's troop given that no other known City troop existed at the time.

In the days that followed an establishment for the troop was duly provided, which allowed for the provision of 109 horses at 8l each, at a monthly cost to the State of 324l 16s for the troop, excluding the officers. Rossiter was to be the captain of the troop, and officers were Lieutenant Anthony Markham and Cornet Charles Norwood. The money for the troop was to be provided for out of the Excise.[55] When Rossiter left for Lincolnshire, on or just after 6 June, he took Norwood with him, for the latter was to return to London in early July with news of Rossiter's victory at Willoughby Field in Nottinghamshire.[56] However, it would seem that the troop did not survive the departure of its Captain. On 6 June, the Derby House Committee reported that an order be sent to the Commons in which it was to be noted

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[51] *A Letter sent from the Lord Goring Directed to the Lord Maior, Aldermen, and Commonalty of the City of London...* (London: 1648), TT E.445 [42]; *Carter Relation*, p.100.

[52] JCC Vol. 40, ff.278v,279r; Rushworth, *Historical Collections Vol.7*, Vol. 7, pp.1135–1136, 1130; Richard Collings, *The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, 30 May – 6 June 1648*, E.446[11], p.967; Carter, *Relation*, pp.100–118; Samuel Sheppard, *Mercurius Elencticus. 31 May–7 June 1648*, TT E.446 [16], p.219.

[53] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.591.

[54] *The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, 30 May–6 June 1648*, p.968.

[55] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.591; *The Parliamentary or Constitutional History of England, from the Earliest Times, to the Restoration of King Charles II*, Vol. 17, (London: 1763), p.230.

> That in pursuance of their order Col. Rosseter did engage the gentlemen whose names are contained in the present list[57] to do service in this time of necessity, which they performed with great readiness and cheerfulness, and there was very good use of their service; that in regard they are officers and persons of quality, it cannot be expected that they should continually attend that service, therefore to desire the House [of Commons], that the establishment of the troop of horse intended for the guard of the Houses may be expedited; longer attendant upon this service, but may be dismissed with some mark of the Houses' acceptance of their good service.[58]

With the revolt in Kent all but quashed by Fairfax, and with Norwich heading further into Essex the immediate danger to London appeared to have passed and with it the need for drastic defensive measures. It would seem that Rossiter's troop was disbanded as there is no further record of it in the extant sources, and nor does it seem that at this point any other mounted force for London was considered. This, however, was to change in July when a new threat to the nation's capital once again arose.

In early July 1648 both Houses of Parliament had consented to the City raising a new regiment of horse but no formal ordinance was enacted granting the legal authority for the City to proceed.[59] On 12 July, both Houses granted Sir Philip Skippon, by virtue of an order rather than by a formal ordinance, the power 'to inlist all such Persons, and to command them, and draw them out of the late Lines, into any Part as he shall see Occasion, and to conduct and lead them, and to fight, kill, and slay, all such as shall oppose, rise, or make any Insurrections against the Parliament, or to the Disturbance of the Peace of the Kingdom.' At the same time they ordered 'That the Committee of the Militia of the City of *London* be desired to give Assistance to Major General *Skippon*, in the inlisting of Volunteers, Horse and Foot, for the Defence and Safety of the Parliament, City, and Kingdom; and to encourage such as shall come in voluntarily to inlist themselves to the End previously mentioned.' This ambiguous wording, by authorising Skippon and not the Militia Committee to raise the forces, which were to include cavalry, and by providing the committee with nothing but a subordinate role in the process, was to lead to significant conflict between the City and House of Commons during the height of the emergency that engulfed the capital that summer.[60]

Prior to this, in April Skippon had been recommended by the pro-army Militia Committee to command the City forces before the Committee was replaced by the moderate Presbyterian one the following month, but this was quickly to lead to conflict. Skippon had been supportive in securing the City for the radicals in 1642 and since then had served in first the Earl of Essex's army, and then the New Model Army. While a political moderate he was highly respected by the Army, the City and by Parliament so his appointment as commander of City forces again was welcomed by all sides. However, it did not take long for Skippon's true sympathises to become apparent.

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[56] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, pp.591, 628.

[57] Quoted in Grey, *Impartial Examination*, Appendix p125–127.

[58] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1648–1649*, p.102.

[59] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.622; *JHL*, Vol. 10, p.362.

[60] *JHL*, Vol. 10, pp.379–380; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, pp.633, 635.

On 25 April, Common Council made the suggestion in a petition to Parliament, that Skippon be appointed commander of all the City forces, to which the Commons assented on 27 April, and he was formally appointed on 2 May, even though there were some conservatives in London that openly questioned his suitability for the role as being too close to the army.[61] Initially Skippon seemed to be the ideal choice and Parliament had benefited from his presence in late May in organising the City defences when it seemed that the revolt in Kent might spread; he also took the decisive lead in preventing Norwich from entering London on 4 June. However, there were many within the City who would have been extremely happy to see Norwich admitted and the nation's capital declare for the King and thus his actions, though successful from Parliament and the army's perspective, alienated him from an influential section of the both the City government and the general population. His standing in the City was diminished further by his constant efforts throughout June to thwart Royalist attempts to muster support for the beleaguered forces in Colchester.

While Skippon was organising the defences in early June, moves were afoot by loyalists within the City to replace him, and a petition was circulated calling for the prevention of further war and an accommodation with the King as well as the call to remove Skippon from command of the City forces. In the City an alliance of Royalists and moderate Presbyterians was beginning to coalesce with the aim of destabilising the City government and providing an opportunity for either a Royalist takeover of the capital or at least a change in civic government to one more amenable to peace. This alliance attempted to have Skippon removed at a Common Hall meeting later in the month, but although failing in this they were able to have the sympathetic Richard Browne elected Sheriff. This was significant as the Sheriff was responsible for law and order in the City and Browne, conservative as he was, could at least attempt to curb Skippon's activities in this role.[62] His appointment was even the more remarkable as traditionally the role of Sheriff was not allowed to be held by a sitting Member of Parliament, as Browne was. It also raised Browne to an influential position within this loose alliance, and from this time on he was continually to be identified as the main representative of the moderate Presbyterians in London. By early July opposing political forces were again arrayed against each other in London and it would not take much to ignite conflict.

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[61] JCC Vol. 40, ff.269r, 262v; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.546; *The Honest Citizen, or, Faithful Counsellor to the City of London*, (London: 1648), TT E.438 [5], p.4.

[62] *A Petition Presented At A Common-Hall In London*, (London: 1648), TT E.449 [35], p.5.

The tipping point came on 3 July when the Commons, upon the recommendation of the Derby House Committee, granted Skippon the authority to raise a regiment of 1,000 horse in London to curb the increasing Royalist activity within the capital. The commissioning of the regiment was driven entirely by the need of Parliament to control a mounted force completely independent of the increasingly politically unreliable City. Rightly the City saw this move for exactly what it was and immediately mobilised its opposition to it with petitions to both Houses of Parliament to rescind the order. The House of Lords, now barely a dozen active members and moving ever closer to supporting the King, welcomed a petition from the officers of the City forces on 5 July calling for the joining of the City and suburban militias under the control of the London Militia Committee, that the King return to London so that a personal treaty could be made with him and that the City be given the authority to raise its own regiment of cavalry. The Lords immediately gave their agreement to the petition, while at the same time they requested that the Commons' order for Skippon to raise his own regiment be respited or completely withdrawn.[63]

After a week of quarrelling between the two Houses, on 12 July the Lords, now almost openly pro-Royalist in sympathy, assented to the Commons order that Skippon be allowed to enlist infantry recruits in London but again refused to grant permission for him to raise cavalry to protect Parliament. To circumvent this the Commons chose to recruit its own cavalry under Butler and Fincher, paid for by subscription of the Members themselves.[64] The City, still seething that its authority was being undermined by Skippon, presented another petition to Parliament on 22 July requesting them to order Skippon to cease his listing of soldiers in 'consideration of the dangerous consequences' of recruiting such forces in London.[65] Again the Lords demonstrated their support for the City, this time by withdrawing their consent to raise infantry, which they had agreed to on 5 July, followed by a request for the Commons to withdraw its support as well. The Commons, however, was in no mood to be dictated to by either the Lords or the City, refused, and further endorsed Skippon's actions to raise infantry and cavalry.[66]

The City, getting no help from the Commons, then decided to take matters into their own hands, and on 27 July Common Council decided that it would raise its own regiment of horse, even though it had no Parliamentary approval to do so, and two days later they established a sub-committee under the main Militia Committee to receive subscriptions from the public. In between, Common Council fired off yet another petition to Parliament requesting that Skippon be ordered to desist with his recruitment, which was naturally supported by the Lords and ignored by the Commons.[67] In response the Commons sent a delegation to the City to explain their reasoning why they had ordered Skippon to raise forces, along with a request that the City pay the arrears of the monthly assessment.[68] Attempts were made for Lords and Commons to discuss the situation by a joint conference on at last two occasions, but no progress on the impasse was achieved, and neither was a compromise found between the Commons and the City.[69]

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[63] *The Humble Desires of Loyall Hearted, Wel-Affected Free-Men of The City Of London in Their Severall Parishes Unto Their Severall Common-Councell-Men by Them Intrusted For The Peace And Welfare of The City*, (London: 1648), TT 669.f.12 [39]; *A Petition Presented At A Common-Hall In London*, p.5; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.622; *Two petitions presented to the Right Honourable the Lords and Commons in Parliament assembled...* 1648, E.451[4]; *JHL*, Vol. 10, p.262.

[64] *JHL*, Vol. 10, pp.378, 377.

[65] JCC Vol. 40, f.288v; *The Humble Petition of the Lord Major, Aldermen, and Commons of the City of London, in Common-Councell assembled...* (London: 1648), TT E.453 [39], p.2.

[66] *JHL*, Vol. 10, pp.390, 392; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.644.

By mid-August there were signs that the City was prepared to back down in its fight with the Commons over Skippon's right to raise forces in London. On 12 August a meeting of Common Council debated whether the City had the legal right to raise its own cavalry without the consent of Parliament and when lawyers were called to give a legal opinion on the matter they found that in fact the City did not.[70] Then, on 15 August, Alderman Gibb approached the Commons in his private capacity to search for a solution to the crisis. The Commons, having made its point that it was they, and not the City, that held the authority to raise forces, was now prepared to compromise, much to the anger of pro-army supporters in the Commons, who had welcomed Skippon's divisive actions. A compromise was suggested that the City be given the authority to raise the forces, but that Skippon was to retain command of them. The Independents in the Commons recoiled at such a measure, for the army had no intention of letting the City build up its forces once again, but despite the vocal opposition of Edmund Harvey and others of the 'Godly pack', a committee was established to work out the details, although with both Harvey and Salwey appointed to it they still had the opportunity to delay its proceedings, which they seemingly did.[71]

However, by now the military situation had dramatically changed, negating the need for more cavalry to be raised in the capital. On 17 August Cromwell defeated the Scottish Army at the Battle of Preston and then 10 days later Colchester surrendered and with that the Royalist hopes of victory were shattered. With the revolt defeated, the need for expensive mounted forces in London evaporated but nevertheless the Commons and City still argued until the suggested compromise was legislated on 3 September.[72] However, despite the Royalist military defeat, sentiment remained strong within London towards the King and so there remained an ever-present threat of further uprisings, a point clearly emphasised when the pro-Royalist Alderman Abraham Reynardson was elected Lord Mayor of London on 30 September.[73]

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[67] JCC Vol. 40, f.291v; *JHL*, Vol. 10, p.402.

[68] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.651; Samuel Sheppard, *Mercurius Pragmaticus, 1–8 August 1648*, TT E.457 [11].

[69] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, pp.651, 666; *JHL*, Vol. 10, pp.402, 403, 404, 434.

[70] Gilbert Mabbott, *The Moderate, 8–15 August 1648*, E.458 [21].

[71] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, pp.671, 672; Clement Walker, *Anarchia Anglicana: Or, The History of Independency*, (London: 1648), p.135.

[72] *JHL*, Vol. 10, pp.487–488.

[73] Bernard Alsop, *The Perfect Weekly Account, 28 September–4 October 1648*, TT E.465 [29].

The friction caused by Skippon, not just his enlisting of men in London but the uses he put them to, emanated directly from Parliament's intention to stifle all Royalist activity in the City. In fact, it was Skippon's express intention to use these forces to quell the unrest in the City and to thwart Royalist schemes in the capital, which quickly made him unpopular amongst the majority conservatives in London, many of whom openly supported the uprisings. The friction between Skippon and the City demonstrates further the split between army supporters in Parliament and the more moderate Presbyterian government in London. The City government diplomatically couched their opposition to Skippon's activities in terms that they were dangerous to the wellbeing of the City, while frequently drawing attention to his nefarious night-time recruitment to prove their point.

For all the criticism of his raising men there is little evidence to suggest that he was particularly successful in this recruitment. One hostile newsletter declared Skippon, by late July, had raised some 8,000 men in the City, but there is no evidence that anywhere close to this number was raised, even the claim that he was able to send a force of 1,500 men to join the army at Colchester seems suspect.[74] On 5 July, with Holland's rising in Surrey imminent, the Derby House Committee only felt able to ask Skippon to provide 100 horse for immediate dispatch and even then the Committee seemed doubtful he could muster so many and there is in fact no evidence that he sent any men at all, suggesting he did not have a large force under his command at the time.[75] However, there is evidence to suggest Skippon was later able to muster at least some cavalry in the City, since in August they were referred to in a Royalist newsletter as being a squadron of horse when they captured a Royalist agent attempting to incite a rising at the Royal Exchange, while the same reporter later referred to Skippon's horse consisting of some 300 men.[76]

In October, when the pro-Royalist judge and prisoner David Jenkins was removed from London to Wallingford, the Committee specifically informed Fairfax that Jenkins had been escorted 'part of the way by some volunteer horse of Maj.-Genl. Skippon here in town'.[77] It is unclear if Butler's force, nominally under the command of Skippon, is being referred to when mention of Skippon's horse is found in the sources. All the orders for Butler's force issued by the Derby House Committee refer to Butler explicitly and there are seemingly no orders from the Committee directly to Skippon, other than that of 5 July mentioned above, which implies that they were separate bodies.

What little evidence there is suggests that the mounted force that Skippon was able to raise was only a few hundred strong but how it was organised is impossible to tell. As they were all volunteers they received no pay.[78] Needless to say, Skippon drew the support for his force from the more radical population of London, those inclined to support the army rather than the moderate Presbyterian City government, and so it is no surprise that he found assistance from the area around Coleman Street, long a centre of religious and political activism in the City. According to one conservative newsletter a force loyal to the City raided the *White Horse Inn* on Coleman Street in early August and found stabled 'no lesse then fourscore and three Horses, saddled and bridled with holsters and pistolls at each saddle bow, these belonged to *Skippon* and there hid, but to what purpose I give the Reader cause to judge.'[79] Skippon also gained recruits in Southwark, another area with a large support base for the army, as late as 21 August it was reported that large numbers from there were flocking to join his forces.[80] Possibly it was these volunteers that are referred to in a series of Militia Committee orders published, most likely in August.[81] According to these orders, on 10 June, Skippon was authorised to raise up to 200 mounted volunteers, but this was increased to 300 ten days later. Then an order dated 2 August indicated that this force had been organised into two units, one commanded by Colonel Robert Mainwaring and the other by Colonel William Webb.[82]

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[74] John Hackluyt, *Mercurius Melancholius, 17–24 July 1648*, TT E.453 [43], pp.126,127.

[75] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1648–1649*, p.164.

[76] Gilbert Mabbott, *The Moderate, 15–22 August 1648*, TT E.460 [19].

[77] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1648–1649*, p.295.

[78] *Ibid.*

It would seem that Skippon's force was extremely effective in containing Royalist activities in London during summer of 1648. Despite a majority of the population being sympathetic to the conservative cause at no time was any Royalist uprising attempted and this was surely in no small part a result of Skippon's heavy and obvious presence within the City. He must have had a tight control of the London forces in early June to effectively block the Earl of Norwich's movements with the use of the Trained Bands, which suggests that the conservative Militia Committee was not all powerful, although it seems that it may have been the Tower Hamlets Trained Bands that faced Norwich at Bow, and Tower Hamlets was a suburb inclined to support the Independents and army rather than the City government. Skippon was effective at restricting Royalist recruitment in London, and perhaps the vitriol that his opponents hurled at him in the press is more evidence of his success than anything else. With the civil war fighting all but over by September there was little need for Skippon's volunteers, but as the army and Parliament were still not confident of the City's support it is likely that Skippon retained some of his forces until the army occupation in December, when presumably they were disbanded.

As has been noted above, in July the City felt the need to raise a regiment of horse to function as a deterrent to the force that Skippon was raising at the behest of the Derby House Committee. Despite the dubious legality of such a move and the political ramifications of it, the regiment *was* actually raised.[83] On 5 August the troop commanders were given as:

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[79] John Hackluyt, *Mercurius Melancholius, 7–14 August 1648,* TT E.458 [10], p.147; Samuel Sheppard, *Mercurius Elencticus, 19–26 July 1648,* TT E.454 [12], p.274.

[80] *JHC 1646–1648,* Vol. 5, p.677; Rushworth, *Historical Collections Vol.7,* Vol. 7, p.1234.

[81] *At The Committee of The Militia Of London The 3d. of Iune, 1648. Ordered, That Major Generall Skippon be Desired to Give Orders to Colonell Manwaring and Colonell Webb, And The Rest of The Gentlemen, to The Effect, as in The Following Writing,* (London: 1648), p.246: TT 669.f.12 [96].

[82] *Ibid.*

[83] *JCC* Vol. 40, ff.290r, 291v.

Colonel [Richard] Greaves [Graves]
Major [John] Alford
Col. [Benj] Blundell – 1st Captain
Major Addams – 2nd Captain
Captain Flower – 3rd Captain
Captain Farr – 4th Captain
Captain Hampden – 5th Captain

Greaves is probably Richard Graves who had served as a colonel of horse in the Earl of Essex' army and then in the New Model Army. His regular army regiment was assigned to escort King Charles from Newcastle to Holdenby House in 1647 and so he would have known Richard Browne then, if not before. As a committed Presbyterian his loyalty to the army was questioned, after which he resigned and returned to London in early June 1647, when the Commons recommended his services. Whether he served in the reformados raised that summer is unclear, but he certainly made himself available for service in Ireland on 29 June. He appears to be a different individual to the Richard Graves appointed to the Westminster Militia Committee in 1647, 1649 and 1651. At some point after August 1648 he fled to Europe and joined Charles II, he accompanied the King to Scotland in 1650, only be captured at the Battle of Worcester the following year and he then spent some years in prison. While not a Londoner it is perhaps his connection with Browne and his obvious political leanings that led to his command of the regiment. [84]

Major John Alford was a resident of Cheapside in 1642 and should not be confused with the MP of the same name. He had served in the Earl of Manchester's regiment in the Eastern Association Army and then in Nathanial Rich's Regiment in the New Model. Alford left the regiment in the summer of 1647 because of his Presbyterian views and was most likely in London prior to the army occupation. His name appears as one the volunteers raised by Rossiter in June to protect Parliament, and he was one of the officers (along with Butler and Fincher) called to appear before the Derby House Committee on 4 July and so was perhaps an obvious and reliable choice to hold command in the City regiment when it was raised in August.[85] In 1651 he became entangled in Silius Titus' plot to restore Charles II (as was Graves), was arrested and then gave evidence at the subsequent trial of Nicholas Love.[86] When he was released from the Tower is unclear but it was certainly before April 1655 when he was an active supporter of the Lord Protector in Exeter during the trials resulting from the failure of Penruddock's uprising.[87]

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[84] Firth and Davis, *The Regimental History of Cromwell's army*, Vol. 1, pp.102–107, 115; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, pp.200, 207–208, 227.

[85] TNA, SP28/131 Part 3, f. 2.; The National Archives, SP28/125 Part 2, Muster rolls, mostly for service in Ireland, 1649–1651, f. 419; Firth and Davis, *The Regimental History of Cromwell's army*, Vol. 1, pp.143–145; Cary (ed.), *Memorials of the Great Civil War in England from 1646 to 1652*, Vol. 1, pp.435–436; Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1648–1649*, p.152.

[86] Thomas Bayly Howell, *A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors*, Vol. 5, (London: 1816) pp.88–98. Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, pp.225, 253; Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1651–52*, (London: Longmans and Co, 1875), p.6.

Blundell had been captain in Henry Martin's horse regiment in the Abingdon garrison in June 1644, was major by March 1645, and colonel in August 1646, and so would also have been well known to Browne.[88] In April 1651 he was appointed commander of a regiment of militia cavalry recruited in London and Kent, while in late May 1651 he, with some associates, including Owen Rowe, submitted an undisclosed proposition to the Commons on a maritime issue and so he may have well have been a merchant before the war. He was appointed to the City Militia Committee on 12 August 1651.[89] He died on 1 October 1651, at Milk Street in London, leaving his widow, Susanna, to petition the Commons for his arrears of pay in August the following year, when she was granted land worth 300l per year in Ireland in settlement.[90]

It would seem likely that (Sir) Thomas Adams, former Lord Mayor (in 1646) and Alderman was the troop's second captain. Thomas Adams, though active in his support for Parliament, was throughout the period a political conservative bordering on a crypto-Royalist and had been colonel of the Blue Regiment of the Trained Bands in 1642. Such were his acknowledged sympathises towards the King it was even rumoured that he had hidden the monarch in his residence in 1646. Adams had negotiated in part the appointment of some of the Salters Hall Committee to the Militia Committee as a compromise measure in 1643 and was active in the events of 1647, when he sat on the Presbyterian Militia Committee in May. He was imprisoned in September 1647 after the army occupied London, on charges of High Treason, but the charges were dropped in June 1648 and he was released. Adams, like Graves and Alford was implicated in the Titus plot of 1651 and it was widely rumoured that he sent money to Europe to assist exiled Royalists in distress. Although elected to both Protectorate Parliaments he was precluded from sitting. In 1660 he was one of the Commissioners who accompanied Charles II back to London, and received a knighthood.[91] It is curious, however, that he is constantly referred to as Major Adams, even though he had previously held the rank of colonel.

The identity of the other three troop commanders cannot be established. Flower might well be the Edward Flower who was trumpeter in Harvey's troop in 1643. A Ralph Farr was captain in Okey's regiment of dragoons when he resigned his commission in June 1647 and volunteered for Ireland (as did

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[87] Thomas Birch (ed.), *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 3, (London: Fletcher Gyles, 1742), p.399.

[88] *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, pp.485, 487; TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.24.

[89] *JHC 1648–1651*, Vol. 6, p.619.

[90] Sir Henry Ellis (ed.), *The Obituary of Richard Smyth, Secondary of the Poultry Compter, London*, (London: The Camden Society, 1849) p.31; *Journals of the House of Commons: 1651–1660*, Vol. 7, (London: 1813), pp.171, 529; Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, p.514; the National Archives, SP25/119, Commissions granted by the Councell to Officers in the Severall Countyes for the Militia, 1649–1651, f.175; *JHC 1648–1651*, Vol. 6, p.619.

[91] *Militia Names 1642*; Keith Lindley, 'Sir Thomas Adams, (bap.1586–1668)', *ODNB*; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.316.

Graves and Alford) which indicates that he was probably a Presbyterian. He was subsequently arrested and sent to the Tower in May 1651 for 'treason in corresponding with the enemies' and is possibly the same person.[92]

What seems clear is that the regiment was commanded by moderate Presbyterians, who were sympathetic to the Royalist cause and who were specifically selected for their political reliability by the City. It is hard not to see the guiding hand of Browne in their appointments. In the case of Graves and Alford they were not Londoners and had not served in the City militia, which suggests that the City government suspected the loyalty of the officer corps in London and that they preferred trusted outsiders, rather than taking a risk with appointing local officers. This indicates the level of fear and mistrust within the City government at the time. There is no evidence that the regiment was ever mustered and deployed, but it is likely that at least part of it was. The recruiting began only in early August, but by the middle of the month the City had decided that they lacked the legal authority to proceed, and it is likely that it was disbanded then, for there is no further mention of it in the extant sources. With the disbanding of Greaves' regiment and Skippon's volunteers the City Horse played no more role in the dramatic military events of 1648, but once again politics were about to intervene and change the course of English history.

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[92] TNA, SP28/146, f.133; Firth and Davis, *The Regimental History of Cromwell's army*, Vol. 1, p.293; Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, pp.205, 252, 253.

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The Third Civil War, 1650–1651

By the autumn of 1648, with the Royalist threat all but gone, Parliament renewed its efforts to come to a settlement with the King and commissioners were sent to the Isle of Wight to discuss the terms. Despite the Royalist defeat and the King's complicit involvement in engaging in another civil war, not to mention his deliberate invitation to a foreign power to invade England, the terms eventually agreed at the Treaty of Newport were moderate and probably acceptable to the majority of the English population. However, the army would have none of it. For them, the terms were a betrayal of the cause, politically and religiously unacceptable to the Independents and they provided no punishment to the monarch whose machinations and duplicity had led to an effusion of English blood.

The negotiations began with the King on 15 September and by the end of November the Parliamentary commissioners were able to present the draft treaty to Parliament for discussion. In the meantime the army, hovering close to London, first at St Albans and then at Windsor, kept up a diatribe against the terms of the negotiations at Newport.

On 18 November the Army Council adopted the *Army Remonstrance* denouncing the negotiations, demanding Parliament be purged, and the King tried for his crimes. When presented to Parliament two days later he *Army Remonstrance* was all but ignored until 28 November when it was rejected in a division of the House of Commons. As November ended the army made further vociferous demands that Parliament dissolve and the King be put on trial but seeing no other alternative to protect their political aims the Army Council voted to occupy London, which it did on 2 December. With the army once again in London the Commons continued to debate the draft Newport treaty and on 5 December, they voted to continue their negotiations with the King on the basis of the Newport agreement, even though he had once again been taken into the custody of the army. This was the final straw for the army. The following day when the Members of Parliament attempted to enter Westminster, they were met by troops under the command of Colonel Thomas Pride and any Members that had shown prior opposition to the army were arrested and only known supporters of the army were allowed to take their seats. In the weeks that followed the army had the King brought to London, he was impeached by the purged Parliament, tried, convicted, and executed on 29 January 1649. With his death England was declared a republic, the House of Lords abolished, and a Council of State established to govern the country.[1]

After the army occupied London in December 1648, it immediately dismantled the Presbyterian government of the City of London. Between 18 and 20 December 1648, a subservient Parliament ordered that known Royalists, any individual that had supported the Presbyterian uprising of 1647, or anyone that had supported a personal treaty with the King would be barred from standing in the upcoming Common Council elections – essentially precluding anyone except Independents from the election, a move which would entirely change the composition of City government. As a result some two-thirds of Common Councilmen lost their seats in the elections of late December to individuals more politically aligned to the army. Then, on 17 January 1649, a new London Militia Committee was approved by the Commons which included Independent stalwarts such as Isaac Pennington, John Fowke, Philip Skippon, Edmund Harvey, Richard Salwey, Robert Tichbourne, Richard Turner, William Underwood and Richard Shute, all of whom had been active radicals during the war and who were all connected in some manner with the City Horse.[2] Other City radicals and 'New Merchants' found favour in the new republican regime created after the execution of King Charles and so the radicals rise to power, first attempted in 1642–1643, had now become a reality.

With the relative peace that the establishment of the Commonwealth brought with it there was no longer a need for the costly upkeep of militia cavalry in London and even Cromwell's invasion of Ireland later that year had no impact upon the security of the City. Despite the outward appearance of a government in control of the nation, the republic was far from stable. Naturally, Charles I son, Charles Prince of Wales, fumed at the death of his father and dreamed of the restoration of his family from exile in France. He had a large body of supporters amongst the defeated Royalists, among moderate Presbyterians and in the rest of the Country that felt dispossessed by the coup that had brought the army and the Independents to power. Charles also had a willing ally in the Scottish government, appalled by the regicide, who almost immediately proclaimed the young Charles, King of Scotland. However, the Scots would only allow Charles to land in Scotland once he had promised to introduce Presbyterianism across the entire British isles, in return for which the Scots would provide an army to help him regain the English throne. Charles vacillated for some time but, in the summer of 1650, finally agreed to the Scottish demands and landed in Scotland on 23 June to try to take the throne of England.

It had been clear to the English for some time that eventually Charles and the Scots would reach an agreement and so the newly-installed

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[1] For a detailed description of the negotiations surrounding the Treaty of Newport see Gardiner, *Civil War*, Vol. 3, pp.470–518. A detailed discussion of Pride's Purge has been provided in Underdown, *Pride's purge*

[2] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.1253–1255 & 1261–1262; J. E. Farnell, The Politics of the City of London (1649–1657), (Phd thesis, University of Chicago, 1963), pp.98–99 & 349–369.

Commonwealth government was well aware that war with Scotland was imminent, and had been making plans accordingly. Cromwell had returned from Ireland in May 1650 to prepare the English Army for a pre-emptive invasion of Scotland, while in London preparations were made to ensure that the City militia was ready for the upcoming war. Philip Skippon had retained his role as commander-in-chief of the London forces, despite the creation of separate militia committees in Westminster, the Tower Hamlets and Southwark in 1649, while also sitting on the Council of State, the executive branch of the new republican government.[3]

The change in the City government could not disguise the fact that there was still a sympathetic majority within the capital that would welcome a Presbyterian-Scottish Army and the restoration of monarchy. With the experiences of the summer of 1648 barely two years past, the City authorities were again concerned of unrest on the streets of London. Cavalry had been used effectively for crowd control and for enforcing civil obedience on the population since the political turmoil had begun in 1642, and thus it was only natural that thought was given at this critical time to raising again the City Horse. Since at least early May 1650, the London Militia Committee had been considering what mounted troops it was likely to need to keep control of the capital, and a draft bill had been submitted to the Council of State by the Committee before 28 May, when it was returned to them with some amendments. The following day the Commons instructed Skippon to present a final draft for discussion on 30 May. The Act was passed on 4 June, which authorised the City to raise a force of 600 cavalry for the suppression of all 'Tumults, Rebellions, and Insurrections that shall happen within the said City, and Liberties, and parts adjacent.'[4] To further strengthen the City response, the Commons also passed another act on 25 June to reinforce the powers of the Westminster Militia Committee and then at the end of the month Skippon's authority over the City forces was renewed and his authority was extended to include the area within the former lines of communication and within the parishes of the Weekly Bills of Mortality, giving him authority in parts of Middlesex and Surrey.[5] Skippon was now in a formidably powerful position with a seat in the national government as well as personal command of all militia forces in and around London. Certainly, nobody connected to the militia ever held as much authority as Skippon did in 1650 and it demonstrates how trusted he was by the republican government.

With the army preparing to invade Scotland, which it did on 22 July, the Council of State set about the restructuring of the national militia to provide a force, under the command of Thomas Harrison, to supporting that part of the army remaining in England to quell any domestic unrest. This reorganisation was embodied in a Militia Act passed on 11 July, which removed the authority of command from the traditional Lord Lieutenants of the counties and passed it into the hands of selected commissioners, bringing them in line with how the London militia had been controlled since 1642.[6] To further strengthen the City militia forces, on 18 July Parliament granted the Militia Committee the power to raise money for the upkeep of the City's fortifications, while at the same time granting the Westminster Militia Committee the authority to raise cavalry.[7]

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[3] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 2, pp.20–23, 123–125, 195–197.

[4] *JHC 1648–1651*, Vol. 6, pp.417, 419; Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1650*, (London: Longmans & Co, 1876), p.176; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 2, pp.391–392.

[5] *An Act Constituting Major-General Philip Skippon to be Major-General And Commander In Chief Of All The Forces Within The City Of London, The Late Lines of Communication, And Weekly Bills of Mortality*, (London: 1650), TT 669.f.15 [37]; *JHC 1648–1651*, Vol. 6, pp.421,431.

Recruitment for these new units of City Horse began immediately, but unfortunately little is known of their structure or organisation. A petition of Londoners to Parliament, dated 11 July, claimed that 600 horse had been raised but no other evidence has been found to corroborate this claim, which is purely the number of horse that the City was ordered to raise.[8] It would seem probable that the horse were raised by the usual method of subscription from members of the public who agreed to supply a horse with (or without) a rider and arms. There is some evidence to suggest that this process was not entirely voluntary, as suggested by the petition of the Spaniard, Antonio Fernandez, who petitioned the Council of State for an exemption on the basis that 'strangers ought not to be charged with arms here, in regard that the people of this nation in Spain are not so charged.'[9] There also seems to have been general requisitioning of horses from suspected malignants, as in the case of the apothecary Mr Gape whose horse was seized by the Westminster Committee but returned to him when the Council of State was convinced that his sympathies lay with the Commonwealth.[10] A muster of sorts was held at the New Artillery Grounds on 29 July at which the subscribers were instructed to 'send in your Horse & Armes required of you'.[11]

The news of Cromwell's victory at Dunbar, when it arrived in London about 10 September 1650, would have afforded great relief to the government but it was clear that despite the victory the forces loyal to the King were not beaten and the risk of Royalist uprisings in England was still real. The Commons wrote to all militia committees across England on 24 September thanking them for their assistance in raising such quantities of cavalry as they had, but as the emergency was not over they instructed the committees to maintain their cavalry 'in the same Order and Condition as now they are, until the Parliament, or Council of State, shall take other Order.'[12] Expecting complaints at the cost of maintaining the cavalry the Council of State wrote to the London committee urging them to find a way 'and that if they can apportion the charge in some other way, by which it borne, Council will give it all furtherance.'[13]

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[6] Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649–1656*, Vol. 1, (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1894), pp.298–299; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 2, pp.397–402.

[7] *An Act Authorizing The Committee of The Militia Of London to put in Execution The Powers and Authorities Contained in an Ordinance of Parliament of the third of December, 1644*, (London: 1650), TT E.1061 [9]; *JHC 1648–1651*, Vol. 6, p.442.

[8] *JHC 1648–1651*, Vol. 6, p.439.

[9] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1650*, p.248.

[10] *Ibid.*, p.274.

[11] *Sir, You are desired to send in your horse & armes required of you by warrant from the Militia of London, to the new Artillary-Ground, upon Monday Next Being the Nine and Twentieth of this Instant Iuly, by Eight of the Clock in the Forenoone...* (London: 1650), TT E.608 [14].

[12] *JHC 1648–1651*, Vol. 6, p.471.

On 22 October a muster of the City and Middlesex forces was held at Hyde Park when the soldiers received an address of thanks from the Speaker of the House of Commons and it is probable that the various troops of the City Horse were present at the same time.[14] Not surprisingly the London Militia Committee continued to grumble at the expense of maintaining the cavalry, which necessitated the Council of State to call a meeting with Skippon to consider what might be done to ease the financial burden. As a compromise it was agreed on 30 October to reduce the size of each troop in the City to 60 men, which suggests that their strength was considerably higher beforehand, probably around 100 men plus officers. This directive must have excluded at least the Westminster militia troop since on 27 November the Council of State provided its agreement to reduce the single troop of horse from 100 to 60 men as well. The Committee was instructed that care 'be taken to give ease to such as deserve it, from good affection or disability of estate to bear the burden; the arms of such as are discharged, if their fidelity is suspected, to be secured, to be forthcoming to be used with the horses, upon summons, for defence of the commonwealth.'[15]

The wisdom of maintaining the horse was soon evident. On 29 November, news was received in London of a Royalist uprising in Norfolk, which, being reminiscent of 1648, caused a certain amount of consternation at the Council of State. Orders were immediately sent to the City and suburban militia committees informing them of the situation and that 'as trouble is expected, their horse may be in readiness, and they very watchful to prevent the breaking out of the like here.'[16] The following day the London militia along with that of Kent, Essex, Buckinghamshire and the other Midland counties were put on notice that they were to ready themselves, while the City was specifically instructed to prepare 'One of the militia troops of London of 100, and one other of the troops of the guards attending Parliament, to be disposed of as Major-Gen. Harrison shall appoint, for suppressing the Norfolk insurrections, and other like disturbances'.[17] Two days later, the Westminster troop was put on notice as well, while the Council wrote to the Militia Commissioners for the Tower Hamlets and Southwark, mentioning the designs of the enemy, and the present breaking out, and requiring them to draw their troop together in a body, 'that they may be in like readiness as those of London and Westminster, to execute commands from Parliament, Council, or otherwise, for the common safety.'[18] The insurrection was soon put down by local troops at Kings Lynn and the London forces were not needed, but the brief revolt demonstrated that the government was not immune to attack at home and it demonstrated how dependent they still were on local forces to provide law and order, and showed that the City Horse were still needed as a deterrent to uprisings in the capital but also as a strategic reserve, a role they had played often enough over the previous nine years and which they were once again about play.

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[13] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1650*, p.353.

[14] Sharpe (ed.), *London and Kingdom*, Vol. 2, p.278; Bulstrode Whitelock, *Memorials of the English affairs from the Beginning of The Reign of Charles The First to The Happy Restoration of King Charles the Second*, Vol. 3, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1853), p.252.

[15] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1650*, pp.398, 403, 443–444.

[16] *Ibid.*, p.447.

[17] *Ibid.*, p.449.

[18] *Ibid.*, p.451.

As the New Year dawned the militia committees continued to protest at the need to keep the horse on duty, but the Council of State was adamant that they be retained. By March, the City seems to have had enough and rumours reached the Council that they were about to disband the cavalry without authority, necessitating the Council to send a stern rebuke. The Council informed the Militia Committee on 4 March that

> We have intelligence that the designs of the enemies of the commonwealth are carried on among them with great diligence and secresy, although they have been unable hitherto to effect anything, by reason of the watchful eye that has been upon them, and the forces which they have seen on foot, in readiness to oppose them. Being informed that you are about to disband the horse raised by you for defence of the Parliament and City, we conceive it very dangerous, as it would open a way to the said enemies to bring their designs into effect; therefore desire you to continue such horse until further notice.[19]

Two weeks later they informed all of the militia committees nationally of a 'very particular discovery of a general design of mischief now in agitation' and that they should be on their guard to prevent local unrest and that 'we cannot be satisfied how far you may be safe against the effects of those contrivances that are now with great diligence in agitation.'[20] News had been received of another nationwide Royalist plot that had put the Council on edge and that once again clearly illustrated how thinly stretched the army was in England, and how reliant they were on the militia for homeland defence.[21] It is no doubt for this reason that a committee of officers, including the increasingly influential Richard Salwey, met prior to 7 April to consider how a force of 3,000 horse and 1,000 dragoons could be raised and paid for, to provide a mobile response to any Royalist uprisings or a Scottish invasion. Salwey submitted this report to the Commons on 8 April in which he recommended that the force be drawn from the county militias that had not so far contributed any forces to the war in Scotland and be deployed for six months, anywhere within the country. He recommended that they be paid at the same rates as in the regular army which would cost 120,000l for the six month deployment, and that the force be taken on to the regular army establishment while mobilised.

The proposal was immediately accepted by the Commons, who gave the Council of State the authority to raise the force effective from 1 May.[22] At the same time the order was given to muster the county militia forces in multiple shires for local defence needs, in readiness for an escalation of the war. On 15 April the Council wrote to the militia committees, including London, informing them of the order and desiring that they 'draw forth a sufficient number of horse of your county, with a sufficient quantity of serviceable arms, viz., backs, breasts, potts, pistols, and swords' to be provided by 'the persons most disaffected to the present Government.' The committees were also to be sure to take 'a special care to make choice of such persons to ride the said horse as have good affection to the present Government, and have also had good experience for such service, and are not enlisted into the army in Scotland.' This force was to be mustered on 1 May, 'when officers appointed by Council will be present to receive them in charge and pay.'[23] This force, when raised, was to be added to Thomas Harrison's command operating in the North of England, while Lieutenant-General Charles Fleetwood was tasked with the defence of London and oversaw their recruitment and the appointment of officers on 19 and 21 April.[24] Where this force was recruited from is not entirely clear but the militia committees of London, Southwark, Hertfordshire, Surrey, Essex, Bedfordshire and Kent were instructed to provide contingents on 21 April. Then on 23 April a letter to both the Westminster and Tower Hamlets militia committees informed them that of the contingent of 119 horses to be provided by the county of Middlesex they were to provide their fair share, as the levy was to be 'borne in the whole county'.[25] The City contingents at least were to muster at Brentford on 1 May.[26]

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[19] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, pp.2 & 70.

[20] *Ibid.*, p.92.

[21] Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649–1656*, Vol. 2, (London: Longmans, Green and Sons, 1903), pp.11–13.

[22] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, pp.134 & 135; *JHC 1648–1651*, Vol. 6, p.557.

From a list of extant commissions[27] a tentative reconstruction of this mounted brigade of militia can be made. It was to consist of three regiments of horse and one of dragoons, which implies the nominal strength of each regiment was to be 1,000 men, which is remarkably high for a cavalry regiment, although not unprecedented. The first regiment, consisting of 12 troops was commanded by Colonel Robert Jermy, at the time stationed in Norfolk, and it was intended that the regiment be for the safety of the Eastern Association and parts adjacent.[28] Interestingly, one of the captains was Major Robert Pelham, the Dorset officer who had commanded a troop in Popham's regiment in 1645, which had formerly been that of Richard Turner. The second regiment, consisting of 10 troops, was commanded by Colonel Benjamin Blundell, formerly of the Abingdon garrison in 1644–1646 and a troop commander in Richard Greaves regiment of City Horse raised in August 1648. It was intended that this regiment be raised from militia forces in London and Kent. The troop commanders commissioned were:

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[23] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, pp.149–150.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp.156, 158.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp.161, 164.

[26] *Ibid.*, p.164.

[27] The National Archives, SP25/65, Order Books, 17 Feb–28 Apr 1651, ff. 295–296; TNA, SP25/119, ff. 172–177; Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, pp.514–515.

[28] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, p.201.

Colonel Benjamin Blundell
Major Edward Waring
Captain Thomas Kempe
Captain St John Brothericke
Captain Thomas Fanchett (also referred to as Foach who already held the rank of major)
Captain Charles Bowles
Captain William Fielder (seemingly replaced by Captain John Geale)
Captain Moyse (seemingly replaced by Captain Samuel Ayre while Moyse seems to have transferred to Jermy's regiment)
Captain Henry Courtney
Captain (Major) Beard

Blundell's origins are unknown. As he served initially in Henry Marten's regiment which was raised in Berkshire it is possible he hailed from there, but there were no gentry in the county at that time with this surname. That he was promoted to eventually command the regiment suggests a closeness with Marten that may mean that Blundell shared his commander's republican views, which would explain why the infant Commonwealth trusted him sufficiently to command a regiment of its vital strategic reserve in 1651, as well as to sit on the City Militia Committee. However, as in 1648 he also was trusted enough by the conservative Presbyterian Militia Committee of London to command a troop which was recruited to counterbalance the pro-Independent forces of Philip Skippon, he was perhaps more of a trimmer than an ideologue.[29]

Edward (or Edmund) Waring was of the Waring family from Shropshire and so might have been the son or nephew of the influential London New Merchant Richard Waring, and thus related to Richard Salwey by marriage. Waring and Salwey (along with an Edward Smith) purchased the manor of Whitborne in Hertfordshire in 1647 for the sum of 1,348l.[30] Edward Waring was elected to the second Protectorate Parliament for Bridgnorth in 1656, was arrested in London in relation to a suit at the Court of Exchequer in early May 1657 but released immediately once it became known that he was a Member of Parliament and was appointed a Militia commander in Shropshire in September 1659.[31]

Kempe is possibly the same officer that commanded a troop in Mainwaring's City Horse regiments in 1645–1647.

How the regiment's recruitment was split between London and Kent is unclear but it seems Bowles' and Foach's at least were Kent troops, both having previously served on the Kent County Committee and the latter distinguishing himself during the 1648 uprising, while Beard's might have been from Essex.[32] Foach's troop was added to the guard quartered at the Mews for the protection of Parliament in August 1651.[33]

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[29] Christopher Durston, Berkshire and its County Gentry, 1625–1649, (Phd thesis, University of Reading, 1977); TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.24.

[30] *Collectanea Topographica et Genealogica*, Vol.1, (London: John Bowyer Nichols and Son, 1834), p.6.

[31] Willis Browne, *Notitia Parliamentaria, Or, An History of the Counties, Cities, and Boroughs in England and Wales, that send Members to Parliament*, (London: Willis Browne, 1750), p.277; *JHC 1651–1659*, Vol. 7, pp.530, 531, 772.

A third regiment of cavalry was also to be raised, and 12 blank commissions were sent to Harrison to use but no evidence has been found that suggests the regiment was raised or where, but possibly the intention was to raise it in the north-western counties where Harrison was operating, since in August the Council wrote to the militia committees of these counties requiring them to provide Harrison with forces 'of the late militia there'.[34] A regiment of dragoons, commanded by Colonel Edward Smith, was also to be raised. Two of the company commanders were Captains Courtney and Kempe and it is possible these were the same officers as in Blundell's regiment. An Edward Smith was ensign in the Southwark Auxiliaries in 1644 and may be the same person, but this is a tenuous connection at best. Smith's major was Charles Ducket and his troop certainly deployed in May and was serving under the command of Colonel Nathaniel Rich in the Midlands in July, in conjunction with elements on Blundell's regiment. What connection Smith's regiment had, if any, with London has not been established.[35]

Exactly how many cavalry London provided for this force cannot be determined but a letter from the Council of State to the City and suburban militia committees on 6 May suggests that it was not an inconsiderable amount. The Council wrote

> We doubt not but you are very sensible of the ease that is given to the City and parts adjacent by reducing the number of horse to be raised to so small a proportion, and this has been done out of a desire that no charge might be made upon you more than is necessary for your safety, which, when it comes in competition, can bear no proportion to a greater imposition. But this place, by reason of its greatness, may give means and opportunity to sudden attempts by illdisposed and disaffected persons, which may neither be foreseen for timely prevention, nor are there always forces ready and unengaged to suppress them; and as we doubt not but within your jurisdiction, there are many well affected persons who are both able and willing to have their horses ready with well-affected riders, for the prevention or resisting of any such mischief, we recommend the same to you, to give encouragement to such men to have their horses ready, and to put them into a posture fit for the ends afore-said, upon all occassions.[36]

That the troops were understrength seems certain, for on 10 May Harrison was informed 'several of the militia troops with you are short of their numbers, viz., 100 in each, besides officers' and he was instructed to write to the committees from whence they came 'to have them supplied to that number'.[37] On 12 May both the Middlesex and Essex committees were ordered 'to send in their appointed proportion of horse', while it was noted that the Westminster troop was 26 horse deficient, as was the Essex troop of Captain Sydenham.[38] On 17 May it was recorded that of the 119 cavalry Middlesex was to raise only 13 were wanting, while both Westminster and the Tower Hamlets Committees claimed they had provided their allotments based on the traditional split of one-fifth and one-quarter respectively, which would have meant Westminster providing 24 and the Hamlets providing 30 men.[39]

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[32] Alan Everitt, *The Community of Kent and the Great Rebellion 1640–60*, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1973) pp.137, 154, 237; Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, pp.168, 236, 378, 356; Spring, *Waller's Army*, p.85.

[33] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, pp.358,364.

[34] *Ibid.*, p.307.

[35] TNA, SP25/65, ff.295–296; TNA, SP25/119, ff.172–177; Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, pp.210, 514–515; National Archives, SP29/121A, Muster rolls, mostly for service in Ireland, 1642, 1642, f.339; Samuel Pecke, *A Perfect Diurnall, 30 June–7 July 1651*, TT E.786 [14], p.1142; Samuel Pecke, *A Perfect Diurnall, 14–21 July 1651*, TT E.786 [21], p.1173.

[36] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, p.181.

No record has been found that confirms if this force mustered on 1 May as planned, but it seems it did not. On 9 May, Fleetwood was instructed to provide orders for Samuel Ayres' troop of Blundell's regiment, Jenkin Jones', William Ivory's and Captain Moyse's troops of Jermy's regiment, along with John Clement's Middlesex troop to march out, but from where and to where is not mentioned.[40] However, three days later it was noted that these troops plus Captain Sydenham's of Jermy's and Major Warren (probably either Waring of Blundell's regiment, or the Warren mentioned in connection with Webb's regiment in 1645) were unable to leave as they had not yet been paid.[41] By 19 May, it is clear that Fleetwood had still been unable to muster his entire force but that four troops were ready for dispatch towards the north, including Captain Brothericke's troop of Blundell's regiment and Captain Pelham's of Jermy's.[42]

By 3 June the Council of State had to admit that 'the other forces of the Militia are not now in being', and by early July it had been decided to stand the county militia down, leaving, in theory at least, the newly raised brigade of cavalry deployed on its own. It is unclear what elements of this militia brigade actually mustered and were deployed, though some certainly were and it also unclear from the fragmentary evidence available what became of those that had marched north in early June to join Harrison. Elements of Jermy's regiment were active in the Midlands in May and perhaps some did serve in the north, as it was mentioned that 600 men of the regiment were part of Harrison's force that was shadowing the Scottish Army as it passed through Cheshire in mid-August, and so possibly they were involved in the major skirmish at Warrington on 16 August. It is also possible that Pelham was operating in Dorset in August when he received orders there, but as he was a native of Dorset this is not conclusive evidence. Jermy received pay from the Army Committee for his troop on 26 August, although where he was at the time is not recorded but probably he was in London, although the whereabouts of his troop is uncertain. None of the other troops listed as being part of the regiment received pay in August when other militia troops did, and it was not listed in the army establishment in October.[43]

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[37] *Ibid.*, p.192.

[38] *Ibid.*, pp.193, 196.

[39] *Ibid.*, p.206.

[40] *Ibid.*, p.188.

[41] *Ibid.*, p.195.

[42] *Ibid.*, pp.207, 210.

The only reference to Smith's regiment found is the pay issued to Captain Alex Temple's company of dragoons on 26 August.[44]

Blundell's regiment, however, remained in existence throughout the summer and early autumn. In mid-July Waring's troop was certainly active in the Midlands.[45] On 26 August, Blundell, Waring, Foach, Bowles, Gales, Kempe, Ayre, Broderick, and Beard all received pay for their respective troops. Where the troops were at the time is unclear, but Foach was certainly in Kent and was ordered to remain there, Blundell himself was at Banbury the following day, while Bowles had been ordered to proceed to Arundel Castle on 23 August. It is thus clear that the regiment was not concentrated, and the troops were operating independently.[46]

It seems probable that at least some elements of Blundell's regiment participated in the Worcester campaign. On 27 August Fleetwood, who was by then at Banbury, was ordered by the Council of State to return 'Col. Blundell with his troop' to London and the following day gave their reason for ordering him back

> as enemies of this commonwealth in foreign parts are very active, and much endeavour to improve the opportunity of the Scotch army being in England, by landing a foreign force upon the coasts of Kent and Sussex, to create troubles in these parts, and divert our army from a close pursuit of the enemy; for prevention of which, such troops or forces as are appointed for preservation of the peace of those counties should be applied. We hold it necessary that Col. Blundell should be returned hither, to be made use of in those parts, and that his own troop should march up with him, and we desire you to give orders accordingly.

However, an ambiguous letter of 1 September to Fleetwood suggests that they had by then countermanded that instruction.[47]

Blundell was present with Fleetwood during the Battle of Worcester and while his regiment is not specifically mentioned in any of the accounts, elements of it must surely have been present for Blundell himself had no reason to be with the army other than as commander of his regiment (see Map Nine). The occasional references to Blundell in the accounts of the battle provide a tantalising clue as to role played by his men.

The English Army converged on Evesham on 27 August just a few days after the weary Scottish-Royalist Army had struggled into Worcester. The Scots had deployed a force to cover the strategically important bridge at Upton, 10 miles downstream from Worcester. On the morning of 28 August

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[43] *Ibid.*, pp.204, 236, 340–341, 284; the National Archives, SP28/80, Warrants issued by army committees, military commanders, etc, August 1651, 1651, f.360; John Hall, *Mercurius Politicus, 14–21 August 1651*, TT E.640 [14], p.1004.

[44] TNA, SP28/80, f.372.

[45] *A Perfect Diurnall, 14–21 July 1651*, p.1173.

[46] TNA, SP28/80, ff.196, 198, 202, 246, 262, 290, 300, 364, 382.; Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, pp.362, 364, 378.

[47] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, pp.374, 377–378, 395.


N
3 Sep
Worcester
River Teme
Powick Bridge
3 Sep
Cromwell
River Severn
Banbury
Evesham
27 Aug
28 Aug
Upton-upon-Severn
Lambert
0
1
2
3
4 miles

Map 9: Major-General Lambert's advance during the Worcester campaign, 1651 a force under John Lambert seized the bridge and Fleetwood's brigade (to which Blundell's regiment was nominally attached) crossed to the west side of the River Severn. According to *A Perfect Diurnall*, that night Blundell commanded the guard on the western side of the river during which time he captured an enemy straggler from whom some useful intelligence was gleaned. The following morning Blundell sent out scouts, who got to within sight of Worcester without seeing any enemy troops.[48]

During the battle itself Fleetwood's forces attacked the defended crossing at Powick Bridge, barely three miles south of Worcester. The crossing was hard fought but by mid-afternoon he was across the river and advancing upon the city while Cromwell attacked from the east. By early evening the battle was over with many of the Scottish infantry preferring to surrender rather than fight further.[49]

The following day Harrison was sent to pursue the fleeing remnants of the Scottish cavalry north and he had with him Blundell who was sent, along with Colonel Barton, with a force of 'eight hundred horse and four or five troops of dragoons' along the road towards Manchester, while another account claimed he had 1500 men with him.[50] Blundell seems to have been present when the pursuing English caught up with the fleeing Earl of Derby at Nantwich and after a brief fight Derby and a host of other Royalists surrendered.[51] There is also some evidence linking Blundell to the capture of David Leslie and John Middleton on 9 September near Rochdale as well. The Council of State wrote to a Richard Haworth of Manchester on 13 September thanking him for his recent services to the State and his recommendation concerning two officers referred to as Milnes and Key. Subsequent correspondence confirm that these two officers were instrumental in capturing Leslie and Middleton. The Council then noted in their letter to Haworth that the 'Lord General, who is now here, and who will order Col. Blundell that right may be done to those who have taken David Leslie and Middleton, and the rest of the prisoners there.'[52] Frustratingly no further mention of Blundell's involvement has been found. Intriguingly, on 30 October the Council rewarded Milnes and Key the sum of 30l each for their role in capturing Leslie and Middleton while immediately before this entry in the Council minutes it had awarded 40l to a Captain Brotherick [sic] 'in token of the well acceptance by Council of his services to the public.' While there is no evidence that this was the same Brotherick that was commissioned in Blundell's regiment in April no other officer of that name has been identified as serving in the Parliamentary or Commonwealth armies. Even if this is the same officer it does not follow that this token of gratitude related to the capture of the two officers but the coincidence is startling.[53]

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[48] Samuel Pecke, *A Perfect Diurnall, 1–8 September 1651*, TT E.787 [15], p.1254.

[49] For a good overview of the battle see Malcolm Atkin, *Worcester 1651*, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2008).

[50] Henry Cary (ed.), *Memorials of the Great Civil War in England from 1646 to 1652*, Vol.2, (London: Henry Colburn, 1842), pp.373–374; *An Exact And Perfect Relation of Every Particular of The Fight At Worcester And Ordering The Battle on Both Sides of The River of Severne From an Emminent Officer of The Army*, (London: 1651), TT E.3603, p.1054.

[51] John Hall, *Mercurius Politicus, 4–11 September, 1651*, TT E.641 [12]; Sir Henry Slingsby, *Original Memoirs, Written During the Great Civil War; Being the Life of Sir Henry Slingsby, and Memoirs of Capt. (John) Hodgson,*, (Edinburgh:1806), pp.154–155.

[52] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, p.429.

While the evidence available does not confirm that Blundell's whole regiment was at Worcester, in fact the only reference to his unit refers to it as a troop, it seems certain that during the campaign his command was considered to be a regiment by the army. In early October, the Commons reviewed the army establishment in light of the Royalist defeat and drew up a list of regiments and their recommendation as to whether they ought to be retained or disbanded. Blundell's regiment is clearly on this list as is the note that it contained six troops; on 2 October, by 29 votes to 19, the Commons agreed to disband the regiment.[54] Neither Jermy's nor Smith's regiment appears on this list and all the others on it are regular army regiments and not militia, however this does not mean that Blundell's was not a militia regiment at the time. The list refers to regiments on the army establishment and paid for by the central Army Treasurer rather than by the local County Committees who would ordinarily pay the militia. In April Salwey had recommended that the militia brigade to be raised be taken onto the army establishment for pay purposes, and troops from the regiment were certainly paid throughout the summer by the Army treasury.[55] The evidence seems to suggest that Blundell's regiment was in existence throughout the summer and on the balance of probability some elements, perhaps all of it, served at Worcester and in the subsequent pursuit.

Despite the effective disbanding in early June of the national militia forces that were not part of the mounted strategic reserve, the Council of State still expected London and its environs to provide militia cavalry for the defence of the capital. On 9 July, they wrote to Skippon explaining that they felt it necessary 'for the public safety, and a very acceptable service to us, if well-affected persons would voluntarily enlist their horses, and mount them with men – who may be confided in'. It is clear from the context of this letter that some sort of voluntary mounted force that Skippon had previously raised was already in existence, and the Council was encouraging him to raise more; they also wrote to the suburban committees asking them to do the same. In the letter to the suburban committees the Council stressed the need that these were to be volunteers for the:

> Council's meaning herein is not to impose this service upon any, but leave it to every man's freedom, not doubting but the well-affected and able will be willing to put themselves into such a posture, by this voluntary listing, which will be of little or no charge to them, as may enable them both to serve the public and preserve themselves against any designs of the enemy.[56]

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[53] *Ibid.*, p.505.

[54] *JHC 1651–1659*, Vol. 7, pp.24–25; Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, p.462.

[55] TNA, *SP28/80*, ff.196, 198, 202, 246, 262, 290, 300, 364, 382.

[56] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, p.284.

On 22 July a 'stately troop of Voluntiers' exercised in Finsbury Fields under the watchful eye of Skippon himself, but who commanded it is unclear. Intriguingly, the troop's cornet was described as having 'the Sword and Bible' displayed in it.[57] Skippon's cornet from 1642 was similarly described as including a sword and bible, and so this might well have been a troop nominally commanded by Skippon himself.[58] Another single troop of volunteer horse was also established under the command of Captain John Mewes, who was commissioned on 26 July, and on 21 August Captain Dendie was commissioned to command a troop of Westminster volunteers. Edward Dendie (Dendy) appears to have been Sergeant-at-Arms to the Council of State prior to this appointment and his troop's lieutenant was Joseph Frost.[59] How successful the suburban committees were in raising volunteers is unclear, certainly no records of commissions for them seem to still exist. On 16 August, the Council ordered any horses held by the volunteer troops in London and Westminster, that were previously seized from malignants, be released, which implies both that there was widespread recruitment and that the troops had failed to strictly enforce the voluntary nature of the recruitment. Three regiments of infantry volunteers were also raised at the same time.[60]

On 11 August panic once again gripped the capital when news of the Scottish led invasion was received. Immediately the Council of State requested Common Council 'to move the City to do what becomes them at such a time for the common safety, wherein their own is included and to that end to do their best for raising some considerable forces to appear in a body for defence of the Parliament and City, in case the enemy should pass by our force'.[61] On the same day the Council wrote to the various county militias around London, including Middlesex, and the south Midlands instructing them to immediately muster their forces, while Major-General Desborough was ordered to concentrate forces to the south of London to protect against any invasion from Europe that might materialise.[62] The following day the Commons renewed the authority of both the Westminster, Southwark and Tower Hamlets, added additional members to the City Militia Committee, including Blundell and Captain Foach, while granting the committee extra powers to raise both horse and foot. They also instructed that commissioners be appointed for listing and valuing horses for use by the militia, while at the same time the Council ordered the seizure of all horses in London to prevent them being used by Royalist sympathisers. Similar instructions were to be given to the suburban committees as well.[63] On the same day a muster of the three new volunteer infantry regiments of the City was held in Hyde Park, while it was noted that 'a stately brigard [sic] of horse' was also present. Most likely this refers to elements of Blundell's regiment and possibly Jermy's and

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[57] Henry Walker, *Perfect Passages, 18–25 July 1651*, TT E.786 [23], p.383.

[58] Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.152.

[59] TNA, SP25/119, f.168.; Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, pp.516, 349 passim.

[60] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, p.319.

[61] *Ibid.*, p.315; LMA, Vol. 41, Journals of the Common Council, f.62r.

[62] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, pp.317–318.

[63] *JHC 1648–1651*, Vol. 6, p.619; Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, p.324.

Smith's.[64] On 13 August it was ordered that a force of 8,000 foot and 2,000 horse was to be concentrated at Barnet on 19 August for 'the immediate safety of Parliament, of London, and Westminster, and these parts.' This force was to consist of a mixture of regulars and militia from the counties north of London, while the horse numbers were to be made up by 'what will be got out of London.' The force was to be commanded by Fleetwood.[65]

On 14 August a proposal was made by the Council of State to mount 1,000 infantry of Colonel Robert Gibbons regiment as dragoons, and the militia committees of the capital were instructed to advise what numbers of the horses they had recently seized would be suitable in this regard, and that commissioners be appointed to purchase additional mounts at a price not exceeding 6l per horse. Southwark was subsequently ordered to provide 100 horses, the Tower Hamlets 150, the City 500 and Westminster 200, and all were to be delivered to St James Field at 3 o'clock on 16 August. Even though it was a regular army regiment which was to be mounted, the Council of State made it clear to the militia committees that it was their responsibility to provide the horses, and that those obtained by subscription were to be valued and the owner's particulars recorded so they could receive payment for them within 20 days. It would seem that even though the horses were provided, the Council had soon changed their minds about mounting the regiment, for on 16 August they informed the militia committees that 'We desire that the horses which you have this day sent to St James's for the mounting of foot may be again taken into your custody, and kept at the charge of the State, until you receive further order from Council for their delivery; and we will take care that the charge of keeping them shall be repaid to you.'

Gibbon's regiment left London shortly after and fought at the Battle of Worcester as infantry.[66] Despite this, the idea of using the horses in the committee's possession to raise dragoons was not forgotten. On 19 August, upon the recommendation of Desborough, a Captain Miller was to be commissioned 'to be captain to the other troop of dragoons to be raised out of the horses seized in and about London,' at the same time Captain John Browne was also to receive a commission to command dragoons, and the following day Smith and Bradshaw received commissions to be their respective lieutenants. Four days later the Council had changed its mind yet again and ordered the two troops be disbanded and the 260 men raised were to be used to recruit John Barkstead's regiment that was garrisoning the Tower of London. The idea of mounting dragoons with horses in London was finally dropped on 25 August when the horses were ordered to be returned to their owners.[67]

In August, London had no formal regiment of militia horse and so it was no surprise that in the present emergency it was once again granted the authority to raise one on 15 August. No strength was specified in the Parliamentary Act, and this was left to discretion of the Council of State, who subsequently informed the Militia Committee the next day that they required some 1,000 cavalry to be raised and to 'get them ready with all expedition.' It would seem that at the same time the Council ordered that all voluntary troops in London be immediately disbanded, presumably as they were no longer necessary now that a formal regiment of City Horse was to be formed.[68] No details of the structure of this regiment have been found but it was commanded by Colonel Owen Rowe.[69] Presumably recruitment did not go as quickly as hoped since a meeting on 22 August between the Council and Militia Committee was intended to 'consider what encouragement should be given to the new regiment of horse raised in London'.[70] When news arrived in London on 19 August that the Scottish Army had crossed the River Mersey a greater sense of urgency gripped London. A muster of all City forces was ordered for 25 August, while the metropolitan militia committees were instructed to provide updated troop strengths and were ordered to 'sit constantly' to ensure the recruiting was maintained. Such was the sense of urgency that Skippon was optimistically ordered to bring the general muster forward to 23 August, but it was only on 25 August that the City militia were arrayed at Finsbury Fields under the watchful eyes of the entire City government. The horse were not specifically mentioned as being present, but at a second muster on 2 September, also at Finsbury Fields, it was noted that 'the new raised horse were also there'.[71]

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[64] Bernard Alsop, *A Perfect Account, 6–13 August 1651*, TT E.640 [7], p.248.

[65] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, pp.325, 338.

[66] *Ibid.*, pp.329, 331, 333, 337, 338.

[67] *Ibid.*, pp.342, 346, 531, 358, 371.

Middlesex raised two troops of militia horse in August, but whether these were recruited in part from Westminster and the Hamlets as had been ordered in May, is unknown. The Middlesex Militia Committee had promised they would be mustered at St Albans on 23 August, and Fleetwood was informed they were to be attached to his growing command. However, it would seem the Committee was overconfident in its expectations for, on 5 September, the two troops were still within the county when the Council of State informed them that they were no longer required, and the following day they were ordered to be disbanded.[72]

The trusted Richard Salwey provided London with the first news of the defeat of the Scottish Army at Worcester when his letter was received at Westminster on 4 September. Quickly letters from Cromwell and others in the army were subsequently received and the magnitude of the English victory was realised when it became clear that those Scots not captured were in full flight for the border. After such a comprehensive defeat the Scottish Army was now unable to threaten London, and the need for an expensive City Horse once again evaporated. The Government was quick to order the disbanding of the county militia forces on 8 September, followed by the order to disband Rowe's regiment on 17 September.[73]

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[68] *JHC 1648–1651*, Vol. 6, p.554; *JHC 1651–1659*, Vol. 7, p.1; Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, pp.335,336.

[69] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, p.436.

[70] *Ibid.*, pp.349, 351.

[71] *Ibid.*, pp.342–343, 349, 388, 391; *JHC 1651–1659*, Vol. 7, pp.6 & 9; Henry Walker, *Perfect Passages, 29 August–5 September 1651*, TT E.787 [14], p.368.

[72] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, pp.349, 411, 413, 414.

[73] *Ibid.*, pp.353, 355, 415, 418, 436; *JHC 1651–1659*, Vol. 7, p.11.


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Interregnum, 1651–1660

The defeat of Charles II and the Scottish Army at Worcester brought with it an end to the warfare that had wracked England for the past nine years. Henceforth the peace of the land was only to be disturbed by the constant threat of Royalist insurrection, encouraged by, but barely aided by, the exiled monarch. With no military activity in England there was no need for London to provide any militia forces, cavalry or infantry, to protect the capital, especially as throughout the years prior to the Restoration there were always some regular army units in and around London, while the Tower of London was permanently garrisoned by an army regiment. With hindsight it is clear that the disorganised Royalists within the country were in no position to mount any serious attempt to overthrow first the Commonwealth, and then the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell, but at the time the threat was taken seriously, and when rumours began to circulate of an attempted uprising the government got edgy and inevitably attention was focused on London to suppress any outbreak.

In early February 1655 letters from the exiled Charles were intercepted that showed a national uprising was imminent. As a precaution Oliver Cromwell, now firmly established as Lord Protector, immediately set about rounding up horses in the capital so they could not be used in the rebellion, while also reconstituting the London Militia Committee and giving it instructions to raise what forces it needed to protect London should the army be required to put down any insurrection in the countryside. The committee included Skippon yet again and other pro-army supporters including former City Horse commanders William Underwood and Owen Rowe, but no specific mention was made of raising any cavalry.[1]

The uprising, known to history as Penruddock's Rising, broke out in various locations across England in March but was poorly planned and quickly put down. The City militia played no direct role in the suppression of the rebellion although three regiments of foot were raised in the capital, under William Underwood, Robert Tichbourne and Owen Rowe, with

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[1] Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1655*, (London: Longmans & Co, 1881), pp.43–44; Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649–1656*, Vol. 3, (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1903), pp.278–279.

Skippon once more in command.[2] On 9 March the Council of State issued instructions to the London Militia Committee to 'enlist, raise, and arm a convenient number of horsemen, under Maj-Gen. Skippon, and officers appointed by him'.[3] *Mercurius Politics* went further by noting that the horse be 'put under their old Officers of horse', but specifically who was not mentioned.[4] A general muster of the City forces was held at Finsbury on 20 March when one broadsheet estimated them to be some 5,000 horse and foot but unfortunately no further evidence has been found that provides detail of the cavalry.[5] By the time the City forces mustered the uprisings had been put down and there was no further need of the London militia, who were presumably stood down. What became of the cavalry is unknown.

A consequence of Penruddock's failed uprising, and of Cromwell's fear that further uprisings would be likely, was the introduction of a form of local military government across England in the late summer of 1655 by appointed Major-Generals, who became responsible for law and order in the counties that they were to govern. While the experiment proved to be a complete failure and the scheme was dropped in early 1657 it did lead to the remodelling of the national militia once more.[6] In May it was decided that, in addition to the normal militia forces, a separate force of militia cavalry would be raised nationwide, which would consist of 64 troops and 6,520 men. This force was a true militia in that the common soldiers were paid an annual retainer of 8l per year, would provide their own horses, arms and equipment, were to muster four times per year and were to be available to serve anywhere in the Country at short notice, during which times they would be paid regular army rates of pay if they served beyond one month.[7] While the remodelling of the national militia pre-dated the establishment of the Major-Generals rule by a few months, when they were formally appointed in October, the generals were given command over this force.[8] The veteran Philip Skippon was appointed to govern London while John Barkstead, Lieutenant (Governor) of the Tower of London, was to govern Middlesex but, due to Skippon's by now advanced age, Barkstead was appointed his deputy which gave him authority over the entire capital. It seems likely that the City of London was exempt from raising any cavalry for this militia force, but Middlesex and Westminster were not. Only a single troop, of 100 men (reduced to 80 in 1656) plus officers was raised and commanded by Barkstead himself at an annual cost of 999l 13s. Who the other officers were is unknown.[9] The militia was to be paid for by a punitive tax on known Royalists but although this was levied it failed to produce the yields necessary. It ultimately became the source of heated debate in the second Protectorate Parliament in 1657 before being rejected by the law makers, an act that ultimately led to the demise of both the rule of the Major-Generals and the militia force the tax was supposed to pay for.[10] No evidence has been found that confirms if the Middlesex and Westminster Horse were ever used or even when they were disbanded.

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[2] D. Border, *The Faithfull Scout, 23 February–2 March 1655*, TT E.481 [10], p.1722.

[3] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD, Int 1655*, p.72.

[4] John Hall, *Mercurius Politicus, 1–8 March 1655*, TT E.829 [16], p.5180.

[5] John Hall, *Mercurius Politicus, 29 March–5 April 1655*, TT E.831 [7], p.5211.

[6] Gardiner, *Commonwealth*, Vol. 3, pp.315–346. See also Christopher Durston, *Cromwell's Major-Generals : Godly Government During the English Revolution*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).

[7] *An Act for Setling The Militia for the City of London, and Liberties Thereof. Thursday, July 7. 1659*, TT E.1074 [8], p.4399.

[8] W. C. Abbott (ed.), *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*, Vol.3, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1945), pp.844–848.

[9] National Archives, SP25/77, Council of State: Order Books, 1656–1657, ff.880, 901; Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1655–6*, (London: Longmans &

Given that London remained safe from Royalist attempts at insurrection prior to 1659, it would seem probable that there was little use for them, especially given that throughout these years there was always a sizeable regular army presence in and around the capital. Even in early 1658, when the threat of a major plot again surfaced in London there is no evidence of the involvement of the City Horse. Cromwell informed the City that it needed to look to its own safety; the Militia Committee was expanded, and a new regiment of Trained Bands was raised, but there is nothing to suggest any cavalry were raised. Probably the plot fizzled away before the City became so concerned that it felt the need to raise yet more expensive mounted troops.[11]

However, by 1659 the situation had changed dramatically. Oliver Cromwell died in September 1658 and was immediately succeeded as Lord Protector by his son Richard, who didn't have the charisma, ability or reputation of his father. It did not take long before an impatient army wanted rid of him, leading to the recall of the Rump Parliament on 7 May and then the army forced Richard to abdicate on 25 May. With the end of the Protectorate the City was quick to seek the reestablishment of its traditional rights, which had been very much subdued under Cromwell and the Commonwealth. The City had never favoured the Rump, its representation being too allied with the army, the Independents and the republicans, and its recall did little to improve relations between the Government and the still moderate and Presbyterian leaning City. Despite this, on 9 May a petition was submitted to the Commons entreating it to once again allow the City the right to control the militia, not just of London but also of the suburbs as well.

The petition was well received and a committee that included Edmund Harvey and George Thompson appointed to produce the necessary legislation.[12] Despite much debate it was only on 7 July that an Act to reconstitute the London Militia Committee was passed which included an impressive 100 commissioners, including many who had previously been connected to the City Horse, though this was still a broadly republican committee. These included Thomas Foach who had commanded a Kent troop in London in 1652, John Ireton soon to be Lord Mayor, John Okey

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Co., 1882), p.372.

[10] Charles Harding Firth, *The Last Years of the Protectorate, 1656–1658*, Vol. 1, (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1909), pp.108–127.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp.50–52; Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1657–58*, (London: Longmans & Co, 1884), pp.328, 330; Charles Harding Firth (ed.), *The Clarke papers: Selections from the Papers of William Clarke, Secretary to the Council of the Army, 1647–1649, and to General Monck and the Commanders of the Army in Scotland, 1651–1660*, Vol.3, (London: The Camden Society, 1891), p.143.

[12] *JHC 1651–1659*, Vol. 7, p.647.

who had commanded a troop of City dragoons in 1642, Isaac Pennington the former radical Lord Mayor, Richard Salwey, Philip Skippon, Edward Storie who had commanded a troop in Richard Turner's regiment, Robert Tichbourne and William Webb who had commanded both horse and dragoons in 1645–1646.[13] The same day the ageing Philip Skippon was again appointed commander of the City forces.[14] The Act itself did not specifically legislate for the raising of a mounted force but the Committee were certainly granted the authority to do so if they desired.

The House of Commons was well aware that it could not rely upon the Army, itself split between those supporting the Protectorate and those now supporting Parliament, and therefore it quickly set about reconstituting the militia. With England once again wracked with division and the constant threat of Royalist uprisings, it is no surprise that the call soon went out for the raising of yet another regiment of City Horse, but whether the City was the willing initiator of this is unclear. On 16 July 1659, the Council of State recommended to the Commons the officers for a regiment that London was in the process of raising and these were approved the same day.[15] Judging by the reaction of Common Council they were either not consulted first or, if they were, then they were not consulted on the detail of the Act beforehand. The day the Act was passed, Common Council immediately sent a delegation to the Commons protesting that the terms stipulated that the force could be sent anywhere in the country that they were needed. The Act also failed to mention the City's long held privilege of it selecting its own militia officers. The petition requested that the Act be modified to stipulate that the City forces would not be compelled to serve outside of London, that the amount of cavalry raised at the cost of the City be limited to just two troops of 75 men each, and that all such forces raised in London 'be put under the command of persons of quality, Freemen, and Inhabitants of the City aforesaid'.[16] The City had lacked the ability to select its own officers since the army purge of 1647 and this still rankled, and it was seen as a deliberate encroachment on its traditional authority. The City also wanted the ability to appoint an officer corps that they deemed reliable and who would protect the interests of the City. The Commons courteously accepted the petition and after a short debate the Speaker informed the delegation that it had been decided that the City would raise six troops of horse, and that the Commons had already decided who the officers would be. No mention was made of the City's insistence that its force be precluded from serving outside of London. With that the petitioners were dismissed.[17]

The Commons had decided that the regiment was to be commanded by the Lord Mayor, John Ireton, the brother of Henry Ireton. Ireton, a City merchant prior to the war, was a committed republican, religious Independent and staunch supporter of the Commonwealth while close family ties with the Cromwell family turned him away from supporting the army after Richard Cromwell's abdication. He was no friend of the moderate Presbyterians in the City, who were still a majority even though their influence had been suppressed during the Protectorate, and it was his position as commander of the City Horse that Common Council objected to in their petition of 16 July. In retaliation Ireton, who in his capacity as Lord Mayor had the sole authority to call a Common Council, refused to allow the Council to sit from the day they challenged his authority in July until 6 September, effectively marginalising City opposition during the crucial weeks that were to follow.[18]

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[13] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 2, pp.1293–1298. *An Act for Setling the Militia for the City of London, and Liberties Thereof. Thursday, July 7. 1659.*

[14] *JHC 1651–1659*, Vol. 7, p.647.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] LMAJCC Vol. 41, f.206v.

[17] *JHC 1651–1659*, Vol. 7, p.647.

From the commissions issued by the Commons in July it is possible to reconstruct the troop structure of Ireton's regiment as follows:

Colonel John Ireton
Major John Child
Captain William Meade
Captain Hugh Mason
Captain Nicholas Roberts
Captain Stephen Henbury

Richard Oram was appointed Captain-Lieutenant to Ireton's troop and Joshua Lasher was the lieutenant to Major Child. Other officers included Lieutenants Randall Kendall, Richard Middleton, Jeremy Ives, Jonathan Hooper, Cornets Henry Wharton, Edmund Hillar, Robert Pascal and Robert Cabel.[19]

The Commons passed similar acts granting the Militia Committees of Westminster, the Tower Hamlets and Southwark similar authority. The first two both raised a single troop of horse, but there is no evidence to confirm Southwark did, although it would seem likely that they did so.[20]

The Westminster troop consisted of:

Captain Silus (Elias) Taylor
Lieutenant John Clemens/Clements[21]
Cornet Richard Hawkins
Quartermaster John Koy[22]

The Tower Hamlets troop consisted of:

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[18] Gary S De Krey, 'John Ireton (1615–1690)', *ODNB*; LMAJCC Vol. 41, ff.206r-v; Charles Harding Firth (ed.), *The Clarke Papers: Selections from the Papers of William Clarke, Secretary to the Council of the Army, 1647–1649, and to General Monck and the Commanders of the Army in Scotland, 1651–1660*, Vol.4, (London: The Camden Society, 1901), p.40.

[19] *JHC 1651–1659*, Vol. 7, p.647; Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1659–60*, (London: Longmans & Co, 1886), p.32; John Hall, *Mercurius Politicus, 28 July–4 August 1659*, TT E.766 [27], pp.628–629, 630; D Border, *The Loyal Scout, 22–29 July 1659*, TT E.993 [3], p.112.

[20] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 2, pp.1290–1293, 1308–1312, 1312–1316.

[21] Clements had commanded the Middlesex troop in 1651.

[22] *Mercurius Politicus, 28 July–4 August 1659*, pp.637 & 638.

Captain Robert Wakelin
Lieutenant John Adis
Cornet Nathaniel Horsman
Quartermaster Robert [?V]alley[23]

The Loyal Scout of 3 August is the only source that mentions the raising of a troop of volunteer horse in the City at the same time, but it would be plausible that some were raised, if only for a brief period of time, presumably entirely at the cost of the volunteers.[24]

Throughout July reports flooded into London about a projected nationwide Royalist insurrection and the City was ordered to take immediate precautions to arrest suspected Royalists, to seize horses to prevent them from being used by Royalists, and to keep the militia in a state of vigilance. A letter to the City and suburban committees of 29 July illustrates the fear the Council of State was in. The commissioners were informed:

> of a speedy insurrection intended by the enemy, desires that the powers given you by Parliament may be speedily put in execution, for raising and arming horse and foot amongst the well afiected [sic], taking care that horses and arms are put into the hands of such only. You are to meet frequently tuo execute the orders of Parliament or Council. You are to order your regiments of horse to draw together forthwith into the Artillery Ground, there to await orders.[25]

News had been received of a likely uprising in Kent and on that same day the Council of State instructed the London Militia Committee:

> to keep together in a body the militia horse of London, and quarter them in inns and places where you shall judge they may be of most use and in greatest readiness, to prevent commotions and preserve the peace. You are to direct some of the troops to be constantly on guard, and take care of the avenues of the City, and the roads, &c., committed to the care of Cols. Rich and Berry's troops, and to hold correspondence with them, and to apprehend and examine any persons you suspect.[26]

Ammunition was provided for the City forces, horses were to be seized, barges across the Thames were secured and, upon the rumour that Richard Browne was involved in the planned insurrection, an order was sent out for his apprehension and arrest, but it was soon rumoured that he had left the City.[27]

On 30 July, the regular troops in London were ordered to deploy to Blackheath to prevent any march on London by the Kent insurgents, and two troops of Ireton's regiment were ordered to join them early the next morning, while other troops were sent directly into Kent in an attempt to forestall the uprising.[28] The Kent uprising, like most of the other summer attempts to overthrow the government, came to nothing. The forces Parliament sent into Kent were sufficient to overawe the few willing to attempt the insurrection who were quickly scattered or arrested. No Royalist rendezvous was attempted at Blackheath and late on 1 August the two troops of Ireton's regiment were ordered home, with the thanks of the Council of State but they were warned to maintain their vigilance.[29] Elsewhere across the country Booth's uprising, as it became known, was easily quashed although the government was on edge throughout August and the City militia forces were on constant guard against further attempts at revolt, with Ireton's regiment being called out to patrol the streets on at least one occasion.[30] Many observers, biased Royalist sympathises as well as more neutral foreign diplomats, were of the opinion that the City militia forces, controlled by the minority republicans, would prove unreliable and ineffective but events proved otherwise. The City militia played a key role in pacifying London and their presence and determination certainly ensured no open revolt was able to happen in London, and Ireton's regiment, as well as the suburban troops, must have played a significant role in this.[31] By 2 September, and with the City seemingly quiet, the Militia Committee were ordered to stand the cavalry down and return the horses to their owners, but they were warned to keep their arms secured while at the same time all members of the militia were to swear an oath denouncing Charles Stuart, which was presumably administered.[32]

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[23] John Hall, *Mercurius Politicus, 21–28 July 1659*, TT E.766 [23], p.624.
[24] D Border, *The Loyal Scout, 29 July–5 August 1659*, TT E.993 [11], p.117.
[25] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD, Int 1659–60*, p.49.
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] *Ibid.*, pp.52, 54; *The Loyal Scout, 29 July–5 August 1659*, pp.114,115.

The City Horse's involvement during 1 August 1659 was to prove to be the last time they were to be deployed in action during the Civil War and Interregnum, and the next time they were mustered it was to be for an otherwise more peaceful purpose. With the danger of Booth's uprising over, the factions that dominated the Country's political scene quickly fell out amongst themselves again. In early October, General John Lambert led a military coup that toppled the government of the restored Rump Parliament, but the English Army in Scotland, commanded by General George Monck, refused to accept the legitimacy of Lambert's new government of hard-line republicans and supporters of the Protectorate.

In the last months of the year Monck readied his army to march into England to restore legitimate government, by force if necessary. In December former City Horse captain John Okey led a group of committed republicans to seize the Tower of London but failed, while Richard Salwey's attempt to convince the navy to support Lambert's government also failed. On 1 January Monck led his army into England and when Lambert tried to block his passage his own army disintegrated without a fight; he was arrested and imprisoned in the Tower of London. As Monck marched towards London a resurgent Parliament tried to regain power by agreeing to let the Presbyterians in the City take control of the militia and by ordering Monck to advance on London to end the political carnage. With events rapidly turning against the republicans such stalwarts as Henry Vane were expelled from Parliament, Richard Salwey was imprisoned and the clamour to allow the return of the expelled MPs from 1648 and a restoration of the pre-purge Parliament, grew louder and louder.

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[28] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD, Int 1659–60*, p.53.

[29] *Ibid.*, p.64; *The Loyal Scout, 29 July–5 August 1659*, pp.115–116.

[30] Firth (ed.), *Clarke Papers Vol.4*, Vol. 4, p.47.

[31] James D Ogilvie (ed.),*Diary of Sir Archbold Johnston of Wariston*, Vol.3, (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1940), p.129; M (Francois) Guizot, *History of Richard Cromwell and the Restoration of Charles II*, Vol. 1, (London: 1856), p.467; Allen B Hinds (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, 1659–1661*, Vol. 32, (London: 1931), pp.47–61.

[32] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD, Int 1659–60*, pp.164, 166, 179, 200.

Monck, who had arrived in London at the end of January was now the pivotal player in national politics. On 11 February, he informed the Rump that the excluded Members of Pride's Purge of 1648 were to be readmitted and the newly reconstituted 'Long Parliament' was then required to dissolve itself, with new elections be held and that this new Parliament would decide on the form of the political settlement the Country was desperate for. The Long Parliament, with Denzil Holles once again at the helm, while sympathetic to an accommodation with the monarchy, as it had been in 1648, was still determined that any restoration of monarchy would be on the basis of similar terms agreed with Charles I at the Treaty of Newport.

Just before the planned elections Lambert escaped from the Tower of London and joined up with John Okey to attempt a republican led uprising which ultimately failed miserably. The mood in the Country had now changed and in the new elections held at the end of April, not only were the republicans and supporters of the Commonwealth routed, but those who were elected were overwhelmingly also pro-Royalist in sympathy. Despite the futile attempts of Holles and the few supporters left with him to insist upon a negotiated settlement in the restoration of monarchy, they were easily outmanoeuvred by the majority pro-Royalist members and by mid-May Parliament had invited Charles to return to England virtually unconditionally. The King landed at Dover on 25 May and was welcomed by an outpouring of joy and relief when he triumphantly entered the City of London on 29 May 1660. The English Revolution was over.[33]

Not surprisingly the City Horse were to be involved in these momentous events and they played an honoured part in the celebrations that marked the return of the King, whose restoration was anything but certain when Monck first arrived in London. On 9 February, the Rump Parliament debated the reconstitution of the London Militia Committee into a form that was supportive of its need to retain the government of the Country, but political events soon made this debate obsolete, as just two days after this debate Monck ordered new elections, effectively beginning the end of the Rump Parliament. On 21 February, the purged members of 1648 were readmitted, and the restored Long Parliament had its own ideas as the composition of this vital committee. On 23 February, a delegation was sent from the City to congratulate 'the Long Parliament' on its restoration along with the request that the Militia 'may be forthwith settled in the hands of Citizens of known integrity & interest in the City' and a list of such trusted names was provided. Parliament obviously agreed for it immediately passed a resolution appointing this new committee, but it was only on 12 March that a formal Act legislating the establishment of this new committee was promulgated. The London Militia Committee appointed on 12 March by the newly restored Parliament was shorn almost entirely of all the radicals that had served on it at various times over the past 18 years, although Isaac Pennington and Philip Skippon's inclusion suggests a degree of reconciliation. Richard Browne, the darling of the moderate Presbyterian and crypto-Royalists in London since 1648, was appointed to serve on it for the first time, though he had been in hiding since his involvement in Booth's uprising the previous year, but with the readmission of the precluded Members, of which he was one, it was then safe for him to be seen in public.[34] This Act, unlike the one of July 1659, included no clause that the City forces were to be engaged anywhere but London, and specifically gave the City the authority to appoint their own officers. Again no specific instruction was given to raise cavalry, but the legislation gave them that authority, if needed.

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[33] See Ronald Hutton, *The Restoration: A Political and Religious History of England and Wales, 1658–1667*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) for a more detailed description and explanation on the demise of the English Republic and the restoration of the monarchy.

The newly appointed Committee met on 29 February and immediately set about re-establishing the six regiments that were the core of the traditional London Trained Bands and then, on 23 March, the Committee resolved to raise a regiment of 500 horse in six troops. The minutes of this Militia Committee in 1660 are the only ones to survive from the period and provide interesting details on how it, and possibly previous, committees conducted their business.

On 25 March, Richard Browne was 'elected' by his follow committeemen to command the regiment while Edward Storey, previously of Richard Turner's regiment, was appointed as the regiment's major and on that date, it was envisaged that it would consist of the following troops[35]:

Major-General Richard Browne
Major Edward Storey
Captain [?] Birkyn
Captain Robert Morris
Captain Benjamin Ducane
Captain Thomas Barrett

However Storey, who had been associated with the City radical movement in 1642, and Birkyn both refused to serve and were discharged on 11 April, while Ducane was offered the position as lieutenant-colonel of the Green Auxiliaries, which he appears to have accepted instead.[36]

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[34] *JHC 1651–1659*, Vol. 7, p.647; *To the Parliament of England: the Humble Petition of the Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons of the City of London, in Common-Council Assembled*, (London: 1660),TT E.669.f.23 [61]; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 2, pp.1455–1458.

[35] Militia Minutes, p.xxx.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp.xxxv, xxxvi.

One month later, on 23 April, when the regiment was first mustered, the regimental officers were:[37]

Troop Commander	Lieutenant	Cornet	Quartermaster
M-G Richard Browne	Christopher Shaw	Adam Kirby	Joseph Blamley
Maj Benjamin Henshaw	Nathl Summer	Robert Blackston	John Carey
Cpt James Muddiford	Henry Collins	John Jones	Henry Barber
Cpt John Clarke	Thomas Rycroft	Edmond Modlicott	Edwd Powell
Cpt Robert Morris	Thomas Walker	William Kempe	Thomas Hobday
Cpt Thomas Barrett	John Ryland	Saml Putt	Edwd Perry

Instructions were sent out to all who had subscribed to provide both horse and rider on 29 March, informing them to keep the horses in their possession until further notice while the process of listing continued. Despite the Committee noting that this was progressing satisfactorily on 11 April, it evidently was not, since on 13 April the Common Councillors for each Ward were instructed to prepare lists of individuals in their Wards that could afford to subscribe but had so far failed to do so. On 18 April, the Committee sent out directives to all subscribers to bring their horses, arms and riders to the New Artillery Grounds on 20 April so they could be 'viewed, approved and Listed'. Then on 24 April a muster of the entire City militia forces was held in Hyde Park watched by the Lord Mayor 'in his Coller of SS and the Aldermen in their Scarlet Gownes with many persons of quality' from a specially erected wooden grandstand which cost the City 100l. This was no doubt an impressive sight and the source of great civic pride which must have been heightened when the Lord Mayor received news during the muster that Lambert had been brought into London that day, a prisoner once again.[38]

Browne's regiment was not the only City Horse in London that year. In February, as the new Militia Committee was formed, there was at least a single troop of militia cavalry under the command of Captain John Taylor and these were ordered to mobilise for 'preservation of the publique peace', but what happened to them after this is unclear.[39] The Militia Act of 12 March established new militia committees for Westminster, the Tower Hamlets and Southwark, all of which also had the authority to raise cavalry.[40] By April the Tower Hamlets had raised a troop officered by Captain John Wright, Cornet John Hill and Quartermaster John Snow, while the single troop from Westminster was commanded by Captain Ralph Grey, Esq. However no evidence has been found to indicate that Southwark raised a troop.[41] A reference in the Militia Committee minutes, dated 22 March, suggests that consideration had been given to raising some troops of volunteer horse and the Lord Mayor's opinion was sought on the matter, but it is unclear if this referred to specific volunteers troops or Browne's regiment which was approved to be raised the following day.[42] However, on 30 April a group of 'Young Gentleman' requested permission to 'exercise themselves on horseback' at the New Artillery Ground and form themselves into a 'Voluntary Troop' under the command of Browne – a request that the Committee immediately approved.[43] This seems to have been a different group of volunteers to the regiment of 250 that mustered in Hyde Park with the rest of the City forces the week before under the command of the openly pro-Royalist Alderman [Sir] John Robinson, and who are recorded as accompanying the King when he entered London on 29 May.[44]

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[37] *Ibid.*, p.lxii.

[38] *Ibid.*, pp.xxx, xxxvi, xl, xlvi, lvii, lxxx; Oliver Williams, *An Exact Accompt, 20–27 April 1660*, TT E.183 [7], p.862.

[39] Militia Minutes, p.iiii.

[40] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 2, pp.1425–1455.

[41] *An Exact Accompt, 20–27 April 1660*, p.858; *Mercurius Publicus, 19–26 April 1660*, TT E.183 [6], p.268.

With hindsight it is clear that the Country was moving ever closer to an end of the turmoil, but this was far from certain or obvious at the time. The Government was concerned that uprisings might still occur, the army might mutiny due to lack of pay, or that the republicans might force their way back into power with the backing of the more radical elements of the army, and as such there was a clear sense of unease within London. When Lambert escaped on 11 April, rumours of an uprising in London quickly spread and the militia was put on alert, but Lambert had already fled the capital. However, news quickly filtered back to London that he was attempting to raise an army in the Midlands, and this led the Council of State, on 21 April, to inform the Militia Committee 'to take speedy and effective care that all Avenues of the said City be carefully guarded and no persons suffered to pass out of the same without Strict examination'. These instructions were relayed to Browne immediately for his regiment to note during their regular guard duties. However, after news of Lambert's defeat and capture arrived in London, Browne was told that he could reduce his guard until further notice.

After Lambert and Okey's failed attempt to resurrect the republic in late April, and with Monck in full control of the army and his personal preference for the restoration of kingly government, it was apparent that the Commonwealth was over. By early May it was only a question of time before the King returned, and the City set about preparing to welcome him home. On 1 May Charles' Declaration of Breda was presented to both Parliament and Common Council and on 8 May he was formally proclaimed King of England, Scotland and Ireland.[45] The City instantly sent a delegation to the King with a gift of money as a demonstration of their fidelity and loyalty. Despite these protestations of loyalty the Militia Committee was obviously concerned that troublemakers loyal to the previous regimes might cause trouble, and on 27 May, with the King progressing through Kent, Browne was instructed 'to send out patrolls for Securing the peace' within the City.

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[42] Militia Minutes, p.xxii.

[43] *Ibid.*, p.lxvi.

[44] *Mercurius Publicus, 19–26 April 1660*, p.272; *An Exact Accompt, 25 May–1 June 1660*, TT E.183 [22], pp.940–942.

[45] *Journals of the House of Commons: 1660–1667*, Vol. 8, (London: 1802), pp.4–6, 16–17; LMAJCC Vol. 41, ff.230r–231v.

At the same time he was ordered to dismiss some of his regiment but also to send a detachment to Blackheath where the Londoners were to welcome the returning monarch.[46]

The day the King entered London was one of pomp and pageantry. On 22 May, Browne was told to make ready and then ordered to muster his entire regiment 'upon pain of the utmost perills' at the New Artillery Grounds on 28 May at 3 o'clock, in anticipation of the King's arrival. The City Trained Bands were ordered to line the route from London Bridge to Temple Bar and had strict instructions to suppress any signs of demonstration or tumult, but that the musketeers were not permitted to load their weapons and all troops were to be in their allotted positions by 7 o'clock on the night of 28 May.[47]

John Evelyn witnessed the spectacle, which he recorded in his diary:

> This day [29 May 1660], his Majesty, Charles II. came to London, after a sad and long exile and calamitous suffering both of the King and Church, being seventeen years. This was also his birthday, and with a triumph of above 20,000 horse and foot, brandishing their swords, and shouting with inexpressible joy; the ways strewn with flowers, the bells ringing, the streets hung with tapestry, fountains running with wine; the Mayor, Aldermen, and all the companies, in their liveries, chains of gold, and banners; Lords and Nobles, clad in cloth of silver, gold, and velvet; the windows and balconies, all set with ladies; trumpets, music, and myriads of people flocking, even so far as from Rochester, so as they were seven hours in passing the city, even from two in the afternoon till nine at night.[48]

An Exact Accompt also published a detailed account of the King's triumphant entry into London. He travelled from Rochester that morning and met the gathered dignitaries of the City at Blackheath around 10 o'clock. The procession into London was led by 'the flower of the *English* Gentry' followed by 'the City Regiment [commanded] by Major General *Brown*, in which many persons of quality did ride as Volunteers. Also a Troop of Volunteers under the Command of Col. Robinson, who were all clad richly in Buff.' After these followed Monck's own Lifeguard with the King and his entourage, followed by more cavalry from the army. Crossing London Bridge the procession entered the City where they were met by the regiments of the Trained Bands and continued on to Whitehall, and at the Banqueting House he was welcomed by the assembled Lords and Commons.[49]

With King Charles II arrival at Whitehall the monarch took control of the reins of government. The Civil War and the resultant experiments in government were consigned to history and the Country anticipated a peaceful and prosperous future. The City Horse and its officers, born in the chaos of the 1642 summer, and which had witnessed and participated in many of the climactic events over the past 18 years, were there in pride of place at the end as well. With the end of the turmoil Browne's regiment was disbanded at the end of June.[50] For now, with the King returned, the Parliament and City of London no longer had any need for the City Horse.

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[46] Militia Minutes, p.lxviii.

[47] *Ibid.*, pp.lxxiii, lxxv, lxxvii, lxxviii.

[48] William Bray (ed.), *The Diary of John Evelyn*, Vol. 1, (New York: M. Walter Dunne, 1901), p.332.

[49] *An Exact Accompt, 25 May–1 June 1660,* pp.940–942.



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[50] LMA, COL/CHD/MN/03/007, Orders of the commissioners for the Militia of the City of London upon the Chamberlain for payment of the expenses of the Horse Regiment of Militia and the Blue, Green, White, Yellow, Red and Orange Regiments of the Auxiliary Forces of the City, (London: 1660); Militia Minutes, p.lxxxvii.

13

Equipping the City Horse

On 9 June 1642, Parliament established a mechanism of general subscriptions to raise horses, men and plate for its self-defence.[1] The Propositions, as the system became known, established a committee consisting of four City Aldermen (who were to later become the Treasurers of War) that were granted the authority to value and list voluntary donations of money, mounts and weapons from well-affected citizens across the Country for the defence of Parliament. This was envisaged as a non-compulsory loan to be repaid, on the public faith, at an interest rate of 8 percent per annum. Within London and Middlesex, the Militia Committee was given the responsibility of listing and taking into its possession all items received in each of the wards, and a network of collectors were recruited to receive the donations in each precinct. The horses were then handed over the army horse commissioners, John Smith (Smythe) and Thomas Richardson, at Moorfields for assessment and valuation before being issued to the individual troops.[2]

The Propositions provided the initial legal and financial framework for Parliament to raise the forces that were to become the Earl of Essex's army, though it provided no legal authority for London itself to raise additional militia forces. By November the donations of the well-affected were drying up and Parliament mandated that assessors be appointed to list all inhabitants within London who had not yet volunteered to make loans to the war effort, and to pressure those reluctant to do so immediately.[3] It was this principal of voluntary subscription, and its network of assessors and collectors, that was coopted in September 1642 when the first City Horse troops were raised and through which the first troops were equipped.

In the short-term this voluntary (and not so voluntary) system of loans was an effective expedient to raise money and horses quickly for the City Horse. Between October 1642 and July 1643 over 9,309l was raised in cash, horses and arms, with just over 8,000l of it raised in the first three months. A total of 453 horses were also donated, an average value of 20l 10s 8d per horse and equipment. Most of which was used to form the basis of Harvey's regiment.[4] This was in addition to the horses and equipment raised to equip the main Parliamentary army under the Earl of Essex. (A comprehensive analysis of this subscription can be found in Appendix I.) The basis of the Propositions was that of a loan, to be repaid with interest at some unspecified date, however there is no evidence to suggest that any of the subscribers ever received reimbursement for these loans, however when a similar subscription was established in 1645 for Mainwaring's regiment those who subscribed did receive the principal back.

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[1] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.6–9.

[2] *Ibid.*; TNA, SP16/491, ff.123–126.

[3] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.38–40.

When Turner's regiment was raised in the summer of 1643 as part of the General Rising it had been expected that the subscription would once again be adequate to provide sufficient horses and equipment. The City radicals wildly overestimated the enthusiasm of London to finance a new army and it soon became apparent that horses would be hard to come by, leading Common Council on 11 August to grant the Militia Committee the authority to 'seise them where [you] finde them'.[5] Despite this threat, it is clear that some of the citizens did willingly take up the call for subscriptions for horses, but as the extant records are extremely fragmentary it is impossible to assess how effective the campaign was.[6] From what can be learnt from the surviving accounts, in August and September 22 subscribers provided horses (with only a few of them providing equipment as well) valued at a total 304l, giving an average per horse only of 13l 16s. While this is obviously only an inadequate assessment based on the minimal sources available, the impression is that the value of each donation was considerably less than the year before. This might be a result of general fatigue of financing the war, but it might also be a result of the committee's attempts to raise the new force from the poorer areas of the City, where the individuals naturally had less resources to contribute.[7]

The records for Turner's own troop shed more light on the source of his mounts. He received 55 horses directly from Commissioner Walker and which had been raised by subscription through the Salter's Hall Committee, plus 101 further on the orders of the Militia Committee. While not clear, this seems to suggest that the horses were purchased by the Militia Committee rather than subscribed by City residents. In addition to these, a further 29 were received from commissioners Smith and Richardson from army stock.[8] At the same time, Charles Gheste was able to secure 16 horses from friends and relatives for his own troop plus at last a further 17 from individuals in Surrey, only a handful of which came with saddles.[9] Although these relate to just two of the troops in Turner's regiment it suggests already that the City was no longer able to rely entirely upon voluntary subscriptions for its horse and equipment needs.

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[4] TNA, SP28/131 Part 5, ff.1–17.

[5] JCC Vol. 40, f.71r; TNA, SP16/497, f.256.

[6] TNA, SP28/132 Part 1, f.1.

[7] TNA, SP28/9, ff. 309, 323–324, 349–351, 356, 360–361, 365, 378–379, 381.; TNA, SP28/10, ff.49–52, 57–59, 65–67, 79.

[8] The National Archives, SP28/131 Part 1, Army Accounts, Military Officers, Garrisons, 1641–1651, f.1.

[9] TNA, SP28/22, ff.196–197.

In April 1644, the Maiden Troop was added to Harvey's regiment but this time the horses were acquired by direct purchase from horse markets rather than by public subscription, although some of the money used was collected in this manner. Blackwell purchased his horses during the middle of April, some from as far away as Hertford.[10] Similarly when Harvey's regiment was provided with remounts at the same time no attempt at a subscription was made and the horses were all simply purchased.[11] Likewise, later that year when William Underwood's troop was raised the horses were purchased with money from the weekly meal fund.[12]

The Militia Committee struggled to raise funds for horses in 1645 and when Mainwaring's regiment was raised in September, they needed an Act of Parliament requiring the citizens to forcibly contribute money. In this way, the City obtained sufficient funds to purchase 500 horses for the regiment. Once again Smith and Richardson were instructed to value and distribute the horses purchased, which they did with their typical efficiency (their records for this still exist and are analysed in Appendix II.) Luckily for the Militia Committee this was the last time they needed to raise a large body of horse during the war. In the years leading up to the Restoration new units of cavalry were raised in the City but no clear records remain of how the horses were provided although it is likely they were by a combination of subscription, purchase and seizure.

Another source of mounts for the City Horse were seizures from suspected Royalists and this method was employed throughout the war to help satisfy the constant need for more horses. Between November 1642 and the following June, Washbourne had seized some 20 horses himself, of which 11 were retained for the use of the troop.[13] However, it was only on 27 March 1643 that Parliament provided the legal justification for such actions and which specifically empowered the Militia Committee to assist the nominated authorities.[14] By virtue of this Act of Parliament, on 4 June the Earl of Essex provided Harvey, Turner and various other officers and civilians with the authority to conduct searches of the property of any suspected malignants, allowing them to seize any horses they found, and this led to a frenzied activity of horse confiscation by the City Horse that summer.[15] Almost immediately eight horses were seized by Washbourne that had belonged to Lord Conway, who had been implicated in Edmund Waller's plot. The House of Lords were furious that one of their own had been robbed of his horses despite his actions, and immediately demanded that his horses be placed in the safe custody of Sir Robert Harley, which they were.[16] Between early June and mid-August, Gregson of Harvey's own troop, seized 84 horses from suspected malignants, most of which were retained for the regiment's use.[17] Captain Gheste of Turner's regiment was more fortuitous when he claimed he found a stray nag in Greenwich and immediately impounded it for the use of his own troop.[18] No doubt the other troops were able to seize similar quantities of horses as well and so, for a time anyway, this proved to be a useful source of remounts.

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[10] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.502.

[11] TNA, SP28/146, ff.146–158.; TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.142.

[12] JCC Vol. 40, f.104r.

[13] TNA, SP28/146, f.168.

[14] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.106–117; Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD Add.*, p.648.

[15] TNA, SP16/497, f.183.

[16] *JHL*, Vol. 6, pp.95, 98; TNA, SP28/146, f.168.

From the evidence available it would seem that where horses were listed through subscription the owners notified the commissioners at Moorfield of their intention to provide a horse, via the Militia Committee collectors, but then had to wait for further instruction before they delivered them for service. This probably happened quite quickly but how and when the process was started is unclear. There is evidence from later subscriptions that the owners were notified to send their horses to a specified location on a specific date when they were formally received by the army, and responsibility for their fodder and well-being transferred to the military. This was certainly the case in July 1651 and in April 1660 and so was probably the same system used during the First Civil War.[19] In the case of Turner's regiment it would seem that to encourage the horse owners to keep them safe until they were called for, the sum of 5s per week was to be provided to them for their stabling, but despite this Turner was to later complain some owners held back their horses or sent inferior ones in their place.[20] In the case of the 1642 subscription, at least one owner failed to deliver his horse when requested. For horses purchased directly it appears these were delivered by the seller directly to the troop that purchased them.

Once the horses had been delivered to the City or to the army authorities, the burden of feeding and stabling the horses fell upon the City. While there is ample evidence that horses were lodged in private stables across London between 1642 and 1644, prior to being used by the various troops and at a cost borne by the Militia Committee, there is no direct evidence of how the horses raised by subscription were stabled before their issuing to the various troops. As these horses were received on the open expanse of Moorfields it is likely that some temporary stabling had been erected while the horses were processed. In the case of horses purchased by the troops later, the burden of stabling fell immediately upon the City. It is known that Blackwell was purchasing horses in early April 1644 although the troop only formally mustered in early May and so these horses required lengthy and expensive stabling at a cost of 16l.[21] Harvey's remounts acquired in the spring of 1644 would have similarly been stabled before he left London at the end of May, but no records have been found concerning these in particular. However, when Harvey's regiment returned to London in January 1644 at least some of the horses already in the possession of the regiment were privately stabled until May, since it is recorded that some of the stable owners refused to release them to the regiment until their stabling charges had been met.[22] The Militia Committee had previously paid 350l in February and 300l March to stable horses for the entire regiment, while at different times Harvey had paid 278l for stabling of horses in London.[23] The stabling bill for some of Mainwaring's troop from 11 January until 26 May 1644 was 210l when 31 horses were stabled at the Redd Lyon in Grub Street, outside of the City beyond Cripplegate. This tavern was obviously well-frequented by the troop as numerous horses belonging to it had been stabled there for short periods when the troop itself was stationed in Newport Pagnell in late 1643.[24] Harvey stabled some of his horses at the Three Cupps in Broad Street, where the tavern-keeper John Jones charged him 12d each per day. His bill amounted to 167l 11s but only 112l 5s had been paid by 1652 when Jones petitioned for the rest of his money.[25]

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[17] TNA, SP28/135 Part 3, ff.34–37.

[18] *Ibid.*, f.105.

[19] 'Sir, You are desired to send in your horse & armes required of you by warrant from the Militia of London, to the new artillary-ground, upon Monday next being the nine and twentieth of this instant Iuly, by eight of the clock in the forenoone...' (London: 1650), TT E.608 [14].; Militia Minutes, pp.xxx, xxxvi, xl, xlvi, lvii, lxxx.

[20] TNA, SP28/132 Part 1, f.1.

[21] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, ff.502–503; TNA, SP28/22, f.279.

The only evidence of horses being returned to their owners relate to those of Mainwaring's regiment in December 1645, and from these records it seems a similar process, but in reverse, was followed. The horses that returned from the relief of Taunton were made available to the new incarnation of Webb's regiment which suggest they remained in the hands of the City on their return, and so must have been stabled somewhere. When the cavalry and dragoons returned to London in December their horses were stabled in Hounslow and Brentford prior to their inspection and return to their owners, and presumably a notification of sorts was sent to the owner instructing them to collect them promptly, so that the burden of care could be transferred from the City as quickly as possible.[26]

The accounts of both Harvey and Turner illustrate the high rate of the wastage of horses. Blackwell's troop was issued with between 57 and 60 horses when it was raised in early May 1644. According to him, of these 20 were 'un-avoydable lost in Cornwall' either when their riders deserted or lost when they were sick. Some of these were stolen by the Royalists 'contrary to the Articles' while others were 'killed, & tyred, breaking through the Enemy.' 11 more were recorded as making it to Plymouth and were all except one still on hand when Blackwell made his final tally. A further 5 also made it to Plymouth but were subsequently lost. Another 5 died at various times during the summer, 3 were left behind as the regiment advanced through Devon, 3 were killed at Wareham and Plymouth, 10 were captured at various times by the Royalists and 2 were lost when their riders deserted with just 1 being sold. According to Blackwell he lost 83 percent of his mounts during the 1644 campaign.[27] Hackett certainly left two horses in Plymouth when he returned, which suggest he perhaps lost all the others during the campaign.[28]

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[22] JHC 1643–1644, Vol. 3, p.505.

[23] TNA, SP28/131 Part 6, f.1; TNA, SP28/147 Part 1, f.65.

[24] The National Archives, SP28/15, Warrants by army committees, military commanders, May 1644, ff.66–67.

[25] *Ibid.*, p.78.

[26] TNA, SP28/132 Part2, ff.1–70.

[27] TNA, SP28/22, f.278.

[28] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.160.

Similarly the accounts of Harvey and Turner both mention the high wastage rates (see below) but it is the losses suffered by Webb's dragoon regiment in late 1645 that graphically demonstrate how immense a problem this was for a cavalry unit during the Civil War. The regiment was issued with 500 horses in September and was deployed for less than three months when it returned to London in early December. During that period it had not fought in any engagements but lost 173 horses with a further 23 of them dying after they were stabled in the Hounslow and Brentford, a staggering 40 percent wastage rate in barely three months.[29] This loss rate was almost equalled by the 140 horses lost out of the 500 raised a few months earlier for the relief of Taunton over a similar period of time.[30] Clearly, cavalry units suffered high wastage of their horses and must have constantly struggled to both find new ones when on campaign but also to keep the majority of their men actually in the saddle at any given time.

In addition to the constant effort required to provide mounts, the City Horse needed to be sufficiently equipped as well. In the 1642–1643 Propositions, some of the subscribers also provided a variety of equipment but there was no consistency which suggests that they were free to choose what else they provided in addition to the horse. According to one historian's analysis of these subscriptions 173 carbines, 188 case of pistols, 184 buff-coats, 173 swords were provided with just seven sets of armour. From this analysis it is clear that insufficient equipment was provided for all the horses raised.[31] The wording on the original listings is at times ambiguous with phrases such as 'armed complete' and 'furnished complete' often used, and thus it is unclear exactly how much equipment in total was provided. It is also unclear if saddles, bridles and stirrups were included with the horse or if they were provided separately. Only a handful of listings specifically mention that a saddle was included which suggests that they were not ordinarily provided.

The accounts prepared by Harvey which cover the 1642–1643 period show no evidence that he spent money on equipping his men, nor indeed did John Okey for this troop in Browne's dragoons at the same time, suggesting that when the City Horse were first mustered in late 1642 they were already fully equipped from central stores.[32] It is clear that the equipment provided by subscription was insufficient to fully equip each of the troops raised and when horses were listed for Willett's new troop in the spring of 1643 very little equipment was even subscribed.[33] This shortage was probably made good by the horse commissioners at Moorfields who had the responsibility to ensure that each horse was equipped with a saddle (presumably including stirrups and bridle), along with a case of pistols and carbine, when it was handed over to the captain of each troop. This was certainly the case with

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[29] TNA, SP28/132 Part 2, f.71.

[30] JCC Vol. 40, f.143r.

[31] Tincey, 'Armed Complete: How the Well Dressed Parliamentarian Cavalryman Protected Himself in 1642', p.17.

[32] TNA, SP28/147 Part 1, f. 61; TNA, SP28/267 Part 2, ff.34–35.

[33] TNA, SP28/131 Part 5, ff.1–17.

Harvey's own troop who were issued with 60 horses, saddles and arms by the commissioners when it was first raised in October 1642.[34]

With the exception of the 184 provided in 1642, there are no further references to buff-coats being provided at any time to the City Horse, which suggests that if any were worn it was at the expense of the rider and not the government. Richard Browne's commission of 1642 specifically states that his men were to be armed with 'Brest [plate], pistoll proofe, Backe [plate] and Pott [helmet], Carbine, A Case of Pistolls and a Sword, all good and serviceable.'[35] At the same time Harvey's troop was issued with 60 pots, back and breast plates from Owen Rowe, who was both a member of the City Militia Committee but also a major supplier of weaponry for the nascent Parliamentary forces. It is not clear therefore if this armour came from City supplies or from central army stores, but in accounts later prepared by Harvey he was to claim that he had purchased from Rowe arms and armour to the value of over 726l at different times.[36] In April 1644, Rowe was still providing armour for the City Horse when Blackwell purchased 40 sets from him for his newly raised troop, who were also equipped with carbines and pistols but no buff-coats. Interestingly Blackwell's troop was only provided with two swords.[37]

When Turner's regiment was established in the late summer of 1643, also by subscription, he had relied upon the Militia Committee to make good the shortages that the subscription failed to provide, at least for his own troop. No armour was provided from the subscription necessitating the Committee to provide him with 60 sets. They also provided 30 pairs of pistols to add to the 26 pairs provided by the subscribers, 20 more carbines, as the six listed were woefully insufficient, along with an additional 32 saddles.[38] However, when Blackwell's troop was raised in the spring of 1644 the burden of equipping it fell squarely upon the troop commander, perhaps as a result of its unconventional financing. He was responsible for procuring horses from whatever source he could find, which necessitated him travelling as far as Hertford to visit the horse-fair in early April. Drawing money directly from John Dethick he spent 481l 3s for 51 horses at an average cost of 9l 8s 6d per horse. He also purchased 40 great saddles at 42s each, plus 10 'Scotch pads and furniture' for 22s each. The 46 pairs of pistols cost 34s a pair, the 21 carbines cost 22s each, while the 40 sets of pot helmet, back and breast plates, cost 25s per set. The two swords cost 10s each and the 51 sashes were 5s 9d each. In total he spent a further 261l 13s on equipping his troop.[39]

In none of the extant accounts is there any record of hats or boots being issued.

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[34] TNA, SP28/27 Part 1, ff.7 & 9.

[35] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, unpaginated.

[36] TNA, SP28/27 Part 1, f.10; TNA, SP28/146, f.148.

[37] The National Archives, SP28/300, Bills and receipts: army, county committees, 1643–1644, f.1197; TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, ff.504–505.

[38] TNA, SP28/131 Part 1, f.2.

[39] The National Archives, SP28/14, Warrants by army committees, military commanders, Apr 1644, ff.47, 55, 80; TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, ff.501, 506.

Needless to say, equipment was frequently damaged and needed to be either repaired or replaced. At various times Harvey paid over 19l to a Mr Wheelwright and Mr Dawson for repairs to arms, plus 38l for mending saddles for his troop, and a further 20l for saddles in Mainwaring's troop.[40] In early 1644 when Hackett's troop was undertaking a reorganisation in London he paid 3l 10s to a gunsmith for 'fixing & mending of Armes that were spoyled at serverall times' while at the same time paying two saddlers a total of 14l 15s 10d for 'mending of Saddles and Bridles for the Troope.'[41] Prior to the Gloucester campaign Harvey's own troop was re-equipped with 43 new horses, 74 great saddles, 70 pairs of pistols and 70 carbines.[42] After the battle of Newbury, it again needed re-equipping to make good the campaign losses, at which time a further 56 saddles, 96 pairs of pistols and 84 carbines were issued to it by the Militia Committee, which suggests very heavy losses.[43] Replacing lost or damaged equipment on this scale was an expensive proposition. Harvey spent over 1,322l purchasing 183 new horses in early 1644 for his regiment, over 372l for new saddles and bridles plus an additional 800l on new arms, presumably to replace yet more losses when the regiment had been stationed at Newport Pagnell over the previous winter.[44] Such a large number of horses indicates that around half the regiment needed remounts and new equipment by early 1644 – a shockingly high wastage level. That this estimate is accurate seems to be borne out by the specific replacements issued to Hackett's troop in May. On that occasion his troop was provided with 32 new horses, 30 saddles and 30 carbines.[45] When the troop mustered in July it consisted of 67 officers and men, so it is plausible that around half of the troop required a resupply of horses and equipment prior to the Cornwall campaign.[46]

The senior officers were also entitled to have wagons to carry their personal possessions when on campaign. In 1644 Harvey purchased a wagon for this personal use valued at 12l plus two draught horses, valued at 23l, to draw it, while at the same time he spent the staggering amount of 55l for a horse for his own use.[47] Hackett, however, being only a captain believed he was entitled to an allowance of 4s 8d per day in addition to his pay to cover his expenses of providing his own wagon and horse, but when he submitted his claim for this payment for the period October 1643 to May 1644 it was rejected, though there is other evidence that he did receive some wagon money.[48]

A closer examination of Harvey and Turner's various accounts provides a fascinating insight into the matter of loss and wastage of both horses and equipment. The losses that Harvey's regiment incurred during the

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[40] TNA, SP28/146, ff.148, 147.

[41] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.160.

[42] TNA, SP28/27 Part 1, f.3.

[43] *Ibid.*, p.6.

[44] TNA, SP28/146, ff.147–149.

[45] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.142.

[46] Symonds (C. E. Long, ed.), *Symonds Diary*, p.98.

[47] TNA, SP28/146, f.152.

[48] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, ff.145, 161.

Gloucester and Newbury campaigns have been already outlined in Chapter Three. Further equipment and horses were subsequently lost during the time the regiment was stationed around Newport Pagnell that winter and these needed replacing before it joined Essex's army in May 1644.[49] A set of accounts belonging to Harvey illustrate how much rebuilding the regiment required during the first months of 1644. A total of 2,776l was provided to recruit each of the existing regimental troops (excluding Blackwell's) up to full strength and to re-equip them. This was in addition to the 3,521l, the majority of which had come from the proceeds of the sale of wood off Lord Petre's estate, that Harvey had already spent on re-equipping his regiment that year along with his other needs. The magnitude of the task can be clearly judged as he spent over 1,400l on 163 horses, 126 new saddles and 112 old ones, as well as including funds spent on repairing equipment. Arms valued at 726l were purchased from Owen Rowe in a single payment, along with numerous other smaller sums for swords, bridles, pistols and armour. A new chirugeon's chest and instruments was also purchased at a cost of 12l 9s.[50] By the time the regiment left London at the end of May it had been fully re-equipped and recruited but unfortunately it was to be all for nothing as the regiment was all but destroyed in Cornwall, with the loss of nearly all its horses and much of its equipment. According to Harvey's later badly mutilated accounts his troop lost heavily in Cornwall, but the accounts are too damaged to exactly tell the extent of this loss. However the accounts do show that he lost 116 saddles and 105 sets of body armour in the campaign, which suggests the wastage of horses was also very high, perhaps close to 100 percent.[51] Hackett stated that his troop left at least 28 horses in Plymouth when his men returned to London in December, and at least 8 were lost in Cornwall, 4 were noted has having been killed while all the rest were simply stated as having been lost, along with virtually all of the soldier's weapons and equipment. Although, in Hackett's case not all his equipment was lost for six complete sets of body armour, four old saddles and 3 sets of back and breast plates were returned to an undisclosed State store.[52]

Richard Turner's own troop provides another example of the high rate of wastage the City Horse were prone to. The troop received a total of 84 horses when it was first raised, of which 69 were given to troopers and the remainder mounted the officers. Of these only 60 remained with the troop when it was mustered on 2 December. Of those missing 17 had been lost at Olney, 4 had been lost when their riders had deserted, 2 had died and one had broken its leg.[53] Of the 60 left, two were subsequently lost during the fighting at Grafton House, four were sold as being unserviceable, five died, one had been stolen, two were taken by their riders when they deserted while

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[49] TNA, SP28/27 Part 1, f.5.

[50] TNA, SP28/146, ff.146–158.

[51] TNA, SP28/27 Part 1, ff.8, 9, 10.

[52] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, ff.142–143.

[53] TNA, SP28/132 Part 1, f.1.

William Watty sold his for 16s. Of the 84 provided only 45 (53.57 percent) remained when the regiment returned to London in early 1644.[54]

Captain Gheste's accounts illustrate how he lost some of his horses. He had provided six of his own horses for his personal use when he raised his troop in 1643, and of these one was lost at Olney and two went lame.[55] The fate of some of his troop's other horses make interesting reading. One white gelding, which had been duly listed in his troop, was forcibly taken from the rider at Shoemakers Hall by an officer in Waller's army, while one was stolen from a stable in London, never to be seen again. Another was lost at Olney but secured by Herriot Washbourne who then retained it with Harvey's permission, while a further 10 were lost when their riders fled during the battle. In total he later claimed his troop had lost at least 32 horses.[56] Given the recorded wastage rates suffered by Harvey's and Turner's regiments it is hard to imagine that Washbourne's and Underwood's troops, who endured an equally lengthy deployment, were also in such in a dilapidated and pitiful state by the time they returned to London. Clearly the costs related to equipping the City Horse were high and this required a constant flow of money to be made available to pay for them.

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[54] *Ibid.*

[55] TNA, SP28/139 Part 10, f.106.

[56] *Ibid.*, pp.106–107.

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Financing the City Horse

As Parliament began to raise soldiers for the inevitable clash of arms with the King during the summer of 1642 it clearly needed a mechanism to finance them. Initially it expected to finance the war effort based on well-affected individuals loaning either cash, plate, horses, weaponry, and other valuables to be repaid, on the public faith, at some ill-defined date in the future at an interest rate of 8 percent per annum.[1] The initial cavalry raised for Essex's army were financed by this method but by September the well-affected that voluntarily contributed their wealth were losing their enthusiasm and so Parliament provided a further incentive by appointing collectors to coerce, cajole, or otherwise convince the Country's people to be more generous in their largesse.[2] Inevitably the major part of this burden fell upon the citizens of London and it was they, for the most part, that financed not just the main Parliamentary army throughout the war, but the City militia as well. Had the war been over in 1642, this voluntary method of finance would have been sufficient for Parliament's needs and indeed it was adequate to provide the cash to raise the original City Horse troops during the autumn, when over 9,000l value of horses and equipment were collected but as the war progressed it was clear that a more formal and regular source of tax revenue would be required.[3]

The London radical, Richard Shute, was one of the first to call for a more structured approach to finance the war effort in late 1642, and generally his proposals were adopted by Parliament over the next few months, and this provided the mechanism it needed to pay for the main army under the Earl of Essex.[4] Nevertheless, while the revenue raised by the introduction of the Weekly Assessment and the Excise Tax was vast, it was still insufficient to pay all of Parliament's expenses in fighting the war and the inevitable peripheral parts of the war machine, such as the London militia, received little direct money from these collections. As Parliament provided no legal revenue generating opportunities for the City to pay for its militia until 1645,

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[1] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 2, pp.6–9.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp.24–25.

[3] TNA, SP28/131 Part 5, ff.1–17.

[4] *JHC 1640–1643*, Vol. 2, pp.857–859.

London was very much reliant on funding the militia from subscription and whatever other ingenious strategies it might construct. However, the inability of London to finance the army of the General Rising in 1643 and the relatively underwhelming response for subscribers to finance and maintain Turner's regiment, graphically illustrates how limited the City was in being able to finance a military force independent of Parliament.

One alternative method of financing was to take what they could from the enemy. In March 1643, Parliament granted the militia the authority to seize the possessions of anybody thought to be either supporting or sympathising with their Royalist foes, and this gave the City Horse the opportunity to self-finance themselves when the Earl of Essex specifically allowed Harvey and Turner to seize goods and money where they saw fit.[5] In June Essex extended this authority by informing the Militia Committee that Harvey's regiment was to be 'maintained and paid first out of the proceeds, and the remainder to be employed in the service of the state'. [6]

Harvey lost no time in implementing these new directives. As a result between June and late August alone he seized goods valued at just over 8,686l from 26 alleged Royalist sympathisers in and around London, including the staggering amount of 4,000l in cash taken by Captain-Lieutenant Thomas Gregson from a Mr Squires in the City,[7] 849l taken by Richard Turner himself from Sir Ralph Maddison that had been concealed in two wooded chests and numerous bags, plus almost 900l worth of plate taken from Worcester House in the Strand. Numerous others were also plundered for lesser amounts in cash and kind, all of which helped fill the coffers of Christopher Charterhouse, an officer in Harvey's regiment, who was assigned to receive the seized property. In addition to this a further sum of 723l was collected in cash, supposedly by voluntary contribution, from over 300 individuals across Surrey on 22 July alone. Also taken by Harvey's soldiers were dozens of horses including two horses owned by the Earl of Westmorland, three mares taken from Lady Camden, and the single black gelding with a star on its nose seized from Sir George Whitmore. While some of the horses were handed over to John Smith and Thomas Richardson at Moorfield for the use of the army the majority were retained by the regiment.

During the course of these raids Harvey's men also took numerous arms and weapons as well, such as the two carbines, a pair of pistols, a collar and '2 Cartouth boxes' with two poweder flasks from the Duke of Lennox's steward, or the 3 pairs of pistols with holsters taken at Sir John Brookes's house, or the leather coat, a belt, two 'Shorte Gunns', a carbine, a 'Lone barrell', a poleaxe, three powder flasks with some arms making paraphernalia seized from Mr Horner in Surrey, who was reputed to be a gunsmith in the Royalist Army. Most of these arms were delivered to the 'maggazine' for future use. Also taken from various individuals was a large quantity of jewellery and precious stones, but the records are too damaged to assess their worth or know how they were disposed of.[8]

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[5] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.106–117; TNA, SP16/539 Part 2, f.50.; *CSPD Add.*, p.648.

[6] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1641–43*, p.466; TNA, SP16/497, f.165.

[7] 1000l of which was handed over to the Salters Hall Committee.

During the summer a total of 9,410l was taken by Harvey, which he spent almost as quickly as it was collected. He was able to use 2,800l of this money to pay his regiment on 19 June, 17 July, 24 July, 9 and 22 September. Part of this money, 2,000l, was handed over to Sir Gilbert Gerrard, Treasurer-at-War, for the main army's use and Harvey was also able to contribute 310l to help pay for the soldiers in the Earl of Essex's train of artillery before setting off to relieve Gloucester. Smaller sums were disbursed for a variety of miscellaneous expenses associated with the regiment, as well as for new arms, horses, fodder and equipment. On at least two occasions, lesser amounts were given to unnamed individuals 'for Carringe notes to warne the [Militia?] Committee' while a certain Mr Cross was given a gold coin valued at 10s.[9]

The following year a new scheme was proposed to finance Harvey's regiment. The navy, desperately short of timber, had petitioned Parliament to obtain timber from trees on delinquent estates for its use, and the Lords subsequently established a committee to investigate how best this could be achieved, which was followed by an Act that was passed by Parliament on 16 April 1644.[10] The Committee of Both Kingdoms had been considering how best to finance the recruiting and re-equipping of Harvey's regiment since the middle of March, and obviously thought disposal of timber might be the solution to the problem. Thus, on 24 March, Sir Henry Vane, who was both a Navy Commissioner and a member of the Committee of Both Kingdoms, was asked to present a motion to Parliament calling for an Act to grant the disposal of 3,000l worth of timber from the Royalist Lord William Petre's estates in Essex, and the proceeds used to recruit Harvey's regiment.[11] Under the terms of the Act, that was passed on 15 April, the Essex County Committee was to identify what timber was to be felled, arrange for its sale and to hand over the proceeds to Harvey, who was entitled to send his own representatives to oversee the process.[12] The disposal of the timber must have happened almost immediately for Harvey was soon in possession of 1,900l in cash from the proceeds, plus a further 454l 14s 9d received from the estate tenants by order of Lord Saye and Sele. Timber valued at 662l had also been disposed of but the money had not yet been received when Harvey drew up the accounts for the recruitment of his regiment, most likely in May 1644.[13] Of this latter sum 292l was still owing in August 1645.[14]

Harvey certainly sent some of his soldiers to the estate to supervise since they incurred expenses there on entertaining the tenants.[15] It seems that Harvey may also have played a part in the disposal of the timber, despite it being the responsibility of the Essex Committee, for he paid a woodmonger called Hooper 10l for some undisclosed purpose as well as entertaining the "M[aste]r of the Company of the Woodmongers".[16] The money received from this scheme went a long way to cover the costs of his regiment's re-equipping that spring.

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[8] TNA, SP28/135 Part 3, ff.24, 23, 22, 34–38, 40.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp.20–22.

[10] *JHL*, Vol. 6, p.520.

[11] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, p.70.

[12] *JHL*, Vol. 6, p.520.

[13] TNA, SP28/146, f.147.

[14] TNA, SP28/147 Part 1, f.66.

[15] TNA, SP28/146, f.150.

In 1644, with enthusiasm for further subscription based loans waning, the City tried new tactics to raise money for horses. In an effort to tap into a new source of finance, in April the Militia Committee attempted to obtain horse subscriptions from the well-affected maidens of the capital.[17] A similar scheme had been effected in Norwich the previous year in order to raise a troop of horse in Cromwell's regiment, and also called the Maiden Troop; it is possible that this was the inspiration for the City's proposal.[18] The accounts for Captain Blackwell's troop show that he received 812l 12s 6d for his troop's establishment directly from John Dethick, but how Dethick raised this amount is unclear.[19] The broadsheet *Mercuricus Civicus* informed its readers in early April that the 'well affected Maidens in and about the City of London' who, sharing the same risks as their menfolk and unwilling to 'subject themselves to the outrageous usage of the Cavaliers' had taken it upon themselves for the 'raising and setting forth a Regiment of Horse in defence of King and Parliament'. They had already raised the sum of 62l and were hopeful of raising considerably more.[20] Inevitably, perhaps, this new troop, as only a troop and not a regiment was raised, was referred to as the Maiden Troop but at what point the raising of the troop was taken over by the City is unclear.

Dethick was a merchant involved in overseas trade, an associate of Maurice Thompson, and who was also involved with the East India Company. He was later an army treasurer, a future Lord Mayor and was well connected to radical circles within the City. Interestingly, he also had commercial links with Norwich and so might have also had a connection with the raising of the troop of the same name in that city.[21] In April, when Blackwell needed funds, he wrote to Dethick at a Leadenhall address, possibly at the East India Company offices there, but the accounts do not mention where the money came from. There is no evidence to tie the funds to the East India Company, despite Dethick's connection, while internal evidence from Blackwell's accounts suggest that the source was not from the Militia Committee at Guildhall either, nor from the army, for his accounts clearly differentiate from whom he obtained his money.[22] Most likely Dethick was acting as trustee for the money raised by this novel scheme but how much of it was actually raised by the maidens of London is impossible to ascertain. What is clear from Blackwell's accounts, however, is that the money raised was sufficient to fully equip his troop and provide it with mounts, without the need for the City to contribute any additional funds.[23]

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[16] *Ibid.*; TNA, SP28/147 Part 1, f.66.

[17] Thomas Bates, *Mercurius Civicus, 11–18 April 1644*, TT E.43 [10], p.476.

[18] Charles Harding Firth, 'The Raising of the Ironsides', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Vol. 13, pp.17–73, 1899, pp.31–32.

[19] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.501.

[20] *Mercurius Civicus, 11–18 April 1644*, p.476.

[21] TNA, SP16/453, f.120.

[22] Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, pp.139, 175; TNA, SP28/14, ff.47, 55, 80; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.656–660.

By 1645, the sources of voluntary subscription to raise the City Horse were virtually nonexistent as the war weary inhabitants of London resisted and resented each new attempt by the government to squeeze yet more money from them to finance the war. In February, Parliament finally legislated to provide the City with the specific means to not just raise money to fund the militia but also to force the capital's inhabitants to provide horses and riders when the Militia Committee deemed it necessary.[24] The Committee now had the authority to assess all inhabitants who they believed had failed to contribute their fair share to the war effort, as well as the power to force the inhabitants to provide up to two horses, riders and arms at their own cost, if the assessors believed they had the resources to pay. While this Act was primarily intended to force malignants to contribute, it gave the City far-reaching permission to levy yet more financial burden on the inhabitants of the capital, although the Act itself was only to be valid for eight months.

Despite the recourse to legal coercion being available, the City still found it difficult to raise money for more cavalry during the summer of 1645. When the Commons requested a force of 500 dragoons to be sent to relieve Taunton in early June the Militia Committee said that they lacked the resources to comply with the request. With no cavalry force remaining in London they were concerned that if they attempted to raise another unit, they would fail to raise sufficient funds through a subscription, such was the financial fatigue the inhabitants were feeling. Common Council debated how best to motivate the inhabitants to provide the fiscal support to the project and even drafted up a list of explanations that could be used to convince the populace to contribute, and which were subsequently printed for distribution across the City. Armed with sufficient justification for the need for yet more fund-raising, assessors were subsequently sent door to door across the Wards of London raising what money they could.[25] It is unclear to what extent the Committee was successful in raising money and horses, but the regiment was quickly in the field, so presumably it raised sufficient funds.

Common Council was still able to squeeze yet more money from the inhabitants in late July when Parliament demanded a force be raised from various counties, including the City of London, for the reduction of Oxford and surrounding areas. This time it was ordered that only persons with an estate valued in excess of 40l per annum were required to contribute towards a single horse and rider, to a value of 12l for a cavalryman and 6l for a dragoon. Optimistically Parliament ordered that these loans be repaid from future receipts from the sale of delinquents' estates. No mention was made that interest would be paid on the principal.[26] Between 26 July and 29 August a total of 1,727l was contributed by 427 donors, only 6 of whom contributed the maximum loan of 12l, while the average amount contributed was 3l 6s, not even enough to equip a single dragoon, let alone a cavalryman.[27] The Westminster Militia Committee were able to extract the proportionately higher amount of 6l 2s from 26 donors for the troop it raised for the same force, with three contributing the full 12l, plus a further two who provided it a horse with complete arms and one who provided just a set of armour.[28] But is clear that it was becoming increasingly harder for the citizens to voluntarily contribute the funds needed to raise new units of cavalry.

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[23] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, ff.514–505.

[24] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.648–650.

[25] JCC Vol. 40, f.104r.

[26] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.735–736.

In September, when yet more cavalry were requested the City, possibly fearing widespread opposition, felt the need to use the draconian law of February 1645 to force the inhabitants to part with even more of their money. As this was not a voluntary subscription it was possible to extract the full amount of 12l per person as prescribed in the Act of Parliament. Of the 493 registered subscribers, 285 of them loaned the sum of 12l while a further 208 inhabitants provided a horse and equipment valued, by the City Muster-Master, at the same amount.[29]

The forced loans of September 1645 are the last records that have been found that illustrate how London financed the raising of the City Horse during the period 1642–1660. With the absence of any further evidence it can only be speculated as to how later units of cavalry were financed. In 1647 and 1648 units of volunteer horse were established and most likely it was the rider that provided both horse and arms, saving the City the burden of the cost. When full regiments were raised in 1646, 1648, 1649, 1650–1651, 1659 and 1660 it could be assumed that they were raised by a similar system of subscription but whether mandatory or voluntary is unknown. Certainly in some case, such as Skippon's activities in 1648 and Ireton's efforts in 1659, horses were seized from suspected Royalists, a method that might well have been utilised on a number of other occasions.

The London citizens certainly struggled to finance the incessant calls for more cavalry units to be raised throughout the period under review, but the City also had to find the money to pay the soldiers once they were raised. No specific legislation was enacted that provided the City with a constant source of money to maintain its forces, although that was the intention of the Weekly Meal tax. As such both the City and the armies in which the units served were required to find the money from whatever sources they had access to. During its existence Harvey's regiment received money from the Militia Committee, the central army treasurers, from money held by the Earl of Essex, as well as from the local County Committee in Plymouth. Turner's regiment was paid for by the Militia Committee, but it was the lack of funds in 1644 that led directly to the regiment being transferred to the Western Association. Browne's troops in Abingdon received money from a variety of sources as well, though there is no evidence that the City contributed to their maintenance. The forces raised in 1645 were to be deployed for a limited duration and then disbanded which minimised the City's liability at a time when it believed it was being bled dry to pay for the war effort. Despite this the legislation that established Mainwaring's and Webb's regiments granted the City the authority to levy an additional sum of 10,000l in the City to pay for it, but how this was actually raised is unclear.

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[27] TNA, SP28/162 Part1, unpaginated.

[28] TNA, E179/253/12, ff.35–36.

[29] TNA, SP28/132 Part2, ff.1–70.

Pay was a constant problem that all armies struggled with during the Civil War and the City Horse were no different.

The rates of pay for individual soldiers of the City Horse in 1642 are not clear but at the end of 1643[30] the daily pay rates in Harvey's own troop had been set at:

Captain-Lieutenant	18s
Lieutenant	18s
Cornet	8s 2d*
Quartermaster	5s 8d*
Chirugeon	4s
Saddler	5s
Corporal	3s
Trooper	2s 6d

* plus troopers daily pay

However in July 1644 the officers of Blackwell's troop were being paid at a different rate:

Captain	1l 7s
Lieutenant	15s 4d
Cornet	11s 6d
Quartermaster	10s 6d
Trooper	2s 6d[31]

Unfortunately none of the sources explicitly state the standard daily rate of pay and, particularly in the case of the officers, the amounts could vary over pay periods suggesting that some deductions were being made that were not shown in the accounts that have survived. While the pay for an ordinary trooper was a standard 2s 6d per day, it seems that officers' pay was not standardised across Harvey's regiment, or perhaps was simply different in Blackwell's troop because of how it was raised. The ordinary trooper could consider himself lucky for in early 1645 when the pay rates for the New Model Army were set the trooper was paid 2s per day, 6d per day less than Harvey's troopers had been receiving.[32]

While the total wages paid to the officers and men of Turner's troop are extant for its short-lived existence, the amounts are too inconsistent to accurately calculate a daily rate, so it is impossible to identify if there were any differences between Turner and Harvey's regiments.[33]

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[30] TNA, SP28/131 Part 7, ff.1–4.

[31] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.502.

[32] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, p.232.

[33] TNA, SP28/132 Part 1.

Captain John Okey of Browne's dragoons in 1642 was being paid 20s per day, less than captains in the cavalry regiments were being paid at the time.[34]

Evidence suggests that Harvey's regiment did receive frequent pay from late 1642 until it was destroyed in late 1644, but was nevertheless always in arrears. Harvey's troop was probably first mustered on 1 November 1642 and received its first three weeks' pay on 21 November, followed by a further 30 days on 6 December and another 30 days on 31 December. Constant pay continued into January 1643, and it received another 30 days pay on 26 January and a further 30 days pay on 27 February. Partial pay was received on 28 March, with a further 30 days' pay on 10 May, which was the last payment received from the Militia Committee until late in the year.[35] While all of these payments relate to Harvey's own troop it is likely that the other troops were paid at the same time for the same number of days. From 19 June 1643 until 22 September 1643 (93 days) they received pay on four separate occasions from money the regiment had seized, but the amounts paid seem to have covered barely a week's pay each time, meaning they were probably over 8 weeks in arrears by September.[36] The troop of Symon Hackett, who replaced Willett after his death at Aldbourne, received pay on 19 October for about 25 days but it is unclear whether the rest of the regiment was paid at the same time. His troop was also paid regularly until the end of November but again it is unclear if the rest of the regiment was paid during this time, although it is likely that they were and this was perhaps one of the few periods of sustained pay the regiment received.[37] Between 1 December 1643 and 28 May 1644 (179 days) the regiment was paid a total of 4,679l for 55 days' pay, meaning for that period alone they were 124 days or almost 18 weeks in arrears.[38] This included 28 days advance pay on 2 May as an incentive for the regiment to leave London. No records exist of regimental pay for the duration of the Cornish campaign but Blackwell's troop received 14 days' pay on 24 July and a further 14 days' pay at Plymouth on 2 September.[39] Essex paid the regiment a fortnight's pay, 2,000l by the General's reckoning, on 2 September but this pay is only recorded in Blackwell's troop accounts and there are no surviving records of what the other troops received at that time.[40] It would seem probable that the rest of the regiment was paid on the same dates, thus it was a further 10 weeks in arrears after the breakout from Lostwithiel. Hackett's accounts show that his troop received no pay for either himself or his troop when he was in Plymouth, although he was provided with a daily allowance for food while there by the local Committee.[41]

The account records compiled by Robert Mainwaring, the regimental major and the officer responsible for overseeing the receipt and distribution of pay, show that in the period between the regiment's return to London at the end of January 1644 and its eventual departure to join Essex at the end of May, it was paid regularly. While his accounts shed more light on how they were paid they also illustrate that they were only paid for a few days per month during this time. On 21 February they were paid for just five days, on 8 March the officers received seven days' pay but the soldiers just three. On 1 April, the officers received pay for three days while the soldiers were given four days' pay.[42] While it was possible that they were just short paid because of the constant lack of money, it rather looks as if this was not the case and that these were just the days the soldiers served during that particular pay period. It would be cruel indeed if the officers were paying themselves for more days than their troopers. Harvey's regiment was, after all, a militia unit and by its nature part-time and, as with their comrades in the Trained Bands, they were not expected to be on duty permanently when in London, but they were expected to serve for a limited number of days in a given period. The records also indicate that the regiment was also paying for stabling of their horses during this period, which suggests that their mounts were not necessarily available to them during that time and which further suggests that the regiment had been demobilised. Certainly, the horses could not be removed from their quarters in May until the bills had been settled indicating that they were not being used during the day. This further supports the argument that the regiment was not active during the period and that the soldiers were only required to attend to duty a few days in a month, possibly for training or night guard duties. In each case the officers were paid slightly more days, which might reflect the extra administrative work they were required to undertake. However, in the case of Captain Symon Hackett, he was paid for every day during this period.[43] In total the regiment received 2,023l 15s 11d in pay between 11 December 1643 and the end of May 1644.[44]

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[34] TNA, SP28/267 Part 2, f.38. My thanks to Stephen Ede-Borrett for bringing this to my attention.

[35] TNA, SP28/146, ff.133–136; TNA, SP28/147 Part 1, f.62.

[36] TNA, SP28/135 Part 3, ff.20–22.; TNA, SP28/146, f.136.; TNA, SP28/147 Part 1, f.63.

[37] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, ff.146–156.

[38] TNA, SP28/131 Part 6, ff.1–3; TNA, SP28/131 Part 7, ff.1–20.; TNA, SP28/147 Part 1, ff.64–65.

[39] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, ff.502–503.

[40] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644*, pp.493–494.

[41] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.147.

Turner's regiment similarly also received regular pay until it was removed from City responsibility in early 1644, receiving 3,923l between 29 October 1643 and the end of February 1644, while a further 2,000l was paid on 2 March to settle the arrears before the regiment was transferred to Thompson. On 24 May, a further 500l was also received to help pay off the arrears.[45] For the rest of the regiment's existence it suffered the poor discipline consistent with infrequently paid troops, but how often it was paid is unclear. It certainly was paid occasionally when serving in Massey's brigade but when it was disbanded in 1646 the miserly six weeks' pay provided to cover its arrears was grossly insufficient.[46] Washbourne and Underwood's troops received pay when they were in Abingdon, but this was also woefully in arrears leading to constant reports of desertion and even mutiny. Despite this Browne reckoned at the end of October Underwood's troop was only 4 to 5 weeks in arrears.[47]

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[42] TNA, SP28/131 Part 6, ff.1–2.

[43] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.145.

[44] TNA, SP28/131 Part 6, f.3.

[45] TNA, SP28/132 Part 1, f.2.

[46] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.116.; *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, p.728; Sprigge, *Anglia Rediviva*, p.310.

[47] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, p.84.

Hanson's short-lived company of dragoons raised in August 1645, did not suffer from an arrears of pay problem. The company mustered at Henley on 15 August, and the majority were disbanded on 14 September and all 70 soldiers were paid for the full month. The officers and eight of the soldiers remained in arms until May 1646 when they were all paid up to date and discharged. In total the City paid the relatively small sum of 798l 17s for the services of this particular company during its brief existence.[48]

In the case of Harvey's regiment it seems that the officers were provided with 'mounting money', a sum provided to each officer to provide the necessary equipment required for the troop that was not provided from central stores, although it is probable that all the troop commanders were entitled to this amount as well.[49] There seems to have been no need to report these expenses in detail and the money was disbursed at the discretion of the officers, and so there is no way to know how much was legitimately spent preparing the troop and how much was retained. Harvey had disbursed 412l by November 1642 in this manner.[50]

Unfortunately, the surviving records for City Horse pay are very patchy with virtually nothing remaining after 1646. It is known that pay was hurriedly provided to Mainwaring's regiment in late July 1647 before the Presbyterian dominated Militia Committee was cast aside, showing that money could be found to pay them when needed.[51] In 1651 when Blundell's regiment was raised it was intended that it be paid directly by the army and not the City and there is evidence that they were indeed paid regularly during the period that they were in service, and their arrears were settled when the regiment was disbanded at the end of the year.[52] Perhaps the one occasion that the City Horse might have been willing to serve without pay was when they were mustered in May 1660 to welcome to London the newly returned Charles II but ironically they were well paid for their service. Browne's regiment was paid 1,160l 10s for the 11 weeks they were on duty during this period, which included the 30s per day allowance for the officers' horses.[53]

In addition to equipment, horses and money the City Horse also required an effective command and control structure to be in place to enable it to function effectively.

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[48] TNA, SP28/131 Part 8, ff.1–3.

[49] TNA, SP28/147 Part 1, f.61; TNA, SP28/146, f.133.

[50] TNA, SP28/147 Part 1, f.61.

[51] TNA, SP28/237 Part 1, unpaginated.

[52] TNA, SP28/80, ff.196, 198, 202, 246, 262, 290, 300, 364, 382; *JHC 1651–1659*, Vol. 7, pp.24–25.

[53] LMA, Orders of the commissioners for the Militia of the City of London upon the Chamberlain for payment of the expenses of the Horse Regiment of Militia and the Blue, Green, White, Yellow, Red and Orange Regiments of the Auxiliary Forces of the City; Militia Minutes, p.lxxxvii.

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Commanding the City Horse

The tradition of the collective defence of a geographic region by able bodied men in England stretched back as far as the Anglo-Saxon *fyrd*, in which able bodied citizens were banded together in times of war or invasion. In time, these citizens became organised on a county (or borough) basis and were provided weaponry and training on a regular basis. They could be called out for local service upon the orders of the county Lord-Lieutenant, who was himself the personal representative of the monarch in the shire. Prior to the English Civil War the military forces of England were under the exclusive command of the sovereign; the Lord Lieutenants could act only upon the instruction of the monarch. By the seventeenth century this militia was known as the Trained Bands. At that time Parliament had no constitutional authority to raise military forces but it did have the right to raise the money needed to finance them, and this led to conflict between it and King Charles I in the years prior to the outbreak of the Civil War.

In 1637 it was estimated that the English Trained Bands throughout the country had a nominal strength of 93,718 infantry and 5,239 cavalry.[1] Impressive as this force was on paper it was for the most part ill-equipped, lacking in basic training, poorly led, and of minimal military use. The figures for London appear to be estimates only, with some 3,000 pikemen and 3,000 musketeers listed, but no cavalry. Middlesex was recorded as having 1,581 infantry and 80 cavalry, while Surrey had 1,500 infantry and 125 cavalry. There is no separate listing for Westminster and so the militia there were presumably included in the Middlesex total, as presumably the Trained Bands in Southwark, if there were any, were included in the Surrey numbers. Certainly the accuracy of these national, and indeed London, figures are questionable though they do seem to highlight a significant shortage of cavalry involved in the militia. This is perhaps not surprising; horses were expensive to acquire and equally as expensive to maintain, as was the weaponry needed for mounted troops. But they were also unnecessary. The Trained Bands were a locally raised volunteer force for the protection of their county and were not expected to serve beyond the county boundaries and were not intended to be an independent army and therefore had little need for mounted troops. That London had none at all is again hardly surprising. The role of the City Trained Bands was to protect the City from behind its walls and to provide law and order within, and thus horses would be of little use in the crowded and confined space of this urban area. The Trained Bands of the City were not intended to serve outside of the environs from whence they came and so needed no cavalry. They had a purely defensive role and had no need of the more offensive arm – cavalry.

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[1] The National Archives, SP16/381, State Papers Domestic, Charles I, 1638, ff.143–144.

In London command of military forces prior to 1642 was complicated by the proximity of the monarch in Whitehall, but also by the presence of the Royal garrison in the Tower of London, commanded by a Royal appointee. While the City of London had the right to establish its own militia that was nominally commanded by the Lord Mayor, he required Royal instruction to muster them.[2] The link of Royal command over London's militia was severed by the political chaos of early 1642 that saw first a Parliamentary appointed and controlled Militia Committee established with nominal control of the militia; secondly, the removal of the King's appointed Constable from the Tower and the Lord Mayor; and finally by the departure from London of the King himself. This created a legal vacuum of command that was not filled for some months. The March 1642 Act of Parliament that established the London Militia Committee put the militia under the control of Parliament, but it provided the committee with no authority to raise additional forces.[3] The City of London was therefore legally obliged to seek the authority of Parliament should it wish to raise additional militia forces. The Parliamentary chain of command was further complicated when Parliament appointed the Earl of Essex as Lord General of all its forces, including the Trained Bands nationally, but this conflicted with the powers to command the City militia granted to the Militia Committee some months earlier.[4] While there was no specific mention of the London militia in his commission the broad definition of his powers clearly included all the militia forces in the country. Although Essex never attempted to give orders directly to the London militia, he was certainly at times granting commissions and general instructions to London officers, especially in 1643, creating a level of confusion in the command structure.[5] In practice Essex was in no position to directly order the London militia as he always relied upon the goodwill of the Militia Committee, and thus he had to constantly couch his orders in the terms of requests via Parliament to the Militia Committee, as in 1643 when he needed the Trained Bands to march to the relief of Gloucester. A similar degree of confusion in command also existed when Sir William Waller needed City forces in 1644, but by that time Parliament's war effort was directed by the Committee of Both Kingdoms and the Militia Committee had no difficulty in taking orders directly from it.

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[2] Nagel, 'Militia', pp.6,11.

[3] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.1–5 & 5–6.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp.14–17.

[5] TNA, SP16/539 Part 2, f.50; TNA, SP16/497, f.165.

From the end of 1643 onwards a clear structure of command had been established. Parliament would direct its military ideas and requests to the Committee of Both Kingdoms, who would either discuss the requirements formally (or informally) with the Common Council directly or through the Militia Committee to obtain consensus and agreement. Orders were then issued from the Committee of Both Kingdoms to the Militia Committee who had the responsibility to implement them. Both Committees worked together in the spirit of mutual collaboration rather than the Committee of Both Kingdoms imposing its will directly. For the most part this worked satisfactorily with the notable exception of Harvey's outright refusal to serve under Waller in 1644, which showed how toothless the committee could be in the face of any opposition. This system continued in place even after the formation of the Derby House Committee in 1647, although the army was able to directly control the Militia Committee briefly between August 1647 and June 1648. With the advent of the Commonwealth in 1649, the Council of State took over the same function which was carried over into the Protectorate. Although militia activity was minimal during these years the nominal command structure remained in place throughout, except during the brief rule of the Major-Generals when Skippon and Barkstead had direct command over the City militia, bypassing the City government. In the chaos of 1659, the only time in this period that the City Horse were deployed, it was on a direct order from Parliament to the Lord Mayor, also entirely circumventing the organs of City government. The following year the new Militia Committee effectively took its orders directly from General Monck and to all intents and purposes the City Horse were merely an extension of the army for the few months before the Restoration.

A clear indication of who was actually commanding the City Horse, and from whom they were to take their orders, can be seen in who issued the officers' commissions. Unfortunately very few of these exist but those that do are useful. Browne's commission as captain of a troop of horse, issued on 12 October 1642, was clearly issued by the London Militia Committee under the authority granted it by Parliament and that he was to take his orders directly from the Committee. No mention was made of any authority the Lord General had over him.[6] However, the following month his commission to command the London dragoons was signed by the Earl of Warwick, without mention of either the Lord General or the Militia Committee, and that he was clearly instructed to take further orders from Warwick himself.[7] When Warwick's army failed to materialise it might be assumed that a new commission from Essex was issued bringing the regiment under his command, but this is conjecture, although plausible. The regiment then served under Waller, who had his orders from Essex and there is no evidence that the Militia Committee had any control over the regiment while it existed. No commissions remain for Turner's officers, but Turner's accounts make it clear that his regiment was under the control of the Militia Committee when it mustered, until the Committee transferred responsibility for it to the

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[6] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, unpaginated.

[7] TNA, SP17/F, f.11.

Western Committee in March 1644. However, as the origins of the regiment lie within the Salters Hall Committee's activities, and they appointed their own horse commissioner independent of the main army commissioners, it is apparent that they fully intended to control the regiment and it was only after the committee was subsumed by the Militia Committee that control passed to the City government.[8] From that point until 1647 it can be assumed that it was the Militia Committee that issued all further commissions.

With the fractious events of 1647, the Militia Committee found itself in control of not only the London militia but also the army of reformados that Massey was raising, although who actually issued the officers' commissions (if any were issued) is unclear. However, it was certainly the Militia Committee, without approval of Common Council, that was controlling the City Horse. The following year Parliament disrupted the command structure by appointing Philip Skippon to command the auxiliary forces in London, which led to the clash between it and the City over who commanded the forces in London. This led to the unusual situation where Skippon, Rossiter and Butler's cavalry were commanded by Parliament through the Derby House Committee, who commissioned the officers, while the Militia Committee controlled the short-lived militia regiment of Richard Greaves. Control of the City Horse in 1651 was just as confusing, when Blundell's regiment was raised as a militia unit but whose officers were selected by the army, while it served under army orders and pay. Owen Rowe's brief regiment was controlled directly by the Militia Committee who presumably issued its commissions as well. No such confusion existed in 1660, when Browne's regiment was raised, and the officers appointed directly by the Militia Committee.[9]

While it was important that there was a defined chain of command between the executive branch of government and the London militia, and it is clear this was not always the case, it was equally important that the City Horse were commanded by competent and reliable officers. Many of the troop commanders are easily identifiable but understanding who they were and what motivated them to join the City Horse is problematic.

19 officers can be individually identified as having commanded troops in 1642, in Harvey's regiment in 1643–1644, in Turner's regiment or in the independent troops of the Abingdon garrison.[10] Of these, 12 have been identified as either merchants or colonial traders, or their sons.[11] Only 2 officers can be identified in Browne's dragoons in 1642: John Okey and Nathaniel Whetham. Okey was a business owner as well, but his origins are less clear while Whetham had been an apprentice baker who married his

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[8] TNA, SP28/10, ff.49, 50, 52; *Paire of spectacles* p.8; TNA, SP16/497, f.256.

[9] Militia Minutes, pp.iii, xxx.

[10] Beale, Blackwell, Browne, Gheste, Hackett, Harvey, Hooker, Juxon, Mainwaring, Norwood, Salwey, Skippon, Storie, Thompson, Turner, Underwood, Washbourne, Whiting, and Willett.

[11] Blackwell (Grocer), Browne (Woodmonger/coal merchant), Harvey (Haberdasher), Hooker (Distiller), Juxon (Merchant Taylor), Mainwaring (Colonial trader), Norwood (Colonial trader), Salwey (Tobacco trader), Thompson (Colonial trader), Turner (Draper/financier), Underwood (Grocer) and Washbourne (Merchant).

master's widow and was a prosperous white baker when he joined the army.[12] Positively identifying officers after 1645 is much harder, but Edward Waring of Mainwaring's 1645–1647 regiment was certainly from a prestigious merchant family. Therefore there is unmistakable evidence to suppose that certainly the captains of the City Horse were mostly successful and prosperous merchants or traders, who were connected to the very fabric of London, and who had a personal stake in seeing the Parliamentary cause succeed. It is also clear that they were amateur soldiers. 14 officers can be identified has having previously served in the Honourable Artillery Company (HAC) but of these 8 joined only after April 1642,[13] and only 7 were serving officers in the London Trained Bands in 1642.[14] Whetham had also previously served in the Trained Bands.[15] With the exception of Skippon, none of these officers seem to have had any real prior military experience and thus this was clearly an inexperienced officer corps. Only 14 of the officers' approximate dates of birth have been identified with any certainty.[16] From these it can be noted that the oldest officer in 1642 was Skippon, aged 44, while the youngest was Blackwell aged just 18, but who was 20 when he was commissioned captain in 1644. The median year of birth was 1607 and the average age was about 31.

It is equally difficult to positively identify the officers' political views, but all were obviously ardent supporters of the Parliamentary cause in 1642. Blackwell, Okey and Salwey were consistently republican in their politics and were unable to reconcile these beliefs after the Restoration, while Thompson, equally republican quickly dropped his ideals in 1660. Browne was seen by many as a radical in 1642 but as more extreme militants dominated the political agenda he became to be seen as a moderate, clearly against republicanism and in time moved back to be an open Royalist. Harvey was a political trimmer who supported whoever seemed to provide him with the most advantage. Turner managed to have no qualms about working with whoever held political power either. Hooker was arrested by the army in 1647 and so he could rightly be described as a member of the political middle-ground like Holles. For the others there is insufficient evidence to establish their political beliefs. Similarly it is difficult to determine the individuals' religious beliefs. Browne, Whetham, Mainwaring, Hooker were all Presbyterian while Okey, Salwey, Juxon, and Underwood could all be described as Independents. Harvey was lampooned as being both. Norwood later became a religiously extreme Millenarianist, and was even imprisoned for these beliefs in 1651, but judging by the depiction on his cornet of 1643 he was already then a religious zealot.[17] Religion only really became a decisive issue within the Parliamentary coalition after 1644 when the Presbyterian-Scottish Army entered the war and brought with it the demands for reform, that quickly pitted Presbyterians and Independents against each other in England. There is no evidence that either the officers or soldiers of the City Horse were overtly motivated by religion at any stage of its existence. However, both religion and politics were motivators in the purges of the militia by the Presbyterian Militia Committee in the summer of 1647, as was the army's backlash to it after it occupied London. The following year there is a clear sense that the officers of Greaves' regiment and the other auxiliary troops were selected for their political sympathies towards the Presbyterian dominated Parliament and, while there is no evidence to corroborate the hypothesis, common sense would suggest that the officers employed by Skippon were of a more Independent bent. As Parliament appointed the officers for Blundell's regiment in 1651 it would appear likely that they were all considered reliable and supportive of the relatively new republican regime. While nothing is known of the officers that commanded Browne's regiment in 1660 the regiment formation was the product of the pro-Royalist sentiment that swept the capital at the time, and they were likely to have been as pro-Royalist as their colonel.

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[12] Christopher Durston, 'John Okey (bap. 1606–1662)', *ODNB*; Catherine Durning Holt Dampier and Sir William Cecil Dampier, *A History of the Life of Colonel Nathaniel Whetham, A Forgotten Soldier of the Civil Wars*, (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1907), pp.16 & 24; *Report on the Manuscripts of F. W. Leyborne-Popham, esq., Littlecote, co. Wilts*, (Norwich: 1899), p.209.

[13] Blackwell (either April 1642 or July 1643), Browne (1622), Hackett (1637), Harvey (January 1642), Hooker (1627), Mainwaring (March 1642), Juxon (April 1642), Norwood (April 1642), Salwey (September 1642), Storie (1635), Underwood (1635), Washbourne (1631), Whiting (April 1642) and Willett (April 1642). G. A. Raikes, *The Ancient Vellum Book of the Honourable Artillery Company*, (London: Richard Bentley & Son, 1890), pp.34, 42, 44, 45, 46, 51, 53, 62, 63, 64, 68. Evidently, the HAC provided a useful network of future City Horse officers.

[14] Captains (in order of seniority) Hooker, Browne, Harvey, Underwood, Mainwaring with Ensigns Blackwell and Juxon. See *Militia Names 1642*.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] Blackwell (1624), Browne (c1602), Harvey (c1601), Juxon (before 1614), Mainwaring (c1607), Norwood (1610), Okey (1606), Salwey (1615), Skippon (c1598), Storie (probably before 1615), Thompson (1607), Turner (c1610), Washbourne (probably before 1609) and Whetham (1604).

It would be untrue to classify most of these officers as leading members of the active popular radical London opposition prior to the war. Of the troop commanders it is only Thompson and Underwood that can be identified as being amongst the ranks of the militant petition signing opposition in 1641 and 1642. However, it is clear that many of the officers were connected to these leading militants in some way. Richard Turner's father was a leading radical. Thompson's brother, Maurice, was a leading radical, and both Salwey's father and father-in-law, Richard Waring, can be considered leading radicals while even the trimmer Harvey was a fellow parishioner of the ultra-radical Randall Mainwaring. While at a lower level both Whiting and Underwood had actively undermined the established church at the parish level.[18] It would seem likely that these officers, either through conviction or connection, became radical supporters of the City opposition movement by 1641 even if they were of less prominence than their peers at the time.

Many of the officers gained rapid promotion during the war. Browne was captain in October 1642, a colonel by November and Major-General by the end of 1643, as was Harvey, albeit temporarily. Hackett had been Harvey's lieutenant in 1643, was promoted to captain when Willett was killed, while Benjamin Clutterbuck who had been Turner's lieutenant in early 1644 became a captain when Thompson was promoted colonel. Mainwaring had been captain in October 1642, major in 1643 and between 1645 and

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[17] Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.26.

[18] Lindley, *Popular Politics*, pp.139–147.

1647 commanded a regiment of City Horse. John Okey was a captain under Browne in 1642 but went on to command a regiment of dragoons in the New Model Army. Blackwell was a cornet in Harvey's regiment in 1643 before being promoted to captain the following year.[19] Both Browne and Whetham also went on to become garrison commanders – the former at Abingdon and the latter at both Northampton and, later, Portsmouth.

Numerous of the officer corps of the City Horse went on to have prominent and significant political careers. Harvey, Browne, Thompson and Salwey were all elected to Parliament in 1645, and each was active in Parliamentary politics. Harvey was frequently used as a conduit between Parliament and the City, helped oversee the sale of Bishops' lands after 1646 but fell from grace when his greed landed him in prison during the Protectorate. Thompson utilised his maritime knowledge to advantageous effect as a Navy Commissioner under the Commonwealth and Protectorate, while Salwey played a leading role in drafting the Commonwealth's declaration of government in 1649. The young Blackwell went on to command a troop in Oliver Cromwell's own cavalry regiment in 1645 but within a few years was appointed Army Treasurer, a post he held until 1660. For a time he was also the deputy Governor of the new established colony of Pennsylvania. Skippon was always the old soldier, but he successfully managed to keep himself politically relevant until age caught up with him. Browne became the darling of the Presbyterians during the Interregnum and was pivotal in controlling London prior to the Restoration. Underwood, Waring, Blackwell, Whetham, William Webb and John Okey were all appointed commissioners when the High Court of Justice was established in November 1653.[20] Four of the City Horse officers played a role in the ultimate act of revolution during this period: the trial and execution of King Charles. Harvey, Okey, Rowe and Salwey were all appointed judges for the King's trial, but Salwey refused to attend, and Harvey absented himself during the latter stages of the trial and did not sign the death warrant. Only Okey and Rowe had the courage of their convictions and signed the warrant, the act which later brought Okey a traitor's death.

While many of the officers left their mark in history the same was not the case for the ordinary troopers of the City Horse. Lists of some of the ordinary troopers' names still exist today but it is impossible to identify who they were or where they came from. It is also unclear how troopers were recruited into the City Horse. Most likely they, along with so many of the rank and file of the Parliamentary army of late 1642, came from the lower strata of London society who enlisted as a result of the political frenzy that swept the capital that year and who sought the relative security of regular pay. Some perhaps sought an escape from their humdrum lives while others were coerced into joining by their more zealous masters or bondsman. The subscription lists for 1642 are primarily concerned with the provision of horses and equipment, and not their riders, but in a few cases the subscriber also provided a rider as well, but these were far too few and insufficient for the needs of the troops.[21] One of them however, Robert Fenton, was still serving in Harvey's regiment in 1644.[22]

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[19] TNA, SP28/131 Part 7, ff.5 & 27.

[20] *JHC 1651–1659*, Vol. 7, p.353.

When the first troops were raised in late 1642, they were un-regimented, just as those in the regular army were, and it was only in the early summer of 1643 that the regimental structure was established. Thereafter the main City Horse units were formed into regiments, with the exception of Underwood and Washbourne's troops who served under Browne in 1645. The basic troop structure throughout consisted of a troop commander who was assisted by a lieutenant, a cornet, two trumpeters and three junior officers who had specific functions – a quartermaster, a farrier and a saddler. Beneath these officers were corporals who commanded sections of the troop as well as a variety of scouts, chirugeons, surgeon, provost and often a minister. The nominal strength of a troop was 60 troopers and up to a half a dozen officers, although in later years there were attempts to field 100 men in a troop. When regimented the colonel's troop was commanded by a Captain-Lieutenant, while the major assisted the colonel to command the regiment but also undertook to control the administration of the regiment. The major was also generally responsible for controlling the regimental finances.

There is no evidence that any of the City Horse units wore any sort of uniform. Both Harvey and Blackwell purchased scarves (sashes) for their troops when they were first raised, but whether they were the tawny colour traditionally attributed to Parliamentary forces, especially under the command of the Earl of Essex, cannot be said with any certainty.[23] There is also no evidence that buff-coats were systematically provided either. While some were provided by subscribers along with other arms and equipment in 1642, these were insufficient for all the troopers and there is no evidence that they were provided from central stores. The extensive records that exist pertaining to the equipment issued to Blackwell's troop in 1644 make no mention to them being issued and similarly there is no mention of them being issued to the units raised in 1645. Richard Browne's captain's commission of 1642 specifically lists the equipment his troop was to be armed with but makes no mention of buff-coats.[24] Buff-coats were not cheap to purchase and likely to be beyond the means of the common soldier to provide for himself, and so most likely it would only have been officers who had the resources to privately acquire them.

As with all military formations before and after, the City Horse carried troop standards, known as cornets, as well as banners for the trumpets. In the case of Harvey's regiment these were purchased by the individual troop commanders from funds allocated at the time of their creation, which suggests that the officers had discretion as to their appearance. It is known that Captain Peter Willett lost his cornet at Aldbourne, where he was killed; his replacement spent 4l 4s for a new one shortly afterwards while Mainwaring lost his cornet at Newbury.[25] Blackwell, Hackett, Harvey, Mainwaring, Washbourne and Norwood all carried red cornets with a two tone fringe and an individual motto and image upon it. Richard Browne's troop cornet of 1642 was similarly red.[26] However, there seems to have been no such commonality in Turner's regiment where his cornet was yellow/gold, Gheste's was tawny orange while Hooker's was green.[27] A degree of standardisation had been achieved in Mainwaring's regiment in 1646 when all troops carried blue cornets.[28] The cornets were vital to provide recognition on the battlefield and as a rallying point but also were a source of pride within a unit.[29] Equally as important were the trumpeters who seem to be the only soldiers issued with a uniform, possibly emblazoned in some manner. In June 1643 Harvey purchased a new trumpet for 5l, and spent 4s on new boots, spurs and a hat for a trumpeter, along with 12l on a new trumpet banner, cords and strings. He then provided three of his trumpeters with new suits and cloaks, valued at 12l.[30] Symon Hackett was required to purchase new spurs and clothes for his trumpeters after Newbury but at Olney one trumpeter was killed, necessitating the purchase of a new banner and new clothes.[31]

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[21] TNA, SP28/131 Part 5, ff.1–17.

[22] TNA, SP28/131 Part 7, f.32.

[23] TNA, SP28/146, f.133; TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, ff.505–505; TNA, SP28/147 Part 1, f.61.

[24] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, unpaginated.

Maintaining discipline was a constant challenge for the City Horse throughout its existence. While there are no recorded instances of them committing any atrocities, although the reincarnation of Turner's regiment in 1645 and 1646 was openly accused of this,[32] the main problem was desertion. Desertion from an army normally occurs when the men are either pressed into service, not paid sufficiently, or have suffered defeat. The history of Harvey's regiment illustrates that it suffered in each of these ways. Even as the individual troops were being raised in late 1642 and not even deployed there were instances of desertion, which suggest that some at least were serving against their will. The records of both Harvey and Turner's regiments are littered with references to soldiers deserting, frequently taking both their horse and equipment with them. These occurrences became more frequent during the summer of 1644 when the regiment became trapped in Cornwall. The threat of mutiny by Browne's troops at Abingdon in late 1645 and early 1646 was constant and he could do little to placate them.[33] Harvey had been losing a trickle of men from desertion since 1642 when his own trumpeter, William Yates, absconded after receiving an advance of 8l.[34] While from his troop alone 16 men deserted after being paid 28 days advance pay in May 1644, prior to the regiment leaving for Cornwall. Each of these had been serving since at least the beginning of 1644 suggesting that it was the chronic pay arrears that led them to desert once they got this advance pay.[35] The lieutenant of Turner's own troop, Giles Edwards, deserted with two horses in the autumn of 1643, while three others also ran away, including William Collier who was known to have sold his horse for 6s before disappearing after receiving his pay.[36]

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[25] *Ibid.*, p.160; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.181.

[26] Young (ed.), *Emblem*, pp.2, 252, 108, 149, 181, 26, 119, 148.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp.90, 69, 167.

[28] London in Armes/Bod, ff.16–18.

[29] For a more in depth discussion of the City Horse cornets see Appendix IV.

[30] TNA, SP28/135 Part 3, f.20.

[31] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, ff.146, 160.

[32] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, p.561; *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, pp.415, 483–484; Evans, 'Massey', p.197; *Mercurius Academicvs, 23–28 February 1646*, p.103; *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, pp.538,540; *The Moderate Intelligencer, 6–13 August 1646*, p.592.

[33] Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1644–1645*, pp.84, 132, 282.

[34] TNA, SP28/147 Part 1, f.61; TNA, SP28/27 Part 1, ff.6, 7, 10.

As has been shown the City Horse were a disparate assortment of regiments and individual troops that served throughout the war and collectively a review of the existing sources shed much fascinating light on how the mounted troops employed by Parliament were organised and supplied.

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[35] TNA, SP28/131 Part 7, ff.1–20.

[36] TNA, SP28/132 Part 1, f.1.

Conclusion

As has been shown the City Horse played a constant role throughout the years of revolutionary upheaval of the mid-seventeenth century. They defended the capital in November 1642 when Charles I attempted to enter London, and then provided a guard of honour for his son when he did enter the City 18 years later. They scrambled through the breach when Winchester was stormed in 1642, they participated in the relief of Gloucester in 1643 and the disaster in Cornwall in 1644. They fought at both battles of Newbury (1643 & 1644), at Cheriton (1644) and even at far away Worcester (1651). Elements had attempted a surprise attack on Basing House in 1643 while others successfully stormed Shelford Manor in 1645. Throughout 1645 they raided the Royalist outposts around Oxford from their base at Abingdon but were themselves raided and bloodied by none other than Prince Rupert at Olney in 1643. Some of these Londoners might have come close to mutiny in late 1645 when they returned to the capital without orders, while others refused to serve under Sir William Waller in 1644. Very few military formations before the creation of the New Model Army can boast the longevity of service that both the militia cavalry, or their infantry comrades in the London Trained Bands could, and so it is pertinent to ask just how effective the City Horse were and what legacy remains of their service.

London's militia evolved into a key strategic reserve for both Parliament and the Commonwealth/Protectorate. By providing a reliable force to guard and protect the nation's critically strategic capital they allowed the main field armies to campaign farther afield. In this role the City Horse excelled over the winter of 1642–1643, during the heady summer of 1648 and also during the invasion scares of 1650 and 1651. The importance of this cannot be over emphasised, for keeping the capital secure was of paramount importance throughout the period. Prior to 1645, the Parliamentary armies were chronically short of cavalry and so the detachments that also served in the field armies in the Gloucester campaign (1643) and at the Battle of Cheriton (1644), both of which were incredibly significant in the eventual outcome of the war, provided much-needed mobility contributing to the successful strategic outcomes of both campaigns, even if the individual actions of the units were unimpressive. The City Horse did not play a leading role in any of their engagements, but they also did not flee in the face of the enemy either, despite the mauling they received at Aldbourne Chase, Olney and in Cornwall. Given the speed with which they were raised and deployed at various times it is likely that their training was deficient, and so their military application necessarily limited. But in a war where arguably quantity often took precedence over quality in the armed forces, the City Horse played a reliable supporting role on numerous occasions and on balance it might be stated that they played their own small, but meaningful, part in the eventual military success of Parliament.

The City Horse also played an important role in civil defence within London during the constantly changing political climate. They proved effective in late 1642 and early 1643, but also in 1648, in maintaining law and order within the capital even if they were accused on numerous occasions of heavy-handed responses. Under Harvey, they provided a force that constantly bullied and harassed 'malignants' and others who appeared to be politically unreliable in the capital well into 1644, while at the same time extorting money, plate and horses that contributed to the war effort. Harvey himself gained a reputation as a brute and his troops also earned a reputation for their bullying tactics on the streets of the capital. A lack of sources relating to the role of the Militia Committee throughout the period diminishes our knowledge of the day-to-day policing activities of the City Horse and care needs to be taken in believing the comments of the partisan, printed broadsheets, and so it is hard to make a balanced judgement on their activities. However, the impression is that when required to, they proved capable of maintaining law and order in London.

The political role played by the City Horse should also not be forgotten. The English Civil War was more than anything else a political war fought between two sides that sought dominance over the national political agenda. The City Horse were born as a result of this political environment and so it is no surprise that the constantly changing political landscape impacted both the establishment of new units and the timing of their creation. The national events of 1642 led to the formation of Harvey's regiment that year, while the growth of radicalism the following year in London was the catalyst for the raising of Turner's. The Presbyterian/Independent dichotomy of 1647 led to competing forces being raised, as indeed occurred the following year, though this time including Royalists in the mix. Given the importance that politics played in the City Horse formation it is no surprise that some of its leaders, notably Harvey, Browne, Skippon, Okey and Salwey chose to enter the political arena as a result of their previous military connections. At times, especially in 1647 and 1648, control of the City Horse became a political priority demonstrating the importance that they had attained since the outbreak of the war.

The City Horse were, therefore, an assorted group of cavalry units raised at different times and for different purposes throughout the Civil War and Commonwealth period. Little is known about most the citizens that served in the various regiments, independent troops and auxiliary formations but their legacy must surely be that when the cause needed them, they served as best they could, for as long as they could. They won no accolades for their service and their formation names have long been forgotten by all but a handful of military historians. But, as they served and died for causes and beliefs that might seem detached from our modern society, it is beholden to all those who now cherish the freedoms and principles that these men fought and struggled for so many years ago, that they should not be forgotten and the role they played in forging the nation that Britain was to become should be remembered. No memorial has been erected to commemorate the London citizens that fought and died during the civil war years and so this book, in a woefully inadequate way, hopes to honour their memory.



Biographies

John Blackwell

John Blackwell was barely 18 years old at the outbreak of the war in 1642, though he was already an ensign in Blue Regiment of the Trained Bands.[1] His father, also called John, was a grocer who had provided necessaries to the Court before the war and was evidently of some financial substance as he also loaned significant sums of money to the Parliamentary cause. It was rumoured these loans had exceeded 35,000l and he was reported to have died in significant debt.[2] He was related to Oliver Cromwell by marriage.[3] The younger Blackwell was serving as a cornet in Harvey's regiment in December 1643, and was commissioned captain of the Maiden Troop raised in the spring of 1644.[4]

The Cornish disaster did not spell the end of his military career though for he was appointed captain in Oliver Cromwell's own regiment after the Battle of Naseby and fought at the Battle of Langport in July 1645, after which his lengthy account of the battle was published. [5] In early 1646 he became a Deputy Treasurer of War and then in 1652 he was appointed Joint Treasurer, a role he continued in until 1659, when he was removed by the restored Rump Parliament. He also played a prominent role in the distribution of land in Ireland after the 1649 invasion.[6] Blackwell and his father purchased Bishops' land worth over 10,000l between 1647 and 1649, as well as a lot of Royal land, and Blackwell junior was also granted significant land holdings in return for his investment in the various Irish Adventurers schemes, thus they were clearly still a very wealthy family.[7] In 1647 he had been a promoter of the Utopian *Eleutheria* project that intended to establish an independently governed colony in the Bahamas.[8] He was present in Cromwell's funeral procession in 1658.[9]

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[1] *Militia Names 1642.*

[2] G. E. Aylmer, *The State's Servants: The Civil Service of the English Republic 1649–1660*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), p.243.

[3] W. L. F. Nuttall and W. F. L. Nuttall, 'Governor John Blackwell: His Life in England and Ireland', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 88, No.2, 1964, p.122.

[4] TNA, SP28/131 Part 7, ff.5 & 27; TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.501.

[5] John Blackwell, *A More Exact Relation of The Great Defeat Given to Gorings Army in The West; By The Victorious Sr. Thomas Fairfax.*, (London: 1645), TT E.293 [8].

[6] Nuttall and Nuttall, 'Governor Blackwell', p.129.

[7] *Collectanea*, Vol. 1, pp.3, 127, 287, 288; Nuttall and Nuttall, 'Governor Blackwell', p.126 n.19; Robert Dunlop, *Ireland Under the Commonwealth: Being a Selection of Documents Relating to*

Blackwell played no role in the trial and execution of the King and suffered no consequences at the Restoration though was precluded from public office, which led him to develop some personal trading activities with New England.[10] He soon lost much of his Irish lands, as well as the English land he had purchased. In 1672, he married a daughter of General John Lambert and for the next decade lived in Ireland but then, in 1684, moved to Boston, Massachusetts and in 1688 he was appointed Governor of the newly established Pennsylvania colony. This was only a short assignment however, and by the mid–1690s he was back in England, where he died in 1701.[11]

Sir Richard Browne

(Sir) Richard Browne was born c.1602 to parents John and Alice (nee Beard), both London citizens but both originally from Wokingham in Surrey. His martial connection started at an early age when he joined the Honourable Artillery Company in April 1622, and by the outbreak of the Civil War, he was senior captain in the Orange Regiment of the Trained Bands. By trade he was a woodmonger but evidently a successful one and had been a free member of the Company of Woodmongers since 1634. In 1638 he was possibly living in the parish of St Bartholomew the Less, outside the City walls in Farringdon Without Ward, probably close to Whitefriars, where his house had a moderated rental value of 10l per annum. In the summer of 1642 he was wealthy enough to invest 600l into the Additional Sea Adventure project along with many of the other leading 'New Merchants' of the City in their scheme to pacify Irish rebels, in return for which they were to be granted land in Ireland. He was elected Alderman for Langbourne Ward in June 1648.[12]

The Government of Ireland From 1651 to 1659, Vol. 2, (Manchester: University of Manchester, 1913), pp.359–360.

[8] John T Hassam, 'The Bahama Islands', *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society* (Second Series), Vol. 13, 1899, p.5.

[9] John Towill Rutt (ed.), *Diary of Thomas Burton Esq*, Vol. 2, (London: 1828), p.525.

[10] Nuttall and Nuttall, 'Governor Blackwell', p.135.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp.139–141. See also Nicholas B Wainwright, 'Governor John Blackwell', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 74, No. 4, 1950; David Farr, 'Notes and Documents: John Blackwell and Daniel Cox: Further Notes on Their Activities in Restoration England and British North America', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 123, No. 3, 1999; Joseph Dorfman, 'Captain John Blackwell: A Bibliographical Note', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 69, No. 3, 1945 for more on Blackwell's fascinating life after the Restoration.

[12] George Edward Cokayne (ed.), *Complete Baronetage*, Vol.3, (Exeter: 1900), p.115; Raikes, *Vellum Book*, p.34; *Militia Names 1642*; Dale (ed.), *Inhabitants* Vol. 1, pp.199–200; British Library, 'Banners of the Parliamentary Commanders', Add Ms 5247, n.d., f.39; Prendergast, *Cromwellian Ireland*, p.427; Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, pp.400–406; Alfred P Beavan, *The Aldermen of the City of London Temp. Henry III – 1912*, Vol. 1, (London: Eden Fisher & Company, 1908), p.170.

There is no evidence that Browne was politically active prior to standing at the December 1641 Common Council elections for the parish of St Dunstan in the West, though he had served as Constable in 1627 and 1628, as well as a grand juryman in 1638.[13] The elections were clearly fraudulent, and in the ensuing investigation Browne, along with two other militants, were declared elected.[14] In July 1642, Browne was active with other known radicals Samuel Vassell, John Venn, Randall Mainwaring and Owen Roe, when they complained to the House of Lords about the pro-Royalist Lord Mayor, Sir Richard Gurney's handling of a shipment of arms from Hull. Gurney was already in trouble with Parliament for publishing the King's Commission of Array in the City in June and this was the final straw. Gurney was immediately impeached and sent to the Tower and the radical Issac Pennington elected in his place. Browne had played an instrumental part in the City revolution that summer.[15]

Browne was evidently trusted by both the Militia Committee and Parliament since he played a dominant role in military affairs from the summer of 1642 until the end of the war. His role as Governor of Abingdon demonstrated his ability as a commander when, with minimal resources and near constantly mutinying troops, he did much to neutralise the threat posed by the Royalist garrisons around Oxford. Arguably he was London's most successful soldier of the entire Civil War period, although his achievements have never been truly recognised by historians. He can perhaps be aptly described as London's forgotten general.

Despite the part he played in the 1642 City revolution, Browne proved to be no radical revolutionary. He seems to have had no political role in the radical attempts to establish independent armies in late 1642 and 1643, even though he was given command of a regiment of dragoons in Warwick's projected army. His reputation was based on his competence as a commander, firstly by assisting Waller in late 1642, then for his role in quashing the Kent rebellion the following summer. By late 1643 he had been promoted to Major-General and was instrumental in keeping the mutinous City Trained Bands in the field throughout the summer of 1644. Despite the King's earlier criticism of him, the Royalists obviously saw him as a moderate who might be tempted to defect, as fellow Londoner Marmaduke Rawdon had done, when they approached him with an offer to betray Abingdon in late 1644. However, he demonstrated his loyalty to Parliament by keeping them informed of the Royalist approach and perhaps in recognition of this he was voted 760l of his arrears by Parliament in August 1645.[16] In September 1645 he was elected 'recruiter' MP for Chepping Wycombe.[17]

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[13] Wren, 'Disputed Elections', pp.45–46.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] *JHL 1642*, Vol. 5, p.197; Keith Lindley, 'Sir Richard Gurney (b.1578–1647),' *ODNB*; Keith Lindley, Sir Richard Browne (c.1602–1669).

[16] *His Majesties Letter And Declaration to The Sheriffes and Citty of London, January 17 1642*, (London: 1643), TT E.85/20, p.5; Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. The Third Part, Volume Two, pp.808–816; *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, pp.214, 227, 255.

[17] Browne, *Notitia Parliamentaria*, p.241.

As a soldier Browne had shown himself, especially while at Abingdon, as an aggressive proponent of the War Party but in politics he was closer in belief to Denzil Holles' Peace Party than Pym's centrist coalition. In January 1647, he was appointed one of the Parliamentary commissioners that travelled north to receive King Charles from the Scots and transfer him to Holdenby House in Northamptonshire.[18] The commissioners were intended to play a crucial role as the conduit through which negotiations between Parliament and the monarch would take place as a political settlement was attempted. They would be required to clearly articulate Parliament's position and use their skills of persuasion to obtain satisfactory concessions from the intransigent King. Despite these negotiations being quickly aborted, Browne's appointment signifies the confidence and trust Parliament had in him. The Royal entourage arrived at Holdenby in mid-February and Browne remained there with the other commissioners until the King was seized by Cornet Joyce in early June. According to one of the King's attendants, Sir Thomas Herbert, Browne was well liked by Charles and with whom 'the King was pleased to discourse often.' According to Herbert's later memoirs Browne had caught wind of Joyce's presence in the area and fearing something untoward was about to happen, strengthened the guard around the house. When Joyce appeared at Holdenby on 2 June, Browne attempted to intercede but was unable to prevent the King being taken to Newmarket and into the possession of the army.[19]

It is likely that Browne accompanied the King when he left Holdenby and remained with him until he arrived at Hampton Court in mid-August, and as such he was not present in London during the events of July and early August. However, if Joseph Bamfield, who was with Browne at the time, is to be believed, despite his distance from London Browne was still an influential guiding force in conjunction with Holles and his faction in their opposition to the army, and in cementing support within the City.[20] During the unrest of the summer there were constant rumours circulating London that the King was interfering in the events by variously encouraging the Presbyterian party to resist the army, or supporting the army as well as calling for the Scots Army to intervene. Charles strenuously denied these rumours on numerous occasions, but they persisted, and undoubtedly there was an upsurge in pro-Royalist sentiment in the City at the time. Many moderate Presbyterians leaned towards a settlement with the King which brought them closer to the defeated Royalists, a sentiment that was graphically illustrated with the election of the pro-Royalist Lord Mayor Sir John Gayre in 1646, and by the desire in July and early August, to bring the King to London so that a personal settlement could be made with him. The Independent John Juxon went so far to claim that the King even sent Browne to the City to inform them that the King supported their stance against the army. Whether this was true or not cannot be confirmed but with both his City and Parliamentary connections he would certainly have been in a position to do so. Certainly the Commons requested that Browne 'Repair to *London*' and attend the House on 3 August to provide an explanation for such rumours.[21] From the summer of 1647 onwards Browne had been projected as a figurehead of the moderate Presbyterian-Royalist alliance in the City, and for the next 13 years whenever London was wracked by political unrest his name was always connected with it.

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[18] Whitelock, *Memorials*, Vol. 2, p.102.

[19] Sir Thomas Herbert, *Memoirs of The Two Last Years of The Reign of That Unparallell'd Prince, of Ever Blessed Memory, King Charles I*, (London: 1702), pp.16, 18–23. See also the letters from the Commissioners to the House of Lords reporting the seizure *JHL*, Vol. 9, pp.237, 240, 248, 249, 250, 273. as well as the Army's account published in Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 6, pp.513–517.

[20] Joseph Bampfield, *Colonel Joseph Bamfield's Apologie Written By Himself And Printed At His Desire*, (The Hague?: 1685), pp.31–32.

During the summer of 1648 he was again identified as a leader of the moderates in the City and an attempt was made for him to replace Philip Skippon as commander of London forces as the latter increasingly became seen as a stooge for the army. This effort failed, but his appointment as Sheriff instead further demonstrated his influence and popularity amongst the opponents of the army within the capital.[22] Browne played no active role in the negotiations with the King at the end of the year but when these were rejected by the army in late November, and it once again threatened to occupy the capital, Browne publicly attempted to defuse the situation by stating the City's position that it wished to avoid violence and maintain good relations with the army.[23]

Despite Browne's public appeals for reconciliation he had been identified as a potential troublemaker by the army and when it purged Parliament on 6 December the call for his arrest soon went out. As both a Member of Parliament and Sheriff of the City of London his arrest on 12 December was important.[24] He was accused of 'confederacy' with other accused Members of Parliament in inviting the Scots to invade England during the summer. No evidence was ever produced to prove his complicity in this and the army's case rested solely on the claim that Browne failed to support the Commons' motion of 20 July declaring any person who supported or assisted the Scottish invasion to be a traitor.[25] No record of any debate regarding this motion exists and it was passed without a division of the House, so it now impossible to know whether Browne opposed it in any way or if he gave it his support. Nevertheless, the army's accusation was to firmly impact Browne's life for the next dozen years.

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[21] Lindley and Scott (eds), *Juxon Journal*, p.165; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, pp.263, 264, 266; *Constitutional History*, Vol. 16, pp.205–206; Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 7, p.753; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, pp.266–267; *Constitutional History*, Vol. 16, p.204.

[22] *A Petition Presented At A Common-Hall In London*, p.5.

[23] *The Declaration of Major-Generall Brown, Concerning the Lord Generall Fairfax, and the Army...* (London 1648), TT E.475 [18], p.2.

[24] Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 7, p.1361.

[25] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.640; *JHC 1648–1651*, Vol. 6, pp.93–94; *The Articles And Charge of The Armie, Against Fourscore And Odd of The Parliament Men, Who Have Acted Contrary to the Trust Reposed in Them by The People*, (London: 1648), TT E.475 [30]; J. Rushworth, *The Humble Proposals And Desires of His Excellency The Lord Fairfax, And of The General Councel of Officers, in Order to a Speedy Prosecution of Justice, and the Settlement Formerly Propounded by Them*, (London: 1648), TT E.475 [25].

Richard Browne spent the next five years as a prisoner of first the army and then the Commonwealth, even though he was never tried. He was only released in 1653 by the more tolerant newly-installed Lord Protector, Oliver Cromwell. In spite of this Browne was never reconciled to the Protectorate even though he was elected to the second Protectorate Parliament in 1656 but was precluded from sitting. He was clearly more approving of Richard Cromwell and sat in the Third Protectorate Parliament.[26] But throughout the Protectorate his name was continually connected to Royalist attempted uprisings and he finally committed to the Royalist cause during Booth's uprising of 1659.[27] In early 1660 Browne was the obvious candidate to be appointed commander of the City forces by the now pro-Royalist City government and he formally welcomed King Charles II to London in May, when he and his son were knighted. In October he was elected Lord Mayor and played an active role in City and national affairs until his death in 1669 at Debden Hall in Essex, which he had purchased in 1662.[28]

Edmund Harvey

Despite Edmund Harvey disparagingly being called a 'decayed silkman' by the later Earl of Clarendon[29] and 'a late a poore silke-man' by a hostile writer immediately after 'Pride's Purge' in 1648,[30] there is evidence to suggest Harvey was not as poor at the outbreak of the war as his detractors suggest. His grandfather, also called Edmund, hailed from the West Country but moved to London sometime before 1603 where he was a fishmonger, a trade also followed by Harvey's father, Charles. Edmund senior was evidently not rich when he died as he left little of value in his will. Edmund Harvey junior, whose mother was Alice Houghton, of a family of minor and declining Leicestershire landowners, was born between 1599 and 1601.[31] Rather than follow into the fishmonger's trade of his forebears he was apprenticed into the more respectable drapery trade with Richard Hull of St Laurence Lane (off Cheapside) in January 1620.[32] Hull was referred to as a silkman which suggests he was either an importer of silks or a retailer of it. Whatever Hull's role in the business the quantity and value of silk imports during the first half of the seventeenth century had risen considerably and Harvey was therefore involved in an expanding commercial sector.[33] He finished his apprenticeship in November 1627, when he was made a Freeman of the City of London and accepted into the Worshipful Company of Drapers.[34] In December 1629 he married Elizabeth Gott, the daughter of the ironmonger Samuel Gott.[35] By 1635 they had had three children Samuel, Charles and Edmund, although Elizabeth died in April 1641.[36] During this period Harvey's business evidently prospered for he had taken on at least four different apprentices, including his young brother-in-law. In 1638 it might have been he that was renting a shop for a moderated rental of 14l per annum in Goldsmith Row, Cheapside while he lived in a dwelling just off Cheapside with a rental of 24l per year, which, evidence suggests, was quite substantial perhaps with as many as 7 hearths according to the 1666 Hearth Tax return.[37] In later years he was elected twice to be an Alderman but on both occasions his election was nullified on account of him being a Member of Parliament.[38]

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[26] 'Sir Richard Browne (c.1602–1669)'.

[27] David Underdown, *Royalist Conspiracy in England 1649–1660*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), pp.116, 122, 232, 294.

[28] Ellis (ed.), *Obituary*, p.83.

[29] Hyde, *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England*, Vol. 4 New Edition, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1836), p.188.

[30] M. El, *A List of The Names of The Members of The House of Commons: Observing Which Are Officers of The Army, Contrary to The Selfe-Denying Ordinance: Together With Such Summes Of Money, Offices And Lands, as They Have Given to Themselves, For Service Done, And to be Done, Against The King And Kingdome*, (London: 1648), TT E.458 [12], p.6.

[31] (n.d), Ancestry.com. Available from <Ancestry.com> [Last Accessed 27 July 2022]; Ivan Roots and S. M Wynne, 'Edmund Harvey (c. 1601–1673),' *ODNB*.

[32] (n.d), Records of London's Livery Companies Online. Available from <https://www.londonroll.org/home> [Last Accessed 27 July 2022].

In the years prior to the Civil War Harvey had developed a business partnership with the prominent merchant taylor Edmond Sleigh (elected both Alderman and Sheriff in 1654).[39] This was clearly a close relationship. They had known each other since at least 1629, and had possibly been partners since the year before, when they shared a pew at the church of St Mary Colechurch.[40] Both rented adjacent residences in a tenement on the south side of Cheapside, in the same parish, almost opposite the Mercer's Hall and it would seem that both retained these properties throughout the period.[41] Together they were involved in occasional raw silk purchases from the East India Company between 1637 and 1641, during which time Sleigh seems to have acted as guarantor for Harvey's purchases. In April 1642, both had sufficient funds to jointly invest 300l in the Sea Adventurers project, with Harvey contributing a further 100l of his own money, which suggests that he was a merchant of some means. Of the two, Sleigh seems to have been the wealthier though, since in 1638 he was assessed to contribute 5l by the parish vestry for repairs to the church while Harvey was only required to pay 3l. They were still business partners in 1649 and possibly later.[42]

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[33] Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, p.25.

[34] *Livery Online.*

[35] *Ancestry.com.*

[36] Sir Henry St George and Sir Richard St George (eds), *The Visitation of London, Anno Domini 1633, 1634, and 1635*, Vol. 1, (London: 1880), p.360; *Ancestry.com.*

[37] Dale (ed.), *Inhabitants* Vol. 1, pp.175–176, 112; D. J. Keene and Vanessa Harding (1987), Historical Gazetteer of London Before the Great Fire Cheapside; Parishes of All Hallows Honey Lane, St Martin Pomary, St Mary Le Bow, St Mary Colechurch and St Pancras Soper Lane. Available from <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/london-gazetteer-pre-fire/pp448–455> [Last Accessed 12 May 2020].

[38] Beavan, *Aldermen*, Vol. 1, pp.141, 160.

[39] Alfred P. Beavan, *The Aldermen of the City of London Temp. Henry III – 1912*, Vol. 2 (London: Eden Fisher & Company, 1913) p.183.

[40] Centre for Metropolitan History (2011), St Mary Colechurch: Vestry Minutes 1613–72. Available from <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/vestry-mins-colechurch-1613-72> [Last Accessed 12 May 2020].

[41] Dale (ed.), *Inhabitants* Vol. 1, p.112; *Historical Gazetteer.*

[42] Ethel Bruce Sainsbury (ed.), *The Court Minutes, etc. of the East India company 1635–1639*, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1907), pp.216, 269, 286; Ethel Bruce Sainsbury (ed.), *The Court*

When Harvey emerged as a leading member of the London opposition is unclear, but it was likely that he was influenced by the militants Randall Mainwaring and John Towse, both of whom were members of St Mary Colechurch where he also worshipped in 1638. Mainwaring was later Deputy Mayor to Isaac Pennington and took a leading role in the 1642 City revolution while the wealthy Towse was to hold numerous treasurer roles in the Parliamentary war effort before his death in 1645. Incidentally, another parishioner in 1638 was the later Independent Thomas Juxon, brother of Harvey's son-in-law John, whose diary provides a great insight to political events between 1644 and 1647 and who clearly was no admirer of Harvey. An advantageous remarriage in late 1641 to Judith, the widowed daughter of the merchant George Langham, brought Harvey more important connections. Langham was certainly a Parliamentary sympathiser who served with the City forces until his death in 1643, but there is no evidence that he was politically active in the lead up to war. He was lieutenant-colonel of the White Regiment of the Trained Bands during the summer of 1642, the same regiment that Harvey was a captain in. It is possible that Harvey obtained this command through Langham's patronage, especially given that he had only joined the Honourable Artillery Company in January 1642. Langham's eldest son, also called George, and his son-in-law John Juxon, both served in the same regiment, as did Symon Hackett (possibly he also lived in Harvey's parish) and Robert Thompson (later captain in his brother George's horse regiment) and thus there was evidently a network of connections centred on Langham.[43] Clearly, as the country drifted closer to war, Harvey was surrounded by individuals of influence who would shortly attain positions of authority as they served the Parliamentary cause and it would not have been difficult for him to put himself forward as a political radical as well.

The first reference to Harvey playing a political role occurred when he led a delegation of concerned citizens to Common Council in January 1642, probably on the day after the King's ill-fated attempt to arrest the Five Members, asking it to petition Parliament for the removal of Sir John Byron from command of the Tower of London, while also demanding a force be raised for the pacification of Ireland.[44] Maybe this brought him to the attention of the City authorities but it is unclear how he was selected to command one of the troops of horse raised in October, although he would have been known to the Militia Committee when he was appointed to the White Regiment.

Whatever Harvey's motivations for joining the Parliamentary cause it was not long before he gained a reputation for cruelty amongst his Royalist adversaries. As early as 22 January 1643 a call for his arrest was publicised in Oxford on account of his having committed 'severall outrages on His

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Minutes, etc. of the East India Company 1640–1643, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1909), p.144; Prendergast, *Cromwellian Ireland*, pp.412, 443; Walter Scott (ed.), *A Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts...of the late Lord Somers*, Vol.7, (London: 1812), p.455.

[43] *Militia Names 1642*; Raikes, *Vellum Book*, p.62.

[44] Edmund Harvey, *A Seasonable Speech Made To The Lord Maior and Common Councel of London, by Mr Harvey, Being Accompanied Thither With Many Citizens Of Qualitie. Concerning the Great Distempers Of The Times*, (London: 1642), TT E.199 [38].

good Subjects' in London.[45] Later the Earl of Clarendon in his history of the war openly blamed Harvey for the deaths of some female petitioners who attempted to submit a peace petition to Parliament on 9 August. Clarendon, who of course was not an eyewitness, claimed Harvey's men 'behaved themselves wuth such inhumanity, that they charged among the silly women, as an enemy worthy of their courage, and killed and wounded many of them.'[46] Clarendon is probably wrong in his accusation of Harvey. It is known from other sources that elements of Harvey's regiment were in Surrey on the day of the demonstration, not returning until 13 August.[47] Another Royalist source, again writing a few years later, blamed the deaths on cavalry under the command of Sir William Waller and not Harvey.[48] Despite this Harvey was still clearly a monster in the eyes of some Royalists with one, alluding to another incident, in which he mentions 'the butchery of a Peaceable Citizen slain by Captaine Harvey.' The Royalist hatred towards him was not forgotten when, in 1660, he was excluded from the Act of Oblivion because of the part he had played in the King's trial.[49] Harvey clearly had a reputation for cruelty but whether it was truly founded or not is unclear.

One biography of Harvey suggests that he was an active participant on the Suffolk County Committee throughout the war. While this is possible (he did have family connections with the county through his Langham wife) it appears that this is probably an incorrect assumption.[50] None of the references to the Edmund Harvey on this committee ever refer to him by his military rank and yet other mentions of him in the various official records from mid–1643 until 1660 nearly always refer to him by his rank. Furthermore, some of the correspondence signed by Edmund Harvey with other members, who sat at Bury St Edmunds, are actually dated between October 1643 and January 1644 when Colonel Harvey was certainly on duty with his regiment elsewhere.[51] It would seem that this is a case of mistaken identity.

During the summer of 1646 Harvey was elected as a 'recruiter' MP for Great Bedwyn[52] and quickly settled into the role of legislator and sat on numerous committees, in particular the one established to oversee the sale of Bishops' land.[53] Harvey's old comrade Robert Mainwaring was appointed to help value and administer the sale of this land as well. It is probably through his influence on this committee that Harvey was able to purchase substantial Episcopal properties when they were sold. In September 1647, within days of the army's occupation of London, he purchased the manor of Fulham, which included the Bishop of London's residence for the mouth-watering amount of 7,617l 2s 10d, a further 86 acres in Fulham for 6,741l 10s the following year as well as some smaller holdings in Dorset.[54] Where Harvey was able to find this staggering amount of money cannot now be ascertained but it is certainly suspicious that he had acquired such wealth in so short a period of time and his later fraudulent actions lend credence to the suggestion that he had come about it illegally.

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[45] Peter Heylyn, *Mercurius Aulicus, 22 January 1643*, TT E.246 [9]; *His Majesties Letter And Declaration to The Sheriffes and Citty of London, January 17 1642*,p.5.

[46] Hyde, *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England*, Vol. 4, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, New Edition , 1836), pp.188–189.

[47] TNA, SP28/135 Part 3, f.25.

[48] *Mercurius Rusticus*, p.128. See also Gardiner, *Civil War*, Vol. 1, p.219.

[49] *JHC 1660-1667*, Vol. 8, pp.61, 139; Scott (ed.), *Somers Tracts*, Vol. 7, p.433.

[50] 'Edmund Harvey (c. 1601–1673),' *ODNB*.

[51] For example Alan Everitt, *Suffolk and the Great Rebellion 1640–1660*, Vol. 3, (Suffolk: Suffolk Records Society, 1960) pp.43, 60, 67, 68; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.145–155, 223–241.

[52] *JHC 1644–1646*, Vol. 4, pp.400, 641; Browne, *Notitia Parliamentaria*, p.252.

[53] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.904–905.

Prior to the summer of 1647, Harvey's actions had been those of a loyal supporter of Parliament. He was active in the House of Commons and played a role in orchestrating the disbandment of the army, as well as acting as a messenger between the Commons and the City of London on various matters, including during Holles' negotiations with the City for a loan to pay the army's arrears.[55] During the war Harvey had clearly been a supporter of the Earl of Essex, as his refusal to serve under Sir William Waller had demonstrated. During the summer of 1644 after Essex had shocked Parliament by marching into the West Country and when Harvey was back in London after being recalled by the Committee of Both Kingdoms, it was noted by Thomas Juxon, somebody who knew Harvey well, that he was clearly aligned with the attempts of Essex loyalists Sir Philip Stapleton and Lionel Copley to protect the Lord General's political interests in the capital, in conjunction with Denzil Holles. According to Bulstrode Whitelock, whose daughter would later marry Harvey's eldest son, he was sufficiently close to Holles in November 1645 to entertain him and Stapleton to dinner.[56] Then in April 1646, with the war all but over he was involved with Stapleton and Copley in calling for an accommodation with King at the expense of the Independents.[57] Nothing in his actions hitherto suggested that he was in any way a supporter of the Independent dominated army as they tussled with Holles and Parliament, indeed Clarendon was probably prescient when he declared Harvey to have 'become one of the most confided in' by the Parliamentary party.[58] Denzil Holles, who would have known Harvey's worth better than any during these crucial months, clearly trusted him.[59] When the pro-army MPs fled to Fairfax on 26 July he remained in London and did not sign the *Engagement* with the Army at Hounslow on 4 August.[60]

However, when the Parliamentary cause most needed him, and with the army at the very gates of London in early August, he inexplicably changed sides and lent his support to the army, and it is probably no exaggeration to suggest that he was at least partly instrumental in turning London against Parliament. Denzil Holles was adamant that Harvey was one of those responsible for the City's surrender to the army during the first days of August. Holles was later to write that 'Colonel *Harvy* [sic], who was long enough in our Ears, and in our Bosoms, to bottom all our thoughts, know all our desires' betrayed the Presbyterian cause, along with the Earl of Manchester who also 'join'd and engag'd with the Army.'[61] This was a sentiment shared by the anonymous writer of *A Paire of Spectacles for the Citie* who, in December 1647, wrote a lament upon the failure of Presbyterian party that summer in which he lambasted Harvey as '*treacherous*' even though he was 'in the Counsell as deep as any, though they [he and Manchester] basely, now, act against us, shall not dare to hold up their heads.'[62] Specifically what Harvey did to gain the opprobrium of Holles and his die-hard followers is unrecorded but is probably not hard to guess. Presumably when the cause needed its supporters the most, Harvey changed sides and probably used his considerable influence within the City to convince waverers within the government that siding with the army was in its best interests. *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, an overtly anti-army publication, in 1648 reported a speech Harvey purportedly made in which he explained that those in the City that opposed the army were mainly individuals who were not actively purchasing Bishops' land, by which he implied that those individuals were not committed to the abolition of episcopacy or bringing the King to account for the war. The newsletter further pronounced that Harvey's motivation for abandoning the Presbyterian party after being 'once a most *furious Presbyter*' was that he was 'was drawn over to the *Independent*, to secure his slight purchase in the lands of the Bishop of *London*, where-of *Fulham*-house is at this day a very viible [sic] *Monument*.'[63]

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[54] *Collectanea*, Vol. 1, pp.3, 123, 127.

[55] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, pp.133, 207.

[56] Bulstrode Whitelock, *Memorials of the English Affairs from the Beginning of the Reign of Charles the First to the Happy Restoration of King Charles the Second*, Vol. 1, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1853), p.533.

[57] Lindley and Scott (eds), *Juxon Journal*, pp.56, 60, 114; Kishlansky, *The Rise of the New Model Army*, pp.85–86.

[58] Hyde, *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England*, Vol. 4, p.188.

[59] Holles, *Memoirs*, pp.210, 209.

[60] *Report on the Manuscripts of the Earl of Egmont*, Vol.1, (London: Historical Manuscripts Commission, 1905), p.440; Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, Vol. 7, p.755; *JHL*, Vol. 9, p.385.

Whether he always planned to join the army, or if he had any secret correspondence with them is unknown, most probably he just decided to back the obvious winner to protect his self-seeking ambition, but whatever his motive he was certainly well rewarded for his *volte face*. Harvey had never served on the important Militia Committee prior to this but he was appointed to the pro-army committee in September and again to the Commonwealth Committee established in January 1649, no doubt his double-dealing was the cause of this first appointment.[64]

Further cementing his position as a now leading Independent Harvey was not barred from Parliament as a result of 'Pride's Purge' of December 1648 and his name subsequently appeared on a list of leading political Independents in the country shortly after.[65] Harvey had made his choice; he had forsaken the cause for which he had taken up arms and was now unmistakably an army supporter, although Holles perhaps was to have a small measure of revenge over Harvey in 1660 after his eventual return to the newly restored Long Parliament. Within days of his return Harvey, who had sat and had been active in the restored Rump Parliament since the previous year, played his last political role when he was appointed to a committee to consider the appointment of a new Council of State on 21 February.[66] Thereafter he played no further role in the dramatic political events that followed and it is hard not to believe Holles played no role in his exclusion

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[61] Holles, *Memoirs*, pp.210, 209.

[62] *Paire of spectacles* p.7.

[63] *Mercurius Pragmaticus, 22–29 August 1648.*

[64] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.1007–1008, 1261–1262.

[65] William Prynne, *A Remonstrance and Declaration of Severall Counties, Cities, and Burroughs, Against the Unfaithfulness, and Late Unwarrantable Proceedings of Some of Their Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses in Parliament. With Their Dissents Thereunto, and Revocation and Resumption of Their Power Therein.*, (London; 1648), TT E.536 [23].

After the purge of December 1648 only Members of Parliament that publicly declared their dissent to the Commons vote of 5 December agreeing to a continuation of negotiations with the King based on the agreed framework of the draft Newport treaty were allowed to retain their seats. This process began on 20 December though Harvey only gave his dissent on 25 December.[67] While this show of support for the new political order seems quick, there were many who gave their approval immediately on 20 December, which suggests that Harvey felt the need to consider the consequences and perhaps discuss the matter with others before he finally committed himself to what by then seemed to be a republican stance. Perhaps it is telling that Harvey gave his dissent on the day the army agreed to move forward with the trial of the King.

Harvey was appointed a commissioner and judge for the trial of King Charles on 6 January.[68] The trial began on 20 January and, according to Harvey's later admission, he was present throughout, but he did not sign the King's death warrant. During his own trial in 1660, he claimed that he was coerced into acting as a judge and that the 'reasons that I did it [were] not of malice, and it was an error not of will, but of judgement.' He claimed he quickly became disillusioned with the process and tried to influence other commissioners to refuse to participate any further but to no avail. He then claimed that he resolved to excuse himself as a judge and when his presence was demanded at the court he had declared that 'I abhorred the thing, that my soul had reluctancy against it, and I was greatly grieved and troubled at it, and I did refuse any more to come, or to consult about anything that followed.'[69] With his own life on the line it would have taken a more principled man than he to say anything different. It is perhaps telling that the two witnesses he produced in his defence, his brother-in-law and a minister, could only testify to hearsay knowledge that he was forced into participating at the trial. None of the judges that he supposedly tried to persuade not to participate spoke for him.[70] The more respectable Bulstrode Whitelock was clearly aware of Harvey's apparent attempts to disassociate himself with the trial but was not called as a witness, possibly because Whitelock, whose daughter was married to Harvey's son and lived in Fulham Palace, did not want to publicly associate himself with him.[71]

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[66] *JHC 1651–1659*, Vol. 7, p.847.

[67] Underdown, *Pride's Purge*, pp.166,375.

[68] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.1253–1255; *A List Of The Names Of The Judges of The High Court Of Justice, For Tryall of The King Appointed by An Act Of The Commons in England in Parliament Assembled. And a List of The Officers of The Said Court, by Them Elected*, (London: 1649), TT E.669.f.13 [68].

[69] Howell, *State Trials*, Vol. 5, p.1197.

[70] Scott (ed.), *Somers Tracts*, Vol. 7, pp.454–456.

Whatever the truth of Harvey's involvement he was quick to take advantage of the new political order. Even before the establishment of the Commonwealth Harvey was active on numerous Parliamentary committees. As an indication of the importance he had by now attained in the government, on 12 January 1649 he was appointed to lead a committee to review state finances and later others that were established to sell further Episcopal and Crown lands. Then on 1 February, he was included in a committee established to settle the important matter of control of the suburban militia and throughout the first few months of the republic he was an active participant in the consolidation of the government's new found authority.[72] In yet another illustration of his importance Harvey was appointed, on 24 April, as commissioner to a newly established committee responsible for the administering of all customs revenue throughout England.[73]

This new committee had been established because of wide ranging administrative reforms initiated by the new government led by a group of influential City merchants, long associated with the radical movement within the capital. The committee, which sat part-time, had a salaried body of administrators who did the necessary work. Harvey was possibly appointed to act as the chairman of the group and as such he was involved in a considerable amount of administrative work. He seems to have appointed his brother-in-law, George Langham junior, to the position of cashier. As much as 400,000l per annum flowed through the hands of this committee and as such there was a great possibility of fraud.[74] In a clear instance of conflict of interest Harvey authorised the payment of 100l to the church at Fulham in January 1653 for poor relief. An Act of the previous year had levied an impost on coal offloaded through the port of London from which the committee *was* authorised to distribute a portion for the relief of the poor at their discretion.[75] The problem was that Harvey was by then also the Lord of the Manor of Fulham by virtue of his acquisition of Fulham Palace, and so he was clearly channelling funds to an institution over which he held major influence. The following year a further sum of 40l was additionally granted to the parish. In both instances the vicar, Isaac Knight, was informed no disbursement of these funds could be made by the parish without the consent of Harvey himself. In 1655, a vestry meeting acknowledged that it held 370l in trust from such funds and that the disbursement to the poor was entirely at the discretion of Harvey, Knight, Langham and Harvey's eldest son Samuel. While this does not demonstrate any corrupt activity on behalf of Harvey it is clearly an abuse of his prerogative as a customs commissioner to provide funds to his own parish and then to insist that it could only be disbursed by a group entirely beholden unto him.[76] However, late in 1655, a more significant abuse of position came to light that thoroughly implicated Harvey and destroyed his public career.

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[71] Whitelock, *Memorials*, Vol. 2, p.509.

[72] *JHC 1648–1651*, Vol. 6, pp.116, 129, 132, 144, 162, 205.

[73] *Ibid.*, p.193.

[74] Maurice Ashley, *Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate*, (London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd, 1962), p.56.

[75] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 2, pp.505–509.

In early November 1655, Harvey was arrested for embezzlement of 33,000l from the customs revenue and, along with his alleged accomplice Langham, was imprisoned in the Tower of London on the orders of Oliver Cromwell. Upon further investigation the amount of the fraud grew first to 54,000l then perhaps as high as 80,000l. It proved impossible to fix the exact amount he was accused of stealing, but the following year the amount was revised down to just 22,000l. According to his wife Judith, his health deteriorated rapidly in prison and her petition that he be released on bail was granted and he was released in late December. The following legal process was complex and confusing but in the end Harvey, having been humiliated and stripped of all public offices, in February 1657 only paid a pitiful 326l fine for his alleged fraud, but his name was tarnished forever.[77] Only Harvey was investigated for this fraud, none of the other commissioners, but it is impossible to now know the truth and extent of the accusations against him, but the figures mentioned at the time were staggering sums and if he had stolen just a small part of it he would have become a very wealthy man. One rumour had it that Cromwell had him investigated and arrested after Harvey hosted a particularly lavish party for the Lord Protector at Fulham Palace.[78] Perhaps Harvey's vanity was his downfall.

Despite his public humiliation Harvey sat in the second Protectorate Parliament, though for what seat is not clear.[79] His public career made a brief restoration with the recalling of the Rump Parliament in May 1659 and he was immediately involved in the establishment of a new London Militia Committee and played an active role in Parliamentary business until 21 February 1660 after which, and coinciding with Holles return to the Commons, he disappears from the political record.[80] In the days before the arrival of King Charles II the now Royalist Parliament ordered his arrest for the part he played in the Regicide,[81] and with the Restoration Harvey was specifically excluded from the Act of Oblivion.[82] On 6 June 1660, Charles II ordered that he, and all others excluded, hand themselves over to a Sheriff immediately, which Harvey did on 19 June.[83] Harvey was tried on 16 October for his role in the Trial and Execution of Charles I, to which he plead guilty and asked for leniency on the grounds that he had not signed the death warrant and that he had attempted to have the authority of the King's trial rejected. Harvey was found guilty of participating however and sentenced to death, but this was later commuted to life imprisonment, possibly on the intervention of the Duke of York.[84] Edmund Harvey was imprisoned in Pendennis Castle for the rest of his life, and where he died on 25 June 1673. He was buried, ironically, in the churchyard of King Charles the Martyr, a church built in 1662 to commemorate King Charles I.[85] Harvey had at least 13 children, three of them by his first wife and the remainder by his second.

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[76] Thomas Faulkner (ed.), *An Historical and Topographical Account of Fulham: Including the Hamlet of Hammersmith*, (London: 1813), pp.153–155.

[77] Aylmer, *State's Servants*, pp.160–162; Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD, Int 1655–56*, pp.8, 38, 55, 76, 78, 273, 328.

[78] *The Mystery of the Good Old Cause Briefly Unfolded*, (London: 1660), TT E.1923 [2], p.24.

[79] *JHC 1651–1659*, Vol. 7, pp.426, 591.

[80] *Ibid.*, pp.647, 847.

[81] Scott (ed.), *Somers Tracts*, Vol. 7, p.433.

[82] *JHC 1660–1667*, Vol. 8, pp.61, 139; Scott (ed.), *Somers Tracts*, Vol. 7, p.436.

[83] Scott (ed.), *Somers Tracts*, Vol. 7, pp.437–438.

Like many individuals of this period, it is difficult to identify Harvey's religious views. St Mary Colechurch where he worshipped for at least two decades had no reputation as being religiously radical and he seems to have played an active role in parish affairs, especially during the 1630s.[86] Many who would later be identified as religious Independents, or followers of the gathered churches, also led outwardly compliant lives so his parochial involvement does not necessarily demonstrate his true beliefs. The Presbyterian Clement Walker famously described him as changing from being an 'asurious [sic] *Presbyter*, to a Bedlam *Independent*' in 1648, but this was referring more to his political than religious views.[87] According to Harvey on the day of King Charles' execution he sought out the company of Edward Corbet to unburden his soul; Corbet at the time held a Norfolk living but was also a member of the Westminster Assembly, a body made up entirely of Presbyterian clergy.[88] Also present that day was Adoniram Byfield who was not only the scribe for the Assembly but who also, from 1649, was the rector of the church in Fulham, which was a living provided by the Lord of the Manor, who was none other than Harvey himself after he purchased the bishop's estate in 1647. Byfield was the son of Nicholas Byfield, a leading Puritan minister and opponent of James I, and who was referred to as being 'a clergyman of strong Calvinistic principles.' Byfield was replaced in 1657 by Issac Knight 'a very zealous and paynefull preacher of the Gospell of Jesue Christe.' Both ministers were clearly Presbyterian rather than Independents and so it would seem probable that this was Harvey's following as well.[89]

Despite Harvey's lengthy, and reasonably successful, political career he did not distinguish himself as a military commander. His inflated profile in 1643, when he was appointed temporarily Major-General, was probably based on the need to placate the City and his almost sycophantic support for the Earl of Essex rather than for his military competence. According to the biased Parliamentary accounts of Olney he showed personal bravery, but no glossy descriptions of the battle can disguise that his regiment was caught unawares and severely mauled. In 1644 he might have loyally supported Essex but at the expense of undermining both Parliament and the Committee of Both Kingdoms, while the resulting public spat put the high command into an embarrassing position that did nothing to help the war effort. If the testimony of the witnesses in Weymouth are to be believed he comes across as arrogant, rude and condescending. He certainly gained few admirers. The Royalists certainly seemed to have loathed him even though a merciful Charles II spared his life in 1660, despite one loyalist newsletter simply calling him 'a little inconsiderable rat'.[90] His actions in early August 1647 set the entire Presbyterian establishment against him and although he proved to be loyal servant of the Commonwealth his character flaws were too great in the end to retain Cromwell's support. However, a more flattering opinion of Harvey was given by the Presbyterian merchant turned pamphleteer Josiah Ricraft who informed his readers that he possessed 'some what more knowledge of him then many' and called him 'valiant, vigilant and religious true-hearted and right honourable' and that he found him:

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[84] Howell, *State Trials*, Vol. 5, pp.270, 994, 1005, 1196, 1203, 1229; Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, Charles II 1661–1662*, Vol. 2, (London: Longman, Green, Longman & Roberts, 1861), p.265.

[85] Beavan, *Aldermen*, Vol. 2, pp.73, 183; (n.d), Cornwall OPC Database. [Internet] Available from <https://www.cornwall-opc-database.org/search-database/more-info/?t=burials&id=4298683> [Accessed 14 May 2020].

[86] *St Mary Colechurch: Vestry Minutes 1613–72.*

[87] Walker, *Anarchia Anglicana Part Two*, p.13.

[88] Scott (ed.), *Somers Tracts*, Vol. 7, pp.454–456.

[89] Faulkner (ed.), *An Historical and Topographical Account of Fulham: Including the Hamlet of Hammersmith*, p.40; Thomas Faulkner (ed.), *The History and Antiquities of the Parish of Hammersmith, Accompanied with Biographical Notices*, (London: 1839), p.421.

> a man of a noble spirit, free from by, private, and base ends, aiming at the good and prosperity of the Common-wealth; active for the ends contained in the most sacred Nationall League and Covenant: a man most free from the scab of errour, adhering to no faction nor party, further then the Covenant, union of the Kingdomes, and truth of God will admit of; and as hee is a Member of that visible Body the Parliament, so also I verily believe him to bee a Member of that invisible Body of Jesus Christ; I wish so much good to England, that all their Parliament Members were such as pious true-hearted Harvey.[91]

While John Vicars called him simply 'brave Colonel Harvey'.[92] Harvey was certainly a divisive figure, and it is hard to see him other than the dishonest racketeer that one eminent historian has called him.[93]

Edward Hooker

Edward Hooker was a distiller who resided in the parish of St Mary-at-Hill (he was also prominent in the parish of St George in Botolph Lane), who was active with the City radicals in 1642. He served as a Common Councilman until 1650 and played an important part in the political Presbyterian City government in 1645, was a member of the Presbyterian Militia Committee appointed in May 1647 and colonel of the Red Regiment of the Trained Bands until the army takeover in 1647, and then briefly again in the Presbyterian resurgence of 1648. Hooker was appointed a trustee to manage the sale of Episcopal lands in October 1646.[94] After his dismissal in 1647 he was referred to by a sympathetic Presbyterian as a 'valiant prudent godly and faithfull

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[90] *Good Old Cause*, p.24.

[91] Ricraft, *Civil Wars*, pp.114–115.

[92] Vicars, *England's Worthies*, p.61.

[93] Underdown, *Pride's Purge*, p.187.

[94] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.879–883.

Captain' who 'stood up with the first and acted with the best, for the safety of King, Parliament, Kingdome and City, but he indeavoured not to be a Slave to Slaves, had a sword in his hand, and being assaulted by a company of Thieves and rascals, was loath to yield, but indeavoured to defend himselfe.'[95] Hooker, unlike many of his contemporaries, remained true to his beliefs and never seems to have shifted his support to the Independents when they achieved power after 1647, indeed he was one of those arrested in September by the army as it cleansed the City government of those they deemed politically unreliable. He was released in March 1648 and then subsequently lost his position as a Common Councilman in 1650, probably due to his suspect political stance. He was a Presbyterian elder and vestryman at St Mary-at-Hill.[96]

John Okey

John Okey, a Londoner, later disparagingly referred to as a taylor, served as a company commander in Browne's dragoons from 18 November 1642 until 13 February 1643, after which he served under Lord Brooke, Sir William Waller and then commanded a regiment of dragoons in the New Model Army.[97] He was probably initially a Baptist, being a member of Henry Jessey's congregation in Southwark at one time, but also seems to have inclined towards Fifth Monarchist beliefs. Okey became a firm republican and signed the death warrant of Charles I, while becoming an opponent of Instrument of Government and he opposed Cromwell being made King. In an interesting twist he also married John Blackwell's stepmother when her husband, Blackwell's father, died in 1657.[98] After his and Lambert's failed uprising in April 1660 he fled to Europe but was later arrested, returned to England for trial, and executed in 1662.[99]

Robert Mainwaring

Robert Mainwaring was the longest serving City Horse officer, serving continuously from the summer of 1642 until the army occupation of London in 1647. He was born in *c.*1607 but was not apparently related to the later City radical, Randall Mainwaring. He was employed at the London Customs House and was reasonably wealthy by 1638, since the house he was renting in St Dionis Backchurch parish was valued at 32l per year. In 1642, he was a captain in the Green Regiment of the Trained Bands but only joined the Honourable Artillery Company in March that year, while by the end of the year he was free of the Ironmonger's Company.[100] In 1645, he was elected Common Councillor for Cripplegate Ward and in 1646 was appointed as registrar for the sale of Bishops' land, where he must have worked closely with Edmund Harvey.[101] Mainwaring was appointed as judge for the trial of Charles I but does not seem to have sat.[102] He died at his Grub Street home on 19 September 1652.[103]

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[95] *Paire of spectacles*, p.9.

[96] Liu, *Puritan London* pp.63, 64, 181, 230, 234; Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, p.492t; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, p.928; Hamilton (ed.), *CSPD 1645–1647*, p.601; *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, pp.316, 570.

[97] *Paire of spectacles* p.5; TNA, SP28/267 Part 2, ff.38, 40, 41.

[98] Joseph Jackson Howard (ed.), *Miscellanea Genealogica et Heraldica* (New Series), Vol.1, (London: Hamilton, Adams and Co, 1874), p.178.

[99] Murray Tolmie, *The Triumph of the Saints : The Separate Churches of London, 1616–1649*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.156; 'John Okey (bap.1606–1662)', *ODNB*.

Robert Norwood

Nothing is known about Robert Norwood's origins, but he was born *c.*1610. According to a near contemporary image of his troop's cornet he resided in Bread Street.[104] His later life showed that he was a religious sectarian and was obsessed with the New Testament as the motto on his cornet demonstrates. What happened immediately after leaving Harvey's regiment is unclear but in 1649, he was a judge in the trial of Duke of Hamilton and in 1650 was a member of the High Court. Like Blackwell he was also a promoter of the *Eleutheria* project.[105] In 1650 and 1651, he was involved with the self-proclaimed Millenarian prophet Theaurau John Tany, and he wrote numerous pamphlets declaring that there was no Hell or Damnation – extreme views even then. Cromwell even interviewed him to curb his extremism, which failed. Norwood and Tany were prosecuted for blasphemy and imprisoned for six months but the verdict was later appealed and overturned. Norwood's extremism was hardly diminished by his imprisonment, and he was soon referring to himself as Thau Ram Tanjah. In 1654, he became a follower of the hermit Roger Crab who followed a strict vegetarian diet and induced Norwood to emulate his actions. While Norwood agreed, he quickly became ill and died at Enfield on 17 September 1654.[106]

Richard Salwey

Richard Salwey played only a brief role with the City Horse but was a politically active republican throughout the period. Born in October 1615, he was the fourth son of Humphrey Salwey of Richard's Castle, Herefordshire. The origin of Richard's republicanism might have come from his father who was fined in 1630 for refusing a knighthood when Charles I was crowned. Humphrey was elected Knight of the Shire for Worcestershire in 1640, he served on numerous committees during the civil war and was one of the MPs that fled to the army in July 1647. He was appointed a judge at King Charles' trial but refused to sit. Humphrey died in 1652 and was buried in Westminster Abbey but his body was removed after the Restoration.[107] Richard had been sent to London when he was young and taken as an apprentice, possibly by the great merchant and colonial trader Richard Waring, whose daughter he married in September 1641.[108] He is recorded as living in Fish Hill Street in 1640 when he contributed the astronomical sum of 1,000l to the Irish Adventurers.[109] It was probably through Waring and his father that Salwey was introduced to the radical City opposition forces who he quickly became associated with and, possibly utilising his connections with other apprentices, it was rumoured that he was a leading agitator in late 1641 and early 1642. He also soon became aligned with Richard Shute and was widely recognised as one of the leading City militants.

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[100] K. Lindley, 'Robert Mainwaring (b.1607, d.1652)', *ODNB*; Dale (ed.), *Inhabitants* Vol. 1, p.48; *Militia Names 1642*; Raikes, *Vellum Book*, p.63.

[101] 'Robert Mainwaring (b.1607, d.1652)', *ODNB*; Aylmer, *State's Servants*, pp.59, 108, 363.

[102] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.1253–1255.

[103] 'Robert Mainwaring (b.1607,d.1652)', *ODNB*; Ellis (ed.), *Obituary*, p.32.

[104] Add Ms 5247, f.41.

[105] Hassam, 'The Bahama Islands', p.5.

[106] Ariel Hessayon, 'Robert Norwood (c1610–1654)', *ODNB*.

He was elected to Parliament in 1645 and became an important leader, sitting on numerous committees and acting as a Parliamentary commissioner to the army in 1646 and 1651.[110] He was present at the meeting of Parliamentary commissioners and the army on 21 March 1647 which initiated a chain of events that ultimately led to the establishment of the republic that he clearly cherished.[111] He and his father were both appointed judges for the King's trial but neither participated in the proceedings. He served on the Council of State between 1651–1653, was appointed Ambassador to Constantinople in 1654 but felt unable to support the Protectorate. He returned to politics in 1659 when the Rump Parliament was restored and he urged reconciliation with the army, which provoked the opprobrium of Parliament who ordered his arrest in January 1660, although he was released soon afterward. He avoided retribution at the Restoration although was arrested in both 1662 and 1663 on charges of conspiring against the government but was again released. It was rumoured that he was implicated in Monmouth's rebellion of 1685. He probably died in 1686. [112]

Salwey was clearly an ideologue who was committed to republicanism. He was one of the committee appointed by Parliament on 4 January 1649 that drafted the formal declaration of the establishment of the English republic.[113] This was clearly something that he and his family were proud of, so much so that when his grandson erected a memorial to himself many years later in St

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[107] Richard L. Greaves and Robert Zaller (eds), *Biographical Dictionary of British Radicals in the Seventeenth Century*, Vol. 3, (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1983), pp.138–139.

[108] London Metropolitan Archives, DL/A/D/002/MS10091/022, Marriage Alligations Dec 1640-Dec 1641, n.d, f.177v.

[109] Prendergast, *Cromwellian Ireland*, p.409.

[110] Hugh Peter, *Mr Peters Last Report of the English Wars*, (London: 1646), TT E.351 [12], p.4; Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD 1651*, p.352.

[111] Waller, *Vindication*, pp.44–45.

[112] 'Richard Salwey (1615–1686)', *ODNB*; Greaves and Zaller (eds), *British radicals*, Vol. 3, pp.139–140.

[113] *JHC 1648–1651*, Vol. 6, p.111.

Laurence church, Ludlow the following epitaph about Richard was included: 'Major *RICHARD SALWEY*... / sacrificed all and everything in his Power / in Support of publick Liberty and in Opposition to Arbitrary Power.'

Richard Shute

Richard Shute did not serve in the City Horse but was instrumental in the raising of both Richard Browne's dragoons in 1642, and Richard Turner's cavalry in 1643. Shute, described as 'a factor' in 1638, had been a close business associate of the colonial trader Maurice Thompson since at least the late 1630s, and was also a leading member of the City opposition who, along with Thompson, delivered a petition on behalf of then London merchants to the monarch at York in September 1640.[114] With other disaffected members of the London mercantile community he invested in the Sea Adventurers scheme but unlike most he was appointed by Parliament to the committee responsible for managing the project, further demonstrating his importance within the City opposition.[115]

As has already been seen Shute quickly involved himself in lobbying for City control over the financing of the war in late 1642 and early 1643 but was politically sidelined after the radicals lost control in the capital in late 1643. So obnoxious did the Royalists find him that in 1643 one of the pamphlets referred to him as 'Satten Shute'.[116] By the end of the war he had clearly realigned himself with the Independents and he reappeared in October 1647 in a failed attempt by some of the City merchants to secure the customs farm.[117] He was more successful in January 1649 when Parliament named him as one of the commissioners to oversee the reform, and continued loyalty, of the navy which also included the Customs Department.[118] As such he was part of the decision making process that granted Edmund Harvey control over the customs revenue. Shute established himself further in the new regime in 1649 when he acted as a judge during the trial of the Earl of Hamilton, while also being appointed to the newly reconstituted London Militia Committee. In November 1653 he was appointed a judge at the High Court.[119]

Shute's commercial activities expanded during the Interregnum when he was no doubt able to capitalise on both his relationship with Thompson and also his own enhanced standing in London. In 1650 he was purchasing indigo from the East India Company and invested in the government-encouraged United Joint Stock, while still being involved in inter-lopping trade. It was believed his business interests extended to Brazil and the Trans-Atlantic slave trade.[120]

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[114] TNA, SP16/453, f.125; Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, p.313; Pearl, *London*, p.174.

[115] Prendergast, *Cromwellian Ireland*, p.418; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, p.11.

[116] *A Letter from Mercurius Civicus to Mercurius Rusticus*, (London: 1643), TT E.65 [32], p.29.

[117] *JHC 1646–1648*, Vol. 5, p.331.

[118] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, p.1257.

[119] Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, p.548; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.1261–1262; *JHC 1651–1659*, Vol. 7, p.353.

He died at the end of 1660, possibly overseas. Little of his family life can be identified but he is believed that he was closely related to Samuel Shute, later Sheriff of London, who was an outstanding critic of Charles II in the 1680s and his son, also Samuel, who later became Governor of Massachusetts.[121]

Sir Philip Skippon

Sir Philip Skippon is arguably the most identifiable officer that served in the City Horse, although his role as unit commander lasted barely a few months. Despite this he was appointed commander of the London forces on numerous occasions throughout the period and was widely respected by many in the capital. Originally from Norfolk, he served as a professional soldier in Europe from at least 1622, and probably before, until returning to England in 1639. In 1640 he was appointed Captain of the Honourable Artillery Company, beginning his association with the military forces of London.[122] He served as commander of the infantry in the Earl of Essex's army until 1645 and he then performed the same role in the New Model Army until December 1646 when he was appointed Governor of Newcastle but was back in London by March 1647 and was appointed to the Militia Committee in April. He attempted mediation between the army and Parliament during the summer and remained with the army when it occupied London, though he held no formal command. In April 1648, he was again appointed commander of the City forces, but his subsequent actions during the Second Civil War demonstrated that he was more aligned to the army than the Presbyterian forces in London. He played no part in the trial and execution of the King but served on the Council of State under the Commonwealth. In 1650 and 1651 he once more commanded the City forces, was appointed Major-General for London under Cromwell but was by then too old to be effective. He was created a lord in 1657 and supported Richard Cromwell's ascension to Lord Protector while again being given nominal command of the City forces in 1659. He played no role in the events leading up to the Restoration and died in late 1660. [123]

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[120] Ethel Bruce Sainsbury, *The Court Minutes, etc. of the East India Company, 1650–1654*, Vol. 4, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1913), pp.12, 39; Gary S De Krey, 'Richard Shute (d.1660)', *ODNB.*

[121] Gary S De Krey, 'Samuel Shute (d.1685)', *ODNB.*

[122] Ian Gentles, 'Philip Skippon (d.1660)', *ODNB.*

[123] *Ibid.* For a detailed biography see I. Pells, *Philip Skippon and the British Civil Wars: The "Christian Centurion"*, (London: Routledge & Co., 2020).

George Thompson

George Thompson was the younger brother of influential 'New Merchant' Maurice Thompson and, like his brother, a radical religious Independent. The family had pioneered trade with the New England colonies and had extensive properties along the river in Tower Ward.[124] In 1642 he raised a troop of horse in London but there is no evidence that this was connected at that time to the Militia Committee in London and seems to have formed part of Essex's main army and was paid for Parliament. not the City.[125] Whether it was this troop that then joined Turner's regiment in 1643 or a newly raised one is not known. After the departure of Turner from the regiment in early 1644 Thompson became colonel but was wounded at the Battle of Cheriton. He was a recruiter MP in the Long Parliament for Southwark in 1645, served on the Navy Committee of the Rump Parliament, was instrumental in implementing naval reforms during the First Anglo-Dutch War and was also a member of the Council of State in 1651. He opposed the Protectorate and was imprisoned for a while but was active in the restored Rump of 1659.[126] Denzil Holles was to later disparagingly remark that Thompson was given 2,000l 'for his wooden Leg, which nothing but a Cannon could have helpt [sic] him to, for he would never come with-in Musket shot.'[127] He died in 1691.[128]

Richard Turner

Originally from Kent, the Turner family were a wealthy and influential City family. Richard Turner senior was a leading opponent of the King's policies during the 1630s, was heavily involved with provisioning the English Army raised for Ireland in 1641, was major of the Yellow Trained Bands in April 1643 and a staunch supporter of the Parliament throughout the war.[129] Richard Turner junior, his eldest son born in 1610, was a draper in 1634 and married to Martha, daughter of Alderman Alexander Prescot. Turner's younger sister was married to Tempest Milner, another City radical who served on both the Salter's Hall Committee and the London Militia Committee from 1643 until 1660. Turner lived on Watling Street almost next door to Salter's Hall where his regiment was first conceived by the City radicals.[130]

He was elected a Common Councilman for the nearby parish of St Augustine in the 1641 elections, was later identified as a political independent and played a role in the 1647 Independent dominated City government.[131] Turner might reasonably be described as 'a trimmer' though as he navigated the shifting political sands after the Civil War. Despite being a City radical in 1643, when he was part of the Salter's Hall Committee, and later when he actively supported the Independent government after 1647, he was also able to maintain the confidence of the Presbyterian leaders of the City government to be appointed to their Militia Committee in May 1647. He was again sufficiently radical enough in 1649 to be appointed to the republican Militia Committee. In late 1646, he was appointed a contractor with authority to negotiate the sale of Episcopal lands to interested parties. He was elected Alderman in November 1653 but discharged the following year.[132] He died in 1676 at his estate at Totteridge, near Barnet.

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[124] Sir Henry St George and Sir Richard St George (eds), *The Visitation of London, Anno Domini 1633, 1634, and 1635*, Vol.2, (London: 1883), p.282; Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, p.115.

[125] Edward Peacock (ed.), *The Army Lists of the Roundheads and Cavaliers*, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1874. Reprinted by Ken Trotman Books, 1983), p.49.

[126] Alan Thomson, 'George Thomson (1607–1691)', *ODNB.*

[127] Holles, *Memoirs*, pp.136–137.

[128] *Ibid.*

[129] *JHC 1643–1644*, Vol. 3, p.236; *Militia Names 1642.*

[130] *Ancestry.com*; St George and St George (eds), *Visitation* Vol. 2, p.301.

William Underwood

William Underwood, whose family home in Bucklesbury, St Stephen Walbrook parish, Cornhill, was called the Woolsack, was by choice a religious Congregationalist as well as a member of George Cockayne's gathered church in Soper Lane. Despite his Independent leanings he was able to support the proposed limited Erastian Presbyterian church settlement and was an elder at his parish church and served the London Provincial Assembly until at least 1652. He was appointed to the Militia Committee appointed by the republican Commonwealth in January 1649 and then elected Alderman for Bishopsgate Ward on 24 September 1651 but transferred to Queenhithe in February 1657.[133] Underwood was free of the Worshipful Company of Grocers and had been a successful tobacco merchant before the war. He was quick to oppose the King in 1642 and he signed the petition for Lunsford's removal from the Tower and then invested 300l in the Sea Adventures project. He worked as one of the commissioners appointed to collect money for the war effort in the City and was major, and then colonel, in the Blue Regiment of the Trained Bands. He was later an ardent supporter of the Independents, serving on the Militia Committee established in January 1649 and again in 1655. He was member of the court that tried the Duke of Hamilton in 1649, and the following year was appointed to the High Court of Justice. Despite being overtly an Independent he was able to retain is commission in the Blue Regiment during the purge of radicals by the Presbyterian Militia Committee in 1647 and 1648, when he was reviled by one Presbyterian commentator being called 'Shake-rag Underwood'. He died in January 1658 and Cockayne delivered the sermon at his funeral.[134]

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[131] Liu, *Puritan London* p.181; Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, pp.398, 399n, 407.

[132] Liu, *Puritan London* p.181; Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, pp.398, 399n, 407; TNA, SP16/497, f.256; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.928, 1261–1262; Nagel, 'Militia', p.268; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.887–904; Beavan, *Aldermen*, Vol. 1, p.28.

[133] TNA, SP28/131 Part 3, f.102; Liu, *Puritan London*, pp.60, 61; Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, pp.424, 425n; Beavan, *Aldermen*, Vol. 1, pp.39, 194.

Herriott Washbourne

Herriott Washbourne was the seventh son of the merchant Robert Washbourne and had married Agnes Tickeridge prior to 1629. Washbourne resided in St Helens Within Bishopsgate in 1638 in a house with a moderated rent of 29l per annum.[135] He was probably not overly wealthy as his name does not appear in the pre-war trading records of the 'New Merchants', nor in the 1640 list of principal inhabitants of Bishopsgate. When he died is unclear, but he was still alive in January 1656 when he petitioned for 2,500l of arrears of pay.[136]

William Webb

William Webb's early life is obscure. He was possibly the son of William Webb, a merchant taylor, and in 1635 was listed as being of Grey's Inn, which suggests he might have been a lawyer, but he could equally have been the grocer living in Bartholomew Lane in July 1642, who provided a horse valued at 29l.[137] One historian suggests that the family origins were in Berkshire.[138] Whatever his origins he joined the Honourable Artillery Company in March 1641 but seems not to have been an officer in the Trained Bands in April 1642. In March 1643, he was serving in John Venn's London regiment at Windsor but was captain in the Green Auxiliaries later that year at Basing House, after which he was rapidly promoted first to sergeant-major and then colonel of the regiment.[139] He was presumably a Presbyterian sympathiser, for in June 1647 he replaced the radical Randall Mainwaring as adjutant of the City forces.[140] He was elected an elder of the Presbyterian parish church in August 1646 and in 1648 as a Common Councilman for Cornhill. In July 1659 he was appointed to the Militia Committee established by the newly restored Rump Parliament.[141]

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[134] *Militia Names 1642*; Prendergast, *Cromwellian Ireland*, p.414; Brenner, *Merchants & Revolution*, pp.183n, 242, 548, 549; *Paire of Spectacles*, p.10; Ellis (ed.), *Obituary*, p.46; George Cokayne, *Divine Astrologie, or, A Scripture Prognostication of the Sad Events Which Ordinarily Arise from the Good Mans Fall by Death Being the Substance of a Sermon Preached in Stephens Walbrook, Ian. 19, 1657, At the Funerals of the Honourable Colonel William Underwood, One of the Aldermen of the City of London*, (London: 1658), C4901.

[135] St George and St George (eds), *Visitation* Vol. 2, p.328; Dale (ed.), *Inhabitants* Vol. 1, p.69.

[136] Everett Green (ed.), *CSPD, Int 1655–56*, p.125.

[137] Beavan, *Aldermen*, Vol. 1, p.334; TNA, SP28/131 Part 3, f.25.

[138] Sidney J. Madge, 'Colonel William Webb, Surveyor-General 1649–1660', *Notes and Queries*, Vol. 181, No. 9, 1941, p.114.

[139] Raikes, *Vellum Book*, p.59; *Militia Names 1642*; Nagel, 'Militia', pp.144n, 146; *True Mannor*, p.11.

[140] JCC Vol. 40, f.218r.

[141] Liu, *Puritan London*, pp.63, 64; Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 2, pp.1293–1298.

Webb, like many of the City Horse officers, was active in purchasing Bishops' lands. Between 1647 and 1649 he and some partners, one of whom was Philip Skippon, bought land valued at over 4,600l, including two shops in Cornhill.[142] In April 1649, Webb was appointed Surveyor-General of land formerly belonging to cathedrals and collegiate churches, with instructions to arrange for the valuation and sale of this land. This role was expanded to include the sale of Royal Land in July of the same year, a role he retained until the Restoration.[143] It has been estimated that under Webb's supervision some 2,000,000l of land and other property was disposed of during the Interregnum and he was clearly an able administrator.[144]

After the Restoration various lawsuits were filed against Webb for his role in the disposal of these properties but he was never convicted of any crime.[145] He was still active in 1671 and it is believed that he died in September 1673.[146]

Nathaniel Whetham

Nathaniel Whetham, originally a baker, had been lieutenant to Browne in the Orange Trained Bands in 1642, and this seems the obvious reason for him being appointed to the dragoon regiment when it was formed later that year. His rapid promotion suggests that Browne trusted him and that they were of a similar mind and outlook. Whetham had also lived in the same parish as Browne and so might have had an acquaintanceship with him going back some years.[147] He later became a colonel and Governor of Northampton, fought at the second siege of Banbury and after the war was appointed Governor of Portsmouth, where he met George Monck. He later served under Monck in Scotland as a leading member of the English administration, before returning to secure Portsmouth in May 1659 for the army. Monck obviously thought he was sufficiently moderate enough to give him command of a regiment in early 1660 and he also seems to have been present in London at the Restoration.[148] Whetham served as MP for Portsmouth during the First Protectorate Parliament and St Andrews in the Second and Third Parliaments.[149] A writer that knew Whetham before the war wrote, in 1674, that he was 'always affected to Presbyterian ministers and meetings, and so averse to Bishops and monarchy.' Which implies that he, like Browne, started off as radical in 1642 but were seen as moderate by the Restoration.[150]

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[142] *Collectanea*, Vol. 1, pp.3, 123, 126, 284, 287.

[143] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 2, pp.81–104, 168–191, 890–897, 1293–1298, 1355–1403.

[144] Madge, 'Webb', pp.114–116. See also Sidney J. Madge, *The Domesday of Crown Lands : A Study of the Legislation, Surveys, and Sales of Royal Estates Under the Commonwealth*, (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1938), for a fascinating insight to these sales and the role Webb played in them.

[145] Andrew Barclay, 'Recovering Charles I's Art Collection: Some implications of the 1660 Act of Indemnity and Oblivion', *Historical Research*, Vol. 88, No. 242, 2015, p.642.

[146] Madge, 'Webb', p.115.

[147] *Militia Names 1642*; Dampier and Dampier, *Whetham*, p.39.

[148] See Dampier and Dampier, *Whetham* for an extended biography and Wanklyn, *NMA* Vol. 2, p.144.

[149] Browne, *Notitia Parliamentaria*, pp.265, 282, 297.



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[150] *Report on the manuscripts of F. W. Leyborne-Popham, esq., Littlecote, co. Wilts*, p.209.

Appendix I

Horses and Arms Listed, 11 October 1642 – 4 July 1643

The record books of commissioners John Smyth (Smith) and Thomas Richardson in which they recorded the receipt of 453 horses for the use of the City between October 1642 and July 1643 provide some significant insight into not only the procurement of the horses and arms but also on the extent of the support of the Parliamentary war effort in the capital at the time, and are therefore worthy of a more detailed examination.[1] During this period 453 horses, along with an assortment of equipment and weaponry, were listed by a total of 385 separate subscribers.[2] The horses and equipment were assessed by the two commissioners at a total value of 9,302l 16s 8d. The average value of each horse and equipment was 20l 12s 8d while the average amount loaned per subscriber was 22l 3s 0d.

Table 1: Subscriptions and assessment per month for City Horse Oct 1642 – Jul 1643.

Month	Horses Listed	%	Value Assessed (pounds)	%
October,1642	161	35.54	3,764	40.46
November,1642	205	45.25	4,166	44.79
December,1642	1	0.22	24	0.26
January,1643	8	1.77	144	1.55
February,1643	16	3.53	376	4.04
March,1643	29	6.40	474	5.10
April,1643	17	3.75	182	1.96
May,1643	6	1.32	54	0.58
June,1643	7	1.55	79	0.85
July,1643	3	0.66	39	0.42
Total	453	100	9,302	100

Source: TNA, SP28/131 Part 5, ff.1-17

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[1] Unless otherwise stated the following analysis has been extracted from TNA, SP28/131 Part 5, ff.1–17. Where a percentage is included in parenthesis this refers to the percentage of the total of 453 horses.

[2] Only a single subscriber, a goldsmith, failed to list a horse.

Table 1 shows that the enthusiasm for subscription clearly followed the perceived danger that the City saw itself in. With the Royalist Army marching towards the capital in October and November the sense of fear was channelled into a wholehearted desire of wealthy citizens to contribute towards the defence of London. In December and January, with the onset of winter, the withdrawal of the Royalist Army to Oxford and the commencement of peace talks, Londoners felt less inclined to provide further loans for their defence. Then, with spring and the realisation that the war would not be over so quickly, a further infusion of enthusiasm spread across London when remounts were needed for the troops already raised and for the formation of Willett's troop. The citizens' willingness quickly waned however with the introduction of more formal methods of taxation in the spring, replacing the need for the now steadily declining voluntary contributions.

Viewed in isolation these statistics suggest that it was purely self-interest and self-preservation that led Londoners to subscribe horses and equipment for the City Horse and when the threat of Royalist attack receded the inhabitants quickly lost their enthusiasm. But this only tells part of the picture and provides no context as to what other assistance Londoners were providing the Parliamentary cause at the same time. In fact Londoners had been active participants in subscribing horses for the Earl of Essex's army since the introduction of the Propositions in June, with over 830 provided by the end of September, a number significantly higher than the 453 total they raised for the City Horse. While it is true that the subscriptions for Essex's army declined rapidly from October onwards, as Londoners perhaps re-directed their loans to establish their own cavalry force, a further 118 horses were still subscribed for Essex between October 1642 and June 1643, the equivalent of slightly more than a quarter of the horses raised for the City Horse during the same period. Furthermore, Londoners also separately subscribed an additional 205 dragoon mounts and draught horses between October 1642 and July 1643 for use of Essex's army.[3]

The horses provided for the City militia accounted for barely one-third of all horses subscribed by Londoners during the first year of the Parliamentary war effort. This point illustrates that far from being reluctant and self-serving, the citizens of the capital were in fact ardent in their voluntary support of Parliament and that the diminishing subscriptions of 1643 quite likely indicated that many had simply come to the limits of their financial ability to help. It ought to be pointed out that of course it was only the very wealthy that could afford the vast sums required to provide a horse and accoutrements and so this support, at least, came from a very select segment of the population.

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[3] Robinson, 'Horse Supply in the English Civil War', pp.52, 75.

Table 2: **Horses and Subscribers by Ward (and outer areas), City Horse, Oct 1642 – Jul 1643**

Ward	**Total value (pounds)**	**Total Horses**	**Total Subscribers**	**Av Value Horse (pounds)**	**Av value Subscribed (pounds)**
Aldersgate Within	43	2	2	21.5	21.5
Aldersgate Without	581	22	3	26.41	193.67
Aldgate	337	15	14	22.47	24.07
Bassishaw	124	6	6	20.67	20.67
Billingsgate	162	6	5	27	32.4
Bishopsgate Within	598	31	23	19.29	26
Breadstreet	218	10	9	21.8	24.22
Bridge Within	445	23	22	19.35	20.23
Broadstreet	272	16	11	17	24.73
Candlewick Street	116	6	3	19.33	38.67
Castle Baynard	50	2	2	25	25
Cheap	158	8	8	19.75	19.75
Coleman Street	306	17	14	18	21.86
Cordwainer	248	10	9	24.8	27.56
Cornhill	869	34	30	25.56	28.97
Cripplegate Within	142	7	6	20.29	23.67
Cripplegate Without	56	3	3	18.67	18.67
Dowgate	144	7	7	20.57	20.57
Essex	27	3	3	9	9
Faringdon Within	400	21	18	19.05	22.22
Farringdon Without	266	14	14	19	19
Hertfordshire	58	4	4	14.5	14.5
Kent	38	2	2	19	19
Langbourne	287	14	14	20.5	20.5
London	8	1	1	8	8
Middlesex	77	8	8	9.63	9.63
Portsoken	26	1	1	26	26
Queenhithe	147	5	3	29.4	49
Southwark	103	5	5	20.6	20.6
Suffolk	24	2	2	12	12
Surrey	89	5	5	17.8	17.8
Tower	219	8	5	27.38	43.8
Tower Hamlets	55	3	3	18.33	18.33
Unknown	2,257	115	107	19.63	21.91
Vintry	11	1	1	11	11
Walbrook	219	10	10	21.9	21.9
Westminster	122	6	6	20.33	20.33
Total	9,302	453	244	20.53	38.12
Source: TNA, SP28/131 Part 5, ff.1-17					


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3. Bassishaw
4. Billingsgate
5. Bishopsgate
6. Bread Street
7. Bridge
8. Broadstreet
9. Candlewick
10. Castle Bayard
11. Cheap
12. Colemanstreet
13. Cordwainers
14. Cornhill
15. Cripplegate Within
16. Cripplegate
17. Dowgate
18. Farringdon Within
19. Farringdon
20. langborne
21. Limestreet
22. Portsoken
23. Queenhithe
24. Tower
25. Vintry
26. Wallbrook
Note: A single black dot represents one horse
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Map 10: Distribution of horses for City Horse by Ward 1642–1643

The records provide the place of residence for 282 (73.24 percent) of the subscribers from which fascinating insight into the spatial distribution and demographics of the subscribers can be in gleaned, as displayed in Tables 2 and Map 10. A total of 244 (63.37 percent) of the subscribers gave their place of residence as within the traditional boundaries of the City of London. Only 6 (1.55 percent) residents of Westminster subscribed, 5 (1.29 percent) from Southwark and just 3 (0.77 percent) from the Tower Hamlets. The surrounding counties also helped with 8 (2.07 percent) Middlesex residents contributing along with 5 (1.29 percent) from Surrey, 4 (1.35 percent) from Hertfordshire, 3 (0.77 percent) from Essex and 2 each (0.67 percent) from Kent and Suffolk. The remaining 103 (26.75 percent) subscribers gave no abode, but it seems probable that the vast majority of them lived within the City of London. A crude plotting of addresses on a map of London (Map 10) clearly shows that of those residents within the City, the highest concentrations of subscribers are to be the found in the Inner City, either side of the west-east axis formed by Cheapside, Cornhill and Leadenhall Street, with a marked lesser density along the river and in the eastern and western wards. Perhaps not surprisingly this distribution is in line with the traditional view that Parliament gained most of its London financial support from the wealthy centre rather than the poorer outer wards and suburbs.

It is unclear from other sources what roles the captains of the troops had in the raising of horses subsequently listed under their command, but the commissioners records hint that they were not without influence in getting horses listed for their own troops. Table 3 shows the subscription of horses per troop. Edmund Harvey, though resident in Cheapside certainly had many friends in nearby Cornhill Ward, for, on two occasions, the list specifically states horses were listed by his friends who resided there. Upon further examination of the 15 subscribers residing along the thoroughfare of Cornhill, 14 of them subscribed to Harvey's troop, as did one more from Birchin Lane, which runs off Cornhill. Richard Browne was a woodmonger by trade before the war and possibly used his connections to ensure that all six woodmongers that subscribed horses each listed them in his troop. Mainwaring was a resident of Cripplegate Ward, and he drew the largest number of horses (6) from any ward from there. Peter Willett's connection with Enfield can only be guessed at but it was sufficient to produce six horses in late April and a further one in late May.

Table 3: Subscriptions per Troop for City Horse, Oct 1642 – Jul 1643

Troop	Total Horses	Total Subscribers	Total Value pounds
Browne	49	46	1,059
Buller	9	8	170
Clarke	1	1	22
Harvey	96	86	2,203
Ireton	1	1	12
Langridge	1	1	12
Mainwaring	69	45	1,587
Skippon	81	69	1,939
Washbourne	93	80	1,636
Willett	53	48	662
	453	385	9,302

Source: TNA, SP28/131 Part 5, ff.1-17

Table 4: Occupations of Subscribers for City Horse, Oct 1642 – Jul 1643

Occupation	Total Horses	Total Subscribers	Total value pounds	Av Value horse pounds	Av value subscriber pounds
Merchant	42	36	882	21.00	24.50
Haberdasher	28	27	509	18.18	18.85
Merchant Taylor	28	25	561	20.04	22.44
Gent	26	25	440	16.92	17.60
Widows	26	7	661	25.42	94.43
Grocer	25	24	578	23.12	24.08
Brewer	20	13	352	17.60	27.08
Mercer	17	8	390	22.94	48.75
Dray	13	12	264	20.31	22.00
Cloth Worker	12	11	261	21.75	23.73
Girdler	12	12	213	17.75	17.75
Skinner	10	8	239	23.90	29.88
Draper	8	7	182	22.75	26.00
Goldsmith	8	9	190	23.75	21.11
Officer	8	7	171	21.38	24.43
Dyer	7	6	131	18.71	21.83
Knight	7	5	189	27.00	37.80

Woodmonger	7	6	179	25.57	29.83
Leatherseller	6	6	104	17.33	17.33
Carpenter	5	4	82	16.40	20.50
Esquire	5	4	140	28.00	35.00
Fishmonger	5	3	125	25.00	41.67
Silkman	5	5	95	19.00	19.00
Stationer	5	4	84	16.80	21.00
Inn Holder	4	4	54	13.50	13.50
Ironmonger	4	3	79	19.75	26.33
Sadler	4	4	85	21.25	21.25
Salter	4	3	81	20.25	27.00
Sheriff	4	1	120	30.00	120.00
Vinter	4	3	79	19.75	26.33
Alderman	3	2	67	22.33	33.50
Bricklayer	3	2	72	24.00	36.00
Cutler	3	3	45	15.00	15.00
Tallow Handler	3	3	41	13.67	13.67
Yeoman	3	3	26	8.67	8.67
Cook	2	2	23	11.50	11.50
Doctor	2	2	29	14.50	14.50
Founder	2	2	35	17.50	17.50
Oyleman	2	2	35	17.50	17.50
Pewterer	2	2	34	17.00	17.00
Spinster	2	2	32	16.00	16.00
Apothicary	1	1	23	23.00	23.00
Baker	1	1	22	22.00	22.00
Barber Surgeon	1	1	22	22.00	22.00
Blacksmith	1	1	20	20.00	20.00
Chapman	1	1	10	10.00	10.00
Clerk	1	1	12	12.00	12.00
Coachmaker	1	1	10	10.00	10.00
Cordwainer	1	1	12	12.00	12.00
Corporal	1	1	15	15.00	15.00
Corsetmaker	1	1	22	22.00	22.00
Deputy	1	1	16	16.00	16.00
Feltmaker	1	1	3	3.00	3.00
Glover	1	1	7	7.00	7.00

Gunmaker	1	1	22	22.00	22.00
Joiner	1	1	20	20.00	20.00
Mariner	1	1	10	10.00	10.00
Minister	1	1	8	8.00	8.00
Plumber	1	1	12	12.00	12.00
Sapboyler	1	1	26	26.00	26.00
Secretary	1	1	14	14.00	14.00
Taylor	1	1	12	12.00	12.00
Turner	1	1	11	11.00	11.00
Upholster	1	1	10	10.00	10.00
Unrecorded	44	45	1004	22.82	22.31
TOTAL / AVGE	453	385	9302	20.53	24.16

Source: TNA, SP28/131 Part 5, ff. 1-17

The occupations of the subscribers, as illustrated in Table 4, also provide useful insight as to what sections of society were able to voluntarily support the City Horse at this early stage of the war. The records state the occupations of 340 (88.31 percent) subscribers. The largest group of 36 (9.35 percent) individuals, described as merchants, subscribed 42 (9.27 percent) horses with a collective value of 882l (9.48 percent), followed some way behind by the 27 haberdashers (7.01 percent) who donated 28 (6.18 percent) horses valued at 509l (5.47 percent).

While the occupational lists are informative as to the demographic that supported Parliament in the City at the time, they are but a snap-shot of just the wealthiest section of society and provide no evidence as the extent of Parliamentary support amongst the majority of Londoners. In an age where a skilled craftsman might earn up to 40l per annum and an ordinary labourer, if employed six days a week, would be lucky to receive 20l for a year's work, the provision of mounts for the cavalry was clearly beyond the means of most inhabitants of London beyond the very rich.[4] Out of a population of under half a million souls,[5] the 420 individuals that did contribute towards the City Horse in 1642–1643 equate to less than one tenth of one percent of London's inhabitants at the time and so it is clear the entire burden fell upon the small, but wealthy, elite.

While there is no evidence that the ordinary folk of the capital contributed financially to the raising of the City Horse it is possible that collections were made from the poorer inhabitants across London. What is also interesting is who DID NOT subscribe to the City Horse. While one of the City Sheriffs (John Langham) subscribed as did two Aldermen (Andrews and Bunce), the list of subscribers is devoid of the names of the main civic leaders or City Members of Parliament. It is true that many civic leaders did subscribe horses for Essex's cavalry prior to October 1642 but virtually none did for the City Horse. Furthermore, many individuals that were to hold commissions in the City Horse, such as Robert Mainwaring, George Thompson, John Alford, William Underwood, Edmund Harvey, Richard Turner, John Juxon, Robert Norwood, William Webb and others all subscribed to the cavalry for the Earl of Essex but their names are conspicuous by their absence in the subscription list for the City Horse.[6] While this can in no way be seen as a lack of support for the cause, as all were to prove dedicated champions of Parliament, it most likely simply reflects the more humble means from whence they came.

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[4] Jeremy Boulton, 'Wage Labour in Seventeenth-Century London', *The Economic History Review*, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1996, p.279.

[5] Vanessa Harding, 'City, Capital, and Metropolis: The Changing Shape of Seventeenth-Century London', in J. F. Merritt (ed.), *Imagining Early Modern London: Perceptions and Portrayals of the City from Stow to Strype, 1598–1720*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.117.

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[6] TNA, SP28/131 Part 3.

Appendix II

Commissaries John Smith and Thomas Richardson's Accounts, Sept 1645 – Nov 1648

Fortunately, records exist that document the raising of the horses for Mainwaring's regiment in September 1645 and these also include both the fate of the horses and how much the original subscriber was compensated for their losses and, as with the 1642 subscription, it talks much about who was burdened with the responsibility for financing the regiment.[1]

As in 1642 John Smith and Thomas Richardson were the commissioners at Moorfields that recorded these mandatory subscriptions that provided 499 horses for the regiment, as mandated by an Act of Parliament dated 9 September.[2] Unlike in 1642, individuals were assessed for a loan, presumably by the Militia Committee but this is not clear, as to whether they could afford to contribute or not based on an assessment mechanism established earlier in July by another Act of Parliament. While this previous Act did not stipulate the specific criteria for selecting those who were obliged to pay, it did state that it was to be levied 'upon any person or persons being of ability as either now inhabit or have any trade or stock going within the City of London and Liberties thereof.'[3] The September act fixed the sum assessed per person at 12l for a cavalry mount and 6l for the dragoon mounts to be used by Webb's dragoons, to be paid either in the form of a monetary loan payable in cash at the Guildhall, from which a horse and equipment would be purchased, or by a horse and equipment provided to the same value. The assessed would be entitled to a return of 8 percent when the loan matured in six months, and they would be reimbursed from Excise receipts.[4]

In this manner a total of 499 individuals were assessed to provide horses for Mainwaring, of which 294 provided cash while 205 provided horse and equipment. As the number of individuals who contributed was limited by the number of horses required and not by the number of individuals able to pay, this suggests some unknown system of selection was at play that decided who contributed and who did not. Certainly, Common Council decreed that all Common Councilmen were to provide a horse each and as there were around 200 of them, they would account for almost half the horses needed, if they all contributed as ordered. At least 10 of the subscribers were members of the current Militia Committee and numerous of them were present or future Aldermen of the City. For the rest, a system of tickets were issued before 2 September to all individuals assessed at being able to provide horses, which implies that measures to raise the horses were well underway even before Parliament formally enacted the legislation to establish the mounted force a week later.[5] As can be shown in Table 5 and Map 11, Langborne Ward contributed the most with 42 (8.41 percent) horses, followed by Broad Street and Tower with 41 each (8.21 percent) with Lime Street and Queenhithe the least with 7 (1.40 percent) each. Unlike the 1642 statistics, the data provided by the 1645 assessment could be more indicative of the relative wealth of each ward at the time, or at least where the wealthiest citizens were concentrated, but such an assessment cannot satisfactorily be undertaken unless it is first identified how the assessed were selected.

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[1] TNA, SP28/132 Part2, ff.1–70.

[2] Firth and Rait (eds), *A&O*, Vol. 1, pp.766–768.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp.723–725.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp.766–768.

Table 5: Subscriptions by Ward for City Horse, September 1645

Ward	Total/ward
Langborne	42
Broadstreet	41
Tower	41
Farringdon Without	30
Walbrook	27
Aldgate	26
Bridge	24
Cheape	22
Bishopsgate	21
Farringdon Within	21
Billingsgate	20
Breadstreet	20
Cripplegate Within	20
Castle Baynard	19
Coleman Street	16
Aldersgate	14
Cornhill	14
Cordwainer	14

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[5] JCC Vol. 40, f.143.


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Tower of London
1. Aldersgate
2. Aldgate
3. Bassishaw
4. Billingsgate
5. Bishopsgate
6. Bread Street
7. Bridge
8. Broadstreet
9. Candlewick
10. Castle Bayard
11. Cheap
12. Colemanstreet
13. Cordwainers
14. Cornhill
15. Cripplegate Within
16. Cripplegate
17. Dowgate
18. Farringdon Within
19. Farringdon
20. langborne
21. Limestreet
22. Portsoken
23. Queenhithe
24. Tower
25. Vintry
26. Wallbrook
Note: A single black dot represents one subsciber
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Map 11: Distribution of subscribers for City Horse by Ward, 1645

Dowgate	13
Candlewick	12
Vintry	11
Bassingshaw	9
Cripplegate Without	8
Limestreet	7
Queenhithe	7
	499

Source: TNA, SP28/132 Pt 2, ff.1-70.

Of the 499 individuals assessed at least 176 (35.27 percent) were amongst the wealthiest citizens in their respective wards when their names are compared with the [incomplete] list of the principal inhabitants in London in 1640,[6] illustrating further that it was again the wealthiest citizens that bore the burden of financing the City Horse. As an indicator of how onerous this single assessment was on the inhabitants of London, irrespective of all other financial impositions, it should be noted that in 1634 the hated Ship Money assessment for St Mary Bothaw precinct in Walbrook Ward was 76l, equal to an average of slightly over 3l per person assessed. Thomas Cleave, a merchant in the parish, was assessed at the amount of 6l 13s 4d (but paid 10l) for this one-off payment. Thirteen years later the same Thomas Cleave was assessed to pay 12l for the raising of Mainwaring's regiment, a figure almost twice as much as in 1634, which is in addition to all the other taxes which he was continually expected to pay.[7] With each person contributing 12l this contribution proved to be considerably less than the 32l 2s 5d that each subscriber loaned in 1642–1643 or the average horse value of 20l 10s 7d during the same period, clear evidence of how difficult raising funds for the war effort had become by 1645.

As the assessment was technically a loan, to be repaid with interest, it was necessary to record the entries accurately for eventual repayment. Smith and Richardson personally valued each contribution of horses and equipment provided but still the value given was a standard 12l per horse which suggests a simple book value decreed by Parliament was used rather than the real value. Not a single horse was assessed at any value other than 12l and so there is no way of knowing if any were over or under valued. When the horses and equipment were returned to Moorfields just two months later, they were again assessed and a current value given, considering the usage of the horse and damages to its equipment, or of loss. The horse and equipment were then returned to the owners and the difference between the nominal value of 12l and the current value recorded for future reimbursement. Where a horse and/or equipment were either totally lost on service or was no longer fit for any service whatsoever, a regimental officer, most likely the troop commander, along with the City Muster-Master Edward Cludd, certified their complete loss of value and the owner was allowed to receive the full 12l reimbursement. However, these reimbursements were only paid to the owners in March 1647, by which time at least one of the subscribers (Jane Venn of Bassishaw Ward) was no longer alive to receive the benefit. No mention is made in these accounts as to whether the interest owed was ever paid.

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[6] TNA, SP16/453, ff.116–165.

[7] TNA, SP16/278, *State Papers Domestic, Charles I, 1634*, f.238.

According to the Act of 9 September 1645 the horses for the dragoons were to be provided in the form of mandatory loans, as were those for the cavalry regiment, but there is no evidence to corroborate that this was in fact what happened. Smith and Richardson's otherwise detailed accounts make no mention of individuals contributing towards the 3,000l needed for the dragoons and they simply state that the money to purchase the horses was in fact provided to them directly from Common Council.[8] In fact there was no need to place more of a burden on the citizens of London to provide more money to purchase these mounts for, as Common Council was informed on 2 September, the City still had in their possession some 360 mounts provided from the previous force commanded by Colonel Webb that was sent to the relief of Taunton earlier in the summer and so these were transferred into Webb's new regiment.[9] How the remaining 140 were procured is unclear and it is possible the Common Council used funds other than the assessment to provide them, as there is no evidence of individual contributions. Once the horses were returned in December Smith and Richardson valued the losses on service at 2,309l 14s 6d, which the City expected to be reimbursed to themselves out of the Excise.[10]

The City did receive reimbursement from the Excise but had to wait until April 1647 before it was released to them. On 16 April that year Common Council provided instruction of how this money was to be spent but in no instance was any of it reimbursed to horse owners, again implying that there was no debt to the citizens of the capital attached to the dragoon horses.[11] Most of the this money was disbursed in April to influential members of the City government for various non-related fees and interest owed them. But it is interesting that on 1 September 1647, the day before the Presbyterian dominated Militia Committee was replaced by an army controlled committee, the sum of 18l was disbursed to pay the wages for City administrators for their efforts in raising the regiments of Mainwaring and Webb some two years before. On 5 September Smith and Richardson were also paid 20l for their services and over the next 10 days a further 21l was paid out for incidental expenses also relating to the raising of the force. These dates are not accidental. On 23 July 1647, when the Militia Committee was about to be ousted by the army, it rushed to pay their militia forces, so now with the army having occupied London petty functionaries of the City government were again scrambling to pay themselves before they lost control of the money.[12]

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[8] TNA, SP28/132 Part2, f.71.

[9] JCC Vol. 40, f.143.

[10] TNA, SP28/132 Part2, f.71.

[11] JCC Vol. 40, f.213.

[12] TNA, SP28/132 Part2, ff.156–157.

After this, no more of the money was disbursed until July 1648 when between then and November the remaining 135l was paid for expenses unrelated to the raising of the regiments.[13]

The September 1645 assessment sheds interesting light on the processing of raising horses and the administrative mechanism to finance and later reimburse the owners. While it cannot be stated that the same procedures as these were followed each time horses were raised in it is highly likely that they were similar and no doubt the reimbursements equally lengthy.



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[13] *Ibid.*, pp.158–159.

Appendix III

Major-General Skippon's Troop, 1643–1649, and the Bromsberrow Church Cornet

As mentioned in Chapter Two the troop belong to Philip Skippon was transferred to the Earl of Essex's army, along with its commander, in November 1642. By doing so it severed its formal connection with the City of London, along with the latter's need to pay for it. Despite it having a short history with the City Horse it did have a lengthy military career and it is worth outlining its subsequent story as well as the tentative connection it has with a cornet on display in a Gloucestershire church.

It has been established that Anthony Buller was the troop's Captain-Lieutenant in 1642 and he continued to lead the troop in 1643 when it was part of the Earl of Essex's own regiment, commanded by Sir Philip Stapleton. He was wounded at some point in 1643 and left the troop but by September he was commanding his own troop in Hans Behre's regiment, and it is likely that his troop mistakenly fired on elements of Harvey's troop on the night of 5 September, mortally wounding Harvey's Cornet, Flesher. By 30 November Skippon's troop was being led by Nicholas Bragg. Throughout 1644, the troop, still referred to as Skippon's, served in the regiment and was present during the Cornish debacle.[1]

The regiment was transferred into the New Model Army in April 1645 and then commanded by Colonel Richard Graves, who was to later command a regiment of City Horse in 1648 (see Chapter 10). Bragg retained command of what was still Skippon's troop in the regiment. The regiment did not fight at Naseby (1645) but was present at Langport (1645), Rowton Heath (1645) and the sieges of Bristol (1645) and Oxford (1646). Part of the regiment provide the guard at Holdenby House when King Charles was held there in early 1647. Graves himself was commander at Holdenby but was not present when the King was abducted. Both Graves and Bragg left the regiment that summer, though the regiment continued to serve throughout the Second Civil War of

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[1] Turton, *Chief Strength of the Army*, p.23; *True Relation...Glocester*, p.4; The National Archives, SP28/11, Warrants by army committees, military commanders November 1643, f.145; Symonds (C. E. Long, ed.), *Symonds Diary*, p.73.

1648 and assisted in the attack upon the army mutineers at Burford Church in May 1649, just prior to its disbanding in June the same year.[2]

It is unclear if Bragg served in the troop before his promotion in 1643 but it would seem likely. How many of the original City Horse soldiers that joined the troop in 1642 remained with the troop throughout its service is unknown, but it would seem plausible that some did. There is therefore a continuous, if tenuous, link between the troop's continued existence and its London militia origins. To this link can be added the curious story of the two civil war cornets on display in the parish church of St Mary the Virgin, Bromsberrow, Gloucestershire.

It is believed one of the cornets is Royalist and one Parliamentary and that they are connected to the Yate family, whose family church St Mary's is.[3] There is no proof that either belonged to the family nor that the Parliamentary flag was carried at the Battle of Worcester (1651), as has been claimed by the family. However, what is of interest is the design of the Parliamentary cornet. Made of red silk the emblem consists of an arm holding a sword issuing forth from a cloud, a bible and the motto *Ora et Pugna. Juvet et Juvabit Jehhovah.*[4] While a variation of this emblem appears on numerous Parliamentary cornets in this instance it is almost an exact likeness of the cornet carried by Philip Skippon's troop in 1642, and of which images appear in numerous contemporary sources. The only difference being that the arm in the Bromsberrow cornet is enclosed with armour, while the arm in the images for Skippon's are bare. Alan Young in *Emblematic Flag Devices of the English Civil Wars 1642–1660* identifies the Bromsberrow cornet with that of [?Nicholas] Bragg, the same officer that commanded Skippon's troop from the autumn of 1643, based on other images of Bragg's cornet that still exist.[5]

Therefore there is an uncanny similarity between the contemporary descriptions of both Skippon and Bragg's cornets, both of which are almost identical to the cornet at Bromsberrow. Bragg, as a Captain-Lieutenant was not entitled to carry his own cornet even though he would have been referred to as a captain, and so the troop he led would have carried the cornet of its nominal captain, who in this case was Philip Skippon. It is therefore plausible that the contemporary references that relate to the cornet of Bragg are in fact referring to the cornet of Skippon, and therefore it is possible that the Bromsberrow cornet is in fact Skippon's. It is now impossible to prove this, and it is of course possible that the Bromsberrow cornet belonged to somebody else entirely (it is also remarkably similar to that of a Captain Andrew Lloyd of Shropshire except for the background colour)[6] however, the similarities are striking, and it ought not be ruled out as belonging to Skippon. How it ended up in Bromsberrow is, of course, a mystery.

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[2] Sprigge, *Anglia Rediviva*, p.331; Firth and Davis, *The Regimental History of Cromwell's Army*, Vol. 1, pp.102–115; Wanklyn, *NMA* Vol. 1 pp.53, 63, 73, 82, 94.

[3] J. D. T. Niblett, 'Colonel Rice Yate', *Gloucestershire Notes and Queries* (London: W. Kent & Co., 1881), Vol. 1, pp.130–131; Edward Fraser, 'Notes on Two Cavalry Standards of Cromwell's Time', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Vol. 2, 1923, pp.74–77.

[4] *Pray and fight. Jehovah has helped and will help.*

[5] Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.152.

[6] *Ibid.*, p.151.

Appendix IV

The Cornets of the City Horse, 1642–1647

The purpose of cavalry ensigns, known as cornets, was primarily identification. At approximately 2 square feet (0.20 square metres) and affixed to a staff they provided an elevated rally point during the chaos of battle, particularly in the period before distinctive uniforms. The cornets, generally made from damask, mostly embellished with distinctive painted motifs, images, mottos or other designs and with a fringed usually of alternating hues, also fostered a sense of pride within the troop, and their loss on the field of battle brought shame and dishonour to the unit.[1]

Numerous sources survive that show pictorial representations of Civil War era cornets and many of these include images of City Horse cornets, and these sources are discussed below. Most of the sources contain duplicates of cornets found in other sources, which suggest many were copies of other documents. Unfortunately, no original cornets of the City Horse have survived but as explained in Appendix 3, a cornet in the church at Bromsberrow is remarkably similar to that belonging to Philip Skippon.

London In Armes Displayed (c.1646)
Bodleian Library, Oxford: MS Rawlinson B48[2]

As far as the City Horse is concerned this is probably the best, and oldest, single extant source for cornets that has survived. It was prepared by John Lucas and dedicated to the then current Lord Mayor of London Sir John Gayer, sometime between his election in September 1646 and probably before 27 April 1647, when the Independent officers were purged from the Trained Bands but who were listed as still in their commands in the manuscript. It was most likely prepared shortly after the funeral of the Earl of Essex in October 1646. The manuscript contains illustrations of City Horse cornets in

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp.xxiii-l.

[2] London in Armes/Bod.

1642–1643 and 1646, along with ensigns for the trained band and suburban regiments in 1642 and 1646 (though excludes the Auxiliaries). It is likely that the 1642–1643 cornets were copied from images produced at the time. For the cornets, the manuscript provides a watercolour illustration of both the troop commander's cornet (on a lance) angled across the page and his coat of arms without helm or crest, the officers title and a lengthy description of the coat of arms. It contains eight cornets dated between 1642 and 1643[3] with a further eight for the troops in 1646.[4]

London In Armes Displayed (c.1646/7) British Library, London: Add Ms 14308[5]

This is a copy, and enlarged version, of the Lucas manuscript at the Bodleian Library referred to above and most likely post dates it but is still likely to have been created before the purge of April 1647. There are some minor variations in the detail of the cornets, particularly in the placement of wording and the scrolls. As such it is impossible to know which is the closest representation of the original cornets.

Banners of the Parliamentarty Commanders (n.d.) British Library, London: Add Ms 5247.[6]

Believed to be one of the oldest, and therefore most contemporary, manuscript to survive with watercolour illustrations of Parliamentary cornets, it contains images of 12 City Horse cornets.[7] While the date of the manuscript is uncertain it must post-date April 1644 as it includes Blackwell's cornet, whose troop was only raised that month. In all cases it depicts the cornets with alternating colour fringes and in all cases except Gheste, Hackett and Mainwaring 1643 the commander's coat of arms with helm and crest. In some cases it also states the officer's place of residence, either the street or parish name.

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[3] Skippon, Harvey, Browne, Mainwaring 1642, Turner, Washbourne, Norwood, and Blackwell.

[4] Mainwaring 1646, Hackett, Kempe, Hobert, Waring, Taylor, White, and Ashley.

[5] The British Library, London in Armes Displayed, Add Ms 14,308, c.1647.

[6] Add Ms 5247 (previously Sloane 5247).

[7] Skippon, Harvey, Mainwaring 1642, Browne, Washbourne, Norwood, Hooker, Gheste, Turner, Blackwell, Hackett, and Mainwaring 1643.

Arms and Devices borne by Captains on their Cornets in 1642.

Bodleian Library, Oxford: MS Rawlinson D942[8]

This is an undated and unattributed notebook of watercolours and line drawings, mainly of cornets but some coats of arms. Internal evidence suggests most of the contents were produced before early–1643 (before Harvey was appointed colonel) but with some additions, possibly added before mid–1644. It only contains cornets of five of the City Horse troops.[9] Given the preponderance of London officers included in the notebook it is possible it was produced in the capital.[10]

Standards Taken in the Civil Wars (n.d.)

National Army Museum, London: MS6208-1[11]

The manuscript, often referred to as the Earl of Ilchester's Book, contains some 163 flags of the period, although many are outlines only. It is undated and it is not known who produced it. It is possibly a later copy of another manuscript (or a compilation of others) but there is sufficient similarity of the images to suggest it is based on contemporary documents and therefore reasonably accurate. It contains eight cornets[12] of the City Horse plus a single plain red cornet referred to having been lost at Olney, and therefore might have belonged to one of Harvey's troops. Only one, Hackett's, is in full colour and the rest are merely drawn in outline form, and mostly incomplete.

The Colours, or Standards, and armorial bearings of certain officers in the Parliament army 1642…by Jonathan Turmile

Dr Williams' Library, London: Ms Modern, Folio 7[13]

The date of this is unknown but it contains watercolours of 306 flags of which 11 relate to the City Horse[14] Each cornet is displayed vertically on the page affixed to a lance with the officer's coat of arms with helm and crest below.[15] In each case the cornets contain alternating coloured fringes. Only four[16] have the motto in a white scroll, the rest are represented directly on the cornet.

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[8] The Bodleian Library Oxford, Ms. Rawlinson B.942, 'Arms and Devices borne by Captains on their cornets in 1642', undated.

[9] Skippon, Harvey, Browne, Mainwaring 1642, and Washbourne.

[10] I would like to thank Stephen Ede-Borrett for his advice on the provenance of this manuscript.

[11] Ilchester.

[12] Hackett, Harvey, Skippon, Mainwaring 1642, Mainwaring 1643, Washbourne, Browne, Norwood, Hooker.

[13] Dr Williams's Library, Ms Modern, Folio 7, 'The Colours, or Standards, and Armorial Bearings of Certain Officers in the Parliament Army 1642'.

[14] Skippon, Harvey, Browne, Mainwaring 1642, Turner, Washbourne, Norwood, Blackwell, Gheste, Hooker, Mainwaring 1643, and Hackett 1643.

The Art of Making Devises (London, 1648), Thomas Blount[17]

Appearing at the back of the second edition of Blount's treatise on emblems and devices are included the written descriptions of numerous Royalist and Parliamentary flags. Later editions also included captured Scottish flags from 1648 and 1650. Blount includes descriptions of five City Horse cornets.[18]

Prestwich's Respublica (London, 1787), John Prestwich[19]

Another descriptive only of Parliamentary cornets, believed to be based on Add Ms 5247 in the British Library. It contains descriptions of 11 City Horse cornets[20]

The Devises Mottos &c used by the Parliament Officers on Standards, Banners &c in the late Civil Wars (London, c.1710), Benjamin Cole[21]

Cole produced illustrations of 48 Parliamentary cornets to be bound into an edition of the Earl of Clarendon's *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England.* This includes six belonging to the City Horse,[22] each, except Norwood's, have the mottos in a square box rather than a scroll. Being later illustrations they cannot be considered as reliable representations as those produced during the Civil War period.

An interesting manuscript held at the National Army Museum and dated September 1643 illustrates the ensigns for all the Trained Band regiments and was probably drawn by a Royalist spy named William Levett.[23] Unfortunately it makes no mention of the City Horse.

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[15] Except for Gheste and Mainwaring which display no coats of arms.

[16] Norwood, Mainwaring 1643, Hooker, and Gheste.

[17] Thomas Blount, *The Art of Making Devises*, (London:1648).

[18] Skippon, Browne, Blackwell, Gheste, and Hooker (as well as one for Captain Thompson who might have been George Thompson).

[19] John Prestwich, *Prestwich's Respublica*, (London:1787).

[20] Skippon, Harvey, Browne, Mainwaring 1642, Turner, Washbourne, Norwood, Blackwell, Hackett, Gheste, and Hackett.

[21] The British Museum, 'The Devises Mottos &c used by the Parliament Officers on Standards, Banners &c in the late Civil Wars', 1852, 0214.554–555, c.1710.

[22] Skippon, Harvey, Browne, Mainwaring 1642, Washbourne, and Norwood.

In the following section, being the description of the various cornets listed alphabetically by officer surname, I have relied upon Young's *The English Emblem Tradition: Volume 3: Emblematic Flag Devices of the English Civil Wars, 1642–1660* for the formal description of the devices contained on each cornet as well for the Latin translation of mottos.[24] In each instance the contemporary or near contemporary sources that describe the cornet, both visual and textual, have also been cited.

The plate Number after the troop commander's name in the below list refers to the colour image of that cornet in the Plate section of this current volume.

Captain John Ashley (Plate 1)

Troop:	Southwark Militia.
Year:	1647.
Description:	Motto only in black letters on white scroll in three folds.
Motto:	Deus nobiscum/God be (is) with us.
Field:	Azure (blue).
Sources:[25]	
Comments:	In neither manuscript is a fringe indicated and the motto scroll is wavy.

Captain John Blackwell (Plate 2)

Troop:	The Maiden Troop that served in Edmund Harvey's regiment, raised spring 1644.
Year:	1644 (the Bodleian version of Lucas gives the year as 1643 but this is clearly incorrect).
Description:	A walled city above horizontal silver label with motto in black letters. Below is group of silver human hearts, from which flames issue.
Motto:	Accendia cura sionis/Aflame (burning) with love for Sion.
Field:	Gules (red).
Sources:[26]	
Comments:	Both of the Lucas' manuscripts and Add Ms 5247 show the motto in a wavy scroll, while neither of the Lucas' versions

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[23] National Army Museum, Ms 6807-53, 'The Enseigns of the Regiments in the Rebellious Citty of London both Trayned Bands and Auxiliaries' [by William Levett], dated September 1643.

[24] Young (ed.), *Emblem*.

[25] London in Armes/Bod, f.19; London in Armes/BL, f.23; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.43.

[26] London in Armes/Bod, f.15; London in Armes/BL, f.19; Add Ms 5247, f.80; Turmile, f.83; Blount, *Devises*, p.84; Prestwich, *Respublica*, p.69; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.2.

include a fringe but Add Ms 5247 shows it as argent (silver), azure, argent, and gules. The motto scroll is wavy.

Captain Richard Browne (Plate 3)

Troop: Independent troop raised in 1642. Command possibly passed to Captain John Juxon in late 1642.
Year: 1642.
Description: A green laurel wreath at right with quatrefoil top and bottom. At left a skull.
Motto: One of these.
Field: Gules (red).
Sources:[27]
Comments: Neither of the Lucas' manuscripts show a fringe while Add Ms 5247, D942 and Turmile both show it as gules and argent (silver). The version in Ilchester is an incomplete line drawing only. The motto painted horizontal onto the field with no scroll.

Captain Charles Gheste (Plate 4)

Troop: Colonel Richard Turner's regiment.
Year: 1643.
Description: A soldier, his helmet adorned with silver and blue feathers. On his breast a red human heart in flames. His left arm and hand akimbo. In his right an unsheathed sword with a gold hilt. Out of his mouth a silver label with the motto in black letters.
Motto: For God and his countrey [sic].
Field: Tenne (tawny orange).
Sources:[28]
Comments: Add Ms 5247 depicts the fringe as argent and tenne while Turmile shows it as argent and sable (black). None indicate that he had a coat of arms. The motto scroll is wavy.

Captain Symon Hackett (1643) (Plate 5)

Troop: He seems to have replaced Captain Peter Willett who was killed in 1643. The troop served in Colonel Edmund Harvey's regiment.

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[27] London in Armes/Bod, f.13; London in Armes/BL, f.16; Add Ms 5247, f.39; The Bodleian Library Oxford, 'Arms and Devices', f.5; Turmile, f.54; Ilchester, f.83; Blount, *Devises*, p.78; Mottos; Prestwich, *Respublica*, p.98; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.148.

[28] Add Ms 5247, f.47; Turmile, f.67; Prestwich, *Respublica*, pp.44–45; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.69.

Year: 1643
Description: At top right, a cloud from which issues a naked hand holding an unsheathed sword that is pointed diagonally down to bottom left. Motto in black letters on diagonal silver banner from bottom right to top left.
Motto: Veritas et pax/Truth and peace.
Field: Gules (red).
Sources:[29]
Comments: Add Ms 5247 and Turmile depict the fringe as argent and gules but Prestwich (which is not a contemporary source) notes it as argent and sable. The motto scroll is wavy. This cornet was purchased for 41 4s to replace Willet's cornet after he was killed at Aldbourne Chase.[30]

Major Symon Hackett (1646) (Plate 6)

Troop: Colonel Robert Mainwaring's regiment.
Year: 1646 (possibly also 1645).
Description: From cloud at right issues a naked arm and hand with raised sword.
Motto: Gratia et pax/Grace and peace.
Field: Azure (blue).
Sources:[31]
Comments: As with all of the Lucas's illustrations there is no fringe noted. In these illustrations the scrolls containing the mottos are wavy. It is probable that Hackett carried this cornet in the same regiment when it was first raised in 1645.

Captain (later Colonel) Edmund Harvey (Plate 7)

Troop: Independent troop raised in 1642 and then regimented under Harvey in 1643.
Year: 1642.
Description: At top, a gold book (Bible) with the first two words of the motto in gold letters. Below, a city (London) with the other two words of the motto in gold letters.
Motto: Lex suprema salus patriae/The supreme law is the welfare of the country.
Field: Gules (red).

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[29] Add Ms 5247, f.98; Turmile, f.100; Ilchester, f.66; Prestwich, *Respublica*, p.77; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.252.

[30] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.160.

[31] London in Armes/Bod, f.16; London in Armes/BL, f.20; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.84.


Deus Nobiscum.


ACCENDIA CVRA SIONIS

Plate 1 – Captain John Ashley (Dr Les Prince)

Plate 2 – Captain John Blackwell (Dr Les Prince)

See Appendix IV for further information.


My Oath and Sword
mantane this Word,


Turris Jehova.
Robusta Nomen

Plate 19 – Captain Herriott Washbourne (Dr Les Prince)

Plate 20 – Captain John White (Dr Les Prince)

See Appendix IV for further information.

Sources:[32]

Comments: No fringe in either Lucas but in Add Ms 5247, D942 Turmile and Prestwich it is argent and gules. The Ilchester version is only partial, with the Bible (or) and city drawn (no colour) but without the rest of the devices but also with an uncoloured fringe. The Lucas versions show the motto in two wavy scrolls, above and below the Bible and city but Add Ms 5247 and Turmile have the motto painted horizontally on two lines with the Bible and city between a word. The Add Ms 5247 and Turmile versions are almost the same as the cornet belonging to Sir Samuel Luke.[33]

Captain William Hobert (Hubbard) (Plate 8)

Troop: Colonel Robert Mainwaring's regiment.
Year: 1646 (possibly also 1645).
Description: Motto only in black letters on white banner.
Motto: Emanuel.
Field: Azure (blue).
Source:[34]
Comments: No fringe. It is probable that Hobert carried this cornet in the same regiment when it was first raised in 1645.

Captain Edward Hooker (Plate 9)

Troop: Colonel Richard Turner's regiment.
Year: 1643.
Description: Parchment roll inscribed 'Magna Charta.' Motto at top in black letters on silver scroll in three folds.
Motto: Preserva legem domine/Preserve the law, oh God.
Field: Vert (green).
Source:[35]
Comments: Add Ms 5247 and Turmile note the fringe as vert and argent (as does Prestwich). Ilchester is only partial with only the motto and 'Magna Charta' drawn. Add Ms 5247, Turmile and Ilchester are almost identical. Add Ms 5247 and Turmile both note he was the son of Captain Hooker of London while

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[32] London in Armes/Bod, f.12; London in Armes/BL, f.16; BL Add Ms 5247, f.34; The Bodleian Library Oxford, 'Arms and Devices', f.2; Turmile, f.53; Ilchester, f.80; Mottos; Prestwich, *Respublica*, pp.38–39; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.108.

[33] Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.108.

[34] London in Armes/Bod, f.17; London in Armes/BL, f.21; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.51.

[35] BL Add Ms 5247, f.47; Turmile, f.67; Ilchester, f.156; The British Library, Emblems, Ms Harley 1383, f.13; Blount, *Devises*, p.82; Prestwich, *Respublica*, p.44; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.167.

Harley 1383 adds Hooker senior as of Colonel Atkins regiment (Trained Bands).

Captain Thomas Kempe (Plate 10)

Troop: Colonel Robert Mainwaring's regiment.
Year: 1646 (possibly also 1645).
Description: Motto only in black letters on a white scroll in three folds.
Motto: Deo et lex lea [Latin unsatisfactory. Perhaps, 'Choose for God and Law']
Field: Azure (blue).
Source:[36]
Comments: No fringe. It is probable that Kempe carried this cornet in the same regiment when it was first raised in 1645.

Captain (later Major) Robert Mainwaring (1642) (Plate 11)

Troop: Colonel Edmund Harvey regiment.
Year: 1642.
Description: A gold anchor hanging below clouds. Motto in gold letters below.
Motto: Only in Heaven.
Field: Gules (red).
Source:[37]
Comments: According to the Ilchester manuscript, in which it is just an outline drawing, this cornet was captured by the Royalists at the Battle of Newbury on 20 September 1643. In both Lucas versions there is no fringe but in Add Ms 5247 and Turmile it is shown as argent and gules. In all versions (except Lucas) the motto is horizontal, no scroll, at the bottom of the cornet, Lucas shows it on a two part scroll.

Major Robert Mainwaring (1643) (Plate 12)

Troop: Colonel Edmund Harvey regiment.
Year: after 20 September 1643.

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[36] London in Armes/Bod, f.17; London in Armes/BL, f.20; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.40.

[37] London in Armes/Bod, f.13; London in Armes/BL, f.17; BL Add Ms 5247, f.34; The Bodleian Library Oxford, 'Arms and Devices', f.4; Turmile, f.54; Ilchester, f.81; Mottos; Prestwich, *Respublica*, p.39; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.149.

Description: Motto in black letters on silver banner in a descending scroll at left. From right issues naked arm and hand with vertical unsheathed sword.
Motto: Pro fide semel tradita/For the faith once and for all handed down.
Field: Gules (red).
Source:[38]
Comments: This cornet replaced the one (above) lost at the Battle of Newbury in 1643. Add Ms 5247 and Turmile shows fringe as argent and gules. In each version the motto is in a wavy scroll. An uncoloured line drawing appears in D942 (f.3) as well.

Colonel Robert Mainwaring (1646) (Plate 13)

Troop: Colonel Robert Mainwaring regiment.
Year: 1646 (possibly also 1645).
Description: Plain azure (blue).
Motto: None.
Field: Azure (blue).
Source:[39]
Comments: Not recorded in Young. According to Young it was the tradition that the colonel's cornet was generally of a plain colour.[40] Perhaps the reason both Harvey's and Turner's cornets did not follow this tradition is that they were both captains prior to promotion to the rank of colonel. No fringe is recorded.

Captain John Norwood (Plate 14)

Troop: Colonel Edmund Harvey regiment.
Year: 1643.
Description: Cloud at right from which an arm and hand holding hammer uplifted against mountain to left. Motto in black letters on silver scroll above.
Motto: Coram Zerubbabel/Before Zerubbabel. In Lucas it reads Zerubbabel Coram.
Field: Gules (red).
Source:[41]

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[38] Add Ms 5247, f.98; Turmile, f.101; Ilchester, f.82; Prestwich, *Respublica*, p.77; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.181.

[39] London in Armes/Bod, f.16; London in Armes/BL, f.19.

[40] Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.xxvi.

[41] London in Armes/Bod, f.15; London in Armes/BL, f.18; BL Add Ms 5247, f.41; The Bodleian Library Oxford, 'Arms and Devices', f.17; Turmile, f.55; Ilchester, f.85; Mottos; Prestwich, *Respublica*, p.99; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.26.

Comments: The motto is in line with Norwood's extreme religious beliefs. Lucas and D942 show no fringe but Add Ms 5247 and Turmile both show it as or and gules. In all versions the motto is in wavy scroll on a single line, except in Lucas where it is over two lines. The Ilchester version is an incomplete line drawing.

Captain (later Major-General) Philip Skippon (Plate 15)

Troop: Independent troop which transferred to Earl of Essex army in late 1642.
Year: 1642.
Description: Blue clouds in right corner from which issues a naked arm and hand holding an unsheathed sword with a gold hilt. To left is closed book (Bible) with gold clasps. Motto below in gold letters.
Motto: Ora et pugna. Iuvat et iuvabit Iehovah/Pray and fight. Jehovah helps and will help.
Field: Gules (red).
Source:[42]
Comments: Lucas shows no fringe but Add Ms 5247, D942 and Turmile show it as gules and argent. Ilchester is an incomplete line drawing showing only devices and no motto. In both Lucas, the motto is in wavy scroll but in Add Ms 5247 and Turmile it is horizontal over two lines with no scroll. The cornet shows more than just a passing resemblance to the cornet attributed to Captain Nicholas Bragg, who after 1643 commanded the troop in Essex's regiment.[43] It is also remarkably like the cornet in Bromsberrow church (see Appendix 3).

Captain Elias Taylor (Plate 16)

Troop: City of Westminster Militia.
Year: 1646.
Description: From cloud at top centre issues a gold portcullis. Motto below in black letters on white banner in three folds.
Motto: E caelo sola solas (solus)/From heaven comes our only comfort (salvation).
Field: Gules (red).

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[42] London in Armes/Bod, f.12; London in Armes/BL, f.15; BL Add Ms 5247, f.31; The Bodleian Library Oxford, 'Arms and Devices', f.2; Turmile, f.53; Ilchester, f.79; Blount, *Devises*, p.78; Mottos; Prestwich, *Respublica*, p.38; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.152.

[43] Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.152.

Source:[44]
Comments: No fringe. Taylor commanded the same troop in 1659 but it is not known if the cornet remained the same.

Captain (later Colonel) Richard Turner (Plate 17)

Troop: Colonel Richard Turner regiment.
Year: 1643.
Description: At right, blue clouds, from which issue left arm and hand holding black flag with gold tassels with inscription Iehovah nissi.
Motto: Iehovah nissi/Unless Jehovah.
Field: Or (gold).
Source:[45]
Comments: Lucas indicates no fringe but Add Ms 5247 and Turmile show as argent, and argent mixed with sable (black). All versions depict the same image. Lucas notes Turner as only a captain and does not mention his later rank of colonel. Lucas also notes the date as 1642 but there is no evidence that Turner commanded a troop until 1643 (see Chapter Five).

Captain Edmund Waring (1646) (Plate 18)

Troop: Colonel Robert Mainwaring regiment.
Year: 1646 (possibly also 1645).
Description: Azure field with silver scroll. Motto missing.
Motto: Missing.
Field: Azure (blue).
Source:[46]
Comments: The cornet is incomplete with motto missing. No fringe. Waring commanded a troop in Turner's regiment in 1643/1644 but there is no evidence to suggest this was the same cornet used in that troop. Not recorded in Young.

Captain Herriott Washbourne (Plate 19)

Troop: Independent troop raised in 1642 and then regimented under Colonel Harvey in 1643.
Year: 1642.

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[44] London in Armes/Bod, f.18; London in Armes/BL, f.22.

[45] London in Armes/Bod, f.14; London in Armes/BL, f.17; BL Add Ms 5247, f.50; Turmile, f.68; Prestwich, *Respublica*, p.46; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.90.

[46] London in Armes/Bod, f.18; London in Armes/BL, f.21.

Description: An armed man. In his helmet a white feather. His left arm akimbo with hand on hilt of sword. A gold book (Bible) in his right hand. Motto in gold letters below.
Motto: My oath and sword mantane [sic] this word.
Field: Gules (red).
Source:[47]
Comments: Lucas's versions include no fringe but Add Ms 5247, D942 and Turmile show the fringe as argent and gules. Lucas shows motto in wavy scroll either side and below the armed man while Add Ms 5247 and Turmile show as horizontal over two lines below the man. Ilchester is an incomplete line drawing. Washbourne commanded a newly raised troop in the Abingdon garrison from late 1644 until 1646 (see Chapter Seven). As it was common for captains to retain their cornets if they transferred it is possible he used this one in that troop as well.[48]

Captain John White (Plate 20)

Troop: Tower Hamlets Militia.
Year: 1646.
Description: At top centre, the White Tower (Tower of London). Motto below in black letters on white banner in three folds.
Motto: Turris robusta nomen Iehova/The name of Jehovah is a strong tower.
Field: Gules (red).
Source:[49]
Comments: No fringe.

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[47] London in Armes/Bod, f.14; London in Armes/BL, f.18; BL Add Ms 5247, f.39; The Bodleian Library Oxford, 'Arms and Devices', f.6; Turmile, f.55; Ilchester, f.84; Mottos; Prestwich, *Respublica*, p.98; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.119.

[48] Young (ed.), *Emblem*, pp.xxvi-xxvii.

[49] London in Armes/Bod, f.19; London in Armes/BL, f.22; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.243.

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Year: 1643
Description: At top right, a cloud from which issues a naked hand holding an unsheathed sword that is pointed diagonally down to bottom left. Motto in black letters on diagonal silver banner from bottom right to top left.
Motto: Veritas et pax/Truth and peace.
Field: Gules (red).
Sources:[29]
Comments: Add Ms 5247 and Turmile depict the fringe as argent and gules but Prestwich (which is not a contemporary source) notes it as argent and sable. The motto scroll is wavy. This cornet was purchased for 41 4s to replace Willet's cornet after he was killed at Aldbourne Chase.[30]

Major Symon Hackett (1646) (Plate 6)

Troop: Colonel Robert Mainwaring's regiment.
Year: 1646 (possibly also 1645).
Description: From cloud at right issues a naked arm and hand with raised sword.
Motto: Gratia et pax/Grace and peace.
Field: Azure (blue).
Sources:[31]
Comments: As with all of the Lucas's illustrations there is no fringe noted. In these illustrations the scrolls containing the mottos are wavy. It is probable that Hackett carried this cornet in the same regiment when it was first raised in 1645.

Captain (later Colonel) Edmund Harvey (Plate 7)

Troop: Independent troop raised in 1642 and then regimented under Harvey in 1643.
Year: 1642.
Description: At top, a gold book (Bible) with the first two words of the motto in gold letters. Below, a city (London) with the other two words of the motto in gold letters.
Motto: Lex suprema salus patriae/The supreme law is the welfare of the country.
Field: Gules (red).

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[29] Add Ms 5247, f.98; Turmile, f.100; Ilchester, f.66; Prestwich, *Respublica*, p.77; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.252.

[30] TNA, SP28/144 Part 10, f.160.

[31] London in Armes/Bod, f.16; London in Armes/BL, f.20; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.84.


Deus Nobiscum.


ACCENDIA CVRA SIONIS

Plate 1 – Captain John Ashley (Dr Les Prince)

Plate 2 – Captain John Blackwell (Dr Les Prince)

See Appendix IV for further information.


ONE OF THESE


FOR GOD AND HIS COVNTREY

Plate 3 – Captain Richard Browne (Dr Les Prince)

Plate 4 – Captain Charles Gheste (Anderson Subtil)

See Appendix IV for further information.


Veritas Et PAX


Gratia et
Pax

Plate 5 – Captain Symon Hackett (1643) (Dr Les Prince)

Plate 6 – Major Symon Hackett (1646) (Dr Les Prince)

See Appendix IV for further information.


LEX SVPREMA
SALVS PATRIÆ



Plate 7 – Captain (later Colonel) Edmund Harvey (Dr Les Prince)

Plate 8 – Captain William Hobert (Hubbard) (Dr Les Prince)

See Appendix IV for further information.


LEGEM
PRESERVA
DOMINE
MAGNA
CHARTA


EA Lex
Deo
Lea.

Plate 9 – Captain Edward Hooker (Anderson Subtil)

Plate 10 – Captain Thomas Kempe (Dr Les Prince)

See Appendix IV for further information.


ONLY. IN. HEAVEN.


PRO
FIDE
SEMEL
TRADITA.

Plate 11 – Captain (later Major) Robert Mainwaring (1642) (Anderson Subtil)

Plate 12 – Major Robert Mainwaring (1643) (Dr Les Prince)

See Appendix IV for further information.




CORAM ZERVBBABEL·

Plate 13 – Colonel Robert Mainwaring (1646) (Dr Les Prince)

Plate 14 – Captain John Norwood (Dr Les Prince)

See Appendix IV for further information.



Ora et Pvgna
Jvvat, et, Jvvabit Jehoveh



Ecœla
sola
solas.

Plate 15 – Major General Philip Skippon (Anderson Subtil)

Plate 16 – Captain Elias Taylor (Dr Les Prince)

See Appendix IV for further information.





Plate 17 – Captain (later Colonel) Richard Turner (Dr Les Prince)

Plate 18 – Captain Edmund Waring (1646) (Dr Les Prince)

See Appendix IV for further information.


10
My Oath and Sword
mantane this Word,


Turris
Jehova.
Robusta Nomen

Plate 19 – Captain Herriott Washbourne (Dr Les Prince)

Plate 20 – Captain John White (Dr Les Prince)

See Appendix IV for further information.

Sources:[32]

Comments: No fringe in either Lucas but in Add Ms 5247, D942 Turmile and Prestwich it is argent and gules. The Ilchester version is only partial, with the Bible (or) and city drawn (no colour) but without the rest of the devices but also with an uncoloured fringe. The Lucas versions show the motto in two wavy scrolls, above and below the Bible and city but Add Ms 5247 and Turmile have the motto painted horizontally on two lines with the Bible and city between a word. The Add Ms 5247 and Turmile versions are almost the same as the cornet belonging to Sir Samuel Luke.[33]

Captain William Hobert (Hubbard) (Plate 8)

Troop: Colonel Robert Mainwaring's regiment.
Year: 1646 (possibly also 1645).
Description: Motto only in black letters on white banner.
Motto: Emanuel.
Field: Azure (blue).
Source:[34]
Comments: No fringe. It is probable that Hobert carried this cornet in the same regiment when it was first raised in 1645.

Captain Edward Hooker (Plate 9)

Troop: Colonel Richard Turner's regiment.
Year: 1643.
Description: Parchment roll inscribed 'Magna Charta.' Motto at top in black letters on silver scroll in three folds.
Motto: Preserva legem domine/Preserve the law, oh God.
Field: Vert (green).
Source:[35]
Comments: Add Ms 5247 and Turmile note the fringe as vert and argent (as does Prestwich). Ilchester is only partial with only the motto and 'Magna Charta' drawn. Add Ms 5247, Turmile and Ilchester are almost identical. Add Ms 5247 and Turmile both note he was the son of Captain Hooker of London while

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[32] London in Armes/Bod, f.12; London in Armes/BL, f.16; BL Add Ms 5247, f.34; The Bodleian Library Oxford, 'Arms and Devices', f.2; Turmile, f.53; Ilchester, f.80; Mottos; Prestwich, *Respublica*, pp.38–39; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.108.

[33] Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.108.

[34] London in Armes/Bod, f.17; London in Armes/BL, f.21; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.51.

[35] BL Add Ms 5247, f.47; Turmile, f.67; Ilchester, f.156; The British Library, Emblems, Ms Harley 1383, f.13; Blount, *Devises*, p.82; Prestwich, *Respublica*, p.44; Young (ed.), *Emblem*, p.167.

Throughout the English Civil War, numerous militia and auxiliary cavalry formations were raised in and around the City of London at the behest of Parliament, which have collectively been termed 'the City Horse'. Using an extensive array of primary sources this study describes in detail the raising, equipping, maintenance and deployment of these units and analyses how effective they were as a part of the Parliamentary war effort.

The book follows the various units from their baptism of fire at Winchester in 1642, through their campaigns of 1643 and 1644, and to their important, albeit peripheral, role in the Parliamentary victories in 1645/46. It describes their significant role during the heady summer of 1647 as the New Model Army marched on the nation's capital, as well as the part they played in the political turmoil in London during the Second Civil War of 1648. It further describes the units' reorganisations in 1649 and their participation at the Battle of Worcester in 1651. The efforts of some of the City Horse's senior officers to prolong the English Republic in 1659 are discussed, and the study ends with the participation of the City Horse in the welcoming of Charles II's entry into London in 1660. Uniquely amongst the units raised during the wars, the City Horse served throughout the whole period.



The work demonstrates clearly how political imperatives created and moulded this body of troops and how it was used as a pawn in the greater 'game of chess' that was the English Revolution. It is a story of zealous political and religious individuals, of greed, avarice, treachery and naked ambition – of individuals brought together by the political maelstrom of their times and of their endeavouring to do what they thought to be right. The book recounts bravery but also not a small amount of cowardice.

Finally, the book is a testimony to those Londoners who served, and to those who died, in the City Horse, a military formation that has been sadly neglected by military historians, which this study sets out to correct.

Century
of the
Soldier
1618-1721

Front cover: Cornet from Captain Simon Hacket's troop, c.1643
Back cover: Officer of the City Horse, c.1643

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